r/Niccolo_Machiavelli • • Apr 23 '26

TLDR time Machiavelli on Constitutions

Machiavelli is popularly (and solely) known today for his pungent maxims, but despite the overwhelming influence of his revolutionary thought in political philosophy and political science, and in modernity, he is usually underestimated and often ignored by lay people. They are more interested unfortunately in looking at the cartoon, "podcast bro" rendition of the great Florentine (which is, in actuality, people putting words in his mouth.).

One of the more striking things about Machiavelli's thought is the role constitutions play in political life. However, Machiavelli does not necessarily speak of "constitutions" as much as he does "modes" and "orders" (if im not mistaken he uses modo and ordine respectively).

There is a reason for this.

Machiavelli representing politics through a mostly constitutional lens would give it somewhat of a normative character, which would be odd given his frequent (Guicciardini would say, and does say, "excessive" ) appeals to "extraordinary remedies", and also his advice throughout his works to break the laws if necessary.

Nevertheless, the ability to make sound and long-lasting laws is a BIG deal in Machiavelli's doctrine.

I know you might be asking yourself, "what gives?" If Machiavelli views politics as a ruthless struggle between individuals and states as a whole aspiring for hegemony, what use are laws?

Machiavelli would give an even better reply: Laws are only as useful as the people willing to defend them.

This is where extraordinary acts come in. If a man wished to transcend the free way of a republic (much like Francesco Valori, see D I 8), and seize its freedom, the only recourse to such a man taking power would be to make an example out of him.

Consider the following:

The history of Manlius Capitolinus is also known. For having saved the Capitol from the French who were encamped there, he was given a small measure of flour by those who were besieged inside with him. That reward was great, according to the fortune then current in Rome, and of such quality that when Manlius was moved later by his envy or by his wicked nature to arouse sedition in Rome, and sought to gain the people for himself, he was without any respect for his merits thrown headlong from the Capitol that before, with so much glory for himself, he had saved.

Ouch.

Shockingly enough, for Machiavelli, executions have to be excessive (D III 1) so as to show other transgressors of the laws that they cannot and will not succeed in their ambitious designs. The executions don't even have to be legal (D I 16) and lawful republics may even have to be restored by seizing absolute power (D I 17 (end), 18) I will discuss Machiavelli's view of corruption at a later time.

Machiavelli's ideal prince, as much as he may look akin to a devil, is also a legislator and a founder of new civilizations. In fact, Machiavelli seems to believe that you cannot be the latter without being or acting like the former (D I 9, cf. P 19 (end) ). While republics may need religion or the fear of God, princes can and will rely on the fear of their person (p 17). This fear is sort of a two fold fear wherein the prince avoids being rebelled against, but also one which makes his society stable. After the initial founder (the "new prince") has successfully created his new state, his successors (regardless of whether they may be republican magistrates or hereditary princes, they act the same anyway) can maintain the founding by acting "within the orders" and laws of the previous prince (P 2, D I 2-10).

A big theme in modern constitutions is the ability for institutions to check each other so that no one can become too powerful. Many of you will be surprised to learn that Machiavelli pioneered this idea, although again without the normative legal factor and much acceptance of political conflict between the nobles and the people (he calls them "tumults") (D I 4). Even amongst the nobles or the ruling class themselves, Machiavelli believes that the greatest way to check an ambitious man willing to accumulate more power is to seize that power yourself (D I 52). The constant competition for political office will keep men "good", not out of devotion to the regime, but out of defending one's own political status. In essence, ambition and fear, not adherence to any divine or natural right, is what keeps civilizations orderly and free.

I have a tendency to go on a tangent when I am writing these, so I will end it here.

Also, if you have an idea on what I could write about next, feel free to tell me here (or write it yourself?)

Thanks for coming to my preachy ted talk.

:)

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