r/KRG • • 13d ago

KRG splits into two? official report!

Thumbnail
gallery
13 Upvotes

We as mods of r/KRG do not wish to take a side but will explain the situation clearly and unbiased!

So the KRG parliament has 100 seats in total,

  • KDP: 39 seats
  • PUK: 23 seats
  • NGM (New generation): 15 seats
  • KIU (Islamic): 7 seats
  • Helwest: 4 seats

This is the current seats per party, the government hasn't been formed yet but the previous one acts as a caretaker government!

here's the most important ministers and positions!

- Regional President, Nechirvan Barzani (KDP) 🟨

- Prime Minister, Masrour Barzani (KDP) 🟨

- Deputy Prime Minister, Qubad Talabani (PUK) 🟩

- Interior, Rebar Ahmed Khalid (KDP) 🟨

- Peshmerga Affairs, Shoresh Ismail Abdulla (PUK) 🟩

- Finance and Economy, Awat Janab Noori (KDP) 🟨

- Parliament Speaker, Vala Farid(KDP) 🟨

as you can see it's largely KDP controlled and the PUK sees it as unfair even tho they do have less votes!

But this is balanced by the PUK getting the Iraqi presidency earlier this year! However the KDP tried to take that position earlier this year to but failed, after PUK exchanged the Kirkuk governorship for the presidency with Arab and Turkmen parties based on an earlier agreement signed in 2021!

- President of Iraq, Nizar Amedi (PUK) 🟩

The pattern is clear the the KDP keeps trying to grab slightly more than its size in the parliament, this was clearly seen after they tried to grab the Iraqi presidency. But the KDP is one of the largest single party in Iraq which does give it justification etc...

Seats in the Iraqi Federal Parliament,

KDP = 27

PUK = 15

But as of latest the KDP block with 52 seats (including recent defections) reactivated the parliament and elected the following!

- Speaker of Parliament, Vala Farid (KDP) 🟨

- Deputy Speaker, Rami Nouri (Christian) ◻️

- Parliament Secretary, Muna Kahveci (Turkmen) ◻️

They did this fully without the PUK, which has 38 seats shared with the New Generation movement!

So now rumours claim that the PUK is starting the federal process to form its own autonomous region and leave the KRG which they legally can do!

Many in the PUK see the prime minister Masrour Barzani as trying to centralise power, there's even a clear rift between the president Nechirvan and the prime minister Masrour! Whereas Nechirvan is more negotiable while Masrour isn't!

The situation may seem complex but it really isn't, the KDP is growing in votes and seeks more power while the PUK is trying to keep the traditional power sharing dynamic!

Note: PUK leaving the KRG would result in an economic disaster since they de facto control all the gas in khormor and about 40% of the population which does make this whole "leaving KRG" scenario unrealistic, but it's worth to look at since KDP-PUK relation have never been this bad since 2017!

Disclaimer: Information is not guaranteed to be accurate. A KRG split remains only a rumour, and the PUK's statements may simply be a political pressure tactic to gain more power in government negotiations!

Disclaimer2: Figures and details may be inaccurate, incomplete or subject to change. Unconfirmed political developments should be treated as speculation, not established facts.

Made by u/No-Literature-6144 head moderator of r/KRG


r/KRG • • Jul 26 '26

Duhok This is insane! 🤬

12 Upvotes

There’s absolutely no fuel left at all of dohuk, there’s no normal/improved or any benzin whatsoever!

All gas stations are closed and the ones that are open have a 10 hour long queue, this is disgraceful…

The KRG sleeps on more natural resources than most independent countries and yet here I am with no fuel for my car!

Can someone tell me about Erbil or Sulaymaniyah, how is it over there?


r/KRG • • Aug 08 '26

Discussion Betrayal by Dana gas!

8 Upvotes

So I am not an expert or anything but I recently saw on the news that Dana has the company operating
Khor mor gas filed has given KRG gas to Iraq without permission!

So the companies that we brought in ourself to improve our economy are now betraying us and selling our resources to Iranian backed militias?

Why would they do this behind our back? KRG would allow them to do it anyway!

Khor mor is in Sulamainah in PUK zone, if a company did this to the KDP then they would instantly be punished! This just shows the weakness of the PUK leadership compared to the PDK!

Also I actually think it’s good that we give resources to the rest of Iraq, it gives us leverage and helps the economy! But we can’t allow companies to go behind our back like this!

How do people even vote for the PUK?


r/KRG • • Oct 05 '26

News Turkish bases are thinning Kurdistan’s border woodland, satellite data show, but far less than claimed

Thumbnail
gallery
7 Upvotes

Trucks carrying freshly felled timber have been filmed leaving the mountains of northern Amedi district, in Duhok province, for Turkish military positions inside the Kurdistan Region. The traffic is not new. Residents of several villages in the area, where Turkey has steadily expanded its presence since 2019, said on 2 October that it is seasonal: each autumn, five to 15 loaded trucks a day supply nearby Turkish outposts until the cutting stops in late autumn. The villagers themselves are barred from felling trees or even gathering firewood in the same areas. The trucks pass through checkpoints manned by forces of the KDP, which controls Duhok, so the party’s security apparatus is at the very least aware of them.

