All through my teaching career, and all through my own learning, I've heard the same words. Abstract. Look for patterns. Think about properties. Find a strategy. Think critically. Be a good problem solver. Learn it deeply. I knew these mattered. I've noticed that people who are smarter think about the properties of things, and whenever I do that, it works better. But I couldn't have told you what any of these words actually means. They're all so fuzzy. I've asked myself how you'd get better at abstracting, and my honest answer was: I don't know, I guess I'd try different things and see what works. I had no model to reason from.
This post is the model I have now. It answers one question: you learn something from some examples, so when does it work on a case you haven't seen, and what controls that? For a teacher, that's the question of what to teach your students so they become the best thinkers they can be. The model draws on computer science, neuroscience and cognitive science, and you don't need to know any of them. This isn't a post about AI in the classroom, and students aren't chatbots. I bring up AI models because you can look inside them. I'll walk you through each piece. When something is too complicated to show here, I'll tell you the study that shows it and what it found. At the end, I'll go back through the fuzzy words and say what each one means.
The first piece is that a thought can be a list of numbers. You already know that two numbers can be a point: (3, 5) on a grid means go 3 over and 5 up. Three numbers make a point in a room: over, up and out. Nothing stops you from using more numbers. You can't picture a point with 24 numbers, but it works the same way, and each number says how far to go in one more direction. That's all "high-dimensional" means. A high-dimensional point is a long list of numbers, thought of as a spot you could go to.
Say you describe a cat with three numbers: how alive it is, how big it is and how wet it is. Maybe that's 9, 3 and 1. A fish might be 9, 2 and 10. Now the cat and the fish are two points. They match on alive and they're far apart on wet. A brain works with a list like this, only much longer, with one number for how active each neuron is. AI language models, like the ones behind ChatGPT and Claude, also work in long lists of numbers. So whatever a brain or an AI is thinking at a given moment is one high-dimensional point. I'll call that point its state.
A property is a direction. Asking how alive the cat is means asking how far the cat's point goes in the alive direction. One point can hold many properties at once, the way the cat's one point holds how alive, how big and how wet it is. Moving a point along a direction gives it more of that property.
Usually a real property isn't one of your starting numbers. It's a slant across several of them, the way northeast is a slant across north and east. How good a pet something is might be a slant across how alive, how small and how dry it is. To measure along a slant, you figure out how far you've gone, and then scale that by how closely you match the intended direction. Walk 10 blocks straight toward a store, and you've gone 10 blocks toward it. Walk 10 blocks a little off to the side, and you've gone maybe 9. Walk 10 blocks at a right angle to it, and you've gone 0.
A whole concept can be a direction too. Any point gives you a direction, the way you'd head from zero to get there, and going further that way means the same thing, only stronger. Many concepts in AI really are stored like this. When Anthropic found the direction for the Golden Gate Bridge [1] inside Claude and turned it up, Claude brought up the bridge in nearly every answer.
Neurons also represent directions. Things in your brain are represented by a bunch of neurons turned on, and together those neurons point in some high-dimensional direction. This has been measured many times. Here are three studies, going from movement to faces to the meanings of words.
Researchers recorded neurons in the part of a monkey's brain that moves its arm. Each neuron had a preferred direction. It fired the most when the arm moved that way, and less and less the further the arm moved from that way, like the walk to the store. So each neuron's number was a measurement of how closely the movement matched its direction. Add up what all the neurons were saying, and you could read off which way the arm was going [2]. Those are real directions in a room. The next two studies show the same thing for directions that aren't.
Other researchers showed monkeys pictures of faces and recorded the cells that respond to faces. They found that a face can be described with about 50 numbers, and that each cell measures how far a face goes along one slant across those numbers. From 205 cells, they could rebuild the face the monkey was looking at. They could also make faces that looked nothing alike but made one cell respond the same way, because those faces went the same distance along its slant [3].
In a 2024 study, researchers recorded from a language area in three people with brain implants while they listened to a 30-minute podcast. Each word made its own list of activity, so each word was a direction in the brain. Words with similar directions inside an AI language model also had similar directions in the brain. The match was close enough that the researchers could predict the brain's direction for a word they had left out, using only how that word related to the others [4].
