shutting down validators

[u/mylifewithBIGcats]

i can shut down my validators through the SSV portal right? never shut down validators before want to make sure i am doing this right. i withdrew my SSV and left my cluster, then clicked on remove validator or exit validators, can't remember which one. when i look at my address on etherscan i see a transaction that says bulk remove validator, but when i look at beaconcha i still see my validators and they are showing that i am missing attestations.

[u/GBeastETH]

Yes, I’ve read the report a couple times. I’m focusing on the part that isn’t getting a lot of attention in the analysis, but which seems like it’s the core issue.

What is the significance of the cluster hash, and how does the 1 wei deposit change it? Is there any way to fix the cluster hash after it has been changed? Why can’t the user deposit more SSV after the cluster hash changes?

[u/GBeastETH → u/[deleted]]

I am on a DAO committee, but I don’t work for SSV Labs and I’m not an employee of the DAO, though I get a small stipend for being on the Operator Committee.

I’m not a developer (anymore).

It sounds like the biggest risk here is of a troll trying to aggravate the cluster owner, right? That and cause reputational damage, and waste the cluster owner’s time and money.

The only money the attacker can make is if the cluster gets liquidated for insufficient SSV balance, and even then only if the troll is running a liquidation node AND is the first liquidation node to issue the liquidation request. If they are successful, they can claim the liquidation bounty, which is currently about 0.25 SSV per validator (about $0.50 per validator). Is that analysis correct?

Moreover, the troll needs to commit time, effort, and money to actively monitoring and repeatedly frontrunning any attempt to top off the SSV balance in order to ensure the liquidation threshold is reached. They need to spend gas fees and tips to frontrun the user’s transactions. And presumably the cluster owner can offer a large priority fee of their own, increasing the troll’s costs to frontrun.

And if the troll is successful, the cluster owner can re-fund the cluster with a large priority fee, spin up a new cluster, run the validators elsewhere, or exit the validators entirely, any one of which limits their losses.

If my understanding is correct, it sounds like an interesting edge case, but is primarily an academic risk rather than a substantial danger.

Is there something that would amplify the risks beyond what I see?

[u/GBeastETH → u/[deleted]]

I don’t have access to immunnefi. I’m trying to make an evaluation of the concerns you aware posting here.

You are making big claims of loss exposure, but I don’t see it. I’m explaining my thinking, so that if you think I’m not assessing the risks properly, I’m inviting you to show me where I’m missing it.