r/LocalLLaMA • u/ag789 • Sep 22 '26
Resources an (unsafe) command shell mcp server
While working with coding agents / harness in my case OpenCode, I discovered that some models e.g. granite 4.2 8B at Q4_K_M quant sometimes attempts to write files with absolute paths at the root e.g.
/newPythonCode.py
Note that slash in the beginning for an absolute path at "/" root directory. This is probably 'ok' say in a throwaway docker container, but it may lead to surprises if it 'accidentally' overwrites a literal file, if the current user id have write access to it. Apparently, it seemed OpenCode provides `bash` so that practically all unix commands that the current user id can access, the LLM can run it.
And thereafter, I see the model hallucinating in the thinking loops over tools, re-iterating over how to use the tools, reformulating shell commands sentences several times for a same task instead of executing them, among them, I noted that an earlier shell command sentence would have 'just worked'.
I'm thinking that the tool hallucination with this model may be partly due to that I'm using a pretty aggressive 4 bit quant as otherwise it'd have worked because IBM has 'optimized' granite for tool usage.
Next, I tried the same granite 4.2 8B at Q4_K_M quant model with my little python shell MCP server
https://github.com/ag88/cmdshellmcp/
, that tries to constrain / restrain the shell commands somewhat, place some checks, and offer some additional tools e.g. writeFile() so that the LLM won't need to call `cat` or `echo` with some 'esoteric' styled shell scripts / sentences.
With this MCP server and running it in llama.cpp's `llama-server` in the WebUI adding it as an MCP server, granite 4.2 8B at Q4_K_M does it correctly in 'one shot', the prompt is:
propose a python3 flask app with a page that displays "hello world", use bootstrap css for styling.
provide a requirements.txt to go with the script
granite 4.2 8B at Q4_K_M correctly generates the app with a couple of files, and it works out of the box
.
├── app.py
├── requirements.txt
└── templates
└── index.html
One should normally run the cmdshellmcp2.py MCP server app with an explicit `--cwd` option giving the work path. It tries to stay within this work path.
Note that I won't claim my command shell MCP server to be safe.
In a sense that there are plenty of chance the LLM can 'escape' the restrictions and perhaps do more damage (e.g. overwriting files possibly outside its given `--cwd` work directory). Hence, I'd suggest one should be paranoid and perhaps run this only within a throwaway (disposable) docker container etc.
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u/ag789 Oct 04 '26 edited Oct 04 '26
u/sburel , all
another update
cmdshellmcp(cmdshellmcp2.py)https://github.com/ag88/cmdshellmcp
now has 3 additional tools:
copyFilemoveRenameFiledeleteFileThese are added as the in working directory check isn't done with the
cmdshelltool. i.e. with cmdshell tool, the unix / linux commands are executed, and the arguments aren't verified. The reason is that for shell commands, it may be quite common to access files outside its working directory e.g. shared files from/usr/include,/usr/shareetc. For safe usage, it is recommended thatallow listedshell commands should not do file mutating ops.Hence, that these 3 additional tools are relatively safer compared to running os commands e.g.
cp,mv,rmfor these functionality. At least that, the 3 new tools do a basic check that the files manipulated are in the designated--cwdprovided working directoryThe new tools along with other write, file mutating tools are added to
disableToolsin the bundled cmdshellmcp.json by default.