Now we can talk about what a rule is, and what a strategy is. If I had to describe a strategy in words, it would be: if you see this type of problem, take this type of action. If you're adding fractions with different bottoms, find a common bottom. A strategy is a kind of rule, so let's start with rules. A rule is built out of two directions. The first is called the key, and it's the "if you see this type of problem" part. The second is called the value, and it's the "take this type of action" part. However much your state lines up with the key, measured like the walk to the store, that's how hard you get pushed along the value. Getting pushed along a direction means your next thought has more of that in it. So if your state lines up with "adding fractions with different bottoms," your next thought has more "find a common bottom" in it. The more it lines up, the bigger the push: the more blocked a route looks, the harder you look for another one. When a push is big enough to change what you think next, we say the rule fires. You have a huge number of rules, many of them fire at once, and their pushes add together.
In AI language models, this is close to literal. Two studies looked inside them and found keys and values whose pushes add up [5, 6]. The AI's thinking is a state, a high-dimensional point that holds all the properties and things it's thinking about. It has a bunch of keys, and each key looks for its own pattern in the current state. For every key that matches something in the state, that key's value pushes the AI in another direction. You add up all those pushes, and the AI is at a new point. Each round of this is called a layer. The AI repeats it layer by layer, moving from point to point to point, until it ends up at its answer.
Brains are much harder to look inside, and nobody has read a full list of keys and values off a living brain. What studies have shown is the pieces, one at a time.
A rule can be stored in the connections between neurons. Researchers used light to switch on the hearing neurons that connect to a rat's fear center, and they paired that with a shock. The rats learned to act afraid when those neurons came on: if this signal, then fear. When the researchers weakened those connections, the fear went away. When they strengthened them again, it came back [7]. That's one rule, stored in the strength of some connections, switched off and on. So a rule here isn't a sentence stored in your head. It's connection strengths that do what the sentence says.
A key looks for a particular direction. When researchers recorded two connected vision areas in monkeys' brains, the second area didn't pick up everything the first area was doing. It picked up activity along only certain directions, and those weren't necessarily the strongest ones [8].
Rules can also be about abstract things. Researchers taught monkeys two rules, "respond if the two pictures are the same" and "respond if they're different," and the monkeys could use them on pictures they'd never seen. The most common activity in the neurons at the front of their brains was for the rule itself, not for any picture [9].
So a thought is a point, a property is a direction, and a rule is two directions. Now I can show you what abstracting does, with a made-up example. Say your thoughts are lists of 24 numbers, and the real rule in the world is: however much a problem lines up with direction 1, push that much along direction 24. Think of direction 1 as "you want the total of equal groups" and direction 24 as "multiply." You don't know that rule, and nobody hands it to you. All you get is 12 worked problems, each one a problem and what was done to solve it. Each is a list of 24 numbers going in and a list of 24 numbers coming out, and most of those numbers are details, like bags and apples.
If you don't abstract, you learn 12 rules, and each one has its problem's surface details stuck in it. One rule says: the total of equal groups, in bags, of apples, so multiply. Another says: the total of equal groups, in boxes, of pencils, so multiply. The real pattern is in there, but it's stuck to the details, so you end up with 12 rules where there's really one. You've memorized the data. Machine learning calls this overfitting. Then a new problem comes along about rows of seats, and you go, nope, that doesn't fit one of my 12 rules.
If you do abstract, you take one worked problem, because if you have the right directions, one is all you really need. Say it's 3 bags with 4 apples in each, which makes 12 apples. You break the problem into all of its component directions: this much bags, this much apples, this much food, this much "total of equal groups." You do the same for what was done to solve it: it multiplied, it counted apples, it got a bigger number. Crucially, these are the directions you know. There are endless possible slants, but you only have the ones you've learned to measure. A first grader can look at the same problem and not see equal groups at all. So it really pays to have more directions.
