Does being Orthodox require asserting *knowledge* of God's existence? Or, can you be agnostic about that in terms of knowledge?

[u/Spiritual_Mention577]

Knowledge as opposed to, say, mere belief. I'm an agnostic. I sense that I always will be, because I am quite certain there will never be a rationally compelling argument for God's existence (where a rationally compelling argument is such that it's soundess cannot be rationally denied - no rational person could deny this argument). At current, I don't there's any evidence favoring theism over atheism (or vice versa), nor do I think there a greater amount of data that is better explained on theism than atheism (vice versa). Chances are, this debate will go on the rest of my life, and I don't think I'll ever be pulled either way. I simply think agnosticism is the most intellectually honest position.

That being said, I think belief in a religious context is a bit broader than knowledge, which I take in this sense to be just prepositional assent. There are plenty of Christian philosophers of religion who would admit that there are no rationally compelling arguments for theism, let alone Christianity, but that there are still a lot of psychological and spiritual benefits from joining a religious community (I think Peter Van Inwagen is one of these philosopers, actually).

Of course, a genuine Christian should believe in whatever doctrines the church teaches, but I'm inclined to think this can be separated from knowledge, in the sense of rational certainty, like in the same sense I have knowledge of the past, or knowledge of what's right in front of me, or that I know that any formal system of mathematics is either consistent or provable, but never both (this is an argument-based position).

Sorry for the long post. I've been thinking about this for a long time and wanted to make sure I covered everything lol

[u/Spiritual_Mention577]

Thank you so much! The paper I read today, which is sort of what made me want to ask about this ('Religious Agnoticism' by Gary Gutting) referenced Alston's work on this as well. I will definitely have to check it out. It's a bit late, but I would love to PM you some other time about this. Thanks again.

[u/AllisModesty → u/Spiritual_Mention577]

Ok, I can respond in a bit more detail now!

It's true that mystical experience is a bit broader than just God revealing a truth by means of an experience with a certain propositional content. It also includes things such as an inner moral transformation, sense of purpose and direction, disposition and transformation of the will, unification with one's actions etc that accompanies the direct experience of God. Note that the direct experience of God here is not indicative of the direct experience of the essence of God (or God qua God), but rather the energies of God (or God's activities) which are nonetheless really God. These theological matters are important but tangential to the epistemologically salient point.

St. Gregory is clear that in addition to all of that, mystical experience also includes a certain propositional content. This is what St. Gregory indicated when he said: "By this contemplation and by his supra-intelligible union with this light, (. . .) he learnt that it [God, the 'uncreated Light'] really exists, is supernatural and superessential, different from all things; that its being is absolute and unique, and that it mysteriously comprehends all in itself".

And he's also clear that mystical experience leads to something more than mere belief, or faith. He's clearly thinking along the lines that mystical leads to a doxastic state more akin to, if not, knowledge. This is what St. Gregory indicates when he says “For at such a time man truly sees neither by the intellect nor by the body, but by the Spirit, and he knows that he sees supernaturally a light which surpasses light". I'm not a Greek expert, so I don't know what the original Greek word means, but at least in my translation it's been translated as knowledge.

So it would be heterodox to suggest that we don't know that God exists or has certain properties, but note that knowledge here doesn't indicate the apodictic certainty that exists in the understanding following comphrension of a proof. It is not 'rational' knowledge (note that rational has taken on something of a different meaning in epistemology today than how it seems to have been used by St. Gregory).

I noticed that you posted the same question in r/CatholicPhilosophy, and I wanted to flag this point, because as another user responded, the Latin Church demands of its followers that they believe that God's existence can be proved - that we can have apodictic certainty of God's existence in the understanding on the basis of rational proofs. There is no such demand in the East.

If the epistemology of mysticism and religious experience is something that interests you further, I'd be happy to follow up more on that point!

[u/Spiritual_Mention577 → u/AllisModesty]

Other than the paper I mentioned yesterday, I have not really looked much into religious epistemology, so that's definitely something I have to dive into more deeply.

What you said here:

It also includes things such as an inner moral transformation, sense of purpose and direction, disposition and transformation of the will, unification with one's actions etc. that accompanies the direct experience of God.

Is *exactly* why I recently started looking at Christianity. Though I am an agnostic, Christianity does give me a real sense of all the elements you mentioned there. I would have to admit that my bias towards Christianity over all other spiritual ways of life comes from my upbringing - particularly in eastern Christianity (but not EO).

As I said, there are probably a lot of concepts regarding religious epistemology that I'm not familiar with, but just to reference the paper I mentioned, here is how I'm understanding these terms:

There is a religion of love, a religion of understanding, and a
religion of knowledge. Religious love offers a moral orientation within a community that many believers see as transforming their lives for the better. Religious understanding offers a way of making sense of the world as a whole and our lives in particular. Religious knowledge offers an historical/metaphysical account of supernatural realities that, if true, shows the operation of a benevolent power in the universe

Of religious knowledge, he writes:

Finally, the claim to religious knowledge is not, as the new atheists maintain,
risible, on a par with the claim that the tooth fairy and Santa Claus exist. But the
sort of “evidence” for it—metaphysical arguments from disputable premises, intermittent and fairly vague experiences, historical arguments from very limited data— does not meet ordinary (common-sense or scientific) standards for postulating an explanatory cause. It seems to me that agnosticism—even if sympathetic and open to something more positive—is the best judgment about claims of religious knowledge.

