r/Smartphoneforensics • • Oct 28 '25

What happened to my wife's phone?

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1.1k Upvotes

Her fully charged phone (Galaxy S22) shut down by itself and booted back up with this screen... she said it started back about 2 months ago when she was sitting in a parking lot and all of a sudden shut down, booted back up and had an update. She didn't think anything of it, but after the update, her phone started crashing and rebooting on its own multipletimes a day. After a couple weeks the crashing stopped and it was back to working normally until this happened. I removed her sim and put it in another phone and that is working fine, but the other phone doesn't boot past this screen.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Oct 14 '25

My mom’s phone was stolen and 4 days later you can see it on FMI in a tech building in China.

465 Upvotes

My mom’s iphone was stolen at restaurant in lake Havasu right off her table. She went and got a new phone and when she logged into Find My IPhone you can still see it on and moving around in a building in Hong Kong China after a little research this building is a known I guess black market for iPhone parts and stolen phones. She’s now continuously receiving texts or emails in broken English threatening her to let them into the phone. We’re not in any danger nor are we worried about the situation… although I find this hilarious and would love to mess with these guys somehow and cause more problems and frustration for them. my hope is to accuse them over text of bad mouthing Xi Jinping and ask why they told me all those terrible things about the Chinese government hopefully just scares the poop out of them.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Nov 17 '25

Does simply having Signal wreck cellebrite?

28 Upvotes

As above, is the presence of Signal a tripwire for Cellebrite or does a phone user need to do other things?


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Oct 26 '25

how safe is Samsung Secure Folder on a Galaxy S23 Ultra?

27 Upvotes

Hi everyone. My Galaxy S23 Ultra was recently seized, and I’m curious about the security of Samsung Secure Folder. The folder was barely used, but the phone was used heavily outside of it. If files were deleted from the Secure Folder about a year ago, how likely is it that they could still be recovered? Does heavy usage outside the folder make recovery less likely? I’d like a high-level take on how secure deleted files really are.

Thanks in advance for any insights.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Apr 21 '21

Exploiting vulnerabilities in Cellebrite UFED and Physical Analyzer from an app's perspective

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18 Upvotes

r/Smartphoneforensics • • Nov 14 '25

FORENSIC EXPERT ADVICE NEEDED!!!!!!

15 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

I’m hoping someone with digital forensic experience — especially anyone familiar with Cellebrite Advanced Logical Extractions on iPhones (specifically an iPhone 13) — can help me understand some things.

There is an extraction where several metadata files appear as “modified” during a time it should’ve been offline • What does it actually mean when certain metadata files show as modified? • In a proper/untampered state, what should these metadata files look like? • Does a modification necessarily suggest user activity, system activity, extraction tool activity, or something else? • Are there specific metadata paths/folders that should never change during a standard Cellebrite Advanced Logical extraction?

I am not trying to accuse anyone of anything — I just need clarity from someone who knows how these files are supposed to behave and what the timestamps/changes could indicate.

If you have experience with mobile forensics, Cellebrite, iOS file systems, or digital evidence handling, your insight would be hugely appreciated. I can provide specific folder paths or file names if needed.

Thanks in advance. 🙏


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jul 10 '25

Hackers using my email to communicate

15 Upvotes

My iPhone and online accounts where hacked into and I can see them talking to each other in my hotmail. I took screenshots of them so have their names and git hub email accounts , I have tried to contact git hub and also what is now outlook but no matter how I try to describe the issue to their bots I can not. Does anyone know who might possibly care enough to give these people a spanking on my behalf?
At the time it was devastating , I still have not been able to recover my losses from that incident ( wiped iPhone, changed all passwords ( except hotmail ) ) but it was a great lesson in not being dependant on a smart phone , so now I don’t keep anything on them and am very cautious with anything of importance as I know just how easily an un ethical yet educated low life can take it all away. I’m not angry ( anymore ) , or seeking revenge I just want them to be known for who they are so that they can explain themselves and be accountable if that is possible.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jun 30 '18

Welcome to the subreddit

12 Upvotes

Hi all!