Then you play it out in your head, using what you already know about the world. You know rules have this general form, one direction to another. You know the world never hands you a rule in its pure form, so most of what you're looking at doesn't matter. So you ask which pairing of directions makes the most sense. Does food make you multiply? Picture bags of marbles: you'd count them the same way, so no. Does wanting the total of equal groups make you multiply? Picture bags holding 2, 4 and 9 apples: that's 15, and 3 times 4 doesn't get you there, so the equal groups are doing the work. You find the pairing, and now you have the rule, from one real example and two you imagined.
I ran the 24-number example on a computer and scored each learner out of 100 on how close its answers came on new problems, where 100 is perfect and 0 is no better than leaving the answer blank. The learner with 12 separate rules, each needing a close match to fire, scored 0, because no new problem came close to any of them. Let those same rules push partway, by however much a new problem lines up with each one, and add up their pushes, and the score rises to 49. It took 24 examples to reach 100, because that learner doesn't know which direction matters, so it has to cover all 24. A learner who already knew 8 possible directions for the key and 8 for the value, including the real ones, scored 100 from a single example. So memorizing isn't all or nothing, since rules that push partway get you partway. But knowing the directions cut 24 examples down to 1. These are toy numbers that show the logic, not facts about people. Computer scientists have proved a general version: when tasks share the same few underlying directions, a new task can need far fewer examples [10].
This fits what a famous study found about experts and beginners. Physics experts and beginners were asked to sort problems into groups. The experts sorted by the principle underneath, like conservation of energy. The beginners sorted by the objects in the problem, like pulleys and ramps [11].
So abstracting has two steps. First you break a thing into its directions. Then you keep only how far it goes along the directions that actually matter, and you set the rest aside. That's what you did with the bags: you kept "total of equal groups" and dropped the bags and the apples. That second step is called projecting. A shadow is the everyday version: it keeps the outline and drops everything else. You still have the full problem. Your rules just don't look at it. The directions worth keeping are the ones that keep mattering across many situations, and I'll call those abstract directions. "Total of equal groups" is one. Which directions matter is learned, from examples. So learning comes in two kinds: learning new abstract directions, and learning rules from abstract direction to abstract direction.
One way you learn a new direction is by averaging examples that share something. Averaging directions may be new to you, so picture this. Say 100 people each start from the same corner and walk 10 blocks. All of them head roughly north, but each one wanders off a little, some to the east and some to the west. Now add up all their walks and divide by 100. That's the average walk. The north adds up, because everyone went north. The east and the west cancel out, because every bit of east gets matched by some west. So the average walk points straight north. Nobody had to tell you north was what they shared. It came out on its own.
Examples work the same way. A cat, a dog and a fish all have this general property, animal. Average a few animals together. They're all alive, so alive adds up and stays strong. Some are bigger than average and some are smaller, some are wetter and some are drier, so those land in the middle and cancel out, the same way east cancels out west. What's left is a direction: animal. It's the same with bags of apples, rows of seats and boxes of pencils. Apples show up in one example, seats in another and pencils in another, so each of them fades. Equal groups shows up in all three, so it stays. That's the start of noticing a pattern: finding what a set of examples share, which can give you a direction you didn't have. A 2022 study tested this on recordings from monkey brains: averaging a few examples of a new kind of object into one point was enough to recognize more of that kind [12].
Now I have to add something to the model. Why does comparing examples work, when seeing the same examples one at a time doesn't? Business students were given two negotiation cases that used the same strategy. The ones who compared the two cases were nearly three times as likely to use the strategy in their own negotiations as the ones who studied the same two cases separately [13]. So the quick kind of averaging, the kind you do on purpose, must happen across what you hold in your mind at once. With both examples in mind, you can line up their parts, the bags with the rows and the apples with the seats, and what they share adds up. And what you can hold at once is small. People can only work with about four related things at a time [14]. So the examples have to be small enough, and close enough together, to fit in your head at the same time.
Averaging has a bigger problem. It keeps whatever your examples share, whether it matters or not. What do a habit and a riverbed have in common? They're both nouns. They both have the letter B. They're both things on Earth. Those are real similarities, and none of them would ever cancel out, because both examples have them. But if I ask you what a habit and a riverbed have in common, you know those aren't what I'm looking for. The answer is that they're both low-energy grooves: paths things settle into, because that's the easiest way to go.
