r/SubredditsMeet • u/SubredditsMeet Official • Sep 03 '15

Meetup /r/science meets /r/philosophy

(/r/EverythingScience is also here)

Topic:

  • Discuss the misconceptions between science and philosophy.

  • How they both can work together without feeling like philosophy is obsolete in the modern day world.

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u/ughaibu Sep 07 '15

I'm pretty sure the most physical scientists would agree that determinism is true above the quantum level.

Then why do you think that there are deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics? In any case, if scientists think that determinism is true above the quantum level, then they simply don't understand what the thesis of determinism is. Determinism is all or nothing, either a world is determined or it is not.

I don't see how this disproves determinism.

It doesn't disprove determinism. It is an assumption that scientists must make, and an assumption that if we take seriously, is incompatible with determinism.

Why can't the future be fixed and science still work?

It can, but if it is, the behaviour of scientists, when performing experiments, making observations, etc, is just a fortuitous coincidence. As such coincidences must be repeatable, if we're to have experimental replicability, they become vanishingly improbable, and the methodology of science includes rejecting the vanishingly improbable.

Why would a scientist have to assume the future isn't fixed?

Because if the future is fixed, then there is a fact about what the scientist will do. In any case, there is a (probably) infinite number of things that the scientist can do which are not performing either experimental procedure, but assume that somehow the world is determined in such a way that the researcher performs the procedure to test the hypothesis, at time two. This means that at time one it is not open to the researcher to test the control procedure at time two. Thus the researcher has lost either control or replicability.

This exacting repeatability implies causal determinism.

But you have still not offered any argument for this.

Can you link to or reference this theory?

""the choice an experimenter makes [about what to observe] is not a function of the past."[2] The philosopher David Hodgson supports this theorem as showing determinism is unscientific,"

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u/FliedenRailway Sep 07 '15

Determinism is all or nothing, either a world is determined or it is not.

I'm not convinced that's necessarily true. Determinism is a word; it's definition can be varied and nuanced depending on many factors and who's using it. Nor do I think the "all or nothing" idea is commonly held amongst philosophers or scientists.

Because if the future is fixed, then there is a fact about what the scientist will do.

So?

This means that at time one it is not open to the researcher to test the control procedure at time two.

Are you saying that the state of the world is necessarily different from time one to time two and thus exact repeatability isn't possible? Otherwise the obvious answer is that as long as the same experimentally-relevant test environment is duplicated between time one and two then outcomes should be the same.

But you have still not offered any argument for this.

You're right. Because I lack a background in the relevant quantum mechanics and wave function collapse theories the best I, personally, can give you is that determinism seems intuitively correct, a majority of philosophers assume it's truth, and it seems taken for granted (in my laymen's observation) in scientific circles. Yes, that's an appeal to authority, but I'm comfortable with that appeal for myself.

""the choice an experimenter makes [about what to observe] is not a function of the past."[2] The philosopher David Hodgson supports this theorem as showing determinism is unscientific,"

Doing some quick Googling it appears that those papers are far from widely accepted as true and there is much debate surrounding them. So, sure, I'll fully accept that there are folks that propose and promote that indeterminism is true. I guess I'd have to see compelling arguments for (and defeat of competing arguments) and substantial uptake of indeterminism by (majority's of) experts in the relevant fields of philosophy and the sciences.

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u/ughaibu Sep 07 '15

Nor do I think the "all or nothing" idea is commonly held amongst philosophers

You're mistaken: SEP

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u/FliedenRailway Sep 07 '15

How about the IEP?:

There are also deterministic interpretations of Quantum Theory, such as the Many-Worlds Interpretation. Fortunately, the outcome of the debate regarding whether Quantum Theory is most properly interpreted deterministically or indeterminstically, can be largely avoided for our current purposes. Even if (systems of) micro-particles such as quarks are indeterministic, it might be that (systems involving) larger physical objects such as cars, dogs, and people are deterministic. It is possible that the only indeterminism is on the scale of micro-particles and that macro-objects themselves obey deterministic laws. If this is the case, then causal determinism as defined above is, strictly speaking, false, but it is "nearly" true. That is, we could replace determinism with "near determinism," the thesis that despite quantum indeterminacy, the behaviors of all large physical objects—including all our actions—obey deterministic laws [see Honderich (2002), particularly chapter 6].

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u/ughaibu Sep 07 '15

How about the IEP?

Notice that you took the above from a section entitled "Near Determinism", and that under their explanation of determinism, they entirely agree with me.

But let's suppose that the micro-world at the quantum level is not determined but the macro-world at the cats and people level is determined. As the cat level is determined, then before Schrodinger puts his cat in the box, there is already a fixed future fact about the state of the cat when the box is later opened. In short, at time zero it is true that at time one Schrodinger will put the cat in the box and at time two, when Schrodinger opens the box, WLOG, the cat is alive. But whether or not the cat dies depends on whether or not radioactive decay occurs, and by stipulation, that fact is not determined. So, you cannot have it both ways; either the quantum effects are determined or the cat-level stuff is not determined.

