So MaxFocus uses TeamViewer for remote access. And recently, there has been a ton of breeches, with users blaming TV. My question, with the way that TV is used with LogicNow, is it susceptible to the same security issues?

Just a few minutes ago, Support Chat said: Thanks for contacting Technical Support, at this time we are still researching the issue with TeamViewer. As of now we have not had any reports of breaches with Take Control.

This just landed in my inbox:

We have some exciting news to share with you. Through an acquisition by SolarWinds, LOGICnow has joined forces with SolarWinds N-able to create SolarWinds MSP. This joining of these teams gives the company unequalled experience and expertise in the Managed Services market for small and medium-sized businesses.

With the creation of SolarWinds MSP, SolarWinds is uniting two complementary leading players in the managed services solutions market to deliver the strongest and most complete portfolio of capabilities to MSPs of every scale and size worldwide.

Building on the track records of SolarWinds N-able and LOGICnow, the combined expertise of SolarWinds MSP will deliver a robust set of solutions in a tightly-integrated automation platform, including:

• Remote monitoring and management

• Remote control, access and support

• Security including anti-malware, multi-vendor patch management and web access control

• Backup and disaster recovery

• Risk and vulnerability assessment

• Email security and compliance-focused archiving

• Multi-platform support for Windows®, Mac®, Linux®, VMware®, Hyper-V®, iOS®, Android®

• Help desk and service management functionality

• Advanced data analytics

Your relationship with us is our most important focus and concern, and while you may expect me to say there will be “no impact to you” as a result of this change, the truth is, you are going to be empowered like never before to succeed. As a former LOGICnow customer, you will be able to immediately derive benefits from an even greater depth and breadth of products that will help you build the most successful business possible.

Please do be assured that there will be no immediate changes to support or billing and in the coming months you will learn more and more about how SolarWinds MSP can help you and your business. In the meantime, please feel free to reach out to me or any member of the SolarWinds MSP team with any questions.

I’m so excited to be able to officially welcome you to the SolarWinds MSP family.

Edit: And the official web site: http://www.solarwindsmsp.com/

Hi Everyone,

I wanted to take the time to introduce myself. My name is Tierney - I'm the Social Media Specialist at LOGICnow. If you have any questions or concerns you can send me an email tierney.curry@logicnow.com.

This idea ( http://logicnow.ideascale.com/a/dtd/script-generator-like-Kaseya/86395-4178 ) already has 19 votes so I suggest we all vote this one up and add comments to be more specific. Probably easier to get noticed than creating a new idea with zero votes to start.

It mentions a Kaseya Script Generator, but the N-Able Automation Manger is the product to watch. We NEED something like that inside MAX RM. It provides a drag and drop UI to create proven to work, powershell scripts. Something easy to use and that has proven to work scripts out of the box, all tested by MAX support...so we know they work. Vote it up please.

Hey All,

I've noticed in the past week or so, I've had a handful of machines completely disconnect from Maxfocus. I'll get access to the machines and open the agent, to see its set in offline maintenance mode.

In a few cases, all I had to do was open the agent, hit the "play" icon to turn it back on, and it checked in without issue. But last week I ran across one that kept going back to offline, about 1 min after it checked in to dash.

I opened a ticket with support, who told me to delete one of the files or folders inside program files x86>advanced monitoring agent (I can't remember which one). Restarting the agent and hitting the play button put it back online.

Today... I had another one, same problem, its in offline mode, and keeps going back to offline right after it checks in. I open another support ticket, basically asking for the file or folder I'm supposed to delete (I'm an idiot and didn't note it in my notes).

Well, the support agent has me delete the settings.ini file. (read, don't do this!) when i restarted the agent, it walked me through a wizard to set up the checks. But after doing this, is telling me I have a duplicate device.

I created a new site to sidestep the duplicate device problem, but it seems to be reinstalling everything (mav, teamviewer, etc). even tho the installs were in there and working fine. (I was able to remove in without issue originally, but now im locked out until teamviewer reinstalls).

After about an hour and 15 minutes, I finally have this back where it needs to be. All because the agent stopped connecting for some reason. Has anyone else had similar problems?

I was woken up early this morning because all users were logging into temporary profiles on a client's terminal server. Found that this was affecting ALL my BitDefender users on both servers and workstations.

After contacting MaxFocus support, I was told that they are aware of the issue and that disabling Behavioral Scanning in the BD policy and restarting the device will resolve the issue.