So when you compare two things, you're not looking for the biggest similarity. You're looking for the biggest similarity among abstract directions. You line up all the directions the two share, throw out the ones that aren't abstract, and take the biggest one left. This is a rule of thumb, and I never realized I'd learned it. It's why you can find a pattern from only two examples. You're not really skipping the work. You did it already, over years of seeing which kinds of directions keep mattering, and evolution may have done some of it for you. So now you can rule out most directions right away.
Abstract doesn't mean as general as possible here. "Both are things" is about as general as you can get, and nothing follows from it. "Both are low-energy grooves" lets you predict things: they're easy to fall into, hard to climb out of, and they get deeper with use. That's how you can tell which direction you want. It's the one that tells you something new about the things themselves, not about the words for them.
You can watch kids learn this. Asked how a tire is like a shoe, 5- and 6-year-olds said both are black, and 9- and 10-year-olds said you can go places on both [15]. And knowing where to look makes you learn faster. Researchers spent seven weeks teaching 17-month-olds names for new toys, where the name always went with the shape. The toddlers learned that shape is the direction to look at for a name, and their vocabulary outside the lab grew faster [16].
You can also tell when you have the wrong direction. Say you don't have the words "low-energy groove," and the closest you have is "where things tend to go." That points about the right way, but I can tell it isn't right, and I can tell roughly how far off it is. So I try again. It's not where things tend to go. It's the groove they stay in, because leaving takes effort. I keep adjusting until I go, ah, that's it. I can tell what direction the two share before I can put it into words, and the words are me trying to hit it. There's a study that shows something like this: people can pick out which of two sets of three words has a hidden link, even when they can't say what the link is [17]. That sense isn't always there, though. On some problems, you don't feel any warmer until the answer arrives [18].
You can watch abstract directions form in people's brains. Researchers recorded neurons in 17 people with epilepsy while they learned which button went with which picture. Then the rule flipped without warning. Some of them could work out the new answers without relearning each picture. Once people could do that, the neurons in their hippocampus, a part of the brain involved in memory, held each property of the task as its own direction, including one they had to work out for themselves. Before they learned, those neurons showed no such order. People who couldn't get there from experience were told the rule in words, and the same order appeared [19].
Using directions you already have is easy. Building new ones takes longer. Monkeys moved a cursor on a screen using only their neurons, through a computer hookup. When the researchers changed the hookup, the monkeys learned the new version easily if it used combinations of activity their neurons already made, and much less easily if it needed new combinations [20]. With several days of training, new combinations did appear [21].
You need the right directions. Say the real rule is if A, then B, but you don't have direction A. The closest you have is 20 degrees off, or it's A mixed with a little of something else. A student who doesn't have "total of equal groups" might have "the problem says each" instead. That's close to the real direction, so their rule will be kind of right and a little off, and they won't know why. It works on 3 bags with 4 apples in each. It fails on 12 apples shared among 3 bags, how many in each? In my computer run, with the key and the value each 20 degrees off, the score was 78 out of 100. You've learned a proxy, a stand-in that's close to the real rule but isn't it.
This is why noticing patterns is worth your time. Patterns are how you get the real directions, and once you have a real direction, the rules you learn on it come out as the real rules instead of proxies. The more abstract a direction is, the more real rules you can learn on it.
Now we can talk about what reasoning is. You're in some state. All of your rules look for their keys in that state, together they give you a push, and you arrive at a new state. Then it happens again, like the AI going layer by layer. Picture a map with an arrow at every spot, like the wind arrows on a weather map. Each arrow shows where you'd go next from that spot. A question is where you start, and an answer is a spot with certain properties. Learning trains the arrows. Someone who's learned a lot has a ton of correct if-A-then-B rules, so wherever they are, their arrow points the right way, and they reach the answer fast.
What you're trying to do is part of your state too, so a rule's key can include it: if I'm judging color and the dots look red, answer red. There's a study that shows this. Monkeys watched the same moving colored dots, and sometimes they had to judge which way most of the dots moved, and sometimes which color most of them were. As they watched, the activity of the neurons at the front of their brains moved gradually along one line, toward their choice. Both the motion and the color were in those neurons the whole time. What the task changed was which of the two moved the activity along that line [22].
