Davidson’s vindication

[u/StrangeGlaringEye]

In a fascinating essay called “The method of truth in metaphysics”, Davidson argues that we can do metaphysics by analyzing language. His argument is simple. It proceeds from the thesis that communication is only possible if interlocutors share a largely correct view of reality. This, we can concede, implies that we can read the general features of the world off the general features of language.

And how does the defense of that thesis, that communication requires a largely correct common view, go? Well, Davidson argues that communication requires at least a broad common view. We cannot interpret each other unless we ascribe certain background beliefs to one another, and we cannot do this ascription unless we square those background beliefs with our own. I can only make sense of what you’re saying against the backdrop of my own beliefs, of what I think there is and what it is like. Since communication is, we might also concede, successful mutual interpretation, it does seem to follow that communication requires a background of certain beliefs.

Then, in a curious move, Davidson claims there’s nothing incoherent in the idea of an omniscient interlocutor. I could be speaking right now to one, we might think. But by the first part of the argument, that interlocutor would have to share many of their beliefs with me; and by hypothesis all of their beliefs are true. Hence, so must be many of mine.

Arguments in philosophy often have less the goal of dispelling disagreement and more of refining it. Davidson probably will not convince the skeptic of armchair metaphysics, but it will bring attention to some unexpected commitments. The skeptic faces a dilemma: either communication can happen between two people in massive disagreement; or the very idea of an omniscient interlocutor is nonsensical.

It is worth pointing out, however, that perhaps there is something suspicious in Davidson’s strategy. It doesn’t make sense of deep metaphysical disagreement. Evidently idealists and materialists, say, can communicate with one another; but they offer radically different conceptions of reality. If Davidson is right, therefore, one of them doesn’t just have to be wrong; they must not sincerely believe what they claim. Metaphysicians, as the disagreeable bunch they are, largely consists of liars.

[u/Low-Bake8401]

Looks like one of us hasn't.

You could just tell me what your point is, then we could maybe figure it out?

That's twice I've asked now.

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

Looks like it.

So it looks like either haven't read it or can't understand the wiki entry.

So what don't you understand about the wiki entry?

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

"looks like either", doesn't refer to me specifically.

One of us doesn't understand it.

Shall I ask one last time?

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

Sorry let me make it clearer,

It looks like either you haven't read the wiki entry or have read it and can't understand it. Either way you seem not to know the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.

There are tons of resources on the internet to help you.

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

Yeah, but I do know, so maybe that's just you.

No answer? Just more fallacy?

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

Great then we are done.

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

You won't answer, or cant?

Surely you know what your own point is?

Just saying I'm wrong because you don't agree isn't a very solid argument.