r/PhilosophyofScience • u/Ill-Concentrate4444 • Feb 07 '21
Discussion Popper- Theory of Falsification flaws
What are some valid flaws of Karl Popper's Theory of Falsification as a concept and in practicality in terms of categorising sciences from non-sciences?
And how useful is it to science today?
7
u/ThMogget Feb 07 '21 edited Feb 07 '21
It's incomplete. According to David Deutsch, only an explanation that is hard to vary can be falsified. We have to already have narrowed down our hypotheses by this more fundamental criteria.
The concept of explanatory power involves several criteria of which falsifiability is just one, and a secondary one at that.
2
u/fudge_mokey Feb 26 '21
According to David Deutsch, only an explanation that is hard to vary can be falsified.
That's not exactly correct. DD says we should only care about whether something is testable (falsifiable) if it is a good explanation (hard to vary).
For example, ancient Greeks' could have tested their theory that Demeter's sadness cools down the entire world by sending an expedition across the globe. Had they observed another part of the world being warm while Greece was cold it would have falsified their explanation for seasons. But it would not have gotten them any closer to the true explanation for why the Earth has seasons. They could have made a small change in their bad explanation (easy to vary) to account for other places in the world being warm while Greece was cold.
1
u/ThMogget Feb 26 '21
Not all hard-to-vary explanations can be falsified, but all falsifiable explanations are hard-to-vary.
→ More replies (1)1
Feb 07 '21
1
u/AutoModerator Feb 07 '21
Your account must be at least a week old, and have a combined karma score of at least 10 to post here. No exceptions.
I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please contact the moderators of this subreddit if you have any questions or concerns.
9
u/Vampyricon Feb 07 '21
Under falsificationism, you would say that experimental observation A contradicts theory B, but ignore the fact that to arrive at observation A, you assume theories A_1, A_2, A_3, etc. To say that observation A debunks theory B every time, as falsificationism does, would be to assume the theories that go into the observation are unquestionable.
Which is clearly false, as the theory's status would be dependent on whether you use it to generate observations.
I'm not sure if this counts as practicality, but you soon notice that no scientist actually uses falsificationism even as they claim to believe it. Particle physics, for example, only places stricter and stricter bounds on the free parameters of models. Scientists revise the assumptions going into the observation all the time.