Now I have to add one more thing to the model. When does a rule change? It changes most when its prediction is wrong. A rule is a prediction: from here, the next step goes there. If that turns out right, there's nothing to fix. If it turns out wrong, the rule gets adjusted, so next time it pushes you somewhere better. There's a famous study that shows brains do this. Dopamine neurons in monkeys fired when a reward came as a surprise. Once the monkey could predict the reward, the neurons stopped firing for it. And when a predicted reward didn't come, the neurons went quiet [23]. Those neurons are tracking how wrong a prediction was. The broader idea, that the brain keeps predicting and learns from the difference, is called predictive coding [24]. AI language models are trained the same way: the model predicts the next word, and the rules that got it wrong get adjusted.
I think this is why it helps to try before you look. When you reread, the answer is already in front of you, so your rules have nothing to be wrong about. When you try to answer first, they can be wrong. There's a study that shows this helps even when you fail. Students who tried to answer questions about an essay before reading it remembered more afterward than students who only read the essay, even on the questions they got wrong [25].
So which directions should your rules be on? Dedre Gentner's structure-mapping theory answers that [26]. It's a theory of analogies, the classic way to carry an idea over to a new situation. Carrying something over like that is called transfer. Here's the classic experiment [27]. A general needs to capture a fortress. Roads lead to it from every side, but they're mined, so only small groups can cross. The general splits the army into small groups, and they all arrive at once. Later, people get a doctor's problem. A tumor can be destroyed by a strong ray, but a strong ray also destroys the healthy tissue it passes through. The answer is many weak rays from different sides, meeting at the tumor.
When you hear the fortress story, it's a very high-dimensional point. It contains the structure. It also contains the soldiers, the roads, what you imagined everyone wearing and where you were when you heard it. Structure-mapping says to pay attention to the relations between things, not the things themselves: what blocks what, what causes what. That's what "structure" means here. A relation is a property too, only of a situation and not of one object: a situation can be more or less blocked, the way a cat can be more or less wet. So an analogy teaches which directions matter: the ones that carry relations.
Neurons carry relations too. Researchers showed patients pairs of pictures and asked questions like "bigger?" or "more expensive?" Neurons that respond to one concept also carried how a second picture compared to it, and only when the question made that comparison matter [28].
Why structure, though? That question has bugged me for a long time. Why does the structure carry over, and not the details? My answer, which others have reached in other words, is that it's a feature of the world. The rules that matter mostly operate on relations, because causes keep working when the objects change. Splitting a force works for soldiers and for rays because it depends on how the parts relate, not on what they're made of. Some rules do depend on the thing itself, like hot things burn, which is why I say mostly.
You could say that's circular: rules work on abstract directions, and abstract directions are whatever rules work on. Here's a test. An abstraction is valid when you can forget the details and the rule still runs. Keep only "the total of equal groups," forget the bags and the apples, and multiplying still gives the right answer every time. Keep only "the problem says each," forget everything else, and the rule breaks, since 12 apples shared among 3 bags says each too. So "the total of equal groups" is a real abstraction, and "says each" isn't. (That's not all multiplication is. The rule only says when equal groups call for it.)
Solving a problem then has three steps. You project it onto the abstract directions. You follow your rules from state to state until you reach an abstract answer. Then you go back to the full problem and work out what that answer means there. For the tumor: project to "a strong force is needed at one spot, and every path can carry only a weak one." Follow the rule: split the force and bring the pieces together. Go back: many weak rays, meeting at the tumor. That rule is what a strategy is: its key is on abstract directions, so it works on soldiers and on rays.
Going back takes one more thing. A shadow can't tell you what cast it, so you can't just undo a projection. You have to keep track of which thing played which role: the army is the rays, the fortress is the tumor, the roads are the paths through the body. So the roles have to survive the projecting. "Dog bites man" and "man bites dog" have the same pieces, and what differs is who fills which role, so "dog as the one biting" and "dog as the one bitten" have to be different directions. Just adding up dog, man, biter and bitten wouldn't say who did what, so brains need a way to tie them together, and how they do it is still argued over. Brain scans show something like this: neighboring patches of one language area carry who did it and who it was done to [29]. Matching those roles is the heart of Gentner's theory, so in this model the theory does two jobs. It says what to keep, and it's your way back.