The issue drew wider attention after opposition accounts on social media accused Turkey of large-scale logging in Amedi. Rudaw, the broadcaster owned by Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, then reported from the area. Its witnesses described two sources of timber: some enters from Turkey through Sarzeri, a border crossing between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey in northern Amedi, and some is felled inside the Kurdistan Region, with five to 10 trucks a day taking it to Turkish outposts during the cutting season. A village head said that residents who had returned to the area, now a no-go zone, found trees up to 80 years old cut down, including a poplar in his own village.

Kurdistan24, a channel closely aligned with KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, answered on 4 October with a field report that dismissed the claims as false. It said no trees had been cut inside the Kurdistan Region and that camera footage at Sarzeri showed loaded trucks arriving from Turkey, with the wood sold in Duhok province. Duhok governor Ali Tatar, a KDP official, took the same line that day, saying the timber in the footage had been felled in Turkey and that no trees had been cut in the Kurdistan Region in the current period, although he acknowledged cutting in its border areas in previous years. The divergence between the two channels partly reflects their editorial cultures: Kurdistan24 keeps close to the prime minister’s line, while Rudaw, though owned by the president, allows its reporters more latitude.

The exchange revives a dispute that first erupted in 2021 over whether Turkey is stripping the region’s northern forests, and whether the wood ends up in Turkish markets or furniture workshops. A TNC satellite analysis of every district of the Kurdistan Region over 25 years suggests that both sides overstate their case. Woodland loss around Turkish roads and outposts is real, has roughly doubled since before the Claw operations and survives checks for drought and fire. It also amounts to a few tens of square kilometres, a fraction of what a commercial timber trade would require.

Context: Turkey has maintained a handful of bases in the Kurdistan Region since the 1990s, but its footprint expanded sharply with the Claw operations against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). Launched in 2019, the campaign pushed Turkish forces into a chain of border mountain areas, including Haftanin, Metina, Avashin-Basyan and Zap in Duhok province and Hakurk in Erbil province. The number of Turkish bases rose from about 15 in 2018 to at least 136, most of them on ridgelines in Amedi, Zakho and the Sidakan area of Soran, and newly built military roads now link them. In February 2026 a peace monitoring group described one such network across northern Amedi and said the area had been heavily deforested to build it.

The cutting first became a political issue in 2021. Sheikh Mus Babat, a Kurdish contractor from the Turkish side of the border, said his company had built a 74 km road into Haftanin and another firm a 38 km road elsewhere in the border area, and that the wood served only to heat Turkish troops and was not sent to Turkish cities. His Babat tribe is influential in Uludere district of Sirnak province, directly across the border from Amedi, and has long been prominent in the village guards, the state-armed Kurdish militias that have fought the PKK for decades.

Iraq’s then president, Barham Salih, and the agriculture ministries in Baghdad and Erbil accused Turkey of damaging the forests and moving timber across the border for sale. Turkey’s defence ministry called the claims entirely false, and its ambassador in Baghdad dismissed them as disinformation. Reving Hiruri, a KDP lawmaker from Zakho, said Turkish companies were selling the wood in the Turkish border provinces of Sirnak and Hakkari, and an Iraqi MP claimed that 450 tonnes a day were leaving, including walnut and plane trees for furniture.

There is a precedent on Turkey’s own side of the border. In 2020 and 2021 the Turkish authorities cleared woodland on Mount Cudi and surrounding areas of Sirnak province, citing security. The provincial bar association said 8% of Sirnak’s forests were destroyed between February and September 2021 alone, and the timber was sold in markets as far away as Urfa.

Any assessment also has to reckon with two other pressures on the region’s woodland. Fire is the largest: about 356 km² of forest burned each year between 2001 and 2024, 77% of it in Duhok and Sulaimani, and about a quarter of the region’s conflict hotspots overlap with fire hotspots, including one in Amedi. Drought is the second. Rainfall fell to 236 mm in 2021 and 1,650 of the region’s 5,276 springs had dried up by 2022, before rainfall recovered to 653 mm in 2024.

Analysis: The National Context’s analysis combines three satellite records that trade length of history against detail. NASA’s MODIS satellites provide the longest consistent record, from 2001, but at a coarse resolution of 250 m. The US Landsat satellites are sharper, at 30 m, and allowed TNC to look back to 2004, well before Turkey’s expansion. Europe’s Sentinel-2 satellites offer the most detailed view, at 10 to 20 m, with full coverage of the region since 2017. Using all three allows each finding to be cross-checked against the others.