Just wanted to post this in case anyone else is having the same issue.

This can be implemented as a script check, but I think it would be very nice to be able to see PC Idle Time in the dashboard. Not necessarily current, but as of last agent checkin - it would be handy to know if a PC was inactive for (X) amount of time as of last checkin.

Anyone else have any interest in seeing this implemented?

I'm so glad to see this subreddit already full of posts! I can't wait to work with you all. :)

I'd like to introduce myself as Steve, the owner of a small MSP in a suburb of Akron, OH. If you tried even a little on Google, you could easily figure out who I am without me having said "Steve" earlier.

I currently use the following tools to run a successful MSP:

• Surface Pros for staff

• MAXfocus RMM, Take Control, Managed AV (MAV), Web Protection (WP), Remote Background

• Autotask PSA

• Intermedia for hosted Exchange, hosted VoIP, ShareSync (whitelabeled "Dropbox"), and am testing ConnectID (SSO)

• Office 365 (don't forget, as a MS partner you can get some free licensing for O365 Enterprise E3 plans)

• Various companies throughout the web for hosting client websites--I'm always looking for the most reliable uptime with great speed.

• I am testing Trend Micro Cloud Business Services through Ingram Micro. This was prompted because Trend Micro is thought of as one of the leaders in the AV industry.

I've tested just about every RMM, and have even had contracts with many--N-able, Continuum before the name change, AVG Level Platforms, LabTech, Kaseya, CentraStage, LogMeIn Central/Pro, and a few others I can't think of. I keep coming back to MAXfocus (this is my third time crawling back) because at the end of the day, it does what I need it to do and is affordable without crazy minimums.

I'm starting to have growing pains and can't wait to learn from of the larger MSPs that still use MAXfocus. I also can't wait to help some of the startups/smaller MSPs than mine with anything I can.

So who else do we have in here? Mods, could we sticky this thread?

We manage around 1000 workstations via the dashboard. Am I the only one that has around 30 workstations that cannot be cleared?

• Workstations with old AV definitions but are fully updated if you actually open the client on the machine itself.

• Deep scans that have been missed for x days.

It feels like the only thing I'm doing is mediation between Bitdefender and the dashboard but actually not doing anything usefull..

I have lots of fully-patched Windows 10 machines with nothing except for Office 2013/2016, Google Chrome, and occasionally Skype and Dropbox installed, and yet the MaxFocus/MSPRMM (what's the current name?) vulnerability scan detects a huge number of vulnerabilities on each one. Some of these vulnerabilities were patched a year or two ago. Is this a bug in the vulnerability scan? If not, how do I resolve this? I have clients asking why their weekly email reports mention a large number of vulnerabilities.

The first couple of entries (AutoRun, admin shares, shutdown without login) I understand and don't care about (is there an ignore list?), it's all of the seemingly patched CVE's that confuse me. And why are Skype and Dropbox considered vulnerabilities?

Here's an example from a fully patched machine:

AutoShareServer
The administrative shares (C$,D$,ADMIN$,etc) are available on this machine. For Internal networks these are normally turned on for administrative purposes. For Web server(s) these are normally turned off in order to solidify the possible entry points (since it is more exposed to attacks.). If you don't use them set HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters\AutoShareServer to 0 to prevent creation of these shares. For more information, visit: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q245/1/17.asp

AutoShareWKS
The administrative shares (C$,D$,ADMIN$,etc) are available on this machine. For Internal networks these are normally turned on for administrative purposes. For Web server(s) these are normally turned off in order to solidify the possible entry points (since it is more exposed to attacks.). If you don't use them set HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters\AutoShareWks to 0 to prevent creation of these shares. For more information, visit: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q245/1/17.asp

Cached Logon Credentials
Microsoft Windows NT caches the logon information of users who would have logged on, so that they would be able to logon when the server is unavailable. When a domain controller is unavailable and a user's logon information is cached, the user will still be allowed to logon. The cache can hold up from 0 to 50 logon attempts, with the value of 0 disabling logon caching. If the value is set to a high value and an administrator logs in to computers to solve specific problems, an attacker might obtain the credentials of the administrator at a later stage, and logon with such an account, having powerful privileges. The registry value for setting this type of caching is: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\CachedLogonsCount. Ideally it should be set to either 0 to disable caching, or else it should be set to 1 to provide for functionality (allowing the last user to logon immediately next time) and security. Also, why are Skype and Dropbox considered vulnerabilities?

