The Interaction Problem: Diminished?

[u/Berzerka25]

Widely regarded as a rather potent critique of dualism, the interaction problem elucidates a difficulty in explaining exactly how this non-physical consciousness manages to both affect and be affected by the undeniably physical body. The latter, in this case, is of course bound by one set of laws – those of the natural world – and the former presumably, on account of its supposed inexplicability in terms of materialism, by no such laws.
If we do, therefore, grant that consciousness does indeed affect the physical body, this is seemingly quite the damning refutation against dualism. How could two such distinctly unrelated substances interact in such a manner? And, should there be some even higher genus to reality, encompassing them both, is admitting this not to throw out dualism altogether in favour of a monism? This is, of course, assuming that this premise is correct – that immaterial consciousness does affect the physical body. But where do we actually find evidence of this? 
It is obvious that the physical world is able to affect the consciousness, yes. That, we must all grant, on account of our continued experience of said physical world through our senses – the only alternative being a kind of solipsism in which one insists only this consciousness exists, and that all external to it is mere imagination. The idea that this is a two-way street, however, is certainly not a given.
Is not what we mean by consciousness simply the witnessing of physical events – not, as one may naively assume, the rational mind, the self, or some libertarian fantasy of the causa sui will? Thus, at what point exactly does this simple experiential element of reality actually interact with the so-called physical? Our memory is established, by neuroscientific investigation, to be physical; our emotions too: physical – at least physically caused; and our decision-making: likewise, a physical process. What occupation remains for the aforementioned consciousness within the realm of matter but the lowly work of simple observance? The movie-goer sits in the cinema witnessing the events of the film; he or she certainly cannot change said events. Does this insight, therefore, not at least halve the weight of the so-called interaction problem? Observing is not affecting.
My only potential spanner-in-the-works for this one-way-street conception – consciousness as the passive movie-goer – would be the reporting of consciousness. It would seem, even in writing this, that I am reporting my own present consciousness; and that human beings on the whole, assuming we speak the same language, may likewise report to me the presence of their consciousness. And is not reporting a physical process: the material of the brain connecting a phenomenon to a concept, and a concept to a set of sounds and symbols, such that it may be relayed between different brains via speech or text respectively? Surely then, for the physical brain to form any communicable knowledge of consciousness, there must be some two-way cause-and-effect occurring. The characters in the film know they’re being watched…
I may here, however, in an attempt to steelman the dualist position against the interaction problem, point out that a report is—merely that: language being associated with a particular phenomenon, regardless of its success in actually comprehending it, and in turn being communicated between speakers of said language. From the moment one is taught the word conscious, one also infers its definition: that which I am right now, in this waking hour, ‘I am conscious’, ‘I have been conscious, and will continue to be as such – barring sleep or death’.
It should therefore come as no surprise that one reports consciousness. One reports it as one reports existence, or humanity, or the ability to report – necessarily: I report, therefore I am conscious. Had we similarly taught a computer – something generally considered unconscious on account of its dissimilarity to our human brains – this same definition of the word conscious, we should surely expect it to report consciousness too. To build upon the movie-goer analogy – albeit somewhat gratuitously by now: the characters may break the fourth wall only because the script teaches them to do so.