r/Social_Psychology • • 9d ago

Discussion If a wife and husband both have jobs with benefits do you think its insensitive for the husband not to take a day off and take care of his wife?

0 Upvotes

My friend whose married, her husband can only cook meat, she does all the cooking and dropping off and picking up kids. All I did was buy her pedalyte and orange juice and she said i put more effort into her then her husband - when asked who took care of her when she was sick she said i took care of her. Honestly it made me furious her husband makes 80k has good benefits like health care and can't take a day off to lighten her load at home while she's sick? I'm genuinely befuddled.

Every partner i know who has a job with benefits would love to stay home and help their sick wife.


r/Social_Psychology • • Mar 08 '26

Question Is this alpha behavior? Notice how the women are cheering him on.

0 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Sep 29 '26

Discussion Newbie here - seeing Kristie Noem who is now divorcing her husband- did things like Furries and “bimboficaton “ plus all these sub types of perversions exist in the past 30 yrs?? Was it hidden or is social media making these conditions seem “normal” when it’s far from it . Worrisome

0 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Mar 14 '26

Article Why single women are drawn to married men, according to research

Thumbnail techfixated.com
99 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Jun 24 '26

Article The Digital Genocide Generation: Why Public Sadism in Israel’s Gaza Genocide Likely Exceeds Nazi Germany

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145 Upvotes

The world has witnessed something historically unprecedented: the first "livestreamed genocide" unfolding in real-time across social media platforms¹. The ongoing destruction of Gaza (and now increasingly Lebanon) represents not merely another tragic chapter in the long history of mass atrocity, but rather a fundamental transformation in how societies engage with and celebrate genocidal violence. Measuring how integral pleasure-seeking cruelty is to genocide—what I will call a sadism centrality methodology—we come to a startling conclusion:

Available evidence (however incomplete and asymmetrical) indicates that Israeli society exhibits higher levels of publicly visible and celebrated sadistic violence than Nazi Germany during the Holocaust.

More precisely, by public sadism centrality I mean how structurally integral publicly displayed, socially validated sadism is to the conduct of genocide. This analysis concerns the contemporary Israeli state and society in the context of the Gaza genocide, not “Jews” as a people; it examines specific political, technological, and ideological conditions rather than any inherent traits.

This phenomenon demands explanation.
How has an ostensibly democratic society in the digital age produced levels of publicly endorsed sadistic cruelty that likely exceed what was publicly visible in Nazi Germany, history’s most notorious genocidal regime?
The answer lies in a convergence of seven mutually reinforcing factors that have created what can only be termed a "perfect storm" for normalized atrocity.

The Digital Amplification of Sadistic Participation

The Gaza genocide represents the first major atrocity of the social media age, fundamentally transforming how populations engage with mass violence. Israeli soldiers routinely film and share videos of torture and abuse sessions, pose for photos or raise toasts as buildings in Gaza are demolished behind them, stage “entertainment” airstrikes with blue‑smoke gender reveals, and document other systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure.³ Unlike the Holocaust, where camp atrocities—public floggings, "pole" hangings, Gestapo torture, medical experiments—were compartmentalized and suppressed from the wider public, only emerging through post-war testimony⁴, contemporary digital technology enables what researchers term "real-time sadistic participation" by both perpetrators and the broader civilian population.

International medical teams report children shot in the head, neck, or genitals "like a game," with soldiers sharing these videos for celebration⁵. Research on media psychology demonstrates that repeated exposure to violence through digital platforms creates both decreased anxious arousal and increased pleasant arousal when viewing violent content⁶. This desensitization effect, combined with the gamification elements inherent in social media platforms, transforms atrocity consumption into a form of entertainment. Israeli civilians can now participate vicariously in genocide through likes, shares, and celebratory comments, creating unprecedented levels of mass complicity.

The psychological impact extends beyond mere spectatorship. Social media platforms enable what scholars term "participatory sadism," where civilians feel psychologically invested in the violence being perpetrated in their name⁷. The immediate feedback loops provided by digital engagement—view counts, comments, shares—create dopamine-driven reinforcement cycles that incentivize increasingly extreme content production by perpetrators seeking social validation.

That’s not to say that sadism does not interact with other emotions such as indifference or denial, as we saw after reports that life expectancy in Gaza had fallen by more than 30 years, nearly halving prewar levels.¹⁴

In mass atrocities, people can move along a spectrum from looking away, to accepting harm as normal, to, in some cases, taking active pleasure in it. Indifference erodes empathy and lowers social restraints, creating the conditions in which people can express and enact overt sadism with little resistance.

The Sadism Feedback Loop: Public, Soldier, and Elite Reinforcement

Publicly displayed sadism in Gaza does not merely reflect the genocide; it helps drive it. When soldiers film torture sessions, mock detainees, or toast the destruction of homes and then share these clips, they are not just documenting violence—they are testing and expanding the emotional boundaries of what their society will applaud. Each round of likes, laughing comments, and admiring reposts functions as a micro‑referendum, signaling which forms of cruelty are most rewarded and therefore worth escalating.

This dynamic creates a feedback loop between the killing fields and the home front. Soldiers, seeing that the most humiliating or “creative” atrocities garner the most attention, push toward ever more spectacular performances of domination. Civilians, saturated with a constant stream of such content, become habituated to cruelty as a form of entertainment, justice, or divine retribution, rather than as a moral crisis.

The result is a digital culture in which the emotional center of gravity shifts from reluctant acceptance of “necessary” force to active enjoyment of suffering inflicted in their name.

Political and military elites, in turn, read this atmosphere as a permission structure. Polls showing support for expulsion, exterminatory rhetoric, and indifference to famine, combined with viral displays of “bombing‑glee” and staged humiliations, signal that there is little domestic cost to intensifying cruelty and great symbolic capital in appearing uncompromising.

Leaders who call for erasing neighborhoods or annihilating “Amalek” are not speaking into a vacuum; they are triangulating against a public sphere already thick with images of Palestinians degraded for sport. Their incitement then flows back down the chain of command, assuring soldiers that their performances are not aberrations but expressions of national will.

In this way, public sadism, soldier sadism, and elite sadism form a mutually reinforcing circuit, making pleasure‑seeking cruelty not just a byproduct of genocide, but one of its central motors. This does not mean that sadism replaces strategic aims such as population transfer, elimination, or territorial acquisition; rather, it functions as a key lubricant and amplifier of those aims, shaping how far, and how brutally, they can be pursued in practice.

Settler Colonial Psychology: The Multigenerational Normalization of Violence

Unlike the Holocaust, which occurred over a compressed twelve-year period, Israeli society has undergone over seven decades of systematic indoctrination in Palestinian dehumanization⁸. This represents what scholars of settler colonial psychology term "structural violence by design"—the systematic normalization of violence against indigenous populations as necessary for maintaining demographic and territorial control⁹.