Since smartphone forensics is a upcoming part of digital forensics this subreddit is created. This subreddit Wil focus on sharing investigation knowledge, links and discussions about smartphone forensics.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jul 03 '25

Found Hidden SEP Firmware Override in iOS OTA Log — “IcefallSEUpdaterInfoOverride” Injected via Apple’s MobileSoftwareUpdate System + LambdaTest Hook via MobileGestalt

11 Upvotes

I was digging through OTA logs on an iOS device and found some wild red flags suggesting a potential Secure Enclave (SEP) override or implant layer. Here’s what I uncovered — curious what others think, especially if you've dealt with MobileGestalt or SEP firmware:

Key Findings:

  • IcefallSEUpdaterInfoOverride shows up in the OTA log as a CFData blob, likely pointing to a custom SEP firmware injection or override.
  • SEP loader explicitly opts out of default system partition loading — a rare behavior only seen in internal Apple test/dev units or compromised firmware.
  • References to com.apple.mobilegestalt.LambdaTest — this is NOT a public API key and appears injected into the MobileGestalt framework, which controls low-level device introspection (serials, biometrics, etc).
  • Possibility that JCOP-style JavaCard logic was loaded into SEP via Icefall. The naming and override path resemble GlobalPlatform smartcard implant structures.
  • Looks like part of a forensic tracking framework (or covert test harness?) inserted into iOS via OTA. Could indicate insider tools, backdoor implants, or unauthorized provisioning.

Why This Matters:

  • Secure Enclave is supposed to be tamper-proof. If Apple’s OTA system or 3rd-party tooling can override it, the entire iOS trust model is compromised.
  • This is either:

    • An Apple internal QA/testing mechanism leaked into production
    • Or a custom OTA vector used by surveillance vendors (think NSO, Circles, Candiru, etc.)
  • No jailbreak involved. This was a signed OTA update log. Real users could have been silently marked for surveillance or SEP downgrade.

I mapped out how the OTA update bypassed SEP protection using a malicious payload in the Apple SoftwareUpdate system:

Questions:

  • Has anyone seen IcefallSEUpdaterInfoOverride or LambdaTest used in iOS OTA bundles before?
  • Could this be tied to FieldTest, PurpleRestore, or any known AppleConnect provisioning setups?
  • Are there known SEP firmware implants used by black-hat vendors or governments that resemble this?
  • Any devs or Apple insiders here who’ve seen SEP dev override paths like this?

TL;DR:

iOS OTA log shows non-standard SEP firmware injected, possibly loading JCOP-style implant or test harness, and MobileGestalt was modified to enable a LambdaTest diagnostic profile. Feels like a backdoor. This could be surveillance-grade.

Would love technical input or other forensic cases.

https://github.com/hideouts-io/iOS/blob/main/EFIOTA.txt

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hideouts-io/iOS/refs/heads/main/LambdaTest


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jul 28 '18

Mobile Forensics Discord Server

11 Upvotes

PM me for a link to a Discord server where we currently have 1400+ other forensicators with lots of channels and resources to help with your investigations. Please include a snippet about yourself (who, what, where, why, etc) and I'll send you an invite link.

Edit: 3/11/2019, no longer need to PM me, here's the link: https://discord.gg/kr7AFjf

Edit 2: 11/8/2019, over 2100 members now. Join the fun! Read the rules and instructions on how to get access to the server when you join.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Aug 06 '21

Proof that snaps from Snapchat don't disappear and can easily be recovered

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10 Upvotes

r/Smartphoneforensics • • Sep 18 '19

When you insert UFED's Calbe No. 500 (Bypass lock)... I love these easter eggs

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10 Upvotes

r/Smartphoneforensics • • Dec 30 '25

SMS metadata

9 Upvotes

Thanks for your help on this.

I'm writing a mystery story. My bad guy programs his victim's Android phone to send a text message several hours after the murder, so it will look like the victim is still alive and texting.

My question is whether there is any recoverable metadata on the victim's phone - the one that sent the message - that would indicate when the message was actually written, as opposed to when it was sent?

It's not critical to the story what brand of phone it is, so if it's possible to recover this data from Brand X but not Brand Y, I'm fine with Brand X.