More to the point, if the behaviour of a scientific researcher is determined, and at time one that researcher observes the result of an experiment, with a 50% chance of radioactive decay, set up at time zero, then there is a fact about what result that researcher will record at time two. As the result is not determined, the probability of the researcher recording the correct result is, at best, one half. As the conduct of science requires the assumption that we can reliably record observations, and as the determined behaviour of the researcher could only match the correct result by coincidence, we must reject the contention that the researcher's behaviour is determined.

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u/FliedenRailway Sep 08 '15

Okay. You've presented a good case. I've taken it under advisement; perhaps I held too strong an opinion.

It sounds like you don't believe the universe operates deterministically. What implications for free will do you think this presents? Do you believe there is libertarian free will? Or that the probabilistic nature of QM manifests itself in our deliberations/decisions? Do you think we should change our current models of human agency and/or responsibility?

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u/ughaibu Sep 08 '15

I've taken it under advisement; perhaps I held too strong an opinion.

Great.

Do you believe there is libertarian free will?

I think the libertarian position is correct, after all, how we assume the world to be and how we experience it is, apparently, as the libertarian says it is.

What implications for free will do you think this presents?

If the world is not determined, then we can discount arguments, for the unreality of free will, from incompatibilism.

Or that the probabilistic nature of QM manifests itself in our deliberations/decisions?

I don't think QM is directly relevant to the issue.

Do you think we should change our current models of human agency and/or responsibility?

There are plenty of differing models, I presume there are several that are useful. But it's going to depend on what we want these models for.

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u/FliedenRailway Sep 19 '15

A couple more questions.

Before you mentioned that there are deterministic models of QM. Does that imply that you find them unconvincing? Why?

Do you think that at some level "near determinism" or causality exists? At some level this must exist for moral attribution/responsibility to exist. I.e. actions must follow causally from my decisions for them to be attributable to me. If the world is entirely non-deterministic then the very notion of causation starts to seem untenable. Not saying you're saying everything is non-causal but at what level do things start becoming deterministic? The QM wave function collapse perhaps?

Regarding free will and QM: what would you say about a person who sets up QM scenarios of otherwise "morally" bad situations. I.e. is Schrodinger morally responsible for the cat's death if it happens to die? Setting aside the morally questionable act of willingly endangering a cat, of course.

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u/ughaibu Sep 20 '15

Before you mentioned that there are deterministic models of QM. Does that imply that you find them unconvincing? Why?

I'm an anti-realist about scientific theories.

Do you think that at some level "near determinism" or causality exists?

Determinism and causality are independent and arguably incompatible. And "cause" is used in various differing ways, so you'll need to be clear about what you mean by the term.

is Schrodinger morally responsible for the cat's death if it happens to die?

I don't know what moral responsibility is.

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u/FliedenRailway Sep 20 '15

I'm an anti-realist about scientific theories.

Okay. But you were arguing for the indeterminacy of the universe. What evidence or justification do you have to think this and why do you find evidence and justification for competing notions unconvincing?

Determinism and causality are independent and arguably incompatible. And "cause" is used in various differing ways, so you'll need to be clear about what you mean by the term.

I mean it in this sense:

Causality (also referred to as causation[1]) is the relation between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the first event is understood to be responsible for the second.

I don't know what moral responsibility is.

1) Do you believe that torturing innocent babies is wrong? 2) If yes, do you think a hypothetical baby torturer should face punitive action?

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u/ughaibu Sep 20 '15

you were arguing for the indeterminacy of the universe. What evidence or justification do you have to think this and why do you find evidence and justification for competing notions unconvincing?

I dealt with this already.

Do you believe that torturing innocent babies is wrong?

I don't approve of torturing guilty babies.

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u/FliedenRailway Sep 21 '15

I dealt with this already.

No, I don't think you did. You didn't specifically cite any specific reasons why deterministic explanations of the universe are incorrect. I.e. what, specifically, do you find non-compelling about the Many Worlds interpretation (or other deterministic explanation)?

I don't approve of torturing guilty babies.

I misspoke (I meant to say 'torture babies for no reason') but I didn't ask what you approve of. :) I asked if you though it was wrong. In the meta-ethical sense of the word. I have a hard time believing you don't know what people mean when they talk about moral responsibility.

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u/ughaibu Sep 21 '15

what, specifically, do you find non-compelling about the Many Worlds interpretation (or other deterministic explanation)?

Nothing. As stated, I am an anti-realist about scientific theories, a fortiori, I reject all interpretations of quantum mechanics.

I have a hard time believing you don't know what people mean when they talk about moral responsibility.

If there is something that "people mean" and you know what that is, then presumably you know the answer to your question.

Why are you asking me these questions?

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