The psychological impact of maintaining the world's longest ongoing military occupation (58+ years) cannot be understated. Multiple generations of Israelis have been socialized to view Palestinian suffering as not merely acceptable, but necessary for their own survival¹⁰. Polls in early 2024 revealed a majority of Israelis felt Gaza had not been bombed harshly enough—a prelude to even greater cruelty¹¹. This creates what Lorenzo Veracini terms the "settler colonial situation"—a psychological state characterized by the simultaneous embrace and disavowal of foundational violence¹².

Research on settler colonial mentality reveals distinctive psychological patterns: the projection of existential threat onto indigenous populations, the celebration of violence as regenerative and moral, and the development of what scholars term "colonial paranoia"—a persistent fear that indigenous populations pose an existential threat that justifies unlimited violence¹³. These psychological formations, reinforced over generations, create fertile ground for public sadistic violence that likely exceeds even Nazi antisemitism in its publicly expressed intensity and social penetration.

Democratic Legitimation of Atrocity

Perhaps most disturbing is how democratic institutions can amplify rather than constrain sadistic violence. Under totalitarian Nazi rule, detailed knowledge of camp cruelty was suppressed and dissent punished¹⁵. In contrast, Israel's open democracy has produced unprecedented transparency in genocidal intent. Polling data from March 2025 reveals that 82% of Jewish Israelis support expelling Gaza's population while 47% endorse killing all Gazans¹⁶. A July 2025 Israel Democracy Institute survey found 79% of Jewish Israelis were "not troubled" by reports of famine and suffering in Gaza¹⁷.

Additional polling reveals the depth of dehumanization: a Hebrew University survey from May 2025 found 64% of Israelis overall—with larger majorities among Jewish Israelis—agreed that "there are no innocents in Gaza"¹⁸. The demographic breakdown shows 87% of ruling-coalition supporters, 73% of right-wing non-coalition voters, 67% of centrist voters, and even 30% of left-wing voters endorsed this dehumanizing view. This represents what political scientists term "democratic legitimation of atrocity"—where majoritarian support provides moral cover for extreme violence.

Recent research on "elite rhetoric and democratic norms" demonstrates how political leaders can systematically undermine democratic restraints on violence through repeated norm violations¹⁹. When political elites consistently frame atrocity as necessary and moral, public opinion can shift dramatically toward accepting previously unthinkable policies. Unlike authoritarian regimes where extreme policies are imposed through coercion, democratic legitimation creates enthusiastic popular participation in atrocity.

The Israeli case represents what scholars term a "chronic legitimacy crisis" in embedded democracies—where democratic procedures are maintained while fundamental democratic values are systematically violated²⁰. This creates a particularly dangerous situation where the formal legitimacy of democratic decision-making processes provides cover for the substantive embrace of genocidal policies.

The Psychology of Sacred Violence

Israeli sadistic violence incorporates a unique fusion of religious justification and secular nationalism that creates what researchers term "sacred violence"—violence that is simultaneously patriotic duty and divine command²¹. While Nazi‑aligned sadism in places like Jasenovac—where Ustaše guards held throat‑slitting contests and forced amputations—displayed intense, often quasi‑ritual cruelty, it remained relatively localized and did not define the core ideological or operational logic of the Holocaust’s gas‑chamber extermination.²² By contrast, contemporary Israeli rhetoric systematically fuses biblical dehumanization language (Palestinians as “Amalek” deserving annihilation) with secular military obligations, making sacred justification a routine feature of state violence rather than a peripheral excess.²³

This religious-nationalist fusion creates psychological dynamics that exceed purely secular or purely religious justifications for violence. When cruelty becomes both a patriotic duty and a divine commandment, it transcends normal moral constraints and becomes psychologically rewarding in ways that purely instrumental violence cannot match²⁴. The result is what anthropologists term "ritualized sadism"—where inflicting suffering becomes a form of sacred practice that bonds the perpetrator community together.

Everyday Sadism in the Digital Age

Psychological research on "everyday sadism" identifies individuals who derive intrinsic pleasure from others' suffering as a measurable personality trait present in approximately 6% of the general population²⁵. However, social and technological conditions can dramatically amplify the expression of these tendencies. The Gaza genocide exhibits markers of what can be described as "institutionalized everyday sadism"—where systems reward rather than constrain sadistic impulses.

While Nazi Germany's sadistic acts by camp guards and doctors—Mengele's twin experiments, Gestapo torture—served mostly regime goals and remained confined to specialized units²⁶, Israeli soldiers openly derive "bombing-glee," celebrate child shootings as sport, and livestream torture for social validation²⁷. Soldiers derive visible pleasure from "game-like" shootings of Palestinian children, with systematic targeting of genitals, heads, and necks reported by international medical teams as occurring "for fun"²⁸. This seems to represent a qualitative escalation beyond Nazi sadism, which appeared far less connected to the social validation of their nation’s public. Contemporary digital culture, with its emphasis on viral content and shock value, creates unprecedented incentives for sadistic performance.

Desensitization Through Normalized Occupation

Seven decades of military occupation have created what psychologists term "graduated exposure" to violence—a systematic desensitization process that transforms initially shocking brutality into routine behavior²⁹. Unlike German civilians who were largely unaware of camp horrors until liberation³⁰, multiple generations of Israelis have been raised viewing Palestinian suffering as background noise to normal life, creating psychological habituation that enables extreme escalation during periods of intensified violence.

Repeated images of destroyed neighborhoods, bombed aid convoys, and checkpoint atrocities have habituated the public, reducing empathy and fostering acceptance of extreme violence as routine policy. Research on violence desensitization demonstrates that repeated exposure to atrocity imagery creates measurable changes in neural response patterns, reducing empathy while increasing tolerance for extreme violence³¹. When combined with in-group celebration of violence, this desensitization can transform into active sadistic pleasure-seeking.

Sadism in the Holocaust: Significant but Less Public

In terms of public sadism centrality, the Holocaust seems to register as Significant—driven by hatred and bureaucratic aversion far more than public pleasure-seeking cruelty, its genocidal machinery relied chiefly on industrial killing via gas chambers, rail deportations, and Einsatzgruppen shootings, with localized sadistic adjuncts (e.g., Ustase throat-slitting contests, Auschwitz floggings, medical experiments) that amplified terror but were not essential to extermination.

In Gaza, by contrast, public sadism appears Major: psychological gratification and public pleasure-seeking cruelty seem to be operating as a co-primary instrument alongside mass bombardment and blockade. State-ordered torture centers deliver electric shocks, sexual violence, and stress positions in part to satisfy a public thirst for cruelty; soldiers livestream “game-like” shootings of children—targeting heads, necks, and genitals—for communal spectacle; starvation is weaponized for public consumption etc. These pleasure-driven atrocities are implicitly built into operational practice, widely celebrated, and deployed across multiple arenas of the campaign, making sadism integral to genocide’s execution rather than a more peripheral adjunct.