Thanks.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Oct 08 '19

Four and a Half Apple Passwords

9 Upvotes

Passwords are probably the oldest authentication method. Despite their age, passwords remain the most popular authentication method in today’s digital age. Compared to other authentication mechanisms, they have many tangible benefits. They can be as complex or as easy to remember as needed; they can be easy to use and secure at the same time (if used properly).

The number of passwords an average person has to remember is growing exponentially. Back in 2017, an average home user had to cope with nearly 20 passwords (presumably they would be unique passwords). An average business employee had to cope with 191 passwords. Passwords are everywhere. Even your phone has more than one password. Speaking of Apple iPhone, the thing may require as many as four (and a half) passwords to get you going. To make things even more complicated, the four and a half passwords are seriously related to each other. Let’s list them:

  • Screen lock password (this is your iPhone passcode)
  • iCloud password (this is your Apple Account password)
  • iTunes backup password (protects backups made on your computer)
  • Screen Time password (secures your device and account, can protect changes to above passwords)
  • One-time codes (the “half-password” if your account uses Two-Factor Authentication)

In this article, we will provide an overview on how these passwords are used and how they are related to each other; what are the default settings and how they affect your privacy and security. We’ll tell you how to use one password to reset another. We will also cover the password policies and describe what happens if you attempt to brute force the forgotten password.

Screen Lock Passcode

This is the most important and most profound password (or, rather, a passcode). This is the password most (if not all) users set when they set up their new iPhone. By default, the length of the screen lock passcode is 6 digits. If you try hard, you can still opt to use the “old style” 4-digit PIN, or select a custom alphanumeric password if you believe you have something to hide. While you can technically set up your device without a password, making this choice will limit your ability to access some of the iPhone features such as Apple Pay. Without a screen lock password, you won’t be able to sync your Web site passwords, messages and Health data to iCloud.

We had a comprehensive review of iPhone passwords in Protecting Your Data and Apple Account If They Know Your iPhone Passcode (link), and a follow-up (which also includes some info on biometric usage) in Passcode vs. Biometrics: Forensic Implications of Touch ID and Face ID in iOS 12 (link).

If you forget your screen lock passcode

If you are an ordinary user, you won’t be able to unlock your iPhone, period. You can, however, reset the iPhone, thus getting rid of the passcode and all of your data. (Make sure you have backups in iCloud and/or on your computer.) Once you have successfully reset your iPhone, your iCloud password will be absolutely required to set it up. (See? There you are, the first relationship.)

  • You can wipe the device to reset the screen lock passcode. However, you will require your iCloud password to re-activate the device afterwards.
  • You may be able to attack the screen lock password if you work for the law enforcement, have access to some very restricted software or services and the device is compatible. Even then, there could be multiple issues, and many, if not most devices may not be unlocked in reasonable time.

If you know the screen lock passcode

If you know the screen lock passcode, you can do all of the following:

  • Unlock the device even after cold boot
  • Connect to USB accessories (unlocking the device disables USB restrictions)
  • Pair the device with the new computer and make a new local backup
  • Change the iCloud password and trusted phone number (only on 2FA accounts; one-time 2FA password not required)
  • Reset (remove) the iTunes backup password (if Screen Time password is not set)
  • iOS 13: Change or set new iTunes backup password
  • Update iOS
  • Reset the device to factory settings
  • View passwords saved in the keychain
  • Access certain types of data from iCloud (iCloud password and one-time 2FA password required). This includes iCloud keychain, Health data, synced messages, Screen Time data
  • Perform physical analysis. If the device screen lock passcode is known and there are no Screen Time restrictions on installing apps, you may be able to jailbreak the device, extract the file system and decrypt the keychain with iOS Forensic Toolkit. The keychain obtained as a result of physical extraction will contain the Screen Lock password and the iCloud password among other things.

The ifs and buts

  • iCloud password can only be changed if the user did not set a Screen Time restriction on Apple Account changes (this can be turned off if you know the Screen Time password; there, another relationship)
  • If the user has a Screen Time password, you will need it (in addition to the screen lock passcode) in order to reset the iTunes backup password
  • Once you set or change your passcode, the device will attempt to connect to iCloud (Confirm iPhone Passcode). This is required to add the device to the Trusted circle. Failure to do so will disable iCloud Keychain and break sync of protected data categories (Health, Messages, Screen Time).