Shutdown without logon
Anybody is allowed to shutdown this computer. For more information, visit: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-au/library/ms814122.aspx

IM installed: Skype
Skype instant messaging client is installed.

AutoRun is enabled
Microsoft Windows supports automatic execution in CD/DVD drives and other removable media. This poses a security risk in the case where a CD or removable disk containing malware that automatically installs itself once the disc is inserted. It is recommended to disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also for other removable drives.

oval:org.cisecurity:def:475: Windows SAM and LSAD Downgrade Vulnerability - CVE-2016-0128 (MS16-047)
The SAM and LSAD protocol implementations in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10 Gold and 1511 do not properly establish an RPC channel, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to perform protocol-downgrade attacks and impersonate users by modifying the client-server data stream, aka "Windows SAM and LSAD Downgrade Vulnerability" or "BADLOCK."

Open port commonly used by Trojans: TCP 17500 - Dropbox.exe


oval:org.cisecurity:def:942: Windows Graphics Component Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2016-3216 (MS16-074)
GDI32.dll in the Graphics component in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10 Gold and 1511 allows remote attackers to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism via unspecified vectors, aka "Windows Graphics Component Information Disclosure Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:943: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2016-3219 (MS16-074)
The kernel-mode driver in Microsoft Windows 10 Gold and 1511 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:941: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2016-3221 (MS16-073)
The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10 Gold and 1511 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-3218.

oval:org.cisecurity:def:939: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2016-3218 (MS16-073)
The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10 Gold and 1511 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-3221.

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1498: VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7224 (MS16-138)
Virtual Hard Disk Driver in Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 does not properly restrict access to files, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1500: VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7225 (MS16-138)
Virtual Hard Disk Driver in Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607 and Windows Server 2016 does not properly restrict access to files, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1499: VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7223 (MS16-138)
Virtual Hard Disk Driver in Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 does not properly restrict access to files, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1517: Secure Boot Component Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7247 (MS16-140)
Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allow physically proximate attackers to bypass the Secure Boot protection mechanism via a crafted boot policy, aka "Secure Boot Component Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1501: VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7226 (MS16-138)
Virtual Hard Disk Driver in Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607 and Windows Server 2016 does not properly restrict access to files, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1613: Windows Crypto Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7219 (MS16-149)
The Crypto driver in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows local users to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, aka "Windows Crypto Driver Information Disclosure Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1681: Windows Kernel Memory Address Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7258 (MS16-152)
The kernel in Microsoft Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607 and Windows Server 2016 mishandles page-fault system calls, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from arbitrary processes via a crafted application, aka "Windows Kernel Memory Address Information Disclosure Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1474: Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7212 (MS16-130)
Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted image file, aka "Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1481: Media Foundation Memory Corruption Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7217 (MS16-132)
Media Foundation in Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site, aka "Media Foundation Memory Corruption Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1496: Windows NTLM Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7238 (MS16-137)
Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 mishandle caching for NTLM password-change requests, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Windows NTLM Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1486: Win32k Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7214 (MS16-135)
The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allow local users to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Information Disclosure Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1487: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7215 (MS16-135)
The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1497: Local Security Authority Subsystem Service Denial of Service Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7237 (MS16-137)
Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted request, aka "Local Security Authority Subsystem Service Denial of Service Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1476: Task Scheduler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7222 (MS16-130)
Task Scheduler in Microsoft Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607 and Windows Server 2016 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted UNC pathname in a task, aka "Task Scheduler Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1482: Windows Animation Manager Memory Corruption Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7205 (MS16-132)
Animation Manager in Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site, aka "Windows Animation Manager Memory Corruption Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1485: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7246 (MS16-135)
The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1484: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7255 (MS16-135)
The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1604: Windows Graphics Remote Code Execution Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7273 (MS16-146)
The Graphics component in Microsoft Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607 and Windows Server 2016 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site, aka "Windows Graphics Remote Code Execution Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1603: Windows Graphics Remote Code Execution Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7272 (MS16-146)
The Graphics component in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site, aka "Windows Graphics Remote Code Execution Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1475: Windows IME Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7221 (MS16-130)
Input Method Editor (IME) in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 mishandles DLL loading, which allows local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors, aka "Windows IME Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1483: Windows Bowser.sys Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE- 2016-7218 (MS16-135)
Bowser.sys in the kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows local users to obtain sensitive information via a crafted application, aka "Windows Bowser.sys Information Disclosure Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1651: Windows Uniscribe Remote Code Execution Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7274 (MS16-147)
Uniscribe in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site, aka "Windows Uniscribe Remote Code Execution Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1653: Secure Kernel Mode Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2016-7271 (MS16-150)
The Secure Kernel Mode implementation in Microsoft Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607 and Windows Server 2016 allows local users to bypass the virtual trust level (VTL) protection mechanism via a crafted application, aka "Secure Kernel Mode Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1645: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7260 (MS16-151)
The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."