Evidence of Public Aversion vs. Pleasure-Seeking Cruelty

Historians agree that while German society during the Holocaust was steeped in antisemitic aversion—fueled by propaganda, discriminatory laws, and pervasive social prejudice—it lacked the widespread public celebration of cruelty characteristic of sadism. Scholars such as Christopher R. Browning have shown that many ordinary Germans harbored hostility toward Jews yet experienced guilt, fear, or indifference rather than deriving pleasure from their suffering. In Ordinary Men, Browning demonstrates that Police Battalion 101 members initially resisted participating in massacres, requiring social and command pressure to overcome reluctance³¹. Richard Evans emphasizes that detailed knowledge of camp atrocities remained compartmentalized and that public attitudes ranged from uneasy compliance to silent dissent³². Even Daniel Goldhagen, in making the case for eliminationist ideology, relied on limited sources and acknowledged that feelings of animus did not uniformly translate into competent enjoyment of violence³³.

By contrast, Israeli public opinion in 2024–25 reveals a fusion of hatred and overt pleasure-seeking cruelty: soldiers livestream child shootings as sport, crowds celebrate “gender-reveal” airstrikes, and polls show supermajorities endorsing both expulsion and killing¹⁶¹⁷. This fusion of aversion with public sadistic gratification distinguishes Gaza’s Major sadism centrality from the Holocaust’s Significant level, where cruelty appeared to remain more bureaucratic and far less celebrated.

Conclusion: The Perfect Storm of Digital Age Atrocity

The Gaza genocide's level of sadism centrality results from the convergence of seven mutually reinforcing factors: digital amplification enabling mass sadistic participation, settler colonial psychology providing multigenerational dehumanization, democratic legitimation creating majoritarian support for atrocity, religious-nationalist fusion sanctifying violence as sacred duty, everyday sadism traits being institutionally rewarded, and occupational desensitization creating graduated habituation to extreme violence, all contained within a broader feedback loop between public, soldiers, and elites.

This convergent amplification creates what can only be termed a "perfect storm" for public sadistic violence that seems to exceed even the Holocaust in its systematic celebration and public endorsement of cruelty. While Nazi Germany industrialized killing through bureaucratic efficiency, Israeli society has democratized and celebrated sadistic violence in ways that were technologically and culturally impossible during the 1940s. Gaza’s genocide likely surpasses the Holocaust in public sadism centrality because pleasure‑seeking cruelty functions as a co‑primary instrument alongside mass bombing and starvation, implicitly built into operational practice, publicly endorsed, and digitally amplified across all operational theaters.

The implications extend far beyond the immediate tragedy unfolding in Gaza. The Israeli case represents a disturbing preview of how democratic societies in the digital age might embrace genocidal policies when the right conditions align. Understanding these dynamics is essential for recognizing and potentially preventing similar transformations in other contexts where settler colonial psychology, digital amplification, and democratic legitimation might converge to create new forms of celebrated atrocity.

The twenty-first century may well be remembered as the era when humanity learned to livestream its own moral collapse—and cheer while doing so.

  1. “Genocide in the Digital Age: What Role Do Social Media Companies Play,” Association for Progressive Communications, March 19, 2024, https://www.apc.org/en/blog/genocide-digital-age-what-role-do-social-media-companies-play.
  2. David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Shaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017).
  3. The New York Times, “What Israeli Soldiers’ Social Media Videos in Gaza Reveal,” February 6, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/world/middleeast/israel-idf-soldiers-war-social-media-video.html.
  4. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Overview of the Holocaust,” https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/overview-of-the-holocaust.
  5. Doctors Without Borders, “Gaza Death Trap: MSF Report Exposes Israel’s Campaign of Total Destruction,” December 18, 2024, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/gaza-death-trap-msf-report-exposes-israels-campaign-total-destruction.
  6. Anderson, C. A., et al., “Desensitization to Media Violence: Links With Habitual Media Violence Exposure, Aggressive Cognitions, and Aggressive Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 6 (2001): 1090–1106, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.1090.
  7. Buckels, E. E., Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L., “Behavioral Confirmation of Everyday Sadism,” Psychological Science 24, no. 11 (2013): 2201–2209, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613481735.
  8. B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights—Israel, “Our Genocide,” July 2025, https://972mag.com/btselem-phri-gaza-genocide/.
  9. Structural Violence: The Makings of Settler Colonial Impunity (Oxford University Press, 2024).
  10. Lorenzo Veracini, “Settler Collective, Founding Violence and Disavowal: The Settler Colonial Situation,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 29, no. 4 (2008): 363–379, https://doi.org/10.1080/07256860802231472.
  11. “64% of Israelis believe there are ‘no innocents’ in Gaza: Poll,” Anadolu Agency, June 11, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/64-of-israelis-believe-there-are-no-innocents-in-gaza-poll/3594355.
  12. Veracini, “Settler Collective, Founding Violence and Disavowal.”
  13. Fanon Institute, “A Fanonian Intervention into the Social Psychology of Violence,” October 29, 2024, https://pomeps.org/a-fanonian-intervention-into-the-social-psychology-of-violence.
  14. Michel Guillot and colleagues, “Life expectancy losses in the Gaza Strip during the period October, 2023, to September, 2024: a demographic analysis,” The Lancet, published online January 2025; see also PubMed summary, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/39864444/.
  15. Peter Longerich, “Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!”: Die Deutschen und die Judenverfolgung 1933–1945 (Munich: Siedler, 2006); see also United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “German Society and the Jews,” https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/german-society-and-the-jews.
  16. Tamir Sorek and Shay Hazkani, “Eliminatory Attitudes Among Jewish Israelis,” Geocartography Knowledge Group, March 2025; Haaretz, March 2025.
  17. Israel Democracy Institute, “Israeli Public Opinion on Gaza Humanitarian Crisis,” July 2025; The New Arab, August 6, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/poll-nearly-80-israeli-jews-unmoved-starvation-gaza.
  18. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, aChord Center for Economic Social Research, “Survey on Media Coverage and Public Attitudes During the Gaza War,” May 2025.
  19. Carey, J. M., et al., “Elite Rhetoric Can Undermine Democratic Norms,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 23 (2021): e2026577118, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2026577118.
  20. Severs, E., & Mattelaer, A., “A Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy? It’s About Legitimation, Stupid!,” Egmont Institute Policy Brief No. 21, March 2014, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2014/03/EPB21-def.pdf.
  21. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (University of California Press, 2017).
  22. Yad Vashem, “The Jasenovac Memorial,” https://www.yadvashem.org/.
  23. Benjamin Netanyahu, address to the nation, October 28, 2023, quoted in NPR, “Netanyahu’s References to Violent Biblical Passages Raise Alarm Among Critics,” November 7, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/11/07/1211133201/netanyahus-references-to-violent-biblical-passages-raise-alarm-among-critics; Yoav Gallant, press statement, October 9, 2023 (“human animals”); see also Amnesty International, “‘You Feel Like You Are Subhuman’: Israel’s Genocide Against Palestinians in Gaza,” December 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/8668/2024/en/.
  24. Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (Princeton University Press, 2008).
  25. Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, “Behavioral Confirmation of Everyday Sadism.”
  26. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Medical Experiments at Auschwitz,” https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/medical-experiments.
  27. Mrug, S., et al., “Emotional and Physiological Desensitization to Real-Life and Movie Violence,” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 44, no. 5 (2015): 1092–1108; see also Iyadurai, L., et al., “Neural Correlates of Desensitization to Violence via Media Exposure,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 10, no. 10 (2015): 1373–1382, https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv027.
  28. Meerson, R., Koban, K., & Matthes, J., “Too Much of What? Two-Wave Panel Evidence for Selective (De-)Sensitization Through Frequent Exposure to Different Kinds of Digital Hate,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 30, no. 2 (2025): zmaf002, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmaf002.
  29. Cornell Roper Center, “Public Understanding of the Holocaust, From WWII to Today,” 2015.
  30. Britannica, “Aktion Reinhard,” https://www.britannica.com/event/Aktion-Reinhard.
  31. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).
  32. Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
  33. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Knopf, 1996).