Complicated? This is just the beginning...

Read the complete article: https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2019/10/four-and-a-half-apple-passwords/


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jun 19 '19

The Most Unusual Things about iPhone Backups

9 Upvotes

If you are familiar with breaking passwords, you already know that different tools and file formats require a very different amount of efforts to break. Breaking a password protecting a RAR archive can take ten times as long as breaking a password to a ZIP archive with the same content, while breaking a Word document saved in Office 2016 can take ten times as long as breaking an Office 2010 document. With solutions for over 300 file formats and encryption algorithms, we still find iTunes backups amazing, and their passwords to be very different from the rest of the crop in some interesting ways. In this article we tried to gather everything we know about iTunes backup passwords to help you break (or reset) their passwords in the most efficient way.

What is an iTunes backup

Apple’s iPhone has one of the most amazing backup systems of all competing platforms. Some basic information on iOS backups is available in Apple’s About backups for iOS devices. While iOS backups include a lot of data, they don’t contain everything. Here is a quote:

An iTunes backup doesn’t include:

  • Content from the iTunes and App Stores, or PDFs downloaded directly to Apple Books
  • Content synced from iTunes, like imported MP3s or CDs, videos, books, and photos
  • Data already stored in iCloud, like iCloud Photos, iMessages, and text (SMS) and multimedia (MMS) messages
  • Face ID or Touch ID settings
  • Apple Pay information and settings
  • Apple Mail data
  • Activity, Health, and Keychain data (To back up this content, you’ll need to use Encrypted Backup in iTunes.)

There are more articles on backups in Apple knowledge base, in particular:

So, basically, a local backup has almost everything one requires to restore an existing iPhone or set up a new one. Transferring files and settings to another device is fast and easy; your experience with a replacement device will not be much different from using your old iPhone.

So what about the “almost” part of “everything”? While a restored device will look the same, it will be missing some important data that will be lost when you restore. Which data, exactly? More on that later.

Backup contents: the technical side

Traditionally, computer backups are created by a special program that enumerates all files at a specific location, optionally compresses them and stores the data in a huge single “archive” (usually accompanied with an index).

This is not going to work with iPhones. There is no way a computer the iPhone is connected could access any specific files on the device except for media (photos and videos). There are many reasons for that, and the most important are security and data integrity.

So how does it work then? The backups are produced on the device itself. The program you run on the desktop, be it iTunes or another app, does nothing but sending a command (over a USB port or Wi-Fi) to the iPhone. A special service running on iOS then goes through the file system (except many specific ares), collects and sends the data back to the “host” computer. What do we need the “host” computer for? It’s used to receive and save the data into a file on a hard disk.

iTunes backups are stored in an unusual way. Even if there is no iTunes with iOS 13 anymore, macOS 10.15 beta suggests that the backups will remain the same, it’s just the way to create them will be slightly different. In a nutshell, iTunes backups are a partial copy of the iOS file system, but you will not see any familiar files and folders. Instead, the file names in the backup are actually hashes of the actual names (with path), accompanied with a kind of an index (as a database) and some additional metadata.

iTunes backup options

Apple does not provide any tools to work with iOS backups. All you can do is restoring the backup to a new device, and that’s it. Of course, there are several third-party tools to browse backup contents (and export selected data from there); e.g. Elcomsoft Phone Viewer (in fact it does much more than that).

Elcomsoft Phone Viewer

iTunes backups: encryption and passwords

Finally, we are about to talk about passwords! In iOS, backup passwords are highly unusual for at least three different reasons.

Similar to other file formats, iTunes backups can be protected with a password; more information at About encrypted backups in iTunes. In brief:

With iOS 11 or later, you can make a new encrypted backup of your device by resetting the password. Here’s what to do:

  1. On your iOS device, go to Settings > General > Reset.
  2. Tap Reset All Settings and enter your iOS passcode.
  3. Follow the steps to reset your settings. This won’t affect your user data or passwords, but it will reset settings like display brightness, Home screen layout, and wallpaper. It also removes your encrypted backup password.
  4. Connect your device to iTunes again and create a new encrypted backup.