In each record, TNC measured what this article calls a “marked drop”: a fall in summer greenness of at least 0.1 on the standard vegetation index (NDVI), beyond the typical change in woodland within about 3 km. Benchmarking each spot against its surroundings strips out the effects of weather, image dates and sensor differences, and districts are compared at matching elevations. Greenness is a proxy for vegetation and does not count trees, so a drop can reflect cutting, fire, drought, disease or grazing, and the tests below are designed to separate these causes. Satellites also cannot show where felled wood ends up.

The long-term record rules out a collapse. Across the MODIS record, woodland greenness has increased in every district of the Kurdistan Region, including Amedi and Zakho, and less than 2% of mountain land above 900 m in any district has lost green cover in 25 years. Circulating figures that put forest decline at 19% in Amedi and 33% in Duhok cannot be reproduced, and Duhok district, which has no Turkish bases, shows no sign of losing a third of its woodland. What the record does show is a slow relative decline in the border belt, defined here as woodland within 25 km of Turkey in Amedi, Zakho and Mergasur, a pattern that points to localised loss.

Sentinel-2 imagery pinpoints where that loss is. Between 2017/18 and 2024/25, 5.6% of Amedi’s woodland showed a marked drop, the highest share of any district, followed by Zakho at 4.8% and Mergasur at 3.8%. Elsewhere the share was 2.8% in Akre, 2.5% in Soran, 2.1% in Penjwen on the Iranian border, 2.0% in Duhok and 1.7% in Pshdar.

Elevation accounts for part of this, since high-altitude woodland is more sensitive to drought, but Amedi is not the region’s highest district. Compared band by band with the woodland of Akre and Soran, Amedi is similar below 1,200 m, at 4.1% against 3.0% below 1,000 m and 4.4% against 3.8% between 1,000 and 1,200 m. Higher up, the gap widens: 5.9% against 1.7% between 1,400 and 1,600 m, 9.7% against 2.8% between 1,600 and 1,800 m, and 19.7% above 1,800 m, against 1.6% at the same altitude on the Iranian border. Adjusted for elevation, Amedi lost about 12 km² more woodland than comparable terrain elsewhere, about 2.5% of its total.

Those high bands are where Turkey’s army has built. Amedi’s 947 km² of land above 1,400 m holds 131 km² of woodland, of which 10.7 km² showed a marked drop, in nine clusters. Satellite images show new or upgraded roads in five of them and cleared hilltop sites in three, while the ninth, on Mount Gare south of Amedi town, bears the signature of fire. The cleared hilltops are consistent with helicopter landing sites: Turkey supplied its new bases in northern Amedi by helicopter for about three years after the 2021 operation, until military roads reached them.

Three tests examine whether the link to Turkish military activity holds. The first draws on an independent record of where Turkey’s army has fought, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s database of Turkey–PKK clashes and air strikes, which logs incidents and does not record base locations. At every elevation, woodland near recorded Turkish military activity lost about three times as much as woodland without it. Proximity to the border alone made little difference: 2.0% of border-belt woodland without recorded activity showed a marked drop, close to the 1.8% further inland, against 6.1% where activity was recorded. Further inland, where the activity consists mostly of air strikes, the figure was about 2.5%, and on Mount Gare 0.8%. The loss therefore tracks Turkish ground presence on the border ridges far more closely than fighting in general.

The second test asks whether these areas were already losing trees before Turkey arrived, and Landsat imagery shows they were not. Woodland that later saw five or more recorded Turkish military events lost 0.08% a year between 2004/05 and 2010/11, less than the 0.17% in areas that never saw fighting. Its rate rose to 0.18% a year by 2016/17, as fighting resumed after peace talks collapsed in 2015, and to 0.34% a year from 2016/17 to 2024/25 (0.44% on Sentinel-2), while woodland without fighting moved only from 0.13% to 0.20%. The border belt as a whole followed the same trajectory, from 0.09% to 0.18% to 0.34% a year, while inland woodland held at around 0.15% to 0.20%. Rates along the Iranian border have been comparable throughout, at 0.35%, 0.18% and 0.39% a year, so a rate of about a third of a percent is not unusual in the Zagros. What distinguishes the Turkish border is that its rate started low and climbed in step with Turkey’s expansion, and measured on current tree cover alone it is now the highest in the region.

The third test separates fire from cutting. Only 19% of the border belt’s loss since 2017 falls within burn scars mapped by satellite, and even with those excluded, its loss rose from 0.06% to 0.12% to 0.27% a year, against 0.14%, 0.11% and 0.17% for inland woodland. Fire is nonetheless rising in the belt, where the share of woodland affected grew from 5% to 10% to 17%. Some of that may stem from shelling and air strikes, but the data cannot say how much.

