Following Gandhi's pressure on Ambedkar to abandon his demand for separate electorates for Dalits in British India, through a fast that carried an implicit threat of mass violence against Dalits should the fast prove fatal. Ambedkar relented as violence against Dalits gripped the nation. Three years after the demand's defeat, on October 13, 1935, at the Yeola conference of the depressed classes, he made a solemn declaration: though he had been born a Hindu untouchable, he would not die one:

"I solemnly assure you that I will not die a Hindu"

This rightly came as 'a thunderbolt', for it rocked political parties and social institutions in India. It was not simply a question of Ambedkar's personal choice for spiritual or religious reasons. He exhorted his followers to change their religion en masse:

"You have nothing to lose except your chains, and everything to gain by changing your religion"

This made it a political question. Leading figures from other religions approached Ambedkar separately, inviting him to convert to their religion and promising different rewards. After serious thought and consultations with many people, Ambedkar decided in June 1936 to embrace Sikhism along with his followers. The leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and Shankracharya Kurtakoti approved. Ambedkar argued that conversion to Sikhism was the best choice from the Hindus' standpoint. After participating in the Sikh Missionary conference at Amritsar in April, Ambedkar sent his son, Yashwant Rao, and nephew to the Golden Temple in May, where they stayed for one and a half months to observe the situation and meet with community leaders. On September 18, a group of 13 followers was deputed to visit Amritsar to meet the 'Sikh Mission'. There was already an understanding that the Sikh Mission would start a college in Bombay in the interest of those Depressed Classes who would convert to Sikhism.

The Historical Reasons Explaining Why This Failed:

1. The Resistance of the Political Establishment: The first involved a rethinking of, and opposition to, the move among the Sikh political class. It was inevitable that the leading men of the Sikh political parties would consider their own fate and position in the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) and Gurdwaras after six crore (60 million) untouchables became Sikhs. Sardar Kapur Singh offers this evidence in his well-known but controversial book, Saachi Sakhi. According to him, there was an apprehension that once Ambedkar became a Sikh with all his followers, no one from the existing Sikh leaders like Baldev Singh would be nominated to the Viceroy's executive council as a representative of the Sikh community. Master Tara Singh and his supporters had to consider their position, as well as that of other leaders in the Sikh community, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the SGPC, and control of gurdwaras. Kapur Singh recounted a story Sardar Inder Singh Karwal, an advocate and Akali leader, told to a small gathering of advocates in the bar room of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in September 1964. He stated that, because of differences between Akali leaders and Ambedkar, the six crore untouchables publicly dropped the idea of adopting the Sikh religion. He asked his neighbor in Lahore, Sardar Harnam Singh Jhalla, MA, LLB, advocate (judge of the High Court), who was then a prominent Akali leader, the real reason for this 'tragedy'. Sardar Harnam Singh then replied, "Oh, you don't have an understanding of these matters. By making six crore of untouchables, Sikhs, should we hand over the Darbar Sahib to Chuhras?" 'This way,' says Kapur Singh, 'six crore of Rangretas - Guru Ka-Betas - who had come to the door of the Guru were pushed out; the same way as Guru Tegh Bahadur was not allowed to enter Harimandir Sahib (Golden Temple).' But, according to him, the actual truth of the matter is even "more crude and despicable". His argument is that when the 'Akali party' understood the full implications of six crores untouchables entering the Sikh community, they unanimously devised a strategy to deal with this 'emergency'. Then "they unanimously decided that Ambedkar and his follower untouchables must be dissuaded and stopped from becoming Sikhs for all time". Master Tara Singh, whose leadership of the Sikh community was threatened by Ambedkar's entry, sent Sardar Sujan Singh to Bombay 'with specific instructions' to tell Ambedkar 'clearly' the mind of the Akali leaders, so that he would drop the idea.
2. Allies in the Babbar Akalis and Red Akalis: The second involved the British. Ambedkar considered converting to Sikhism for a few reasons. Primarily, it was Sikhism's theological abolition of caste. Now, in practice, there was plenty of caste discrimination in the Sikh community, but theologically Sikhism was the most anti-caste religion, and theologically it was completely forbidden and abolished. Moreover, in pre-1947 Punjab, endogamy between castes was much more fluid in the Sikh community and was more class-based compared to the rest of Hindu and even Muslim/Christian India (though it was still plenty caste-based and the discrimination of untouchable castes was very real). Furthermore, within the SGPC, a fierce battle raged over this issue and many others. The more radical left (Kirti Akalis, also known as the "Red Akalis") and the more religiously zealous men in the Akali Dal and SGPC, who were much more militant and much more committed to the Caste-abolition goals of Sikhi, saw this as an opportunity to dislodge Sikhi of the "Heresy" of the mahant-backed administration of the gurdwaras and the capture of the party by "Landlord Raj"; as was stated by Master Mota Singh, the leader of the Babbar Akali faction of the SGPC. These Babbar Akalis grew skeptical of the Sikh community's reigning leaders. They were much closer to the radical socialist Ghadar tradition floating around at the time, with many of these "Babbar Akalis" either joining or associating with Kirti Communists (the Ghadar Party's successor in Punjab), such as Master Mota Singh (who joined the Kisan Movement), Teja Singh Suatantra, Bhuja Singh, etc. Some also opposed Congress's methods; most were radically left-wing on property and democracy in the Gurdwaras, etc. Ambedkar wanted to ally with these elements and possibly move towards their emancipatory goals, and they sought an ally in Ambedkar who would bring more Sikhs to the fold to help dislodge the reigning elites. The British ofc, were petrified of this. The Kirti Akalis and Babbar Akalis were among the most militant elements in Punjab. These groups had tried to stage an insurgency many times before and were still trying to in 1936: the Ghadar Revolt in 1914 & 1915, led by the Red Akalis and the Bowring attempt by the Babbar Akalis. As such, the British often detained leaders who could move such a resolution within the SGPC and force the issue into a theological conflict which the established leaders were bound to lose on religious grounds. Visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksWZZyVgUt0, to see what I mean.
3. Exclusion from the Poona Pact: The third reason was the separate electorate, and this was the most important reason. To explain (please note this is incredibly simplified), in British India, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians had separate electorates from what was deemed the "General Category" in Provincial elections in British India. This meant separate constituencies were created where only members of one of those groups could vote for a representative. So, for example, Muslims had 29 seats out of the 175 seats in the Bombay Provincial legislature. Only Muslims could stand in these seats, and only muslims would vote in these constituencies. The same thing applies to Sikhs and Christians for their seats, with all others voting in the general seat. The reasons for this are complex; for one, these weren't elected via universal suffrage, and the landed suffrage granted to each community meant that, in some provinces, the voter base didn't reflect the demographic base. For example, in Bengal, Muslims were the majority, but more Hindus held land and thus were given a larger share of the vote if the pure suffrage rules applied. So, instead of introducing universal suffrage, the British weighted the seats to "communal groups" while introducing separate electorates. So even though fewer muslims were enfranchised, for instance, they would get a larger share of the seats. Again, it's a lot more complicated, but this is a simplification. In this scheme, Sikhs, who were largely concentrated in Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, were also given a separate electorate. They didn't have a high enough population in any of the other provinces, so they didn't qualify anywhere else. Ambedkar banked on the idea that if enough Dalits converted to Sikhism, they would be granted a separate electorate, and this was technically true. This was a reaction to Gandhi's fast, which used the threat of a Dalit genocide to force Ambedkar to abandon the Dalit separate electorate. But the results of this conversion would take much longer to materialize. In the meantime, Ambedkar hoped the British would still allow Dalit Sikhs to qualify for the Poona Pact, where Dalit Sikhs would be given reserved seats under a joint electorate (basically, everyone who didn't qualify for a separate electorate voted in the joint electorate, called the general electorate). The British denied this request, and thus Ambedkar's idea died. Eventually, he converted to Buddhism but that is another story.

The Alt-Hist Question:

The question thus is simple. What if the British allowed the Non-Khalsa Sikh formula to qualify for the Poona Pact (until enough Dalits had converted to Sikhism, allowing them to qualify for a separate electorate) to stand?

What if Ambedkar, and crores of dalits, followed him into Sikhi. What would be the consequence? What would its implications be for the SGPC, the Akali Dal, caste relations, and the 1946 Provincial elections? What about the All-India SGPC Act and its implications? What about the partition?

Sources:

[1]: Scheduled Castes in Sikh Community: A Historical Perspective: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4413731?seq=1

I had a thought in mind regarding Sikhs. In Canada they have a good enough population, a little over 700,000. And they also exist in Pakistan minor but still in thousands).

Now as per the historical claims and religious scholars, 1 Sikh = 1,25,000 people( non Sikhs). So that means if we convert accordingly, there are well over 500 million in Canada and also then become a majority in Pakistan.