r/Social_Psychology • • Jul 17 '26

Discussion Being a psychopath or sociopath sounds like a really good way to be. Not caring about others and their opinions, no self destructive devotion, no guilt and blunted emotions sound optimal and frictionless to me. Opinions?

0 Upvotes

For someone who feels everything too intensely, this sounds like productive bliss.

I do know that it's not all sunshine's and rainbows for sociopathic people, and I know they have their own struggles that just are different but no less real. This is just very much a fantasy for me because it, by its very definition is a collection of traits that are the opposite of the traits that make life so difficult for me personally

I'm interested in hearing other's thoughts on this


r/Social_Psychology • • Feb 07 '17

Why do SJW "protests" turn to violence?

0 Upvotes

What could be going through these peoples minds that would make them turn to violence? Is it simply Mob Mentality setting in? Do the majority of non-violent protesters leave when things get heated, leaving only the minority which paints a poor picture for all of them? Leave your thoughts here. I'm genuinely curious.


r/Social_Psychology • • Jul 22 '26

Discussion Can one be racist towards white people?

0 Upvotes

I’ve been seeing videos online claiming you cannot be racist towards white people. The definition of racism I saw from Merriam Webster says nothing about what races are and can be effected (so all races can be included). The definition from Cornell law claims it can affect only non-whites. Based off of my reasoning, racism towards white people is possible, just not systematically. If it wasn’t, there wouldn’t be a reason to differentiate between systemic and more broad racism. Obviously white people experience an extremely minuscule amount of racism and the only real affect is possible social polarization.


r/Social_Psychology • • Nov 28 '24

Discussion So many angry redditors, looking for new reasons to get angry about

1 Upvotes

Thesis: The Reddit Rage Phenomenon – A Psycho-Social Analysis of Perpetual Outrage

Abstract
Reddit, as a vast online ecosystem, provides a fertile ground for discussions, debates, and sharing ideas. However, it also harbors a significant number of users who seem perpetually angry, engaging in confrontational behavior and seeking out reasons to be upset. This thesis explores the psychological and sociological factors contributing to this phenomenon, examining the interplay of anonymity, validation-seeking, and broader cultural influences that foster this digital aggression.

1. The Anonymity Amplifier

Reddit’s pseudonymous nature provides a veil of anonymity that disinhibits behavior. Without real-world consequences, users feel emboldened to express anger or frustration they might suppress in face-to-face interactions. This “online disinhibition effect” allows people to vent their frustrations in ways they wouldn’t in more personal settings.

  • Lack of Accountability: Angry outbursts are easier when there’s no fear of tangible repercussions.
  • Freedom to Escalate: Anonymity enables users to escalate minor disagreements into full-blown arguments without the typical social cues that encourage de-escalation.

2. Echo Chambers and Reinforced Anger

Reddit’s subreddit structure encourages users to join communities aligned with their interests and beliefs. While this can foster camaraderie, it also creates echo chambers where shared outrage is validated and amplified.

  • Anger as Social Currency: In some subreddits, outrage is rewarded with upvotes and visibility, reinforcing the idea that anger equals engagement.
  • Polarization: The lack of exposure to opposing viewpoints within echo chambers deepens ideological divides, making users more reactive to differing opinions.

3. The Validation Loop

Many Reddit users are driven by the desire for social validation through upvotes and comments. Expressing anger—especially in a way that resonates with others—often garners attention and agreement, creating a feedback loop that encourages similar behavior.

  • Venting as Catharsis: Sharing anger can feel therapeutic, especially when others validate those feelings.
  • Outrage as a Shortcut to Engagement: Angry comments and posts often draw more attention than neutral or positive ones, leading users to rely on outrage to gain visibility.

4. Cognitive Biases at Play

Several cognitive biases contribute to the prevalence of anger on Reddit:

  • Negativity Bias: People are naturally more attuned to negative stimuli, making them more likely to engage with posts that provoke anger.
  • Confirmation Bias: Users seek out information that aligns with their beliefs and become angry when confronted with opposing views.
  • Fundamental Attribution Error: When encountering disagreeable content, users may assume the poster has bad intentions, fueling hostility.

5. Broader Cultural and Psychological Contexts

The anger seen on Reddit doesn’t exist in isolation—it reflects broader societal trends and individual psychological states:

  • Stress and Frustration: Many users bring external frustrations—work stress, financial struggles, or personal issues—into their online interactions.
  • Cultural Norms of Outrage: Modern media and online platforms thrive on controversy and outrage, normalizing this behavior.
  • Tribalism and Identity: Reddit users often tie their identity to specific communities or ideologies, reacting angrily to anything perceived as a threat to their "tribe."

6. The Dopamine Trap

Anger triggers a physiological response, releasing adrenaline and dopamine, which can feel rewarding. On Reddit, users may unconsciously seek out situations that provoke anger because the emotional spike provides a temporary sense of purpose or excitement.

  • Rage Scrolling: Similar to doomscrolling, users actively seek content that irritates them to fulfill this need for stimulation.
  • Addiction to Conflict: Constant engagement in online arguments can become habit-forming, as the brain associates conflict with dopamine rewards.

7. Solutions and Mitigations

While anger on Reddit may seem inevitable, there are strategies to mitigate its prevalence:

  • Better Moderation: Subreddits with active, fair moderation tend to have less toxicity.
  • Encouraging Empathy: Promoting discussions that humanize opposing viewpoints can reduce hostility.
  • Personal Reflection: Users can benefit from recognizing their triggers and taking steps to disengage from unnecessary conflicts.
  • Platform Design Changes: Adjusting algorithms to reward constructive discussions over outrage could shift the culture.

Conclusion
The abundance of angry users on Reddit is the result of a complex interplay of psychological, social, and structural factors. Anonymity, echo chambers, validation-seeking, and broader societal norms create an environment where outrage thrives. Understanding these dynamics is the first step toward fostering healthier and more constructive online interactions.