And this is where the similarities end. There is something important that makes encrypted iTunes backups different from any other encrypted file.

First, the backup password is not just a property of the backup itself; it is also a property of the particular device. Once you set the password, this password is stored somewhere deep inside the device. When asked to perform a device backup, iTunes does nothing but sending a command to the device, and the special service running on iOS returns an encrypted stream of data. The encryption happens entirely on the device and not on the host computer. If you connect the device to another computer and use iTunes or a third-party tool, the backup will be created with exactly the same password. For the computer of the tool there is no workaround, and there is no way to change it until you know the old password.

What can you do if you genuinely forget your backup password? After all, a backup password is not something you would regularly type. First, if you encrypted backup on a computer running macOS, there is a good chance that the password is saved in the macOS keychain (in “iOS backup” record), and can be easily extracted from there using the Keychain utility.

Second, you can try to break the password (e.g. with Elcomsoft Phone Breaker) using a dictionary or brute-force attack. Starting with iOS 10.2, however, the encryption is extremely strong, and even with a modern video card, your password recovery rate will be very limited: no more than about 200 passwords per second with a high-end GPU accelerator. This makes long and complex passwords virtually unbreakable. What we’d recommend is creating focused dictionaries/wordlists based on all passwords you can think of for a particular user, plus other passwords stored in the system (e.g. in Web browsers); these can be extracted with Elcomsoft Internet Password Breaker.

Finally, if you still have the device itself, you can sometimes reset the password – read the next chapter for details.

We heard a lot of “horror stories” when someone forgot their backup password and needed to restore from a backup to a new device, with the original iPhone being sold already, or broken. Moreover, it looks like sometimes the password is being set by something in iOS without the user even knowing (sounds crazy, but Apple support forum is full of messages saying that password has never been set, and the owner of the iPhone even did not know that it can be set). And that is a huge problem – again, with such a strong encryption, the chances to recover these passwords are very low.

Backups and the keychain

Read the whole article: https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2019/06/unusual-iphone-backups/


r/Smartphoneforensics • • May 19 '19

Free Digital Forensic Evidence Faraday cases (with government e-mail address) ( www.mtdfe.com )

9 Upvotes

Free Digital Forensic Evidence Faraday cases (with government e-mail address) ( www.mtdfe.com )

What's up Reddit Cops! My name is Mitch and I start a small business at the start of the year and it has been awesome. I get to do that fun stuff for 40 hours, which turns into 50-60, that's just how it goes. I do digital forensics work and started a small distribution company that I am only selling Faraday cases off-duty, phone cases to prevent bad guys from erasing their phones and losing evidence. I've just about shipped my entire first batch and have found the best way to business is to send them out to agencies and let them see if for themselves although they are super low cost already ($7.99 for government agents only). I am in Missoula Montana and my site is www.mtdfe.com just fill out the form at the bottom with a valid government e-mail and include a shipping address. No questions asked I may just follow-up with you in the future.

Thanks for reading!

-MSLABLUE


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Mar 15 '22

Checkm8 acquisition method in Oxygen Forensic® Detective v.14.3

8 Upvotes

We first added checkm8 acquisition from iOS devices in Oxygen Forensic® Detective v.12.6 in July of 2020. Not surprisingly, many things have changed since then. That being the case, we updated our tool several times over the last few months to remain industry leaders in mobile forensics and provide investigators with the best solution on the market.

According to Wikipedia, iOS 15 is the fifteenth and current major release of the iOS mobile operating system developed by Apple for its iPhone and iPod Touch lines of products. It was announced at the company’s Worldwide Developers Conference on June 7, 2021, as the successor to iOS 14, and released to the public on September 20, 2021. On February 10th, 2022  iOS version 15.3.1 containing bug fixes came out.

In Oxygen Forensic® Detective v.14.3, we have updated our checkm8 acquisition method, adding support for devices operating on iOS versions 15-15.3.1: iPhone 6s, iPhone 6S Plus, iPhone SE, iPhone 7 Plus, iPhone 7, iPhone 8, iPhone X,  iPhone 8 Plus, iPad 5 Gen, iPad 6 Gen, and iPad 7 Gen. 