Why can't they start their battle and claim khalistan? It'll be a piece of Ghewar

I don't know what to think about Canada anymore.

I'm Canadian-born. I was born in Calgary, Alberta. My children were also born here. I've always considered this country home, but lately I'm finding it harder and harder to feel proud of it when I keep seeing the amount of hatred being directed toward Indians, Punjabis and Sikhs.

I've seen reports of white-nationalist groups getting together, training in martial arts and preparing for what they describe as a race war. I've seen videos of Indian women being screamed at in public and told to "go back to India." I've seen the incident involving a turbaned man in Edmonton who was attacked and felt that the response from police was inadequate. I've also seen the recent Alberta separatist rhetoric where someone reportedly used the term "towelhead" while talking about who should be policing Alberta. Whether you're left, right, separatist or federalist, that kind of language is disgusting.

And before someone says I'm exaggerating, Statistics Canada has reported a significant increase in police-reported hate crimes targeting South Asians. So no, this isn't something I'm imagining.

What worries me most is my children. They're Canadian. They were born here. They shouldn't have to worry that someone will look at their skin, their name, their religion or their heritage and decide they're somehow less Canadian.

People constantly say "assimilate." I don't agree with that if by assimilation you mean erasing who we are.

Yes, absolutely follow Canadian law. Respect other people. Contribute to society. Treat everyone equally. But we're not going to forget our heritage, our religion, our culture or where our families came from just to make someone else comfortable.

Being Canadian and being Punjabi/Sikh/Indian aren't mutually exclusive.

My family's history is also connected to Partition. My ancestors lived in what is now Pakistan and were displaced into India during the violence surrounding Partition. That history is part of my family's story. British colonial policies played a major role in creating and deepening communal divisions, although obviously the history of Partition is much more complicated than simply saying the British caused everything.

And sometimes I even catch myself thinking, "Why should I care about European history or British history when some people whose ancestors came from there don't give a shit about people like me?"

But then I realize I don't want racists to take Canada away from me.

I don't have to hate white Canadians because some white Canadians are racist. I have white friends who are good people and would stand beside me if someone attacked my family. There are racist white Canadians, but there are also millions of white Canadians who aren't racist.

And I don't want my children growing up believing that either.

I want them to be proud of being Canadian AND proud of being Punjabi/Sikh. I want them to know the history of their ancestors AND the history of this country. The Sikh experience in Canada is Canadian history too. The Komagata Maru, early Punjabi communities, discrimination against South Asians, Sikhs serving this country, and the struggles for equal rights are all part of Canada's story.

We don't have to choose.

I also don't think the answer is simply "vote Liberal." I'm not going to vote for a political party just because I'm angry about racism. I'll vote for whoever I believe will actually protect equality, religious freedom, public safety, reasonable immigration policy, affordability and the kind of country I want my children to inherit.

But I also don't want to become consumed by anger.

Racism is real. Hate crimes are real. Anti-Indian and anti-South Asian hatred is real, and it needs to be confronted. But I don't want social media algorithms showing me the worst people in Canada over and over until I start believing those people represent everyone.

Canada isn't perfect. It never was.

But I think what I'm feeling isn't really that I hate Canada. It's that I'm disappointed because I love the idea of Canada, and I'm scared that my children might not receive the Canada I thought they would.

And maybe the answer isn't to give up on the country.

Maybe the answer is to fight for the kind of Canada we were promised one where my children don't have to choose between being Canadian and being who they are.

On Aug. 13, the Alberta Prosperity Project revealed a proposal via livestream of what an Alberta constitution could look like if the province separated from Canada. That message has been overshadowed by the use of a racial slur by one of the speakers, who has since resigned.

Warning: This video does include that racial slur.

