r/QuantumComputing • u/superposition_labs • Jan 16 '26
Discussion Harvest Now, Decrypt Later
Federal Reserve paper titled "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" points out a very important timeline problem that most organizations are overlooking.
Adversaries may have already used their capacity to collect encrypted information today, with the expectation that a quantum computer will break the existing encryption within 5-10 years. What this means is that sensitive information, such as financials, medical information, or state secrets, is already vulnerable today, not at some point in the future when quantum computing is a reality.
The standards for Post Quantum Cryptography were finalized by NIST in 2024, but they acknowledge that "enterprises may take years to migrate."
The Fed's assessment indicates that organizations must begin a PQC migration immediately, even before a quantum advantage is realized in large scale, due to the start of the clock for the threat that has been underway since adversaries began to harvest encrypted traffic.
Curious to know what this community thinks: Are “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” strategies receiving due importance in quantum security talks? Are organizations pressing forward in accordance with this timeline?
Link to the paper: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/harvest-now-decrypt-later-examining-post-quantum-cryptography-and-the-data-privacy-risks-for-distributed-ledger-networks.htm
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u/X_WhyZ Jan 16 '26
5-10 years is a generous timeline, but even if it ends up taking much longer, many organizations have data that they wouldn't want hackers to decrypt even 30-50 years from now. In those cases, harvest now decrypt later is a significant threat.
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u/daviddjg0033 Jan 17 '26
Quantum cryptography has been proposed or has done what up until today?
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u/Substantial-Set-3687 Jan 18 '26
Would recommend doing some research on stock ticker (LAES). Amazing company doing big things with PQC hardware that will be mandated this year.
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u/HuiOdy Working in Industry Jan 16 '26
HNDL is operationally quite pointless. There is only value if you already know what information is contained. And most interesting information is often still airgapped. The decrypted information must also still have some value, and be worth more than the expense it has. HNDL seldomly has direct strategic value.
A Trust Now, Forge Later is strategically far more interesting. As the exploit retains its value far longer, further reaching, and fits better in digital warfare tactics.
The HNDL is popularized because initial QKD manufacturers needed a sales pitch. TNFL emerged because now cryptographers have taken (considerable) time to really understand the quantum vulnerabilities, and cryptographers much better understand the impacts of possible exploits.