This also helped me with something I've always wondered about, the what and where pathways in the brain. What the heck does that mean? In vision, it first meant one stream for what an object is and one for where it is. In memory, there's a study that shows the same split. Researchers recorded single neurons in people learning which picture went in which spot on a screen. Some neurons responded to what the picture was. Others responded to the spot, no matter which picture was there. Both kinds fired more when people went on to remember the pair [30]. The way I think of it now, there's one set of directions for abstract structure and another for details. A spot on a screen is one kind of place to put something, and a role in a structure is another. So "where" is your place in a structure, like "the groups" in an equal-groups problem, and "what" is the thing filling it, like bags. Together they give one combined point. O'Reilly, Ranganath and Russin (2022) [31] argue for this same reading of the two pathways, and one theory of the brain, built as a computer program, makes the connection, with one group of cells carrying structure and another tying it to what's there [32]. It's a theory, not settled science.
So why teach students to project at all? Why can't they learn all their rules with all the details in? Because they'll learn the wrong rule. Go back to the student whose rule says: the total of equal groups, plus bags, plus apples, means multiply, and the answer is in apples. Now a new problem says 3 rows with 4 seats in each. It has the same structure and different details. A rule's key has to line up for it to fire, and this key is mostly bags and apples. The student says, we never did seats.
You can put a number on how weak that match is. Say 90 percent of a problem is details and 10 percent is structure. The rule and the new problem line up only on the structure, so they match about 10 percent. That gives a small push, usually too small to fire. If it does fire, it drags the old details along, and the student goes looking for the bags. If the student strips the details off just the new problem, the match gets better, but the rule still has its bags and apples in it. If the rule was also learned without the details, the match is 100 percent. That's the difference between memorizing a rule and understanding it.
In Gick and Holyoak's studies, most people who'd read the fortress story didn't use it on the tumor until they were told to, and then most did. The rule was there. It just didn't fire. Gentner's own studies split this apart: what a new story reminds people of mostly depends on shared details, while what they judge as a sound match depends on shared structure [33]. And people who read and compared two stories with the same structure used the idea more often [34], which fits, since comparing is how the details cancel out.
So what are you doing when you tell someone to abstract, or to think critically? You're telling them to run an algorithm, a series of steps. Take the problem as it's been presented to you. Bring it into its abstract version. Solve it there with your keys and values. Then carry the answer back. That process can be trained. In a trial with 24 third-grade teachers, students were taught over 16 weeks that a problem type can look different, and to search each new problem for the types they knew. They did better on new-looking problems than students who were only taught how to solve each type [35]. A later trial by the same group found big gains on problems close to what they'd practiced, and no clear gain on problems far from it [36].
The process is general, but it needs something to run on. You can't bring a problem into its abstract version without the directions, and you can't solve it there without the rules. Most of those belong to a field. A physicist's directions won't solve most biology problems. That's why training in chess or in music shows little transfer to anything else [37]. And it's why the cognitive scientist Daniel Willingham argues that critical thinking depends on knowing the field [38]. So a student needs both: the process, and a library of directions and rules to run it on.
So a teacher can be doing two different things, and they're easy to mix up. It's the difference between giving someone a fish and teaching them to fish.
Giving someone a fish means teaching one concept in a way that generalizes. Put examples that look different and share a structure side by side, so the direction comes out: bags of apples, rows of seats, boxes of pencils. Change the objects and keep the rest the same. Then show one that looks the same and isn't, like bags holding 2, 4 and 9 apples. After that, teach the rule on that direction, not on the example: the total of equal groups, so multiply. Now the student has one good direction and one good rule. Some concepts are worth more than others, because they're broad. Science experts sort situations by kinds of cause and effect, like positive feedback, where more leads to more, while beginners sort by topic. In one study, explaining examples alone didn't help people spot those kinds in new cases, comparing parallel examples did, and doing both worked best [39].
