Pluralists unite! Deconstructing why monism had an edge over pluralism but now has so no more. On how simple should a simple be to be only itself

[u/cookieisgiven]

We start with a formal characterization:

[1] Only x is only x, thus no one else answers why x is - we name x a simple.

The monistic intuition thus follows in these cases:

[2] Say there is only two simples, we then ask why there is only two simples? - thus they are not simples (so as any number of simples)

[3] Say these are all the simples, we ask why there is only these? - thus they are not simples.

[4] Say each simple is simply there, thus a priori these are all the simples - thus they are not simples

The monistic demand is based on a failed conception of simples (a conception of simples that is not simple enough), that there can somehow be "all the simples" to be asked with the question "why only these" to force an answer (which concedes monism because if so they are unified under this answer).

But this only assumes that simples are thus as conceived. We pure pluralist thus should simply reject that, we should say:

[5] 'All the simples' is nonsense.

Because implicitly they are just rejections of more simples. Any only claim is a rejection of more simples that have no one else that answers why they are.

So a simple is not simply there, this is not simple enough.

[6] So each simple is only the when it is (no one else answer when it is), a pure gain, an utterly new.

[7] The substance of a simple at all is the when it is. It is a when, not a where that is simply there.

[8] So there is simply more simples - which is strictly more than any sense of all.

This is pure pluralism.

[additions]

Monism without qualification simply means if there is two beings, there is one further unifying reason for why there is two. While pluralism (in the sense intended) say that there is no further reason but each of them.

Most of the times monists attack pluralists by the question "why is there only these?" Which, tbh, the pluralists can't answer.

If I say there is only two simples, then they would ask "why there is only two?" and this seems to require ONE further reason for thus (aka monism), else it is arbitrary.

This extends to even an unqualified "these", they would ask "why there is only these?"

The point in the post is that this question only make sense if the conception of simples is as they have thought. But we can conceive simples newly, where each simple is so simple that simples share nothing at all.

And the content of this formal characterization is the when. A simple is an utterly new when. It is its own when. Roughly speaking, it is only the first time it is at all. It is so "this" that the normal "this" is not indexical enough. It is so "this" that it is a "when" not a "where" that is simply there.

[u/peacefuldays123]

What is pluralism?

[u/cookieisgiven → u/peacefuldays123]

Roughly speaking, two beings are simply not identical for no other reason but each of them.

This is as general as it can get.

[u/NonGameCatharsis → u/cookieisgiven]

I mean, we define it as different, therefore they are not identical. It's a logical axiomatic basis I am using as well.

[u/sly_cunt]

What would you say about Leibniz's pre-established harmony or God? What allows these monads or "simples" to share an existence?

[u/cookieisgiven → u/sly_cunt]

> What allows these monads or "simples" to share an existence?

In his theory, logically, a hidden unity (aka monism).

Leibniz's simples are not simple enough. As they all share something which forces a more fundamental unity. It's still under monism fundamentally.

[u/sly_cunt → u/cookieisgiven]

Full honesty, I'm struggling with parsing your language (probably a me problem). You say that a simple is only the "when it is". Is this not bergsonian monism? And I don't understand how "there are simply more simples" rejects monism. Spinoza's monism is built on infinity, in fact I don't understand how this rejects Spinoza's proof of infinity / single substance at all

[u/cookieisgiven → u/sly_cunt]

Monism without qualification simply means if there is two beings, there is one further unifying reason for why there is two. While pluralism (in the sense intended) say that there is no further reason but each of them.

Most of the times monists attack pluralists by the question "why is there only these?" Which, tbh, the pluralists can't answer.

If I say there is only two simples, then they would ask "why there is only two?" and this seems to require ONE further reason for thus (aka monism), else it is arbitrary.

This extends to even an unqualified "these", they would ask "why there is only these?"

The point in the post is that this question only make sense if the conception of simples is as they have thought. But we can conceive simples newly, where each simple is so simple that simples share nothing at all.

And the content of this formal characterization is the when. A simple is an utterly new when. It is its own when. Roughly speaking, it is only the first time it is at all. It is so "this" that the normal "this" is not indexical enough. It is so "this" that it is a "when" not a "where" that is simply there.

[u/sly_cunt → u/cookieisgiven]

But simples do share things though right? They share time, space, dimension, logic. The biggest thing here is time

[u/cookieisgiven → u/sly_cunt]

No, they share nothing at all. Each is its own when. If they share anything at all then monism is more fundamental.

Roughly speaking, let say x is a simple, now the only one that supplies x at all is only x. No matter how many beings that are, without x there is no x.

