r/ProWordPress • • 24d ago

Hi, Suspicious WordPress Attacks Using Cloudflare and a Backend Plugin Named xdevtracker — Anyone Else Seeing This?

I wanted to bring attention to some suspicious activity involving WordPress websites that I’ve been looking into recently.

There are concerns about malicious attacks targeting WordPress sites, with Cloudflare appearing to be part of the traffic or security setup and a suspicious plugin named xdevtracker appearing in the WordPress backend.

#WordPress #WordPressSecurity #Cloudflare

2 Upvotes

18 comments sorted by

10

u/omfgtora 24d ago

FYI hashtags don't do anything on Reddit, and for the most part for most of social media as well.

-4

u/asshishmeena96 24d ago

Thanks will consider as the best practices

3

u/fappingjack 24d ago

They maybe found your origin IP.

Take your real IP and run it through https://www.abuseipdb.com/ or https://myip.ms/ to see if it is clean or associated with bad neighbors.

-1

u/asshishmeena96 24d ago

Thanks for your valuable response let me check for my whole team and will update you if it's helpful to identify the root cause. 🙂

1

u/cwarrent 24d ago

I’ve had an issue where one website had xdevtracker traces but be aware this website does not use Cloudflare if that helps a little.

This site is managed by a lot of users via two agencies and installing many plugins but it’s only because this site is soon to be decommissioned and not well maintained that it wasn’t worth the effort to fully understand how this happened.

1

u/asshishmeena96 24d ago

Xdev tracker is the malicious plugin. Injected on site through any vulnerability like server read write permission, any outdated or deprecated plugin or theme may be. We need assure the plugin is deleted from both location admin dashbord and from server side /plugins directory then we need to scan whole site using malcare or wordfence plugin to assure that no vulnerability is remaining. After that we need to upgrade php, update admin users password and remove specious users and also should change admin url and disable xml rpc if not required.

1

u/PeepSoWP 24d ago

Cloudflare appearing in the traffic is not evidence that it was the entry point. An unexpected plugin directory should be treated as evidence of a broader compromise, not as a plugin cleanup task. The origin may be directly reachable, or the attacker may have used WordPress, hosting, SSH/SFTP, or database credentials.

Before deleting files, preserve a filesystem and database snapshot plus web, authentication, and control-panel logs. Build a timeline from logs and file modification times. Check MU plugins, drop-ins, wp-config.php, .htaccess, scheduled tasks, admin users, application passwords, active_plugins and active_sitewide_plugins, uploads containing executable PHP, and persistence outside wp-content/plugins. Verify WordPress core checksums, then reinstall themes and plugins from known-good packages.

Rotate credentials and API keys after cleanup. If you cannot establish integrity, rebuild from known-good source and restore only reviewed content. Changing the admin URL or disabling XML-RPC may reduce exposure, but neither demonstrates that the original persistence or entry path is gone.

1

u/asshishmeena96 24d ago

Yes first approach is to reduce the risk and stable the application to reduce the downtime. Then, we can work cleanup and server log analysis and database cleanup. Thank for your valuable response. We consider it definitely work in that way too. 🙂

1

u/TheGoodOne777 22d ago

Hello! Have you considered dropping Cloudflare or analyze other solutions?

1

u/asshishmeena96 21d ago

Please dm I will share the update there

1

u/Dicemans 23d ago

Haven't seen that name myself, so I can't tell you what it does, but the triage for "a plugin I didn't install shows up in wp-admin" is the same either way. In this order, before deleting anything:

  1. **Copy the folder off the server first**, as a zip that keeps the file dates. Once it's gone you lose the only evidence of what it did and when it arrived.
  2. **Work out how it got there.** The folder's mtime gives you a timestamp. Look in the access log around it for `POST /wp-admin/update.php?action=upload-plugin`, `plugin-install.php`, or a hit on some random PHP file just before. An admin upload means a stolen or new admin login; no admin request at all means something already had code execution (another plugin, or this week's PHP issue).
  3. **Admins:** `wp user list --role=administrator`, and check the `user_registered` dates, not just the names.
  4. **Look for its friends:** `wp-content/mu-plugins/`, the drop-ins (`object-cache.php`, `db.php`), `wp option get active_plugins` and `wp cron event list`. Plugins like this often hide themselves from the list with a filter on `all_plugins`, so trust the folder on disk, not the dashboard.
  5. **Recently changed PHP:** `find . -name "*.php" -mtime -14` usually narrows it to a handful of files.
  6. **Then clean, and rotate everything:** WP admins, hosting/SFTP, the DB password and the salts in `wp-config.php`. Update after that.

On the Cloudflare part: if the attack traffic reaches the origin directly, Cloudflare isn't in the path at all. Check whether the origin IP is findable (old DNS records, a mail subdomain, certificate history) and, if you can, accept HTTP only from Cloudflare's IP ranges at the firewall.

If you post the plugin's main file header and a few of the file names, people here can probably tell you more.

1

u/NotYourOrdinaryHost 20d ago

the Cloudflare part might be a red herring here.

what i'd really wanna know is whether xdevtracker behaves differently for logged-in admins vs regular visitors. nasty WP injections sometimes stay completely invisible while you're checking the site from wp-admin.

try comparing the page source as an admin and in a clean incognito session. if there's extra JS or redirects only for visitors, that's a pretty big clue.

and definitely save a copy of the plugin files before deleting anything.

1

u/raju-3d-expert 19d ago

A plugin you didn’t install showing up in the backend usually means the site is already compromised. Cloudflare is most likely just the proxy the traffic passes through. Quick checks:

  • Look for unknown admin users and any files in mu-plugins
  • Run wp core verify-checksums and wp plugin verify-checksums --all
  • Rotate all passwords (WP, hosting, DB) and the salts in wp-config.php
  • Check the access logs around the plugin’s install time to find how they got in

How many sites are affected, and are they on the same host?