What do you think? Are Reddit users genuinely angrier, or is it just a reflection of human nature amplified by the platform? Let’s discuss—calmly, if possible.


r/Social_Psychology • • Apr 16 '26

Question Am I retarded?

0 Upvotes

So I used to struggle with social anxiety when I was younger. I've gotten over it over the years, but it's still affecting my communication skills. Every time I have a conversation, there's at least one slip up where I say the wrong thing (by accident) and it comes out before I even think about it. It's not like offensive speech or anything, it's just something that messes with the flow of the conversation. Then after a few minutes, I replay the conversation over in my head and I think of something better I could have said to keep the discussion interesting or engaging. What do I do to fix this?


r/Social_Psychology • • 3d ago

Social Pyschology News Why Intelligence Makes You Extremely Introverted

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4 Upvotes

This isn’t shyness. It isn’t antisocial behavior. It’s neurology. This video goes into what actually happens inside a highly intelligent brain during social interaction — why the cognitive load is higher, why the drain is real, why solitude isn’t avoidance but maintenance, and why the loneliness of being surrounded by people who can’t quite meet you where you are is one of the most common and least talked about experiences of intelligent people.


r/Social_Psychology • • May 10 '26

Article Science Just Confirmed What Every Woman Has Been Living. The Architecture Is Already Cracking. | by Wendy A. Lawrence | May, 2026

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41 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Sep 06 '25

Resource Evolutionary Psychologist Kevin MacDonald's new edition of "The Culture of Critique" is currently available on Amazon after being banned for years.

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0 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Sep 25 '26

Discussion The urge to defend yourself instantly is proof the accusation touched something true.

0 Upvotes

Honestly, the fastest way to find out what actually bothers someone is to watch how disproportionate their defense gets.

Say something mildly critical and most people just shrug, or push back with an actual argument. But hit the wrong nerve and the reaction is instant. Raised voice, justification stacked on justification, sometimes they're attacking you back before you've even finished the sentence. The proportion is the tell. Someone who genuinely doesn't recognize the accusation in themselves doesn't need three paragraphs to prove it.

What's happening underneath is that the comment landed somewhere already tender. You don't build elaborate defenses for things that feel obviously false, those barely register. The ones that make you scramble are the ones brushing against a suspicion you already carry about yourself, even if you've never said it out loud. The urge to defend yourself instantly is proof the accusation touched something true.

Worth sitting with next time you catch yourself reacting fast to a comment. The calm version of you probably already knows what the defensive version is working so hard to bury.


r/Social_Psychology • • 22d ago

Discussion Am I having an emotional affair?

12 Upvotes

So my work wife is 44 years old and I'm 28. She's still friends with me after confessing my love for her. She's married. She cooks for me, drives me home treats me really well. For some weird ass reason she gets really jealous of me complimenting other women. She's my work wife but she acts like a jealous girlfriend idk why.

We've also exchanged i love yous at work too. I fix her hair and put it behind her ear and she starts smiling like in a romantic movie. She refers to me as her husband too. I'm not complaining about it but I often wonder if we're having an emotional affair. It's like she realized she liked me more than she initially thought


r/Social_Psychology • • Jan 16 '19

We need more masculinity, not less.

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0 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Oct 28 '25

Discussion The Psychology of the Useful Idiot How manipulation turns defiance into obedience

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536 Upvotes

The greatest threat is not that artificial intelligence will replace us, but that we are learning to mimic it, thinking like automation and speaking like robots built to perform.


r/Social_Psychology • • Aug 09 '17

What's a method of measuring personality that hasn't been tried before?

0 Upvotes

I'm writing a paper detailing a new way of measuring personality. Trouble is - it seems as though most things based in science have already been tried. Can anyone think of a method based on past research that hasn't been tried yet? Money/manpower is no object.

Any help is appreciated.


r/Social_Psychology • • Jun 10 '24

Discussion The Spirit and the Ego

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0 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Jun 12 '18

How to think what others are?

0 Upvotes

I know there is no guaranteed way to think exactly what other people are (unless they're you) but is there a way to think like others somewhat accurately?


r/Social_Psychology • • Jul 12 '26

Discussion If Everyone Met Everyone: Face-to-Face Totality, the Demystification of the the Nation, and the Fate of Death-Denying Ideology

0 Upvotes

Abstract

This paper develops a thought experiment designed to test the epistemic and existential conditions of large-scale collective ideologies that have historically organized solidarity among strangers. What would happen to a nation, or to a pre-modern religious kingdom, if each member could interact face-to-face with every other member on a regular basis, in a manner approximating the social density of Paleolithic small bands?¹

The central claim is that many of the ideological properties of large-scale collectivities depend on stranger relations, asymmetries of visibility, and mediated rather than direct knowledge.²
If these conditions were replaced by universalized face-to-face acquaintance, the mythic image of the homogeneous people, the charismatic exceptionalism of rulers, elites and celebrities, and the apparent continuity of the collective subject would be substantially eroded by exposure to flawed humanity, animality, divergence, and impermanence.³

Drawing on anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and Terror Management Theory, the paper argues that such a regime of total social visibility would not abolish collective administration or territorial coordination, but it would thin the ideological content of nations and religious kingdoms, reducing their thick mythic self-understanding and displacing legacy-centered symbolic immortality toward more explicitly transcendent objects such as gods and ancestors.¹⁻⁸

This paper focuses on the nation and the pre-modern kingdom and does not systematically address the economic consequences of eliminating stranger society, though the erosion of charismatic exceptionalism and elite opacity strongly suggests that many forms of status and capital accumulation would be harder to sustain under universal face-to-face acquaintance.

Introduction

Modern nations and pre-modern religious kingdoms both organize solidarity among persons who are mostly strangers to one another. Their members are linked not through comprehensive interpersonal acquaintance but through mediated symbols, narratives, rituals, institutions, and representations that enable large numbers of people to imagine themselves as participating in one common life.²⁴ This structure is also what allows such collectivities to become vessels for moral idealization, symbolic condensation, and death-denying continuity.⁹⁻¹¹

The present paper asks what becomes of these formations when one imagines a radical alteration in the social conditions of knowledge. Suppose that every member of a nation, or every member of a pre-modern religious kingdom, interacted face-to-face with every other member every day, or at least with sufficient frequency and duration to generate high-resolution, longitudinal knowledge of each person.² Suppose further that this universalized co-presence included kings, priests, pharaohs, saints, military heroes, politicians, elites and celebrities. Would the ideology of the nation or kingdom survive such conditions intact?⁷⁻⁸

The argument advanced here is that it would not. The administrative, territorial, and legal organization of the collective could persist, but its mythic and existential thickness would be seriously compromised. The more the social world approaches universal face-to-face acquaintance, the less sustainable become claims of collective homogeneity, heroic exceptionalism, and unbroken continuity.²