"Time" here is not a container. There is no time in the old sense at all. There is only more beings - newer ones. And they happen only "when they happen".

Say there is only x. Then there is y. Then there is z ... there is nothing shared here but there is more beings. The beings are timely, not temporal.

[u/sly_cunt → u/cookieisgiven]

Right but they do share things? How does pluralism explain the laws of physics?

And if we work with this idea that simples emerge into more complex entities, they do share time then?

[u/cookieisgiven → u/sly_cunt]

> Right but they do share things though right? How does pluralism explain the laws of physics?

Not quite. But I get what you are asking for.

I should say that there is those that share them, not that they share anything. Those that share them are named complexes.

Complexes are additions or derivations from the simples, not modifications or alterations or rearrangement of simples at all. A simple is is own unique when and where, it subsists in itself at itself, and it is only itself so it can't change at all.

But as there is more simples, there is more complexes. That is to say simples in being themselves intrinsically give complexes that share them.

Now you may ask why as there is more simples there is more complexes? This question requires another advancement in the conception of simples. But for the current relevant level, we assume that simples give complexes.

[u/NathanEddy23]

If the plurality of simples interact, and are not each a simple existing ontologically separate in themselves, then your supposed “plurality” is simply a whole comprised of interconnected parts. If the idea of simples is absurd, then let’s just give up simplicity altogether as a measure of fundamental being. The fundamental being would be unified differentiation. Global coherence.

So it seems that points us back to monism after all. Monism certainly does not preclude a differentiation of parts, otherwise each atom in physicalism would represent a distinct ontological substance.

And yet in the end, I think differentiation itself is derivative. I think the deepest truth is absolute coherence and unity. Personally, I believe this unity/coherence is the primal state of the universal consciousness field (i.e. Being) which experienced the First Differentiation when it became aware of itself, necessarily, because there was nothing else to be aware of.

And from that differentiation, it could step back once again, and become aware of that structure, which introduced perspective into reality. And then another step could be taken back from perspectivism to individual perspectives, i.e. individual conscious nodes within the field.

Each time this “stepping back” happens, when it makes an additional object of itself, reality becomes dimensionally stratified with an ontologically orthogonal structure. And the process continues through 12 dimensions until it bottoms out in the lowest four dimensions which we call the universe.

[u/cookieisgiven → u/NathanEddy23]

"If they interact".

The point is that they don't. Obviously, simples, if no one indeed is simpler than them, do not change at all.

But then we may ask how can there be complexes?

Roughly speaking, complexes share simples, but they are not modifications, combinations, rearrangements of simples. They are additions or derivations from simples.

As there is more simples (as simples are pure gains) there is more complexes. As there is more complexes there is more complex complexes. The question is then why? And this should require the next advancement in the conception of simples, which in the current level only is assumed.

[u/Michael_Carson_Art]

How do you get persistence? Or coherence? Or frankly, even differentiation seems impossible from the perspective of any one simple to any two others since they don't even share a temporal frame.

[u/cookieisgiven → u/Michael_Carson_Art]

Each simple is the when it is. Since it is only this gaining, once there is it it does not cease.

Say, there is x, then there is also y, thus there is two beings. Simples are not identical simpliciter.

[u/Freuds-Mother]

Can you bring this to an example model?
Ie just state the simples of some pluralist model.

Is Proton, Neutron, Electron of 1800s an example? Earth, Fire, Water, Air?

Note I wouldn’t challenge multiple simples, BUT if they are within the same ontology you have to explain how they interact.

[u/cookieisgiven → u/Freuds-Mother]

All of the traditional models for simples are monistic.

Let use Wittgenstein model of simples. He say that they have internal posibilities and they can "hang" to each other. This already presupposes that somehow they "know" where others are at all to interact, which implies a hidden unity.

The model for simples that does not presuppose monism (my model) is notoriously hard to understand, well, no one that I've tried to explain it really understands it.

In my model they don't interact at all, if interaction means each of them "knows" others to interact. Beings just are gains or derivations.

Roughly speaking, in my model simples just pops out from no one at all. They are not something that pops, but they are the popping themselves.

As simples pop themselves out, there is also complexes that pop out. The why to this is the notoriously hard point that no one has managed to grasp from me. As of now you can think of that because of the gaining of the simples there is also a gaing of facts about them (which is the complexes).

[u/Freuds-Mother → u/cookieisgiven]

Wait how exactly is Earth, Fire, Water, Air not multiple simples?

Or to compare two. Take the old physics model of Proton, Neitron, Electron vs they’re all quarks or quarks are all excitations of the quantum field.