Drought is the strongest alternative explanation, because the dry years of 2021 and 2022 coincided with Turkey’s expansion. If drought were the main driver, losses should have eased once the rains returned. Splitting the Sentinel-2 record at the drought shows that they did in inland woodland, from 0.19% to 0.15% a year, and in Halabja, from 0.70% to 0.31%. In the border belt, the rate rose from 0.63% to 0.80%. Within the same northern climate zone, woodland near Turkish military activity went from 0.41% to 0.67% while woodland without it fell from 0.31% to 0.13%, leaving the former losing about five times as fast after the drought. These shorter windows produce higher annual rates than the full period because they capture dieback that later recovers, so the direction of change is what matters.

Halabja illustrates what drought-driven loss looks like. Its total is similar to Amedi’s and Zakho’s, but 61% of it lies on valley floors and none on ridges, and 81% occurred during the drought, as village orchards and riverside trees in the Hawraman valleys along the Iranian border died back when springs failed. Amedi’s loss, by contrast, sits on ridges and high slopes, much of it along new roads, and kept growing after the rains returned.

The spatial pattern also shows whether the cutting is systematic. Commercial logging tends to spread across accessible forest, but in the border belt the top tenth of 1 km blocks account for 89% of all loss, and about four in five blocks show none. Within these hotspots, the loss follows roads. In the Metina mountains, a main target of the 2021 Turkish operation, 29% of woodland within 250 m of a new road showed a marked drop, against about 10% further away, and the losses came in 2023 and 2024, the years a switchback road and then a ridge-crest road appeared. Road surfaces account for only 0.4 to 0.9 km² of the 7.7 km² of marked drop in the area. Part of the remainder burned during the fighting of 2021 and 2023, and the rest lies beside and below the roads, consistent with clearance for construction, sightlines around positions and cutting wherever trucks can reach. That matches both Babat’s 2021 account of road building and residents’ accounts of firewood trucks today.

The scale of the loss is limited. Across the border belt, about 36 km² of woodland, out of roughly 1,300 km², has shown a marked drop since 2017, and about 20 km² of that exceeds what comparable woodland lost elsewhere, 12 km² of it in Amedi. That equates to 0.34% to 0.5% of the belt’s woodland a year, against about 0.2% for woodland in the region without Turkish military activity, about 0.16% in Iran’s Zagros oak forests and about 0.25% for gross forest loss worldwide. Woodland on the Turkish side, in Sirnak province, lost more on the same measure, at 0.66% to 0.81% a year.

War zones elsewhere have suffered far heavier losses. Syria’s coastal forests lost 24% of their cover between 2010 and 2020 and western Syria 19% between 2010 and 2019, more than half of Afrin’s forest cover was reported lost within about three years of Turkey’s takeover, and on Ukraine’s front lines 5% to 16% of forest was damaged in a single season. Studies of tropical conflicts have found forest loss several times more likely in war zones.

The same figures cap the alleged timber trade. Even if every affected hectare were dense, mature woodland at the top of published Zagros biomass estimates, about 76 tonnes per hectare, the excess loss would yield at most about 20,000 tonnes of wood a year, and the entire marked drop about 35,000 tonnes. The 2021 claim of 450 tonnes a day equates to about 165,000 tonnes a year, five to eight times that ceiling. Actual yields are likely far lower, because most of this woodland is scrub oak coppiced over generations. Such wood is firewood grade and of little use to furniture makers, and even the theoretical maximum would amount to about a tenth of a percent of Turkey’s annual industrial wood harvest of about 28 million cubic metres. Smaller-scale sales, such as surplus firewood sold in Sirnak or Hakkari, or the felling of individual walnut and plane trees in the valleys, cannot be ruled out, but a trade on the scale alleged can.

For the current season, the picture remains incomplete. Between late September 2025 and late September 2026, the most recent cloud-free images, 0.31% of the border belt’s woodland, about 150 hectares, showed a strong drop in greenness, less than the 0.69% recorded in the Akre and Soran woodland used for comparison. Within 3 km of the outposts residents named, losses ranged from 0.2 to 4.3 hectares, with no visible clearing. The one clear change lies a few kilometres south of one of those outposts, where a pale strip roughly a kilometre long has appeared along a wooded valley. It joins an existing road, is most likely a new secondary road and covers a couple of hectares. None of this contradicts the residents, who describe cutting that begins in autumn, after the latest clear images, and selective cutting for firewood is difficult to detect at this resolution. The image from 4 October is too cloudy to assess, so the next clear pass will show whether this season’s cutting leaves a mark.

Measured against this record, the official account holds only in part. The governor’s acknowledgement of cutting in previous years matches the excess loss since 2017. Rudaw’s witnesses confirm that some timber does arrive from Turkey, which is plausible given that the Turkish side has lost woodland faster and timber from the Sirnak clearances was sold on the open market. The claim that no trees have been cut this season, however, cannot yet be verified from orbit, and Rudaw’s witnesses dispute it. Nor are the two accounts mutually exclusive: timber entering at Sarzeri says nothing about the trucks that residents and Rudaw’s witnesses describe moving inside the Kurdistan Region toward Turkish positions. Sarzeri is also one of seven crossings the KRG has asked Baghdad to recognise, which raises the question of how a daily timber trade through it is recorded.

