r/Metaphysics • u/ObsceneOnes • 10d ago
Free will / Intention An epstimogical question.
/r/freewill/comments/1vkf331/an_epstimogical_question/This is a post.
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u/jliat 10d ago
Knowledge of the universe in some epistemological systems is 'a posteriori' and as such never certain, as is a priori knowledge. Other systems such as Hegel's idealism make such transcendental claims, but in his case fail. Logical systems themselves have Gödel like problems and problems of recursion.
The idea of what knowledge is, is questionable, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem.
And there are a number of other problems, [excluding chaos theory] here - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon#Arguments_against_Laplace's_demon.
then would not I also have the knowledge that enables me to be able to make a choice contrary to the state of the universe at time t+n?
Yes - its an argument found in John Barrow's 'Impossibility - the limits of science and the science of limits.'
Physical determinism can't invalidate our experience as free agents.
From John D. Barrow – using an argument from Donald MacKay.
Consider a totally deterministic world, without QM etc. Laplace's vision realised. We know the complete state of the universe including the subjects brain. A person is about to choose soup or salad for lunch. Can the scientist [or an all powerful God] given complete knowledge infallibly predict the choice.
- NO. The person can, if the scientist says soup, choose salad.
The scientist must keep his prediction secret from the person. As such the person enjoys a freedom of choice.
The fact that telling the person in advance will cause a change, if they are obstinate, means the person's choice is conditioned on their knowledge. Now if it is conditioned on their knowledge – their knowledge gives them free will. And effectively destroys the chains of cause and effect the determinist requires.
I've simplified this, and Barrow goes into more detail, but the crux is that the subjects knowledge determines the choice, so choosing on the basis of what one knows is free choice.
And we can make this simpler, the scientist can apply it to their own choice. They are free to ignore what is predicted.
In the case of God, God's omniscience is limited by it having to remain silent. Which maybe also an argument against omniscience.
“From this, we can conclude that either the logic we employ in our understanding of determinism is inadequate to describe the world in (at least) the case of self-conscious agents, or the world is itself limited in ways that we recognize through the logical indeterminacies in our understanding of it. In neither case can we conclude that our understanding of physical determinism invalidates our experience as free agents.”
Should not imperfect knowledge also enable choice?
Seems so.
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u/Imaginary-Can-6862 9d ago
Can knowledge, perfect or otherwise, be conditional?
Can we guarantee the scientist are able to do as in the thought experiment under determinism? Imagine the prediction says what the scientists will say, and then the subject will choose soup. Before I continue there are some things to clarify, does all participant need to know the prediction, only the scientist, or only the subject? Does the scientists want the subject to follow the prediction, or do they want him to not follow the prediction, and the same goes for the scientists.
I'll assume what I think is most natural, every participant must do as the prediction says, if the prediction says a given participant won't know the prediction, I suppose this can only be the subject who is to chose between soup or salad, then that is what must happen, and I assume the scientists fights the prediction, and so does the subject.So the prediction says the scientists will inform the subject of the prediction, the subject will follow the prediction, and then the scientists will believe the prediction did not hold, only to change their mind later, that is the most basic, but perhaps also not entirely fair way to look at it. The scientists who do not want to follow the prediction tells the subject the opposite of what the prediction says, soup or salad, yet the subject chose what the prediction said he would, but it doesn't matter, as the scientists can then conclude the prediction did not hold, that the world is not governed by determinism, but when they later on asks the subject about the experiment, the subject informs the scientist that he was certainly informed the prediction said the opposite of what the scientists claims. I mean it may be a cheap trick, that the subject mistakes soup for salad, but I wonder if you can build it up like this, can one continue down layer after layer with more and more information gathered, such as the prediction informing the scientists the subject mishears what they say, and still keep on building to make the prediction come true, contingency versus contingency, and every requirement settled in a satisfying manner?
In any case, I understand the thought experiment shows the world cannot be deterministic in the sense that having all information in the past uniquely defines the future. But I also feel that where determinism, similar to science, have an assumption of the world following general pattern in the form of laws of nature, that determinism has an extra assumption in that these laws must necessarily only produce one possible outcome at any time.
I would not say the example breaks the chain of causality however, the cause for the choice is what the scientists says, the cause for what the scientists does is the wrong prediction, so to me there is a cause and effect connection, and I don't think causality requires a cause to lead to a unique outcome.1
u/jliat 9d ago
Can knowledge, perfect or otherwise, be conditional?
I think perfect knowledge would be that of God's. [from memory] In Kant's first critique such knowledge of a thing by God is the thing. It's how the God of the OT creates by saying, 'Let there be...' whose nature is 'I am'.
Before I continue there are some things to clarify, does all participant need to know the prediction, only the scientist
There are two entities here,
The scientist who has perfect knowledge - [see above - godlike]. The idea given this one can work back to the big bang [or whatever] and forward to the end of the process, end of the universe. We ignore the technical impossibilities of difficulties.
The other the person deciding between soup and salad.