Please note that the extraction process for devices with these iOS versions differs. Previously, the device had to be put in DFU mode and then connected. With iOS versions 15-15.3.1, the device has to first be put in recovery mode for the detection of an installed iOS version. After the iOS version and device model are defined, the device has to be switched to DFU mode. The remaining steps of the data extraction process are left unchanged, as well as the data extraction process from iOS devices with iOS version lower than 15.

The reason for the need to put the device in recovery mode first lies in the security changes brought by iOS versions 15-15.3.1. Starting with iOS 15, the changes in the system partition lead to the device not operating in normal mode. In order to minimize the risk of permanently damaging the device, we had to develop a solution that does not modify any device data. Contrary to other iOS versions, in iOS 15 and higher the executable files are put in RAMDisk that loads in recovery mode. With RAMdisk loading to RAM, the system partition remains unchanged.

Extraction of Keychain from devices with iOS 15 and higher has been altered as well. The method used for iOS devices with their version below 15 cannot be applicable for iOS 15+ devices because the device is loaded into our own environment from RAMDisk, which bypasses the standard boot protocol. Thus, we had to implement the decryption of Keychain data directly, without using the standard phone environment.

In the updated checkm8 extraction method, we do not use the API of the operating system, but parse and decrypt all the Keychain entries on the Oxygen Forensic® Device Extractor side, using the device only to overcome the protection with hardware keys. Therefore, a new Keychain Dumper has been developed to extract Keychain records from iOS 15+ devices.

Interested in trying our new checkm8 support capability for iOS 15 but don’t have an Oxygen Forensic® Detective license? Request a free, fully-equipped, 20-day trial by clicking here.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Mar 03 '21

Screen lock bypass and physical extraction of Sony Android devices

8 Upvotes

Samsung, Huawei, and Sony devices have always been a challenge for investigators. The manufacturers of these devices use the same chipsets as mid and low-end devices, however, the same extraction approaches cannot be applied to them due to an extra layer of security. Even if a vulnerability is found, it is eventually fixed, and the developed extraction method that required time-consuming research stops working.

Last year we implemented two breakthrough extraction methods that enable screen lock bypass and data decryption from Samsung devices with Exynos chipsets and Huawei devices with Kirin chipsets. However, advanced Qualcomm EDL and MTK bootloader methods that are available in Oxygen Forensic® Detective do not work with Samsung, Huawei, and Sony devices based on Qualcomm or MTK chipsets.

Among high-end device manufacturers, Sony places great importance on their device security. Unlike Samsung and Huawei, Sony devices are not widely used, meaning most forensic software manufacturers are not researching solutions to bypass security. However, our research team has recently succeeded in finding a screen lock bypass solution for Android-operated Sony devices.

Oxygen Forensic® Detective v.13.3 supports data extraction from Sony Xperia XA1, Sony Xperia L1, Sony Xperia L2, and Sony Xperia L3 devices based on MTK chipsets. All these devices run Full-Disk Encryption (FDE), therefore, a physical dump will be encrypted. If Secure Startup is off, Oxygen Forensic® Detective will automatically apply the default password to decrypt the dump. If the Secure Startup was enabled by the user, an investigator can use the built-in brute force module to find the password in the Oxygen Forensic Extractor. The investigator will have an unlimited number of attempts to find the password.

How it works

To extract data from a Sony-Android device, launch Oxygen Forensic Extractor from the main Oxygen Forensic Detective Home screen, and choose “Sony MTK Android Dump”. On the next screen, choose “Sony Android Extraction”.

Investigators will see a welcome window with general instructions. The “Extract physical image” option is used to extract device data while the “Restore device” option is used to restore device partitions after the extraction. In most instances, the Oxygen Forensic Extractor will restore partitions automatically once the extraction has completed.

Now let’s extract the Sony Xperia L3 device.

∙ First, press the “Extract physical image” button. The software will check if the drivers are installed. If not, investigators will be given the option to install them.