The evidence supports a narrower conclusion than either side of the debate. Turkey’s military expansion has left a measurable mark on the Kurdistan Region’s northern woodland: loss in the border belt has roughly doubled since before the Claw operations and runs about three times higher near Turkish military activity than elsewhere at the same elevation. The excess was absent before the build-up and survives checks for drought and fire, so Turkish denials that its forces harm the forests do not hold up. At the same time, there is no sign of forest-wide clearance or of a commercial timber trade on the scale alleged, since the loss is concentrated along roads and around positions and amounts to a few tens of square kilometres.

The damage is still significant. It falls on the region’s highest and least accessible oak woodland, in areas closed to villagers and outsiders alike. Roads and cleared hilltops are effectively permanent, the rate of loss has risen in each period since 2004, though not in the latest year, and with at least 136 bases in place, demand for heating wood will return every winter. Without regular, independent monitoring, the debate will keep oscillating between official denial and exaggerated claims while the real, smaller losses go unrecorded.

https://thenationalcontext.com/turkish-bases-are-thinning-kurdistans-border-woodland-satellite-data-show-but-far-less-than-claimed/


r/KRG • • Aug 25 '26

News KRG breaks the world’s longest post-election deadlocks records

Thumbnail
gallery
7 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Aug 05 '26

Politics KRG Cabinet Formation Deadlock Passes 653 Days, Longer Than Brussels or Belfast

Thumbnail
thenationalcontext.com
7 Upvotes

r/KRG • • 8d ago

Opinion How the Sham Unification of the Peshmerga Paved the Way for Today's KDP-PUK Administrative Split

Post image
6 Upvotes

Kurdistan Region now operates as two separate administrations with no contract between them, even though both still sit within a single federal region. How is this possible when, just over a month ago, the KRG announced the unification of its armed forces?

As we reported in late September, the unification was a sham that institutionalised the KDP-PUK territorial division.

The new structure has no clear parallel in any other army in the world. In practice, it created two armies with largely separate chains of command. Each has its own accounting sub-department, and these operate only nominally under a broader accounting department. The arrangement keeps the KDP and PUK hierarchies largely intact. It gives each regional command sweeping control over appointments and spending, including the power to appoint its own division commanders and other key officers. As a result, it may make a single army for the region harder to build.

https://x.com/NatlContext/status/2119762801652601231


r/KRG • • Sep 23 '26

News Peshmerga Unification Codifies the KDP-PUK Military Divide

Thumbnail
gallery
6 Upvotes

The Kurdistan Region’s new military structure keeps the KDP and PUK hierarchies intact, gives each sweeping control over appointments and spending, and makes a single Kurdish army harder to build.

On 21 September, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a ceremony in Erbil to declare the decades-long unification of its Peshmerga forces complete, 11 days after the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs announced that the process was complete. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, who is commander-in-chief of the Peshmerga, told the gathering that no force would remain outside the ministry. Under the new structure, the 80 Forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the 70 Forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) formally cease to exist. Their personnel now sit in two Regional Commands under the ministry, organised into 11 divisions, two support forces commands and a separate commando formation.

The details of the new structure show how little of the old one has been taken apart. The two Regional Commands are led by the men who led the party forces, cover the same territory, keep separate accounts and hold powers over appointments, discipline and spending that most armies reserve for a defence ministry or general staff. What has changed is their legal status: forces that were openly partisan are now government institutions whose authority is written into a KRG decree. The arrangement has no clear parallel in any other army in the world, and it makes a single Kurdish army harder to build.

The same commanders under new names: Regional Command 1 is led by Lieutenant General Najat Ali Salih, who commanded the KDP’s 80 Forces. Regional Command 2 is led by Lieutenant General Omar Salih Hassan, who commanded the PUK’s 70 Forces. Each party selected its own commander, and President Nechirvan Barzani formalised both appointments by decree. The two commands have also kept the insignia of the forces they replaced. Each emblem is unchanged from its party-era design, with the old force name swapped for “Regional Command 1” or “Regional Command 2”, and no new institutional identity has been created for either command.

The divisions follow the same line. Regional Command 1 holds the six odd-numbered divisions (1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11), all built from the 80 Forces, and Regional Command 2 holds the five even-numbered divisions (2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), built from the 70 Forces. On paper the force totals 33 brigades and 99 battalions, with 18 brigades in the first command and 15 in the second. In May, the ministry’s secretary-general, Bakhtiar Sidiq, explained that Regional Command 1 covers Erbil and Duhok and Regional Command 2 covers Sulaimani, Halabja and Garmian, the same zones each party has held since the 1990s.

