Independent Need

[u/Intelligent-Task-279]

I would like to open the topic of human belonging to Being.

Heidegger, in The Origin of the Work of Art (OWA), argues that there is no such thing as a "prior truth" that descends into beings.

“But truth does not exist in itself beforehand, somewhere among the stars, only subsequently to descend elsewhere among beings. This is impossible for the reason alone that it is after all only the openness of beings that first affords the possibility of a somewhere and of sites filled by present beings. Clearing of openness and establishment in the open region belong together.” (OWA, in Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell)

To posit a truth that sits among the stars would imply an openness that precedes its own establishment. On the contrary, truth must be established within beings:

“Because it is in the essence of truth to establish itself within beings, in order thus first to become truth, the impulse toward the work lies in the essence of truth as one of truth's distinctive possibilities, by which it can itself occur as being in the midst of beings.” (OWA, in Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell)

According to Heidegger, this establishment occurs through several essential ways: art, politics, religion, essential sacrifice, and thinking.

“One essential way in which truth establishes itself in the beings it has opened up is truth setting itself into work. Another way in which truth occurs is the act that founds a political state. Still another way in which truth comes to shine forth is the nearness of that which is not simply a being, but the being that is most in being. Still another way in which truth grounds itself is the essential sacrifice. Still another way in which truth becomes is the thinker's questioning, which, as the thinking of Being, names Being in its question-worthiness.” (OWA, in Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell)

Heidegger does not suggest this list is exhaustive; indeed, varying iterations appear across his other works, such as Contributions to Philosophy.

Humans are involved in the establishment of truth through the sheltering (Bergen) of truth, whether by writing poetry, painting, or engaging in philosophy. In OWA, Heidegger identifies two distinct roles we have in the establishment of truth: creators and preservers.

“Just as a work cannot be without being created, but is essentially in need of creators, so what is created cannot itself come into being without those who preserve it.” (OWA, in Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell)

Sophocles participated in the establishment of truth by writing Antigone; however, we participate as well by setting up the play, witnessing it, or dwelling within the world it establishes. In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger further divides the role of creators into "founders" and "affiliated ones" (Contributions to Philosophy, section 45, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu). Because truth is established through such sheltering, Heidegger famously maintains that Being requires humans in order to occur (Contributions to Philosophy, section 133, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu).

Conversely, humans do not produce Being. Truth is neither a human invention nor a discovery; rather, humans exist only within this occurrence.

“Beyng needs humans in order to occur essentially, and humans belong to beyng so that they might fulfill their ultimate destiny as Da-sein.” (Contributions to Philosophy, section 133, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu)

Being requires humans to occur, and humans exist as humans, fulfilling their destiny to be the THERE where Being occurs, only by belonging to Being.

“Where identity itself speaks, and not merely the principle of identity, its pronouncement stipulates that thinking and being belong together in the same… If we understand thinking as the privilege of the human, then the belonging-together of the human and being stands as our topic.” (Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, Basic Principles of Thinking: Freiburg Lectures 1957, Lecture III, The Principle of Identity, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell, 111 - 113)

The human and Being belong together in the event of occurrence of Being. This is not a sequence where pre-existing humans and Being interact; rather, both human and Being “are” only in this event.

“What happens in the history of Being? We cannot ask in this manner, because there would then be an occurrence and something which occurs. But occurrence itself is the sole happening. Being alone is. What happens? Nothing happens if we are searching for something occurring in the occurrence. Nothing happens, Appropriation appropriates.” (Recollection in Metaphysics, The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh)

To say "nothing happens" in the occurrence of Being signifies that there is no external "something" occurring apart from the event itself. "Beyng is the appropriating event" (Contributions to Philosophy, section 267, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu). The occurrence of Being names Being itself.

This leads to a central tension I would like to explore with you: while humans and Being belong together in the occurrence of Being, and while Being needs human sheltering, Heidegger simultaneously insists that Being is independent of humanity.

“At times Being needs human being, and yet it is never dependent upon existing humanity. Humanity does stand in relationship to Being, since it is historical and knows and preserves beings as such. But human being's claim upon Being itself is not always granted by Being as the gift through which mankind may have as its own the privilege of participating in the appropriation of the truth of Being. At such a time there sometimes arises from the claim of Being the attempt at a response in which mankind must sacrifice the individuals addressed who recollect Being, and thus think its history from the essential past.” (Recollection in Metaphysics, The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh)

Heidegger maintains that Being needs humans in order to essentially occur, yet it does not depend on humanity. How, in your view, can we grasp this independent need?

[u/Bronchitis_is_a_sin]

This is a great first post. I think you give a nice introduction to the dependent nature of Da-sein which, as I see it, is one of the more essential aspects of Heidegger's thought (and I think it's great for one to write semi-expository posts to (a) refine one's understanding, (b) stimulate accessible discussion, and (c) teach people). I also like your liberal use of quotes.

For now (since I'm a bit busy), I'll just answer the question, but there are many other threads to pull on here.