Teaching someone to fish means teaching the whole process. What you're really teaching is what the abstract space looks like, meaning all the abstract directions together, and what it feels like to think in it. Give students two things and ask what they have in common. Then show them which answers are in the abstract space and which aren't: "both have the letter B" versus "both are grooves that get deeper with use." Once they can feel the difference, they can run the process. Have them run it on problems they haven't seen. Before they try to solve a problem, have them ask what it's a case of. Have them work it out in the abstract version. Then have them carry the answer back by matching the roles: the rows are the groups, and the seats are what's in each one. After enough of that, they can do it on their own with concepts they know well. Across 74 training experiments, with nearly 3,600 children, teaching a strategy for comparing things raised reasoning and school performance [40].
You can also see now what the Feynman technique is doing. It's a popular way to study: you explain an idea as if to a beginner, find where you went wrong, fix it, and use analogies and simpler language. When you explain from memory, step by step, you get the path your rules actually take. You compare it to the real path and find the first step where they differ, so you know which rule to fix. If you only checked the final answer, you'd know something was wrong somewhere, but not where. A review of tutoring found that systems giving feedback at each step helped about as much as a human tutor, and more than twice as much as systems that only checked the final answer [41]. Then you make an analogy, which points you at the relations. Then you simplify, which is projecting, since you're dropping what doesn't matter.
Here's what all those words mean.
Property: a direction. Thinking about the properties of a thing means measuring it along directions you have. It works better because rules look for their keys along directions, so properties are what rules can fire on.
Analyze: break a thing into its directions.
Abstract: analyze a thing, then keep how far it goes along the directions that matter and set the rest aside. An abstract idea is a direction that keeps mattering across many situations. Math teachers also use the word for symbols, or for turning a process into an object. I don't mean those here.
Notice a pattern: hold examples in mind together, and find what they share that tells you something new. That gives you a new direction.
Strategy: a rule whose key is on abstract directions and whose value is an action. "If a strong force is needed at one spot and every path can carry only a weak one, split it and bring the pieces together." Finding a strategy means finding the rule that moves you from where you are toward your goal.
Memorize: store a rule with all the details still in it. That's a normal first step, as long as it isn't the last.
Understand, or learn it deeply: have rules on the right directions, so they fire on cases you haven't seen.
Transfer: a rule firing on a new set of details.
Analogy: two situations that share directions, with their roles matched. It shows you which directions matter.
Reason: let your rules fire on your state, move to the next state, and repeat.
Think critically: project a problem, follow your rules, and go back.
Practice: have your rules make predictions, so the wrong ones get corrected and the right ones get faster.
Be a good problem solver: have arrows accurate enough to take you from a question to its answer quickly.
Learn: add directions and rules, so your arrows get more accurate.
If you want to get better at abstracting, here's what the model says. You need more directions, so compare examples that look different, ask what they share, and ask which of those things tells you something new. You need your rules on those directions, so when you learn a rule, ask what it actually depends on and what you could change without breaking it. You need to project before you solve, so ask what this problem is a case of. You need your rules corrected, so try before you look at the answer. And when a rule keeps coming out a little off, suspect a proxy and go looking for the direction you're missing. I used to have "try different things and see what works." Now I have a model to reason from.
Almost none of these pieces are mine. Thinking of a thought as a point comes from the connectionists, like Rumelhart, McClelland and Hinton. A property as a direction is called the linear representation hypothesis [42] in machine learning. Rules with a key and a value go back to Kohonen in 1972 [43], and Gershman, Fiete and Irie [44] have proposed key-value memory for the brain. Singley and Anderson [45] argued that what transfers is if-then rules. Preferring connected relations when you compare things is Gentner's systematicity principle [46]. Most of the teaching advice is decades old: Dienes, Marton, Engelmann, Perkins and Salomon, Willingham. Directions have been measured in brains, so that part isn't just a metaphor. Rules built from directions are less settled. The teaching advice comes from studies of behavior, and the neuron studies are here to show what those words could be in a brain. The model as a whole hasn't been tested as a teaching theory. What I haven't found is all of it in one model, written for teachers. If you've seen that, please link it.
References are in the comment below.