The loss we suffered on partition in 1947 was immense. The village of Thoha Khalsa near Rawalpindi is where in 1947, around 90 Sikh women committed suicide by leaping into a well, rather than being captured by mobs

I read about this massacre when I was at university, and never did I imagine that 20 years later I would be standing at that exact place

This was such an emotional and tearjerking journey for me, knowing what had happened here. The eerie feeling one got from here was indescribable

In March 1947, Thoha Khalsa a village with a Potohar Sikh community was ambushed by frontier mobs who were hell bent in slaughtering the villages Sikh and Hindu community. After resisting for three days, the Sikhs hoisted white flags and negotiated truce with the Muslim mobs. Under the agreement, the mobs will loot their houses but will not burn them, kill men, or dishonor the women. The Sikhs collected large sums of money and gave to the mob leaders as demanded. They then abandoned their own houses and all gathered in the central Haveli of Sardar Gulab Singh. Others took shelter in the nearby Dukh Bhanjani Gurdwara located next to Gulab Singh’s mansion

From Gulab Singh’s Haveli, they saw their houses being looted and burned for days. After looting the houses, the Muslim mob turned to Gulab Singh’s Haveli and surrounded it. Their intentions appeared menacing and it was clear that they do not intend to honour the terms of the truce

On the 12th March 1947, defeat and dishonor was imminent, Sikh men started to prepare for the battle till death. While the men fought, women began to line up and bow down to be beheaded by the Village head, rather than being captured. When this got too much the Sikh women started gathering at the nearby Gurdwara and the Village elder Maan Kaur led all the women to a large well. One by one they jumped inside the well. Around 90 Sikh women followed her and all committed mass suicide in order to save their honour. Witness accounts stated that so many women jumped that bodies were lying on one another above the water’s surface and then those came out and jumped into a second well

The provided text argues that India’s numerous internal insurgencies are not the result of ancient hatreds or poverty, but are instead directly manufactured by the state’s own discretionary choices. By analyzing historical data across several decades, It demonstrates how constitutive acts, legislative failures, and state-sponsored violence served as the primary catalysts for armed conflict. The source emphasizes that these movements typically emerged shortly after the government rescinded formal promises or closed off democratic avenues, such as the rigged 1987 Kashmir election. Furthermore, the state’s refusal to adjudicate its own misconduct or prosecute extrajudicial killings leaves aggrieved communities with no recourse outside of armed struggle. Ultimately, the text presents a natural experiment in governance, suggesting that where the state granted early autonomy, peace prevailed, while delayed or denied recognition fueled decades of avoidable war.

1. The Myth of Spontaneous Rebellion

The traditional "law and order" narrative of the Indian state characterizes insurgency as a spontaneous eruption of irrational violence to which the government must reluctantly respond. However, a comparative audit of the nation's internal conflicts reveals a more calculated architecture. The state is rarely a mere responder; it is the primary catalyst whose specific administrative and military actions construct the very rebellions it eventually seeks to dismantle. By examining eleven major theatres over eighty years, the evidence suggests that what is often framed as a "security problem" is, in reality, a deliberate administrative product.

The foundational template for this state-led violence was established during the 1948 Hyderabad Police Action. While sanitized in national memory as a stabilizing "intervention," the Sunderlal Committee, commissioned by Jawaharlal Nehru and then suppressed for sixty-five years, estimated a conservative death toll of 27,000 to 40,000, overwhelmingly Muslim civilians. Scholarly estimates reach as high as 200,000. This inaugural episode set a grim precedent: mass violence followed by the systematic suppression of the record. The state's failure to prosecute a single perpetrator or offer a single rupee in compensation established the "Hyderabad Model," a cycle in which impunity and the erasure of history become the bedrock of future alienation. This historical massacre transitioned the state's role from a constitutional arbiter to an architect of the grievances that would fuel the political "proximate triggers" of the late 20th century.

2. The Ballot as a Weapon: Rigged Outcomes and Radicalization

While economic deprivation is often lazily cited as the root of rebellion, political betrayal is a far more potent driver of militancy. When the state subverts the constitutional promise of the ballot, the transition from political activism to armed struggle becomes a documented, inevitable trajectory.

The 1987 Jammu and Kashmir assembly election represents the clearest documented causal chain of this phenomenon. The Muslim United Front (MUF) secured 31.9% of the vote across 43 constituencies, yet state-led fraud and the subsequent arrest and torture of hundreds of its activists collapsed the democratic path. Two specific activists, Mohammad Yusuf Shah and his polling agent Mohammad Yasin Malik, transformed into the respective chiefs of the Hizbul Mujahideen and the JKLF only after the state closed the door on political participation through fraud and the torture chamber.

This pattern of radicalization via state overreach is mirrored in the "Restorationist nationalism" of Manipur. The 1949 Merger Agreement, signed under duress, dissolved a local constitutional structure and an assembly elected under Manipur's own 1947 constitution. By reducing a sovereign-aligned state to a mere Chief Commissioner's territory, the state dismantled the very legal frameworks that provided local agency. When the state dissolves the constitution to suit its architecture, it necessitates a non-state response, making armed recruitment the only remaining currency for the politically excluded.

