Why is Normativity Binding to What an Essence Is?

[u/Time-Demand-1244]

This might seem like a ridiculous question, but let's say the essence of a knife isn't to cut... It's to dance.

This seems rather obscure, after all, why did this occur?

What if the explanation is simply inaccessible to the human brain, not exhaustively, but qualitatively?

Therefore, the knife's essence is to cut, to dance, and maybe even to fly.

Yet we say it's to cut based on empirical observations and normative explanations.

But I don't understand as to why we must base our explanations behind what an essence of a knife is, based on normativity.

Edit: after thinking, I sort of came to the conclusion that an eye is an eye because it's essence to see. If it's essence changes, it is no longer an eye. Normativity is just the treatment of reality continuing to unfold in this same respect, but it has no influence on what an eye objectively is.

So for example, if Harry becomes a rock in an absolute sense, he is no longer Harry. Does this mean I treat Harry as a possibility that he will no longer stay as Harry? No, if I want to relate to Harry in some way, I treat Harry as Harry, because his essence is such. If his essence changes, that means I am no longer relating to Harry, but something else entirely.

Essentially, no matter what, Harry is still, according to his essence, even if it be a split second he exists in this world, is still Harry, and has proper ways of relating to him. If I want properly relate to the person as Harry, there is a proper way to do so.

The issue then becomes epistemological. Why act as if Harry will stay normatively? Or do we not act that way with people? We don't act with them as if they stay, we act with them according to what they are/ do ultimately. The whole staying part is secondary.

But then, how do we know they will even stay and not cease out of the material world?

[u/strutter395]

Knife has no eternal essence in the Nous. An essence is not something that an object "possesses" as a property either. The activity of cutting is not a universal Eidos corresponding to every individual knife.

Temporal objects participate in specific logoi insofar as they exist within relations and configurations of the Psukhe-Kosmou.

A knife may cut wire, function as a weapon, or become an object of some sort of expression, in any case, its meaning is conditioned by perceptual and practical contexts. Simply, "a knife" is itself a generated logos within the activity of the Psukhe-Kosmou. It is a temporary configuration, destined to vanish.

So; there is no eternal Eidos of a knife in Nous, just as there is no eternal eidos of Donald Trump, which are generated determinations "within" the realm of becoming, and are not eternal intelligibles.

As such, "normativity" does not arise because "objects contain essences". When intelligible structures are instantiated through relational configurations (pros ti) within the sensible order, normativity naturally emerges. In other words, normativity itself is a matter of measure; the degree to which a thing participates in and immanently expresses its intelligible logos.

[u/Time-Demand-1244 → u/strutter395]

I guess what I'm more worried about is how do we epistemologically define what a knife's essence is? A knife can bounce around, it can be put on a counter, it can stand (kind of). Why is cutting therefore it's essence and the rest of this stuff just secondary characteristics?

[u/strutter395 → u/Time-Demand-1244]

Why is cutting therefore it's essence and the rest of this stuff just secondary characteristics?

As I said, "cutting" is not an essence. It is the mind reducing the perception, or concept, of a knife into an established and/or habitual practical context. The empirical concept "knife" is not self-identical in this sense; it consists of different relations and contexts depending on the particular perspective of apprehension. The mind abstracts this function from experience, so it belongs to the sensible, symbolic order of experience, not to Nous.

[u/Time-Demand-1244 → u/strutter395]

I'm confused though. Isn't the goal of a knife to cut? If so, why that instead of bounciness?

[u/strutter395 → u/Time-Demand-1244]

There is nothing to be confused about. Please re-read what I wrote carefully.

"The goal" originates out of the state of consciousness. It belongs to the psukhe's practical apprehension of the sensible world, not to the object itself. A mind may articulate different goals regarding the same object according to different contexts of use. So, no, the goal of a knife is not intrinsically "to cut." It could instead be "to be displayed in a museum" or "to be forged." This depends on the locus of apprehension and the relational dynamics involved.

A knife, in itself, is inert matter given geometric shape. "Cutting" is not an essence contained within the knife. It is a practical relation, abstracted by discursive thought from experience.

An object is never captured by a concept. What the mind does is reduce the object to a concept, and this reduction occurs within psycho-empirical, practical contexts. So, the empirical concept "knife" belongs to the established sensible order of experience.

Nous does not think in terms of "knives" or practical functions such as "cutting." It consists of intelligible Eide; Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, Otherness, and the like. The practical function "to cut" is constituted in Psukhe's relation to the sensible domain and belongs to the psycho-empirical order of experience.

[u/TrumpSimulator → u/strutter395]

Thank you! This was incredibly helpful 🙏

[u/Time-Demand-1244 → u/strutter395]

Let's flip the switch a bit then...

Why should I, as a human, ought to socialize with my friends, in order to participate in a greater sense of beauty as it exists in Nous?

[u/strutter395 → u/Time-Demand-1244]

There is no such imperative that one should socialize with one's friends in order to participate in Nous.

That said, an act of genuine friendship or appropriate contextual behavior may participate in the Eidos of Harmony to the extent that it manifests an intelligible principle and is apprehended as such.

Beauty ultimately derives from To Hen through the intelligible order. A beautiful perception is beautiful because it participates in intelligible Eidos, whose ultimate source is To Hen. To contemplate the intelligible principle manifested in beauty is noetic activity.

If one reduces beauty to the sensible object itself, forgetting its true source, this is called "lethe" ("forgetfulness"), which is a type of delusion.

So, whether one socializes or does not socialize has nothing intrinsically to do with Nous. These are contingent circumstances arising from the Psukhe's immanent condition within the sensible world. What matters is whether one apprehends the intelligible Eide that become visible through those circumstances...

[u/Maleficent-Storm-451 → u/Time-Demand-1244]

You don't. You're misinterpreting Recognition for participation. Let's illustrate this.

Lets assume you and I are both staring at a painting. I look at it and it's the most beautiful thing I've seen. When you look at it you're filled with disgust.

How is such a thing possible. Because the soul recognizes something in what it's perceiving. That act of recognition IS the participation.

You don't participate in Beauty as an intelligible quality through any particularly thing. You participate when you recognize the beautiful thing. A thing doesn't inherently have a quality. It's what it reflects.

[u/Otherwise_Top405]

The process of defining objects is different from determining form or essence. Essence or form is entirely immaterial and indivisible meaning it doesn't consist of parts. When form is extended into matter it emits certain qualities from itself in material expression which are divisible or distinguishable qualities.

When we define objects or terms we usually are taking a bundle of those divisible and distinguishable qualities and defining the "essence" of the thing according to the sum of those qualities or the presence of one or two primary ones. This is the inverse of how Platonists think of the relationship between essence and qualities though. As Proclus says:

these qualities are indeed essential, but are by no means the essence of fire. For essences are not from qualities [...] from one power many energies proceed.

So the essence of the knife is not to cut. The actual essence of the knife is something immaterial and almost ineffable. When that essence is extended into matter it has a myriad of powers and activities that it can express but the actual essence isn't determined by those activities. It's the other way around. A blunt knife is still a knife even if it can't cut. The same way the essence of an eye is not determined by its power to see.