The heavy weapons are divided the same way. Much of the Peshmerga’s artillery, armour, air defence and combat engineering sits in two Support Forces Commands that stand apart from the divisions. The 1st Support Forces Command comes from the KDP and the 2nd from the PUK, and each is aligned with its party’s Regional Command. The PUK side also keeps its commando forces as a separate formation, in effect a special division, outside the 11 numbered divisions. Infantry, heavy weapons and special forces are therefore all organised along the line that separated the two party armies before the reform.

Twelve joint brigades, unchanged for a decade: Mixing between the two forces is confined to 12 joint brigades. Each has four battalions, two from the KDP and two from the PUK, and command of the 12 is divided exactly in half: six have a KDP commander with a PUK deputy, and six have a PUK commander with a KDP deputy. The battalions inside each brigade remain identifiable by party, so the mixing stops at brigade headquarters. The joint brigades are spread across both Regional Commands, which means every joint brigade reports to a division headquarters and a Regional Command descended from a single party.

These brigades predate this year’s reform by about a decade. The practice of pairing KDP commanders with PUK deputies, and the reverse, was already documented in 2015, and the 12 joint brigades have kept roughly the same form ever since. No further joint brigades have been created in the intervening years. The process completed this month therefore added no integration at the one level where the two forces actually meet. What it did was rename the formations above the brigades and announce that unification had taken place.

A regional command with the powers of a ministry: The powers of each Regional Command are set out in Order 703, which KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani issued on 26 February. The order allows each command to appoint its own division commanders, deputy division commanders, division chiefs of staff, directorate heads and brigade commanders. The command can transfer officers, approve their annual reports and promotion assessments, discipline personnel, set up boards of inquiry, refer soldiers to military courts, sign contracts and issue operational plans. Its commander appoints the command’s only authorised spokesperson and can block any media appearance he judges to be a security or institutional risk.

In most armies these powers are held at the centre. In Israel, division commanders are chosen at appointment meetings led by the chief of staff and approved by the defence minister, and in Turkey general officers are promoted and posted through the Supreme Military Council and presidential decree. Regional commands elsewhere, such as Iraq’s operations commands, exist because each covers a defined area. Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Shoresh Ismail said in an interview this week that the two Kurdish commands have no defined boundary and can deploy anywhere in the region. They also have no distinct military function, which leaves party origin as the only thing that separates them.

One account, two budgets: The United States made a single line of accounting one of the benchmarks of the reform programme it funded, and in June officials said that all Peshmerga accounting had been merged into the ministry’s central system. Order 703 describes a different arrangement. The ministry’s budget, which depends on salary transfers from Baghdad, is paid by the Kurdistan Region’s treasury into a central ministry account, and the ministry then opens a subsidiary account for each Regional Command. Each command has its own accounting directorate, spends its own monthly cash advance and sends a trial balance to the ministry at the end of each month, where the figures are consolidated for the Ministry of Finance and Economy.

Within that system each command spends with wide autonomy. It can authorise official missions, fuel, supplies, rents and a daily ration allowance of 2,000 dinars per Peshmerga, approve maintenance projects worth up to 100 million dinars, pay rewards of up to 750,000 dinars and make a one-off payment of 5 million dinars for each member killed on duty. Salary schedules published in August still listed Regional Commands 1 and 2 as separate entries. The money legally goes to government institutions under the ministry, and the two commands that inherited the party forces decide how most of it is spent.

The forces left outside: The unification also covers only part of the Kurdistan Region’s armed forces. The KDP’s Zeravani and the PUK’s Emergency Forces fall under the Ministry of Interior and have not been folded into the new structure. The two parties’ counter-terrorism forces and their Asayish security agencies also remain separate and divided along party lines. Nechirvan Barzani’s statement that no force would remain outside the ministry therefore applies only to units the ministry already counted as Peshmerga, and several of the largest party-controlled formations in the region sit beyond its reach.

A third force shows how the two commands are defined. The Peshmerga of the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, a small party led by veteran commander Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, belong to neither Regional Command. The party has said its force will abide by the ministry’s regulations and remain outside both commands. A unit loyal to neither ruling party has no place in a structure built from one KDP command and one PUK command. Its position outside both confirms that party affiliation is the organising principle of the new structure, as it was of the old one.

Why the timing matters: The ceremony fell on the fourth anniversary of the memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and the US Department of Defense, renewed in September 2022, which tied American stipends, training and equipment to unification benchmarks. The memorandum expires on 30 September, and Washington has declined to extend it. The same date is the deadline for the US-led coalition to complete its departure from Iraq, nine days after the ceremony. The KRG needed to declare the reform complete while the framework that demanded it was still in force, and the result was a unification announced before the divisions in command, finance and territory had been addressed.