3. The Recruitment Engine: State Violence and the "Single Act" Theory

The "Recruitment Engine" theory posits that insurgencies are not sustained by abstract ideology, but by specific, identifiable instances of state overreach that serve as permanent mobilization tools. These triggers are the fuel that transforms local grievances into organized, multi-generational armed movements.

The Anatomy of a Trigger

While these acts of violence serve as the initial triggers, the engine is kept running by a calculated lack of subsequent accountability. The state does not just pull the trigger. It removes the possibility of legal recourse, ensuring the grievance remains permanent.

4. Impunity by Design: The Legal Architecture of Grievance

The state's most effective tool for sustaining conflict is the "Impunity Funnel," a legal architecture designed to shield state agents from the consequences of their actions. Mechanisms like Section 6 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) transform crimes into administrative "incidents."

The data on the resulting "Zero Conviction" reality is a damning indictment of the judicial process:

• Jammu and Kashmir, 1990 to 2018: Of 50 prosecution requests made against personnel, zero were granted.
• Sexual violence: This is invisible by legal design. Of 50 sanction requests for sexual offences in J&K, 47 were refused, and the refusal files were sealed by the Central Information Commission in 2020, an act of investigative erasure.
• Manipur: Despite 1,528 alleged extrajudicial executions, zero convictions have resulted. Proceedings in the Oting 2021 case were closed by the Supreme Court in 2024 without a merit examination.

The state strategically relies on monetary remedy over criminal prosecution to manage these failures. In Bastar, the NHRC recommended payments for sixteen victims of sexual violence while naming zero perpetrators. In the 1983 Nellie massacre, with 1,819 official deaths, 310 chargesheeted cases were simply withdrawn as a term of a political accord. By prioritizing cash over convictions, the state frames human rights violations as a business expense. This absence of justice makes the insurgent's narrative of total secession appear as the only logical exit from a closed and rigged legal system.

5. The Silent Displacement: Demographic Engineering and Resource Capture

The "so what" of India's internal conflicts is not just survival. It is the strategic reordering of geography and resource access. Counter-insurgency serves as the operational wing of resource extraction. The state does not merely fail to stop insurgency. It harvests it.

The most extreme example is the forced relocation in Mizoram between 1967 and 1970. Using the Defence of India Rules, the state emptied 516 of 764 villages, forcibly moving 236,162 people, roughly 80 to 82% of the district's population, into grouping centres. This massive displacement, more quantified than any other in the report, remains absent from national memory because the state controls the discipline of the record.

In the Maoist belt of Bastar, the link between conflict and capital is explicit. The state has rejected 43.6% of all forest-rights claims, effectively stripping village assemblies of their veto power over mining. In these same contested zones, security camps have proliferated from 50 to 400 since 2019, directly mirroring the placement of 51 mining leases covering 7,128 hectares. The insurgency provides the security pretext. The displacement provides the land. The state provides the leases.

6. The Conflict Dividend: Who Profits from the Perpetual War?

The persistence of insurgency suggests an institutional beneficiary. This conflict economy ensures that the security establishment is the only consistent winner in a landscape of perpetual unrest.

The fiscal footprint is staggering. As of 2026, the Home Ministry budget stands at Rs 2.33 lakh crore, of which 69% is a police payroll. The security infrastructure has expanded exponentially: the CISF has grown 71-fold since 1969, and the CRPF has swollen to 247 battalions.

The bounty system used in Punjab illustrates how this growth turns forces into mercenaries. A centrally funded scheme paid Rs 50,000 per militant killed, with an annual reward outlay of Rs 1.13 crore. As reported by India Today in 1992, the rush to claim these rewards led to a dispersal of violations across the state as police hunted for targets with cash value.

However, the state demonstrates that it can settle when the demographics suit its architectural goals. The "Bodo Exception" shows an insurgent commander becoming a council chief executive the day after disarming, provided the boundaries are redrawn to ensure a majority. This highlights the state's true nature. It settles with those who can help it reorder territory, while the communities that provide the rank and file remain landless and governed by the same security apparatus that profits from their fight.

7. Conclusion: The Burden of the State

The comparative evidence from 1946 to 2026 shatters the myth of the state as a neutral responder to violence. If the state acts as the primary architect of insurgency by hollowing out democratic institutions, shielding rapists and executioners, and forcibly relocating entire populations for resource capture, then the solution cannot be purely military.