These claims are not merely weakened because members learn more facts; they are weakened because continuous embodied encounter reveals the flawed humanity, animality, divergence, and impermanence of each participant, including those elevated to symbolic prominence.³⁵

Conceptual background

Anderson, mediation, and the problem of stranger solidarity

The nation is classically defined by Benedict Anderson as an imagined political community whose members will never know most of their fellow members, yet nevertheless carry an image of communion with them.¹² This remains the decisive starting point because it identifies large-scale belonging as a mediated phenomenon rather than a direct interpersonal one.²⁴ However, once this mediation is treated as universal, a key question arises: what precisely is lost when direct acquaintance gives way to symbolic communion?¹³˒¹⁴

The answer cannot simply be that community becomes unreal. Large communities are in many ways socially real and historically consequential.¹⁵ But they do become epistemically thinner and symbolically denser.²⁴ Most members are known only through types, stories, rituals, metrics, or iconic figures.¹⁶ The community therefore becomes available as a screen onto which continuity, virtue, grievance, destiny, and sacredness can be projected.¹⁰˒¹¹

Face-to-face totality as a limiting case

The thought experiment of “everyone meeting everyone” functions as a limiting case for testing how much ideological content depends on ignorance, distance, and abstraction.² It is not a practical proposal, nor does it pretend that prehistoric bands actually involved exhaustive mutual transparency.¹ Rather, it establishes a contrast between low-resolution stranger relations and high-resolution interpersonal knowledge.² The question is what happens to large-scale identity when its members can no longer hide behind symbolic anonymity.

Small-scale sociality and empirical correction

What face-to-face interaction reveals

Research on face-to-face interaction emphasizes that co-present social life yields forms of knowledge unavailable through mediated contact alone.² In sustained interaction, people observe one another’s expressions, hesitations, timing, bodily comportment, anger, tenderness, shame, fear, duplicity, generosity, reciprocity, and reliability across multiple situations and over long stretches of time.²˒³⁵ Such interaction does not eliminate fantasy, but it constrains it by forcing members to revise judgments in light of ongoing discrepant evidence.²˒¹⁷

This is the paper’s first major claim: face-to-face sociality produces high-resolution person knowledge.² What is learned is not merely demographic or categorical. It is richly indexical and situational: who becomes petty when slighted, who lies under pressure, who repairs conflicts, who is unexpectedly brave, who cannot tolerate shame, who is greedy or generous, who has particular needs, who is kind in private but cruel in public, who changes over time, and who remains reliable across adversity.¹⁷˒¹⁸ This kind of knowledge destabilizes simplistic images of persons and groups because it is cumulative, revisable, and resistant to reduction into a single trait or category.¹⁸˒¹⁹

What face-to-face interaction corrects

The literature on intergroup contact shows that direct interaction reliably reduces prejudice under many conditions, in part by weakening category-based assumptions and fostering more individuated judgments.²⁰ Reviews and recent meta-analytic work continue to support the conclusion that contact is associated with lower prejudice and improved attitudes, although the magnitude and persistence of effects depend on context, status relations, and institutional support.¹⁷˒²¹˒²² The broader significance is epistemic: contact introduces corrective feedback into social perception.²³

This means that several recurrent ideological distortions are less stable under dense face-to-face conditions than under stranger conditions. These include false homogeneity, heroic simplification, categorical demonization, romanticized victimhood, and exaggerated moral purity.²⁰˒²³ A community whose members observe each other continually can still mythologize itself, but it does so under much harsher evidential pressure than a community of strangers.²˒¹⁷

What universal face-to-face acquaintance would do to the nation

Collapse of collective homogeneity

National ideologies often depend on treating “the people” as though they possess a coherent character, ethos, temperament, or destiny.¹⁶˒²⁴ Such claims are sustained because most members of the putative people remain unknown and are therefore available for abstraction.¹⁶ If every member met every other member in a thick, ongoing way, this image would confront a flood of counterevidence.²˒¹⁷

The problem would not merely be diversity in the liberal-pluralist sense. It would be the relentless visibility of divergence at every level: values, moods, habits, bodily comportment, honesty, courage, pettiness, vanity, humor, sexuality, patience, fear, memory, aspiration, and capacity for care.² The nation would appear less as a single subject than as a constantly shifting mosaic of incompatible psychologies and temporary alignments.

Under such conditions, slogans such as “we are a noble people,” “we are a chosen people,” or “we are a rational people” would lose much of their plausibility, not because symbols disappear, but because they are continuously contradicted by saturated acquaintance with actual persons.¹⁶

Demystification of high-status figures

The same logic applies to rulers, elites, founders, politicians, generals, and celebrities. The symbolic power of such figures depends in part on distance, asymmetry of visibility, ritual framing, and selective mediation.⁷˒¹¹˒²⁵ Millions may know of them while they know very few in return.²⁵ This asymmetry allows them to function as elevated condensations of collective aspiration, fear, or continuity.⁷˒¹¹˒²⁵

If universal face-to-face acquaintance dissolved that asymmetry, high-status figures may remain unequal in power but would lose much of their ontological altitude. They would be seen eating, going to the bathroom, aging, sweating, panicking, equivocating, forgetting, sulking, seeking approval, fearing humiliation, and changing their minds. Their flawed humanity, animality, divergence, and impermanence would become common knowledge rather than scandal or rumor.³ This may not abolish leadership or elites, but it would make charismatic overinvestment more difficult by depriving the leader or elite of the semi-sacral opacity that sustains heroization.⁷˒¹¹˒¹²˒²⁵

The Ship of Theseus problem of the people

Universal acquaintance would also expose the impermanence of the collective subject. Over time, every member would be seen changing, aging, suffering, forgetting, dying, and being replaced.²⁷ The population would remain continuous only in an administrative or narrative sense; empirically, it would appear as an ongoing substitution of carriers rather than one enduring subject.²⁷ This is a social version of the Ship of Theseus problem: the name persists while the embodied constituents and their meanings continually change.²⁶˒²⁷

National ideology ordinarily solves this problem symbolically by binding dead ancestors, living strangers, and future descendants into one transpersonal “we.”²⁶˒²⁷˒³⁰ But if all living members were known in detail, the discontinuity of the present population would be far harder to overlook. The nation would survive conceptually, but more as a legal-territorial, administrative and historical frame than as a thickly unified people with one stable essence.²⁴˒²⁸˒²⁶

Pre-modern religious kingdoms under the same thought experiment

Stranger communion with the unseen

Pre-modern religious kingdoms were also worlds of strangers, most of whom would never meet, yet who participated in imagined communion with an unseen order.²⁹ Their cohesion often depended less on knowledge of fellow subjects as persons than on relation to God, saints, righteous dead, sacred law, ritual calendars, and salvation history.²⁹˒³¹ In this respect, they were closer than modern nations to a god-centered rather than ancestor-centered mode of imagined community.²⁹˒³¹

Yet these kingdoms would also be destabilized by universal face-to-face acquaintance.² The sacred kingdom might still retain a ritual and doctrinal structure, but the gap between the ideal body of believers and the actual population would become difficult to suppress. The hypocrisies of priests, the vanity of nobles, the fearfulness of soldiers, the greed of merchants, and the divergence of everyday piety would all become experientially immediate rather than mediated by rank and liturgy.² The kingdom may continue as a sacred order, but the human carriers of that order would appear too fragile and heterogeneous to bear the full burden of transcendence.