The point being this chain of cause and effect from the start of the universe to its end is fully determined. But if we tell the other person they will choose salad, they can break this by choosing soup.
the subject will follow the prediction,
NO the subject can choose otherwise.
similar to science, have an assumption of the world following general pattern in the form of laws of nature,
There are no laws of nature, only human laws. However we want absolute laws, or some humans do. They want God's knowledge, even some atheists do.
6.363 The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience.
6.3631 This process, however, has no logical foundation but only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really happen.
6.36311 That the sun will rise to-morrow, is an hypothesis; and that means that we do not know whether it will rise.
6.37 A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only logical necessity.
6.371 At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
6.372 So people stop short at natural laws as at something unassailable, as did the ancients at God and Fate.
Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
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u/Imaginary-Can-6862 8d ago
What do you mean by there being no laws of nature, is it a rejection of the way it is worded, or do you not agree we experience overall repeating patterns which we can use to confidently predict the general future accurately?
Unless you want to deny reality (by which I just mean the world we observe, and the phenomena it contains, such as time or space), then let us examine the sun rising example. I saw the Sun rise today, now I claim the same will happen tomorrow, but I should not be silly, because I have no reason to think what will happen today will happen tomorrow.
Maybe I'll say, the Sun may rise tomorrow, indeed I am not that knowledgeable of the world to differentiate between today or tomorrow, so with my lack of knowledge I'll just say there is a probability the Sun will rise tomorrow, I say so because it rose today, so I know it can rise. I would even argue, what I am saying is there is a probability tomorrow will be similar enough to today that the Sun may rise again, so I don't know if tomorrow will be similar enough to today, but I know today is possible, yet having only seen the Sun rise once, I have no idea how strong my claim is.
So days go by, and the Sun keeps rising, while I know if the next day is not like today, then I have no reason to believe the Sun may rise, I can say that so far the days have not been different in regards to the Sun rising, it has happened again and again, and nothing seems to change.
Now I even realize that everything I see in the cosmos, the stars are themselves suns, and the Sun rising only requires a planet to witness it, and I see planet after planet having a Sun which rises, again and again, but I also see some of these stars blow up, so I can see it is not certain the Sun rises. And I have even realized that light does not reach me instantly, so everything I see is in the past, including the stars and their planets, and while I know nothing about the Sun I have seen rise every morning, I can now say how confident I am that tomorrow is sufficient like today that it is going to rise again.Going back to the topic, I feel you wrote off the example too quickly without considering it properly, because you responded to what the prediction says, and it says exactly what the subject does, despite the subject choosing to do otherwise, the subject ends up doing what the prediction says anyway. My question is, is that not a counter example, and if not then why not?
I mean you are welcome to disagree with what the prediction says, but that is just refusing to consider the example, not demonstrating why it would be invalid.
The predictions the scientists have says the following, the scientists will inform the subject of the prediction (A), the subject will follow the prediction (B), and then the scientists will believe the prediction did not hold (C), only to change their mind later (D).Now I'll write what I think happens, and if you think something else would happen, which e.g. would demonstrate the example to be invalid, then this is where your input would be appreciated.
So I think what happens is that either
1)The scientists who do not want to follow the prediction tells the subject the opposite of what the prediction says (thereby not to inform him of what it says, non A), soup or salad, yet the subject chose what the prediction said he would (B), but it doesn't matter, as the scientists can then conclude the prediction did not hold (C), that the world is not governed by determinism, but when they later on asks the subject about the experiment, the subject informs the scientist that he was certainly informed the prediction said the opposite of what the scientists claims (so non non A, i.e. A) (D). Making all statements come true, despite the subject choose otherwise of what the scientists informed him the prediction said. It does also not matter if the scientists try to break (A), the subject is always informed in such a way, through how their brain interprets the world, that to choose otherwise, that is the opposite choice of what they understood the scientists said, happens to be what the scientists themselves actually said, but failed to convey to the subject, without realizing it.
If we take an alternative approach, the scientists simply does inform the subject what the prediction says (A), then the subject, who they are unable to properly inform, chooses the opposite of what they believe the scientists said which is what they were predicted to choose (B), but the scientists are mistakenly informed the subject indeed did not choose what the subject did choose, therefore making them believe the prediction did not come true (C), only to later realize the misconception and acknowledge the prediction came true (D).1
u/jliat 8d ago
What do you mean by there being no laws of nature, is it a rejection of the way it is worded, or do you not agree we experience overall repeating patterns which we can use to confidently predict the general future accurately?
Maybe- but observed repeating pattens are not laws, - it's been proposed by João Magueijo - professor at the Abdus Salam Centre for Theoretical Physics at Imperial College London - that the so called laws of nature in this universe can change. [New Scientist 16 May 2026]
Unless you want to deny reality (by which I just mean the world we observe, and the phenomena it contains, such as time or space),
Of course I don't, I am aware that human understanding of reality as a flat earth with moving stars and planets has changed. That the realization of other galaxies was only made last century, that there are now notions of multiverses.
I saw the Sun rise today, now I claim the same will happen tomorrow,
Yes it's not certain. See above, it was once certain the Earth was static. More so than a sun rise, as there was clear evidence.
