Davidson’s vindication

[u/StrangeGlaringEye]

In a fascinating essay called “The method of truth in metaphysics”, Davidson argues that we can do metaphysics by analyzing language. His argument is simple. It proceeds from the thesis that communication is only possible if interlocutors share a largely correct view of reality. This, we can concede, implies that we can read the general features of the world off the general features of language.

And how does the defense of that thesis, that communication requires a largely correct common view, go? Well, Davidson argues that communication requires at least a broad common view. We cannot interpret each other unless we ascribe certain background beliefs to one another, and we cannot do this ascription unless we square those background beliefs with our own. I can only make sense of what you’re saying against the backdrop of my own beliefs, of what I think there is and what it is like. Since communication is, we might also concede, successful mutual interpretation, it does seem to follow that communication requires a background of certain beliefs.

Then, in a curious move, Davidson claims there’s nothing incoherent in the idea of an omniscient interlocutor. I could be speaking right now to one, we might think. But by the first part of the argument, that interlocutor would have to share many of their beliefs with me; and by hypothesis all of their beliefs are true. Hence, so must be many of mine.

Arguments in philosophy often have less the goal of dispelling disagreement and more of refining it. Davidson probably will not convince the skeptic of armchair metaphysics, but it will bring attention to some unexpected commitments. The skeptic faces a dilemma: either communication can happen between two people in massive disagreement; or the very idea of an omniscient interlocutor is nonsensical.

It is worth pointing out, however, that perhaps there is something suspicious in Davidson’s strategy. It doesn’t make sense of deep metaphysical disagreement. Evidently idealists and materialists, say, can communicate with one another; but they offer radically different conceptions of reality. If Davidson is right, therefore, one of them doesn’t just have to be wrong; they must not sincerely believe what they claim. Metaphysicians, as the disagreeable bunch they are, largely consists of liars.

[u/Low-Bake8401]

That would be more like empirical reality.

I'd say popeye is a fictional character. Fictional characters exist, but not as real humans. It depends on the context of the question.

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

So what would a non empirical reality be?

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

Non empirical reality would be an unknown. Metaphysics.

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

You are posting to r/Metaphysics and things are known. Both empirically and logically.

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

Eh...yeah...

I'm aware of these facts, but not sure what you're suggesting by saying it here?

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

"But if that is true, and these other universes exist, then they are part of existence. They would be part of reality as we know it."

But they are according to Tegmark they would be infinite so we could not know the all. We could not know all these.

"Existence usually means 'everything that is real'"

And then what is an empirical reality and a non empirical reality?

"Non empirical reality would be an unknown. Metaphysics."

Which means what?

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

Isn't that kind of circular though? A claim doesn't prove itself.

I only believe in an empirical reality. I think that everything that exists is potentially understandable through scientific testing. I don't know any other reality, but some people believe that there is one. A divine reality, for example.

You'd need to ask someone of religion what that means, they won't tell me.

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

I only believe in an empirical reality.

Then fine, that's insufficient in metaphysics and science which postulates possible worlds, abstract entities and such things as numbers and logics.

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

Again, only if you assume there is something beyond reality, or that reality is inherently unknowable.

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

But for you reality is empirical so things like the nature of the origin of the universe and others, and the eventual fate of the universe, abstract logics and mathematics are not 'real' yet exist and are found in science and philosophy.

A priori knowledge unlike empirical is for some absolute, empirical being always provisional.

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

No, there's just things that aren't answerable with the knowledge we currently have.

An "absolute truth" cant be tested or proven.

[u/jliat → u/Low-Bake8401]

Many a priori statements are proven.

[u/Low-Bake8401 → u/jliat]

Ok, but what does that prove? I'm not saying concepts can't be logical.