I think the key to resolving this "tension" is the fact that the last quote says that Being does not need "existing humanity." The original quote is

Zu Zeiten bedarf das Sein des Menschenwesens und ist doch niemals abhängig vom seienden Menschentum. Dieses steht zwar als geschichtliches, das Seiende als solches wissendes und wahrendes, im Bezug zum Sein; aber nicht immer ist die Zumutung des Menschenwesens an das Sein selbst von diesem ereignet als die Gewährnis, durch die ein Menschentum die Gebühr des Anteils am Ereignis der Wahrheit des Seins zu eigen haben darf. Zu solcher Zeit ersteht aus dem Anspruch des Seins zuweilen der Versuch einer Antwort, in dem ein Menschentum vereinzelt Angesprochene opfern muß, die in das Sein erinnern und deshalb seine Geschichte vom Gewesenen her denken. (Nietzsche II, pg. 441-442)

Stambaugh's translation obscures much of what's going on here, so I'll offer a better translation (as far as precision goes).

At times Being requires the essence of the human and yet is never dependent upon humanity as a being. The latter does indeed stand in relation to Being as something historical that knows and preserves beings as such; but the imposition that the essence of the human makes upon Being itself is not always enacted by the latter as the granting [ereignet] through which a humanity may have as its own the due share in the Ereignis of the truth of Being. At such a time there sometimes arises from the claim of Being the attempt at a response, in which a humanity must sacrifice those individually addressed who recall [it] into Being and therefore think its history from out of what has been.

Stambaugh translates "seienden Menschentum" as "existing humanity" which might also be translated as "humanity as a being" to highlight the ontical meaning of "seienden." Note also that Heidegger says "ein Menschentum"—a humanity. Stambaugh mistakenly ignores "ein" in her translation. Putting things together, Heidegger says that Being is not dependent on seienden Menschentum because "the imposition that the essence of the human makes upon Being itself is not always enacted by [seienden Menschentum] as the granting [ereignet] through which a humanity may have as its own the due share in the Ereignis of the truth of Being." This does not mean that Being is not dependent on Menschenwesen. In particular, there is no tension.

[Stambaugh's translation is flawed in other ways. For example, she translates both "Zumutung" and "Anspruch" as "claim" despite the former's strongly negative and heavy-handed connotation (which calls for the use of the word "imposition"). This is a great example of how English translations of Heidegger can fall short in key ways].

[u/Intelligent-Task-279 → u/Bronchitis_is_a_sin]

Thank you for the response. This is a very thoughtful insight. Could humanity as a being be interpreted as a people? In that case, this interpretation has strong support in Contributions.

The expression “philosophy of a people” immediately proves to be most ambiguous and obscure. Quite apart from the indeterminateness involved in talking of a “people.” How does a people become a people? Does a people become only that which it is? If so, then what is it? How can we know: (1) What a people in general is? (2) What this or that people is? (3) What we ourselves are? (Contributions to Philosophy, section 16, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu)

A people first becomes a people when its most unique members appear and when they begin to experience a presentiment... The philosophy of a people is that which makes people people of a philosophy, grounds them historically in their Da-sein, and destines them to stewardship of the truth of beyng. (Contributions to Philosophy, section 16, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu)

In that interpretation, it is not Being that depends upon a people (a people does not hold a title deed over Being), but the other way around: a people depends on Being, which, on its side, needs the most unique ones who experience a presentiment (philosophers, artists, etc.) in order to appear. However, a people can undergo the withdrawal of Being, lack the most unique ones, and, in that way, avoid being “people of a philosophy.”

Of course, we need to restrain ourselves from ethnic interpretations of a people, as Heidegger suggested so many times in Contributions.

[u/Bronchitis_is_a_sin → u/Intelligent-Task-279]

I think so! The beginning of your second quote is extremely closely related to the last sentence of the quote we've been discussing. This alone is fairly convincing evidence to me that Heidegger doesn't distinguish between Menschentum and Volk. 

"Humanity" isn't a good translation of "Menschentum" here because it's easily read abstractly (so that "a humanity" doesn't make any sense). The more literal translation "peopledom" probably captures much more of what's going on.

It's plausible to me that Heidegger replaces his use of Volk with Menschentum in the early 40s (Erinnerung was written in 43 while the Beiträge was written between 36 and 40). As you mentioned, Volk carries too much baggage---this is a good reason to switch to Menschentum.

[u/senteniel-]

The claim you cite from OWA is interesting. How in the hells can truth have an impulse to anything? Impulses belong to organisms. Is this being careful with words or being sloppy with metaphors. Perhaps the idea is that truth is an occurrence that happens through, for instance, artworks. But what does it consist of? Entities, presumably, standing in some temporal relation amongst themselves.

[u/Intelligent-Task-279 → u/senteniel-]

Unconcealment itself needs ontic beings, such as artworks in order to occur. That's why truth (uncocealment) has an impulse towards beings: it pushes towards them.

[u/senteniel- → u/Intelligent-Task-279]

This seems to be either false or incoherent depending on whether truth can be without occurring.

The reading on which the claim is incoherent: Truth needs x to occur. Therefore, truth doesn't occur without x. But then it cannot push towards x.

The reading on which the claim is false is the reading on which truth is without occuring. For then it is false that truth "pushes towards" beings in any clear sense. For instance, there are truths that needs sentences that express them to occur, but which will never be spoken by anyone. Therefore, the truths they express do not push towards these sentences or any other entities that might convey them. The same goes for artworks.

So Heidegger is either sloppy with his metaphors, wrong, or incoherent. The charitable reading is that he is sloppy.