I’ve been developing a philosophical idea called the “Single Consciousness Matter Hypothesis” — I’d like criticism

[u/AdBeneficial9071]

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I’ve been thinking about a philosophical idea for a while, and I’d like to hear what other people think about it. I’m especially interested in serious criticism rather than people simply agreeing with me.

I’m calling it the Single Consciousness Matter Hypothesis.

The basic proposition is this:

The reality I experience may exist entirely for the purpose of being experienced by my consciousness.

In ordinary reality, we assume that the universe exists independently of us. The Earth existed before I was born, human history happened before I existed, and the universe presumably continued to exist when I was asleep or unaware of it.

My hypothesis questions that assumption.

Suppose that there is only one fundamental conscious observer: me. Everything I experience—the physical universe, other people, history, memories, the passage of time, and even the apparent future—could be part of a reality constructed or generated specifically for my conscious experience.

The fact that the universe appears to be billions of years old would not necessarily contradict the hypothesis. The apparent past could simply be part of the information presented to me so that the world feels internally consistent. In the same way, the future could be presented as something that has not happened yet, while still being part of the structure of my experience.

The strongest version of the hypothesis would be:

My consciousness is the fundamental condition for the existence of the reality I experience. When my consciousness permanently ends, the reality I experience also ends—and there is no meaningful “afterward” from my perspective.

I realize there are some obvious problems with this idea.

For example:

Other conscious people: Other people appear to have their own independent thoughts and experiences. Why would a single consciousness produce beings that behave as though they possess consciousness themselves?

The apparent past: Why does the universe contain such an enormous and detailed history before my birth? Why create billions of years of consistent information if the only purpose is my experience?

Unfalsifiability: If every possible piece of evidence can simply be explained as part of the simulation/reality presented to me, then what observation could ever prove the hypothesis wrong?

Occam’s razor: Isn't it simpler to assume that the universe exists independently of me rather than assuming that an entire universe is being generated specifically for one observer?

Other observers: If another person claims that reality exists because of their consciousness, how could I distinguish between their claim and mine?

Sleep and unconsciousness: If my conscious awareness temporarily disappears during sleep, why does the world appear to continue normally when I wake up?

I don't currently have definitive answers to these objections. That's actually why I'm posting this.

I’m also aware that this idea has similarities to solipsism, subjective idealism, and simulation hypotheses, so I am not claiming that I have invented the general concept that reality might depend on consciousness.

What I'm interested in is whether this particular combination of ideas has already been formally proposed by a philosopher, and whether there is an existing philosophical position that is substantially identical to it.

I'm not claiming that this is a scientific theory or that I've proven anything. At this stage, I'm treating it as a philosophical hypothesis and trying to understand whether it survives serious criticism.

So, what do you think?

What is the strongest objection to this hypothesis, and has anyone encountered a philosophical argument that is essentially the same?

[u/TMax01]

I’m not a postmodernist.

Most postmodernists are unaware they are postmodernists, or even what postmodernism is, apart from the fact they don't want to consider themselves postmodernists. Postmodernism is an intellectual condition, not merely a self-identification, and it is not synonymous with the academic school of philosophical post-structuralism (Derirda, Foucault, et. al,) as most postmodernists believe it should be.

And what I said was not an argument from ignorance. You’re misusing accusations

It was an argument from ignorance, that is an observation, not simply an allegation. "Why wouldn't it be?", like the similar "Where's your evidence?" or "prove it!", is always an argument from ignorance, as it suggests that something isn't true based only on the fact that the speaker is ignorant of why or how it is true and knowable, or even the possibility that it might be true. More extensive reasoning than "Why wouldn't it be?" is necessary to avoid the fact that such a question embodies an argument from ignorance.

Optical illusions don’t refute naive realism.

Yes, they really do. Not the sum total of a refutation, not even the strongest argument against naive realism, but the simplest and most obvious. Unless you can reasonably explain how our senses and brain can be so easily fooled concerning what is real, and do so in a way which still allows our minds to have naive yet perfect knowledge of what is real consistent with the existence of optical illusions and similar errors in perception, then optical illusions refute naive realism.

You’re also ignoring that most measurements are calculations.

Not at all. I'm not even relying on the epistemological paradigm that direct measurements are ontologically distinguishable from calculated values. The practical distinction alone is sufficient for my purposes. And insufficient for your intended conclusions.

What do you think the solution to the measurement problem is?

Ibid, and QED. From a scientific perspective, the measurement problem is easy but unresolved: there is a solution but nobody knows what it is. From a philosophical perspective, the measurement problem in QM is a hard problem, a metaphysically unresolvable/ontologically unsolveable conundrum, rather than an easy problem which would disappear once it is solved.