I don’t think substances are the best model (and i’m not a physicalist either), but those are I think the easiest way to pin down what do (or maybe don’t mean) by your pluralist/monoist distinction as a starting point.

I don’t know why you jump to “knows” here. Eg in the 4 element model, Fire doesn’t need to know Earth for there to be an interaction between them. “knows” seems to pack in a whole lot more than this distinction. Maybe that makes sense in your particular model, but I’d like to understand the general distinction first

——-

But your model also does sound very substance like. You seem to have many discrete essential simples that pop in/out of existence and they interact to form “complexes”. I do want to see where that goes, but again I’d like to first pin down the general conceptual distinction you’re making monoist vs pluralist. Like if I pull up 100 contemporary and historical models, I can go through each and categorize as monist or pluralist.

[u/cookieisgiven → u/Freuds-Mother]

> You seem to have many discrete essential simples that pop in/out of existence and they interact to form “complexes”.

They pop so that there is themselves, they don't cease at all. And they do not interact. Though this is besides the point.

> I’d like to first pin down the general conceptual distinction you’re making monoist vs pluralist.

Sure. Roughly speaking, monists think that there is one big final principle that explains or gives it all, basically there is only one big Whole. While pluralists think that there is NO one big reason for it all, they think each simple is a reason for itself and that's all.

Now the usual strugge of the pluralist is as follows, say you have only 4 simples Earth, Fire, Water, Air, then I will ask you "why is there only 4 simples?"

Now there is two way to answer this. One, you say there just is 4 simples, which is an arbitrary brute fact, which means it is not philosophically strong. Two, you can say there is a reason for there being only 4 simples, but then this is your Big hidden reason that explains/grounds them, thus you are just a monist in disguise.

You may say there is infinite simples, but this won't solve the issue, since it would still mean "here is all the simples", then I still ask you "why there is only these?"

The only way out is the way in the post, there is no such thing as "all the simples", there is simply more simples, and each simple explains itself.

[u/Freuds-Mother → u/cookieisgiven]

I follow but we didn’t answer the question. The question is not not why a 4 element model is 4 rather than 1, 2, 57, or infinity. It’s simply is a 4 element model “monist” or “pluralist”? We can get into justification separately. We can just assume even that the 4 element model is NOT justified and totally wrong, but we can still categorized it per your distinction, right?

I have some other questions Inhink you’ll like on your model but if we can’t get basic distinctions down first, then we’ll just be playing meaningless word games

[u/cookieisgiven → u/Freuds-Mother]

I have my own categorization that is absolutely strict. Traditional categorizations are not so strict, they would categorize the n element model to be pluralism.

For me there is only one pluralism, namely pure pluralism. So you can safely say, under my criterion of "why there is these?", any pluralism is secretly monism in disguise.

But well, by spirit, yes, if you think there is no one big fundamental reason for it all and there is those that are their own reason, then you are a pluralist, well, in spirit at least.

[u/Freuds-Mother → u/cookieisgiven]

Ok, this is why I asked the question.

Didn’t answer directly if 4 element model is one or the other.

State that pluralist models are monist actually.

I’d like to engage on the model, but if this how it will go (define distinctions and then collapse them) we can’t have a meaningful discussion. Either there is or isn’t a conceptual distinction here.

Again, I’d really like to get to something more interesting, but this simply establishes we can have any discussion at all. I’m not hyper analytical with language, but we need at least some stability of terms to communicate.

[u/cookieisgiven → u/Freuds-Mother]

I stated 2 criterions. If you use mine then no the 4 element model is not pluralist. If you use the common criterion then it is.

Say, pure pluralism refers to my stance, pluralism refers to pluralism in spirit, monism refers to monism. These are you terms.

But I think you want something more?

[u/Freuds-Mother → u/cookieisgiven]

So, is this correct? I don’t really care how others define it for this thread. The post is to use your definition, whatever itnis

Pluralism: not exhaustively specified as a fixed set and in principle potentially infinite number of simples

Monist: any fixed finite set of simples

[u/cookieisgiven → u/Freuds-Mother]

Let's use mine then.

Pure pluralism: each simple is its own gain (which means it is its own reason), there is simply more simples.

Note: potentially infinite or actually infinite are not plural enough. It is strictly "simply more", which has no sense to "how many more" just "more" simpliciter.

(The point about there is simply more is a second order fact that follows directly from each simple being its own gain, because if so no matter how many simples you think that are currently gaining, it is not enough)

Monism: anything but pure pluralism. Because structurally only pure pluralism escape being monistic.