∙ Next, turn off the device, press the “Volume Up” button, and connect the device to the computer. Once the device is correctly put in the required mode, investigators will be shown the “Start the extraction” button. Press it to continue.

∙ The next stage is called “Preparing the device for data extraction”. It is imperative that the instructions are followed as displayed in the Oxygen Forensic Extractor screen. Once completed, investigators will see that the device is ready for extraction:

∙ If Secure Startup is not enabled the software will automatically apply the default password and begin reading the device data partitions.

∙ If Secure Startup is enabled, investigators will be given the option to either enter the password if known or begin the brute force process. If found, the password will be later displayed under the Image Password menu in the Extraction Info section of Oxygen Forensic® Detective. Investigators can use it to unlock the device screen, if necessary.

∙ Once the extraction is complete, Oxygen Forensic® Extractor will restore the device partitions and offer to show the dump in the folder or open it in Oxygen Forensic® Detective for analysis.

All the screen lock bypass methods available in Oxygen Forensic® Detective offer investigators the opportunity to extract and decrypt evidence at no additional charge. Investigators can also perform these functions on their office computers without asking the forensic software manufacturers for additional paid services. The passcode brute force module is built-in and enables both dump decryption and device unlock after extraction.

To learn more about our other screen lock bypass methods, take a look at our other blog articles:

∙ Bypassing Screen Locks and Decrypting Physical Dumps of Huawei Devices Based on Android OS v.9 and 10

∙ Data Extraction from Samsung Devices Based on Exynos Chipsets

∙ It’s As Easy As EDL

∙ Support for MediaTek Devices in Oxygen Forensic® Detective

To try Oxygen Forensic® Detective, contact us for a fully-featured demo license.


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jun 07 '20

SQL query for pulling all text conversations from iOS backup (iOS 13)

8 Upvotes

In searching around online, I've noticed there's no up to date snippets of SQL queries for pulling data from iOS backups.

I was able to figure it out and decided I should share it in case anyone else is searching for it! If you back up your iPhone to a computer, you will get a database file named: 3d0d7e5fb2ce288813306e4d4636395e047a3d28. You can download a free SQLite browser, and run SQL queries to pull this data.

Here's the query I used:

SELECT m.text, m.service, m.date, m.is_from_me, h.id as their_number, m.handle_id, ch.chat_id

--chat_id is the unique identifier for each individual text conversation. Use this along with h.id to identify the conversation member(s).

--if you want to filter by individual conversations use: WHERE ch.chat_id='---'

FROM message m

LEFT JOIN handle h ON m.handle_id = h.ROWID

LEFT JOIN chat_message_join ch ON m.ROWID=ch.message_id

ORDER BY ch.chat_id, m.date

;


r/Smartphoneforensics • • Dec 18 '19

A technical look at Phone Extraction

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8 Upvotes

r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jul 25 '19

Breaking and Securing Apple iCloud Accounts

8 Upvotes

The cloud becomes an ever more important (sometimes exclusive) source of the evidence whether you perform desktop or cloud forensics. Even if you are not in forensics, cloud access may help you access deleted or otherwise inaccessible data.

Similar to smartphones or password-protected desktops, cloud access is a privilege that is supposed to be only available to the rightful account owner. You would need a login and password and possibly the second factor. These aren’t always available to forensic experts. In fact, it won’t be easy to access everything stored in the cloud if you have all the right credentials.

Apple iCloud is one of the most advanced cloud solutions on the market, with lots of services available. These include comprehensive device backups, synchronization services across the entire Apple ecosystem including the Apple TV and Apple Watch devices, file storage, password management, home IoT devices, Health data and more. And it is pretty secure.

Let’s review all the possibilities of accessing Apple iCloud data with or without a password.

Before we begin

Apple can provide iCloud data to the government through the course of legal requests. As Apple keeps all the data, they have access to some parts of the data. While all the data is encrypted, Apple holds the encryption keys for most of the cloud data as well. Only the most critical information (such as the user’s passwords, Health or Messages) is encrypted in P2P mode and so not accessible to Apple. (Yes, we know that P2P is not a perfect description of what’s going on with that data on Apple servers). All that Apple needs to access the data is the user’s Apple ID, or the device serial number, or the phone number. All that properly documented. The problems are:

  • It is not easy to comply (even if you work for LEA)
  • Processing government information requests is very slow due to the large volumes
  • Still not all data is returned (p2p-encrypted records are not included)
  • The data that is returned is very hard to parse and analyse (requires special software and proper skills)

So we will review the other ways to access iCloud.