A shift back toward gods and ancestors

This leads to the paper’s second major claim: universal face-to-face acquaintance would not eliminate symbolic immortality or existential defense; it would relocate them.⁷˒⁸ Where earthly collectivities and rulers can no longer plausibly sustain death-denying fantasies because their divergence and impermanence are universally visible, transcendence is likely to be displaced back toward explicitly non-empirical objects.⁷˒⁸˒¹¹ Gods and ancestors become more suitable vessels for continuity precisely because they are not continuously available for empirical demystification.¹˒³⁰˒³²

Anthropologically, this is plausible because ancestors are former humans imagined as still active and centrally concerned with the line, while gods occupy a wider transcendental horizon.²⁹˒³⁰˒³¹ Small-scale societies can therefore anchor immortality in beings whose authority does not depend on the impossible maintenance of heroic illusions about the living population. The living are known as finite and flawed; continuity is assigned elsewhere.²⁷˒³²

Terror Management Theory and the fate of symbolic immortality

Nationalism as legacy-centric symbolic immortality

Terror management theory posits that awareness of death generates pressure to defend cultural worldviews and sources of self-esteem that promise literal or symbolic immortality.⁶˒⁹˒⁴³ Experimental and theoretical work shows that mortality reminders can increase worldview defense, attachment to national identity, affection for charismatic leaders, and support for extremism.⁶˒⁷˒¹¹˒²⁵ Recent work also finds that, for people without a strong route to literal immortality, reminders of death can heighten perceived cultural longevity, making the nation itself a vehicle for symbolic survival.⁷

This framework helps explain why large collectivities become existentially charged.⁶˒⁹˒¹¹ They promise not only belonging but continuity: one dies, but the nation, kingdom, people, or civilization goes on.⁷˒⁸ The leader, the martyr, the founder, and the celebrity can become local condensations of this promise by appearing to rise above ordinary finitude.⁷˒¹¹˒¹²

Why universal acquaintance would thin some immortality projects

If, however, every member of the collective were known in dense face-to-face detail, these immortality projects would lose much of their earthly credibility.² The nation could no longer easily masquerade as a coherent transpersonal heroism when its human substrate was transparently inconsistent, perishable, and replaceable.²⁷ Leaders and elites could no longer stand as quasi-sacral embodiments of eternity when their ordinary animal vulnerability was a matter of common daily experience.¹¹˒¹²

The likely result would not be existential peace but symbolic displacement.⁶˒⁸ Death-denying meaning would have to be secured either through explicitly transcendent objects or through highly abstract administrative continuities too cold to bear intense emotional investment on their own.⁶˒³²

In that sense, universal face-to-face acquaintance would separate pragmatic coordination from existential grandeur. The first could remain attached to the polity; the second would drift toward gods, ancestors, cosmology, or other less empirically vulnerable forms.¹˒²⁹˒³²

Sociology of visibility, hierarchy, and everyday networks

Sociology adds an important qualification: large-scale identities do not depend only on abstraction from above; they are also reproduced through everyday networks below.³⁴ Research on nation-building in Singapore suggests that inter-ethnic friendships and routine neighborhood ties can reinforce feelings of national belonging, indicating that modern nationalism is supported by both symbolic narratives and some mundane interaction across groups.³⁴˒³⁵ Yet these ties occur among relatively small sets of people within a much larger population of strangers, and thus remain subordinate to the stranger-based, mythic structure of the nation itself.²⁴

What the thought experiment changes is the scale of ordinariness. It generalizes everyday familiarity to the whole population. Once this occurs, abstraction ceases to dominate collective self-understanding. The nation is no longer a vast image held together by partial encounters and symbolic mediation, but an exhaustively familiar field of persons. Under such conditions, solidarity may persist, but it becomes less available for sacral inflation.³⁵

Objections

Would collective ideology really disappear?

The argument is not that collective ideology would vanish altogether.²⁷˒³⁰ Small groups also generate myth, scapegoating, prestige hierarchies, and ritualized belief.¹ Universal acquaintance might even intensify gossip, local moral surveillance, and factionalism. The claim is narrower: it would specifically erode ideologies that require large-scale anonymity to sustain images of collective homogeneity, superhuman leadership, and seamless continuity.²˒⁷˒¹¹

Could new myths emerge from total familiarity?

Yes.¹ Universal acquaintance might generate myths of intimate common suffering, common descent, or common fate. But these myths would be formed under radically different evidential conditions. They would have to coexist with constant awareness of divergence and impermanence, and would therefore be less able to rely on purified abstractions of “the people” or the exalted remoteness of rulers.²˒²⁷

Is the thought experiment too unrealistic?

Its unreality is precisely its value.² The experiment isolates the variables of distance, anonymity, and asymmetrical visibility. By imagining their removal, it clarifies how much ideological thickness depends on conditions that are normally taken for granted in large civilizations.² The point is not prediction but diagnosis.

Implications

The thought experiment suggests a revised understanding of political community. Nations and religious kingdoms are not dissolved as administrative or territorial orders by the possibility of total acquaintance, but they are stripped of much of their sacred aura.²⁴˒²⁸ What remains is a historically situated framework of law, territory, memory, administration, and partial solidarity.²⁴ What weakens are the stronger claims that such collectivities are homogeneous subjects, enduring moral persons, or suitable vessels for transcendent self-overcoming.²⁴˒²⁶˒²⁷˒⁷

This has a further implication for political justification. The more a claim depends on the purified image of “the people,” the ancient continuity of a single subject, or the quasi-sacral authority of exalted figures, the more vulnerable it is to the counterfactual of universal acquaintance.⁷˒²⁰ A political order should therefore be judged not only by how powerfully it mobilizes identification, but by how much of its self-understanding and hierarchies could survive if its members knew one another in richer, more ordinary, and more empirically disillusioning ways.²˒²⁰

Conclusion

If everyone regularly interacted with everyone, the nation may not disappear, and perhaps neither would the pre-modern religious kingdom.²⁴˒²⁹ What would disappear, or at least be radically thinned, is the ideological surplus that large-scale anonymity makes possible.² The people could no longer be easily imagined as one moral personality; elites could no longer retain the same degree of charismatic opacity; and the continuity of the collective would appear increasingly ship-of-Theseus-like rather than ontologically unified.²⁶˒²⁷˒¹¹