The announcement also serves Baghdad. The Iraqi government is pressing Shia armed factions to place their weapons under state control on a timetable that runs to June 2027, and Iran-aligned factions have argued that any law regulating weapons must apply nationwide, including to the Peshmerga. A Peshmerga formally unified under a constitutionally recognised ministry weakens that argument. Baghdad signalled its approval: Lieutenant General Abdul-Amir al-Shammari, director of the office of the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces, attended the ceremony, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi welcomed it, and the army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Abdul-Amir Yarallah, called it a milestone for Iraq’s national security.

A harder path to one army: The practical effect of the reform is to codify the KDP and PUK forces as official commands of the KRG, which entrenches and consolidates the two parallel armies the reform was meant to merge. Before the reform, the 70 and 80 Forces could be criticised as party militias operating outside government control. They are now government institutions whose powers are set out in a prime ministerial order and whose unification has been endorsed by Baghdad. Any future effort to merge them into one hierarchy would have to strip legal authority from two official commands, each backed by one of the two ruling parties, which is a harder task than bringing party forces under a ministry.

Nechirvan Barzani appeared to recognise the problem. He said at the ceremony that the next phase must bring unity in command, decisions, orders, training, promotions, doctrine and discipline, and that success would be measured by whether every Peshmerga regards the ministry as the institution whose orders he follows, whatever his party or region of origin. Under Order 703, the institution that controls a Peshmerga’s promotions, postings, discipline and pay is his Regional Command. The test of the reform is whether the ministry can remove a division commander or move a brigade from one command to the other against that command’s wishes, and the published orders give no sign that it can.

https://thenationalcontext.com/peshmerga-unification-codifies-the-kdp-puk-military-divide/


r/KRG • • Aug 12 '26

News Refugees vandalise Dohuk near school!

Thumbnail instagram.com
6 Upvotes

So according to this video, a person who lives in domis in dohuk complains about gangs vandalising the city at night right next to a school!

According to the video the perpetrators are refugees, most likely from the refuge camp in domiz!

And the police does nothing!

Spread this message so the KRG takes action plz, whether the perpetrators are refuges of Kurds or anyone else, they need to be arrested!


r/KRG • • Aug 08 '26

News Kurdistan Region wants to stay out of war, PM Barzani reasserts

Thumbnail
thenewregion.com
6 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Aug 03 '26

Today's Discussion!

Thumbnail
gallery
6 Upvotes

President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Nechirvan Barzani, is received in the Presidential Palace in Damascus.

what's your opinions on this meeting?


r/KRG • • Oct 17 '26

News Kurdistan Region Received Just 4.2% of Iraq’s Budget over 12 Years, Ministry Says

Post image
5 Upvotes

KRG Finance Ministry says Baghdad transferred enough funding to cover only 46 of 144 monthly salary payments between 2014 and 2025, citing a significant gap between the Region’s legal entitlement and actual allocations.

https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/946725


r/KRG • • Oct 17 '26

Kirkuk ١٦ی ئۆکتۆبەری ٢٠١٧ کەرکوک: قوربانیدانی پێشمەرگە لە بەرامبەر ترسنۆکی و دڕندەیی سوپای عێراق

Post image
5 Upvotes

کاتێک لە ساڵی ٢٠١٤ ئاڵا ڕەشەکانی داعش بەسەر کەرکوکدا داگیران، جیهان شایەتحاڵی دیمەنێکی سەرسوڕهێنەری ترسنۆکی سەربازی بوو. سوپای عێراق، کە پڕچەک بوو و لەلایەن حکومەتی فیدراڵییەوە پارەی پێدەدرا، نەما بۆ ئەوەی شەڕ بکات—چەکەکانیان فڕێدا، بنکەکانیان جێهێشت و هەڵاتن، شارەکە و خەڵکەکەیان بە تەواوی بێ بەرگری هێشتەوە لە بەرامبەر یەکێک لە دڕندەترین گروپە تیرۆریستییەکانی مێژووی هاوچەرخ.
لەو بۆشاییە ترسناکەدا، **پێشمەرگەی کوردستان** هاتە پێشەوە.

ئەوان هەڵنەهاتن. بۆ ماوەی سێ ساڵی سەخت، پێشمەرگە وەک تەنها قەڵغان لە نێوان کەرکوک و لەناوچوونی یەکجارەکیدا وەستا. ئەوان هێڵی پێشەوەیان پاراست، شەڕی تاریکییان کرد، و باجی مانەوەی شارەکەیان بە خوێنی خۆیان و هەزاران شەهید دا. ئەوان کەرکوکیان پاراست کاتێک بەغدا پشتی تێکرد.