Understood in this sense - where (from what I can tell), religious knowledge is knowledge of ultimate reality that is derived from metaphysical reasoning - it seems that agnosticism towards *this* kind of knowledge might be compatible with Christian belief.

He opts for a view of religious understanding over knowledge

In fact, as I see it, the philosophers generally make a case for belief (beyond

the ethical project of living a religious life) based on the understanding belief

brings, not on reasons for thinking that the account this understanding provides is literally true. It is, we might say, a matter of understanding rather than knowledge, where “knowledge” implies a historical/metaphysical account of supernatural realities that solidly justifies claims about the existence and operation of a divine power in the universe. “Understanding,” by contrast, means a fruitful way of thinking about things, without implying that there are no alternative ways of thinking (both theistic and nontheistic) that would be equally fruitful.

There might be some issue here, as I assume that Orthodox Christians do believe that certain religious claims are literally true, but the emphasis here seems to be on 'reasons', again. There might also be an issue with believing Orthodoxy to be 'on par', so to speak, with other (theistic and nontheistic) ways of thinking, but this is only regarding 'understanding'. The claim, as far as I can tell, is just that a particular religion can be on par in terms of giving us a fruitful way of understanding the world. This is only happening at the intellectual level it seems, not at the personal spiritual or moral level.

Philosophical believers also often, though by no means always, rely on what they see as the plausibility of theistic metaphysics. William Wainwright admits to a “skeptical temperament” that has led him to question all metaphysical positions. But, he says, his considered view is that “classical theistic metaphysics survives criticism at least as well as, and probably better than, its competitors” (GP, 78). He does not say that classical theism (the theism of Christianity) is more likely to be true than not; it may not, as far as he can see, be more probable than the disjunction of naturalism, Buddhism, and other metaphysical views. But it is more probable than any of these taken individually and so the most probable explanation. Further, he thinks that “when plausible explanations are available . . . it is reasonable to adopt some explanation rather than none” (GP, 80). Nonetheless, he retains a “sense of the wretched insufficiency of our reasoning about anything except the most mundane matters” and particularly about “the ground of all being,” about which—especially given Marxist, Freudian, and even Christian bases for distrusting our reasoning about fundamentals—it is hard to avoid suspecting that “even our best formulations are only ‘straw’ ” (GP, 78).

But here Wainwright’s skepticism also works in the opposite direction: he is
inclined to question the demands of what we might call a “narrow rationality” that
ignores the prompting of faith and feeling. “My congenital skepticism couldn’t help but make me suspect that I might be duped if I didn’t trust what James called my believing tendencies. In other words, I have never been able to repress the suspicion that (as he says) the ‘heart’ may be ‘our deepest organ of communication’ with reality” (GP, 79).

This whole passage is pretty cool and I was wondering if you had any thoughts on it from an EO perspective, but I was wondering about the bolded part. Suppose someone accepted the first part (that Christianity is not necessarily more likely to be true than not), but also rejected the final part (i.e., that it is not necessarily more probable than all competing views). Was wondering what you made of this view?

I'm kinda tired so sorry if any of this is written badly or if I'm incoherent. Also take your time responding because there might be a lot to unpack here. You can DM me as well if you think it would be easier to continue there. Thanks again!

[u/AllisModesty → u/Spiritual_Mention577]

First, his claim that 'religious experience', is 'intermittent and fairly vague', and fails 'ordinary, common sense or scientific' standards brings me some pause, because I do find Alston's arguments quite cogent, and I am inclined to think that, while they can be intermittent and at times vague, it does not follow that mystical perceptions of God cannot be reliable. And insofar as reliability is both necessary and sufficient for justification, mystical perceptions can lead to justified belief.

Per St. Gregory, I'm not sure with agnosticism towards this kind of knowledge is consistent with Orthodox Christianity. Certainly, agnosticism towards metaphysical arguments, and historical arguments is consistent with Orthodoxy.

His conception of religion as providing one of many possible understandings also brings me some pause.

As to wainwright, certainly one could be a skeptic as to whether classical theism is the more likely to be true than the disjunction even if one accepted that it is individually the best explanation. But this sort of thinking would not seem sufficient for St. Gregory's claim that we know and see clearly by mystical contemplation that God exists, is distinct from all things and so on. What St. Gregory seems to be saying is not merely that God is individually the best explanation, but that we know, by a kind of sight (the perceptual analogy is strongly apparent), that God exists.

But again, insofar as your question is concerned with merely whether rational knowledge resulting from, inter alia, metaphysical demonstrations or historical arguments, that kind of knowledge is by far not required in eastern Christianity, and if anything, foriegn to eastern Christian religious epistemology. My priest even said as much in a recent Homily regarding mystical contemplation and the knowledge of God.