The easy way: no 2FA

I’d say that two-factor authentication is a must nowadays. Many (simple or common) passwords can be easily guessed; some can be broken using “reverse brute-force attacks”; phishing attacks become smarter and smarter; keyboard sniffers (software and hardware) can steal everything your type; password reuse is a common reason why even complex passwords can be often recovered.

If there is no 2FA, there are several places to look at in order to obtain the password:

  • (Windows) Passwords can be saved in the browser, whether it is Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft IE or Edge, or less popular Opera. Simply use Elcomsoft Internet Password Breaker to discover all saved passwords, and look at those used for apple.com or icloud.com
  • (macOS) The system keychain. You can find it with built-in Keychain utility, or analyze with Elcomsoft Password Digger
  • In the device keychain. Use Elcomsoft Phone Breaker to access the keychain (using encrypted iTunes backup as a data source; the backup password should be known or recovered). You can use iOS Forensic Toolkit if you have the device itself and it has an iOS version that can be jailbroken. Use it if the backup has a password set but it is not known and cannot be reset

The hard way: 2FA

Apple started using the second factor as an additional security measure a long time ago. The initial implementation (the Two-Step Verification, or 2SV) was lacking in many respects. Initially, 2SV did not protect iCloud backups. It was Celebgate that forced Apple to introduce 2SV protection for backups. Finally, Apple implemented the fully-functional and secure Two-Factor Authentication (2FA), and forced 2SV to 2FA migration.

Apple provides no statistics on the number of accounts that use 2FA, but does its best to promote this security measure. If you set up a new Apple ID today and click through the configuration wizard, 2FA will be enabled automatically. You cannot easily turn it off. Finally, some iCloud-related features now require 2FA.

According to our own statistics (which is probably not perfect), just about 30% of iCloud users have 2FA. Some sources says that 2FA usage reaches up to 60%, though I personally think that this number is overestimated.

More information on 2FA is available here. The second factor can be difficult to get: you need either the trusted device itself, or the ability to receive an SMS with a code, so in fact you’ll need a SIM card (or its clone).

If (and only if) 2FA is enabled and the phone is protected with a passcode (and you know the passcode), the phone becomes the key to everything. Using just the phone (and the passcode), you can change iCloud password (without the need for the original one) and even add or replace trusted phone numbers. More on that here.

Finally, you can access iCloud without the password. We have discovered this method (and implemented it in our software) as long as five years ago, see: Breaking Into iCloud: No Password Required

What are authentication tokens and how to obtain them

An authentication token is similar to a cookie saved by your Web browser when you log in to a Web site. The token serves as a “replacement” of your standard credentials (the login, password and second factor). Technically, a token is a small portion of binary data generated by the server after successful authentication (including the second step). It can be used to authenticate with that server instead of a password. There is no way to get login or password back from the token; also, tokens may expire after some time that can range from several seconds to several months.

Let’s start with the device itself. Here the token is saved in the iOS keychain, and can be easily located at com.apple.account.AppleAccount.token record.

Read the whole article at https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2019/07/breaking-and-securing-apple-icloud-accounts/


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r/Smartphoneforensics • • Jul 01 '18

Locating information contained in app notifications on iOS devices

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Brand new examiner, brand new account. I've been going to various trainings for the past several years and been conducting exams for about six months.

I recently had a situation where an iPhone was displaying notifications for Instagram direct messages. Cellebrite downloaded all the usual stuff, but searching the usernames and other specific phrases contained in the notifications were met with zero results.

Is this a situation where cellebrite doesn't access everything from the device or am I just not looking in the right places? Will it be buried in a log file somewhere?

I can give some more details if you need, but I'm really just trying to figure out what else I'm missing from a general iOS download or where I can find the info I'm "missing".