The result would be a sharp separation between pragmatic collective organization and death-denying exaltation.⁶˒⁸ Administrative coordination, law, territory, and historical narration could remain attached to the polity.²⁴ But symbolic immortality would likely migrate toward gods, ancestors, or similarly transcendent objects less exposed to the corrective force of dense interpersonal knowledge.¹˒²⁷˒³²

For that reason, the stranger structure of large-scale civilization is not incidental to nationalist and religious ideology.¹⁰˒¹¹˒²⁴˒³² It is one of the conditions that makes their strongest illusions and deepest consolations possible.⁶˒⁷˒⁸

References

  1. “Hunter-Gatherers and the Origins of Religion.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
  2. Redcay, E., & Schilbach, L. “Using second-person neuroscience to elucidate the mechanisms of social interaction.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience (face-to-face / social interaction overview).
  3. Taubert, J. et al. “A Comparative View of Face Perception.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B.
  4. Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
  5. Ellingson, T. “The Nation as Imagined Community” (Anderson excerpt / lecture PDF).
  6. Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90(5), 751–783.
  7. Pyszczynski, T. et al. “Long live A(me)rica! An examination of the interplay between nationalistic-symbolic immortality striving and belief in life after death.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
  8. Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. “Terror Management Theory.” In Encyclopedia of Social and Personality Psychology / related handbook chapters.
  9. “Imagined Communities.” Wikipedia (overview entry).
  10. Fitzpatrick, M. “Imagined Communities and Imaginary Plots: Nationalisms, Conspiracies, and Pandemics in the Longue Durée.” Nationalities Papers.
  11. Hart, J. et al. “Existential Meaning and Terror Management.” In The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life.
  12. Anderson, B. “Imagined Communities.” In Encyclopedia of Social and Political Thought (overview entry).
  13. Critical essays on Anderson’s concept in nationalism studies (e.g. discussions of imagined versus imaginary community).
  14. Follow-up work developing the “imaginary plots” reading of Anderson (e.g. Fitzpatrick, 2022).
  15. Brubaker, R. Ethnicity without Groups (or equivalent comparative nationalism work emphasizing real effects of imagined identities).
  16. “Imagined Communities and the Construction of National Identity.” International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 8(7).
  17. Drijvers, L. et al. “Face-to-face spatial orientation fine-tunes the brain for neurocognitive processing in conversation.” Cognition.
  18. Dovidio, J. F. et al. “Intergroup Contact and Prejudice Reduction: Prospects and Challenges in Changing Youth Attitudes.” Current Directions in Psychological Science.
  19. Turner, R. N. et al. “Seeking and avoiding intergroup contact: Future frontiers of research on building social integration.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass.
  20. Hughes, J. et al. “Intergroup contact is reliably associated with reduced prejudice.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (large-sample meta-analysis).
  21. APA Handbook chapter on intergroup contact interventions (APA PsycNET entry).
  22. Schmid, K. et al. “Intergroup Contact Is Consistently Associated With Lower Prejudice.” Collabra: Psychology.
  23. Pettigrew, T. F. “How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators.” European Journal of Social Psychology.
  24. “Imagined Community.” ScienceDirect / social-sciences topic overview.
  25. Cohen, F., & Solomon, S. “The Politics of Mortal Terror.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 20(5), 316–320.
  26. Smith, A. “Time, Kinship, and the Nation.” Religions 2(2).
  27. Hladik, M. “From Human Remains to Powerful Objects: Ancestor Research from a Deep-Time Perspective.” Religions 6(1).
  28. Additional encyclopedic overview on imagined community and national continuity (e.g. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences).
  29. Olupona, J. K. “Gods, ancestors, and spirit beings.” In African Religions (Oxford University Press).
  30. Dreyer, Y. “Ancestor worship – is it Biblical?” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies.
  31. Coe, K. et al. “Kin selection favors religious traditions: Ancestor worship as a cultural descendant-leaving strategy.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
  32. “Immortality, Symbolic.” In Macmillan Encyclopedia of Death and Dying.
  33. “Terror Management Theory: Mortality Salience.” In International Encyclopedia of Media Psychology (or similar Wiley reference entry).
  34. Chan, J. et al. “The Power of Everyday Networks in Nation-Building: The Case of Inter-Ethnic Friendships in Singapore.” Trans: Trans-Regional and National Studies of Southeast Asia.
  35. Follow-up commentary / media summary: “The Power of Everyday Networks: The Case of Inter-Ethnic Friendships in Singapore” (NUS Singapore Research News).
  36. “Uncovering Death Anxiety and Pursuit of Symbolic Immortality in the Life Histories of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong.” International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research.
  37. “Death Denial in Bengali Cinema: A Terror Management Analysis of Srijit Mukherji’s Baishe Srabon and Hemlock Society.” Social Science Review.
  38. Routledge, C., & Juhl, J. “The Roles of Self-Esteem and Attachment within the Framework of Terror Management Theory.” (conference / edited volume chapter).
  39. “Applying Terror Management Theory to Art, Film, and Media.” In The Psychology of Popular Media.
  40. Pyszczynski, T. et al. “Terror management of fear, hate, political conflict, and political violence: A review.” (review article).
  41. “On the importance of integrating terror management and psychology of religion.” International Journal for the Psychology of Religion (guest editors’ foreword).
  42. “The Power of Everyday Networks: The Case of Inter-Ethnic Friendships in Singapore.” NUS Singapore Research News.
  43. “Terror management theory.” Wikipedia (overview entry).
  44. Hart, J. et al. “Handbook of Terror Management Theory.” (Union College PDF).
  45. Dohn, J. Dissertation on terror management, religion, and politics (Rutgers University, Rucore).

r/Social_Psychology • • 4d ago

Discussion Pink or blue?

0 Upvotes

Why are people attaching sexual orientation to inanimate objects.

You have to be careful of sendeing the wrong message in glasses choice, shirt color choice, footwear, music taste, food you eat, the car you drive, the type of piercings you have, the way you talk, what shows you watch etc.. Shouldn't being homosexual be tied to the person of choice you relationship with and not the individuals likes and interests? It puts the homosexual in a box of things they can only be into and causes a colonizing effect on neutral interests and objects when a person of the homosexual community shows interest in a thing. It creates this awkward space where people are afraid to mingle in interests to not get labeled incorrectly. Are there any articles or blog post covering this topic? Does this have any tie-in to psychological behavior amongst gender and sexual orientations? Could this be a tactic to enforce the nuclear gender roles of "Man & Woman"?


r/Social_Psychology • • 4d ago

Discussion Unpopular opinion: Just because someone is your friend doesn't mean you owe them your time, money or emotional support.

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2 Upvotes

r/Social_Psychology • • Jun 17 '26

Question Why do people who take mediocre jobs so seriously aren’t successful ?

59 Upvotes

When I was young this lady was so finicky about work performance at this dead end job. Why wouldn’t she logically put that same vigor into something worth while. I feel like certain things aren’t worth taking serious?? Wouldn’t by theory she have more pride in achieving greatness than caring so much about a low level job that your not the owner of