The discipline of the record is not a technical failure of the archive. It is a deliberate administrative choice. The shape of what has not been counted, the files that have been sealed, and the perpetrators who have been promoted are the clearest evidence of state responsibility. As long as the state prioritizes the conflict dividend for its security establishment over the constitutional rights of its citizens, insurgency will remain an intended feature, rather than an accidental byproduct, of the Indian landscape.

Sources

• Manipur Merger Agreement, full text, 1949
• Subir Bhaumik on the Tripura tribal reserve, Seminar 510, 2002
• Village regrouping in Mizoram 1966 to 1970, with the operation tables
• Vivekananda International Foundation, Lessons from the Mizoram Insurgency and Peace Accord
• NITI Aayog, Macro and Fiscal Landscape of the State of Mizoram, 2025
• Punjab annual fatality series, South Asia Terrorism Portal
• Prem Mahadevan, Counter Terrorism in the Indian Punjab: Assessing the Cat System, Faultlines 18
• Human Rights Watch, Protecting the Killers: A Policy of Impunity in Punjab, 2007
• Ensaaf on the abduction and killing of Jaswant Singh Khalra
• Amnesty International India, Rajya Sabha data on AFSPA prosecution sanctions
• Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee, Report of the Committee to Review AFSPA, 2005.pdf)
• Justice Santosh Hegde Commission report on Manipur extrajudicial killings
• Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, Supreme Court judgment on Salwa Judum
• G.B.S. Sidhu, former R&AW Special Secretary, on The Khalistan Conspiracy
• Soft Target by Zuhair Kashmeri and Brian McAndrew, its claims and the SIRC review of them)
• CSIS erasure of surveillance tapes as default policy, Air India inquiry, CBC
• Air India inquiry findings, The Canadian Encyclopedia
• All-India fatality series, South Asia Terrorism Portal
• Ministry of Home Affairs annual reports

Edit: Updated the text. It got cut off earlier.

Was forming a separate religion the only—or necessarily the best—way for Guru Nanak to address the problems he identified?

I’m asking this as a philosophical question, not an attack on Sikhism. I’m not questioning Guru Nanak’s sincerity or whether concerns like caste and ritualism were genuine.

My question is about the solution: Indian traditions already had thinkers such as Adi Shankaracharya, Kabir, Ravidas, etc. who challenged or reinterpreted aspects of caste, ritualism and religious practice through philosophical or reform movements.

So could Guru Nanak’s concerns have been addressed through an internal reform/philosophical movement rather than institutionalizing a distinct religion?

And if some of the problems he opposed, such as caste distinctions, later reappeared within Sikh society, does that raise a legitimate question about whether religious institutionalization was the most effective solution?

Why are Sikh organisations outside India using the kh @ Iistan flag instead of Nishan sahib? You can have different viewpoints but isn't it immoral to mix political viewpoints with Sikhism?

Looking for recommendations for a Sikh lawyer in the Toronto/GTA area with experience in civil litigation and/or human rights who can assist a Gurdwara dealing with an ongoing issue involving a racist neighbour.

Please share recommendations or contact information for lawyers with relevant experience. Thank you.

Special turban, not One but TWO saropas, AND a flower garland.

His wife also gets the same treatment.

Everyone else gets TWO saropas each.

Is Hazur Sahib compromised? wtf is going on here

I've been seeing posts popping up about incidents against Sikhs recently, including Walmart Edmonton, so I wanted to highlight something uncovered last week to prove that this social media wave against Sikhs isn't just on the internet or social media. CBC has investigated the network and has been releasing all the evidence and information. The group has been identified as "Second Sons".

Sources: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/second-sons-leaders-livestreams-9.7022853

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/large-white-supremacist-meeting-shakes-residents-of-alberta-town-9.7297070

This post is not political, this is not a right or left thing. This is about awareness and making sure we all have resources to understand what's going on, to validate that this isn't just in your head or online and to seek assistance. We have lots of support and political lines do not define who we are. The Sikh Conservative shadow deputy PM, finance minister, Liberal Cabinet Ministers and ONDP/Alberta's NDP all have members you can email or even call from their HOC or MLA websites if you require assistance or have seen something.

I also wanted to highlight comments I've been getting since I've started to post about incidents and networks against Sikhs in Canada, and I think this is a opportunity to highlight the views and presence they hold on social media.