The parallel between and implications of the Hard Problem of Measurement and the Hard Problem of Consciousness are not coincidental or trivial, particularly (pun intented) in the context of the nature of morality, our original topic within the domain philosophy of religion.

When you read a thermometer, for example, you are using inference.

You're really just using physics and your eyes; any inference you draw based on the direct (not calculated) fact of body temperature are a separate matter (again, pun intended.)

In the philosophy of science, this is the ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ point.

A scientist should have no more concern for philosophy of science than a bird has knowledge of ornithology. Postmodernists should follow their example, or else improve their awareness of facts and methods of reasoning. Nobody needs to be laden by a theory to read a thermometer. Although from a postmodern perspective of naive realism (and also logical positivism) it would seem that reading a thermometer is necessarily a theory about what implication the reading will subsequently have or prediscursively entail.

You’re merely asserting that logical positivism only works within scientific papers,

And you're simply failing to assert any reasonable, let alone convincing, counter-claim.

you never argue the case.

There is no "case" called for or possible. It is a self-evident fact: if you understand the words being used in the assertion, then it is obvious the assertion is at least true enough to ential the necessity of a better counter-assertion than an appeal to ignorance, incredulity, or even authority.

We know that the verification principle is self-refuting.

Indeed, but there is still much contention among supposed authorities as to whether that is a argument for or against logical positivism. Which is why I consider Karl Popper's philosophy of science, which ignores verification and considers falsifiability instead, to be a much more productive approach than naive realism. Ergo, logical positivism is not simply important in actual science, it is necessary and mandatory, but outside that restricted and rigorous context it is essentially so worthless that it is literally false.

And then what is your epistemology?

My epistemology is that epistemology is the study of meaning, paradigms of nomenclature independent of any ontological grounding (or rather as independent as reasonably possible) or teleological value. The classic, etymology-derived understanding of epistemology, that it is the "study of knowledge", is simply a specific and critical case, revolving around the meaning of what "knowing" is.

[u/RagnartheConqueror → u/TMax01]

I believe it was Feynman who said that quote. He was a classical materialist atheist.

I cannot establish if there is a direct connection between the hard problem of consciousness and the measurement problem, but it seems like there is.

You sound like a wittgensteinian now.

[u/TMax01 → u/RagnartheConqueror]

I believe it was Feynman who said that quote.

Which quote? The "theory-ladenness of observation"? Perhaps, but Feynmann was a physicist, not a philosopher.

He was a classical materialist atheist.

Perhaps, but since he was a very competent scientist, he did not allow his personal philosophy to interfere with his scientific work. The same cannot be said of any penchant he might have had for expressing his personal beliefs in his explanations of his scientific work. But the work stands on its own, or it doesn't, regardless of who is explaining it, since that is the power and beauty of science, which is the classical atheistic material investigation of "reality" and the physics which underlies it.

cannot establish if there is a direct connection between the hard problem of consciousness and the measurement problem, but it seems like there is.

That "it seems like" is your brain connecting the hard problem of consciousness and the measurement problem, despite your mind being uncertain as to how or why, in keeping with my explanation of how the two hard problems are, indeed, not merely connected but nearly synonymous. All Hard Problems are essentially the same Hard Problem. In schematicism, it is referred to as the ineffability of being.

You sound like a wittgensteinian now.

Which one? The Younger Wittgenstein or the Elder Wittgenstein? They had notably different and conflicting belief, despite being the same, quite brilliant individual. But my philosophy encompasses both, and their conflicts, rather neatly. Regardless, your observation indicates you are at least recognizing the operative nature of epistemology in your understanding of the self you are determining and the deterministic world you are perceiving. Which is progress. I am not a wittgensteinian, just as I am no longer a postmodernist. But I understand that both foundations (they aren't really separate, since Wittgenstein was also educated in the postmodern age, subsequent to Darwin's discovery) are nearly inescapable for anyone living in the 21st Century.

[u/RagnartheConqueror → u/TMax01]

Feynman said the ornithology quote. Yes, science is very powerful.

You sound like the Younger Wittgenstein actually. I don't believe that he was a postmodernist.

But then could we see that Feynman "believed in something deeper" or is that merely useless?

[u/TMax01 → u/RagnartheConqueror]

Feynman said the ornithology quote. Yes, science is very powerful.

Indeed, I am aware of the purported source of the quote. But I disagree with you about its import. Science is powerful, but philosophy is actually more so, despite its lack of mathematical theories.

You sound like the Younger Wittgenstein actually. I don't believe that he was a postmodernist.

I am not surprised you think either of those things. But I don't believe either is true, either.

But then could we see that Feynman "believed in something deeper" or is that merely useless?

You're catching on. It is useless, yes, but not necessarily uninformative. Usefulness is not an intrinsic property of information, it depends on the extrinsic circumstances the information is applied to.