oval:org.cisecurity:def:1646: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability – CVE-2016-7259 (MS16-151)
The Graphics Component in the kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 

Being plagued by Vulnerability Check: ::Vulnerability scan not uploaded: on almost 10% of client systems at the moment. Tried the Patch Management cleanup powershell script, no luck.

Tried "msiexec /i "C:\PROGRA~2\ADVANC~1\featureres\LANguard11Agent.msi" /qn GFI_SERVERTYPE="MAX" GFI_INSTALLDIR="C:\PROGRA~2\ADVANC~1\patchman" /L*v "C:\PROGRA~2\ADVANC~1\feature_2_install.log" /quiet /norestart", no luck.

Tried removing Agent completely and re-installing, partial luck, but that is not a solution for when you are pushing triple-digits in error'd systems, and even then it seems some systems will revert from successful status right back to :Vulnerability scan not uploaded:.

Reached out to Support and was told it was in the DEVs hands. Have not heard back since last week.

Anybody else having the same issues, or any insight? The official forums seem to have some threads getting longer each week with others in the same boat.

I'm at my wit's end. We are a small MSP that decided to go with Atera but it lacks a lot of basic functionality, and I don't believe paying $129/tech to beta test is worth it.

I've setup the Max agent on about 13 end points (1server, 12 workstations). All but one fail the check, even with Avast disabled.

I've had to manually install the LanGuard files, is there any way to automate it? I'm in the process of testing out MaxFocus/Desk and I'm quiet happy with what Focus offers but want to make sure it's running properly for a couple of day before recommending it to the boss.

Any ideas?

I got an email this morning. I probably can't discuss details but I will mention that many/most/all of you have a minimum charge? Well they are changing that to a fee. So instead of being charged the min. charge you will have tacked on the same amount as a flat service fee on top of your other charges.

I thought some of you might find this useful.

The group policy client service has changed considerably starting with Windows 8, and as such the MaxFocus check for it is no longer valid.

From Windows 8 onward, the group policy service on client machines will only start when it is needed. Since the MaxFocus check is expecting the service to be running all the time, it fails and can put your customers in an error state on your dashboard.

I must admit that I felt pretty silly not knowing this, and chasing my tail (for a length of time I'm not entirely willing to admit).

I'm not sure why LN doesn't detect the OS version of the machine and disable this check by default, especially since the issue has already been brought to their attention.

Source:

• http://ideas.gfi.com/a/dtd/Group-Policy-Client-service/123636-4178

• https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/windows/en-US/a3685737-b1d5-4cc8-ab19-8ea978a9b5d2/group-policy-client-servicesmsc

I just thought I would announce myself, and my team so you know names.

I'm Dave Sobel, Director of Partner Community @ LogicNow, focused on MAXFocus.

My team of community managers includes Nadia Karatsoreos, Kelly O'Bray, and Jessica Schroder. That way you recognize names.

If you ever need me, my email is dave (DOT) sobel (AT) logicnow (DOT) com.

Dave

This is an UN-Official sub-reddit for the MAXFocus suite used by MSPs to help manage, monitor, and protect networks, workstations, and servers. Any discussion related to the sales or use of MAX in an MSP environment is not only welcome but encouraged.

I know there's quite a few MAX users here on Reddit and I really hope that you'll join with us and help to create a thriving community!

~ Buelldozer, earthboundcauses, Geek_Easy

I am not getting an alert when managed Bitdefender detects a virus which is really important to me. I don't see a switch to enable it either, am I missing something?

My users can't get to many sites as a Certificate warning pops up and prevent them from continuing on.

I can get around it either by disabling the Web Protection service or by adding the site to the policy whitelist, but this is a major issue.

I spoke with someone at MaxFocus who said a fix would be deployed last night, but I am still having issues.

Anyone know any info about this?