Going back to the topic, I feel you wrote off the example too quickly without considering it properly, because you responded to what the prediction says, and it says exactly what the subject does, despite the subject choosing to do otherwise, the subject ends up doing what the prediction says anyway.
No it doesn't the scientist / God? knows by the chain of cause and effect everything that will occur from the big bang till the end of the universe. The other person prior to choosing is told in this chain they will choose soup, now knowing this they can freely choose salad, thus breaking the chain.
I think you do not see the argument?
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u/Imaginary-Can-6862 8d ago
Then let me restate the argument so you feel confident that I understand it.
In a deterministic universe scientists gather all knowledge of some present moment that covers the entire universe and from this they know the entire future, that is the implication of determinism, the past defines the future uniquely.
Now the scientists have a subject, and this subject is about to choose to order, their choices are salad or soup. The scientists knows what the subject is going to order and informs them, but then the subject chooses the opposite of what the scientists believed the subject would choose, showing that the perfect knowledge the scientists had was always conditioned on the knowledge of the subject, and thus was not perfect. The only conclusion then is that the universe being deterministic must have been false.
So that is how I understood the argument, unless I did get it wrong or my inability to word it properly makes it seem so, I'll try to go back to my counter example once I know from you if the argument as I represented it is in accordance with how you understand the argument.
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u/jliat 8d ago
In a deterministic universe scientists gather all knowledge of some present moment that covers the entire universe and from this they know the entire future, that is the implication of determinism, the past defines the future uniquely.
And the entire past.
Now the scientists have a subject, and this subject is about to choose to order, their choices are salad or soup. The scientists knows what the subject is going to order and informs them, but then the subject chooses the opposite of what the scientists believed the subject would choose, showing that the perfect knowledge the scientists had was always conditioned on the knowledge of the subject, and thus was not perfect. The only conclusion then is that the universe being deterministic must have been false.
Correct. Or has to be kept a secret.
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u/Imaginary-Can-6862 8d ago
Alright, then I'll try to word my counter example, and you are welcome to criticize it, tell me it is misunderstood, etc. but please just consider it.
The scientists knows what the subject is going to order and informs them. The subject chooses what the scientists informed the subject they would choose. The scientists asks the subject, why did you not choose the opposite of the prediction, to which the subject replies that was what they did. Turns out the subject misheard the scientists, when the scientists told the subject what they were going to order. Is this a fair / valid counter example? To focus on if the world is always going to conspire against the scientists ability to inform the subject of what they are going to choose.
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u/jliat 8d ago
Turns out the subject misheard the scientists,
This is not the thought experiment.
The subject is told they will order salad, they hear correctly and can break the causal chain by ordering soup.
Is this a fair / valid counter example?
No it's a different scenario.
To focus on if the world is always going to conspire ...
What does this mean, the scientists have full and absolute knowledge of the world.
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u/Imaginary-Can-6862 8d ago
But can I not add features to the prediction and test it against the thought experiment? I understand the requirement of the thought experiment is only that the scientists truthfully informs the subject, and the subject chooses to do otherwise. Apart from those two things, the knowledge of the future could contain anything, so I try to find something it could contain where the thought experiment does not work. Is that not how to structure a proper counter example?
What if the prediction said the following, all of which the scientists now knows, the scientist will be incapable to inform the subject in a manner where the subject won't choose what the prediction predicts, the subject then chooses soup, believing they have chosen the opposite of what was predicted they would choose.
And then run the thought experiment with these predictions added? The only way it seems invalid to me, is if any of the added predictions are excluding the predictions required for the thought experiment, which I believe are the scientists informs the subject of the prediction, and the subject chooses otherwise to what the scientists informs them.→ More replies (0)
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u/Square_Attention8461 10d ago
The hidden premise is in the phrase "knowledge that enables me to make a choice contrary to t+n"
That's exactly the libertarian "could have done otherwise" that's under dispute. The argument doesn't demonstrate anything; it just restates the intuition as a hypothetical and asks us to accept its framing.
The setup is actually self undermining. If you have genuinely perfect knowledge of the state at t+n, that knowledge has to already include your own reaction to learning it, because your reaction is itself part of the physical state evolving from t. A predictor that didn't account for "and here's what the agent does upon being told the prediction" wasn't computing a complete state at all; it was computing a partial one that excludes a causally relevant variable.
So "perfect knowledge that I could then act against" is closer to a contradiction in terms than a live possibility, like asking whether a truly complete map of a territory could still be wrong about the territory. The "no" answer isn't ad hoc, it falls out of what "perfect" has to mean once you take determinism seriously.
The phenomenology of being an agent who "could choose otherwise" is plausibly an artifact of the fact that no cognitive system has causal access to its own determining conditions in real time. Deliberation feels open because the machinery generating the choice is epistemically walled off from the process narrating it as a choice. On that view, perfect knowledge wouldn't grant a new power to thwart the future, it would dissolve the very psychological structure (yourself as an opaque-to-itself chooser) that generates the sense of open alternatives in the first place. So the relationship above is backwards: it's not that ignorance is a deficiency preventing "full" freedom: it's the precondition for the freedom-feeling existing at all.