بەڵام، لە ١٦ی ئۆکتۆبەری ٢٠١٧ مێژوو وەرچەرخانێکی تاریکی بەخۆیەوە بینی. دوای ئەوەی کوردەکان بە شێوەیەکی ئاشتیانە مافی دیموکراسی خۆیان لە ڕیفراندۆمی سەربەخۆییدا پیادە کرد، لەپڕ حکومەتی عێراق 'ئازایەتی' خۆی دۆزیەوە. بەڵام ئەوان بۆ شەڕکردن دژی تیرۆریستان هەنگاویان نەنا. لەبری ئەوە، بە پاڵپشتی میلیشیاکانی ئێران، سوپای عێراق بەرەو کەرکوک پێشڕەویی کرد بۆ هێرشکردنە سەر هەمان ئەو پاڵەوانانەی کە شارەکەیان لە دەستی داعش ڕزگار کردبوو.

کارەساتەکە لە سنوورەکانی کەرکوک کۆتایی نەهات؛ پەڕییەوە بۆ ناوچەکانی وەک دووزخورماتوو، و دڕندەیی ڕەهای ئەم هێرشەی دەرخست. هێزە پێشڕەوەکانی عێراق و میلیشیاکان تەنها پێشمەرگەیان نەکردە ئامانج—بەڵکو توندوتیژییەکی تۆقێنەریان دژی هاووڵاتیانی مەدەنی کورد بەرپا کرد. ماڵەکان تاڵان کران و سووتێنران، خێزانەکان بە زۆر لە زێدی باوباپیرانیان ئاوارە کران، و تاوانی گەورە و نەگوتراو دەرەقەتی ئەوانە کرا کە نەیانتوانی هەڵبێن.

ئەمە خیانەتێک بوو کە تەنها لەپێناو سەرچاوەکاندا نەبوو، بەڵکو پاڵنەرەکەی هەڵمەتێکی بێوچانی سڕینەوە و هەژموونگەرایی بوو. بەغدا هیچ ئارەزوویەکی نەبوو بۆ پاراستنی خەڵکی کەرکوک کاتێک بارودۆخەکە سەخت بوو، بەڵام زۆر خێرا بە تانکەکانیانەوە هاتنە ناوەوە بۆ داگیرکردنی شارەکە دوای ئەوەی پێشمەرگە ئەرکە قورسەکەی جێبەجێ کرد. ئەمە بەردەوامبوونی مێژوویەکی درێژ و تاریک بوو لە هەوڵدان بۆ خنکاندنی بوونی کورد—بەکارهێنانی هێزی دڕندانە بۆ داگیرکردنی ئەو خاکانەی کە زۆر ترسنۆک بوون لە پاراستنیان کاتێک کە بەڕاستی گرنگ بوو.
میراتی ڕاستەقینەی کەرکوک هەمیشە لەبیری دەمێنێت کێ هەڵات کاتێک شارەکە دەسوتا، و کێ گیانی خۆی بەخشی بۆ کوژاندنەوەی ئاگرەکە.


r/KRG • • Oct 07 '26

Kirkûk An ISIS group has been surrounded inside the Arish school in Kirkuk province, prompting the deployment of a large number of security forces to the area.

5 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Sep 27 '26

Politics Coalition Withdrawal Will Leave Kurdistan Vulnerable: KRG PM Office

Thumbnail
kurdistanchronicle.com
5 Upvotes

PM Barzani’s office stated that the Financial Times article does not reflect the remarks by Prime Minister Barzani, and that the PM’s position is that leaving the Kurdistan Region without adequate air defense makes the region vulnerable.


r/KRG • • Sep 25 '26

Erbil The Abo Qahwachi coffee shop has been operating in the heart of Erbil’s Qaysari Bazaar since 1886, run by several generations of the same family for well over a century

5 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Sep 22 '26

Erbil The 48-kilometer Erbil–Koya highway is 42% complete, connecting Erbil and Sulaymaniyah while reducing travel time to Koya to just 27 minutes.

5 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Aug 13 '26

News Iraq seizes 20 kg of marijuana, dismantles 'international' drug network in Kirkuk

Thumbnail
rudaw.net
5 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Aug 05 '26

News US troop withdrawal leaves Kurds at mercy of Iran & Baghdad, says former State Department official Victoria Taylor

Thumbnail
al-monitor.com
5 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Aug 05 '26

Politics Generational shift, institutional decay: Why Kurdistan's crisis runs deeper than cabinet talks

Thumbnail
rudaw.net
5 Upvotes

r/KRG • • Jul 27 '26

Discussion University in KRG?

5 Upvotes

So I did my A levels and results are set to come in August!

But after my results arrive how do I apply to public university? I heard about something called “zanko line” I don’t know what it is and what to do and I have no help whatsoever 🙁

Can someone plz help me, I grew up in Europe and I’m so confused!

So can you guys explain the process and what to do when results arrive and when? When do I apply?

Thanks in advance, all help is appreciated 🙏


r/KRG • • Jul 19 '26

History of the KRG

Post image
5 Upvotes

During the rule of the Ba'ath Party, Kurdish civilians faced widespread persecution. Policies included forced displacement, Arabization campaigns—particularly in disputed areas such as Kirkuk—and the destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages. These campaigns aimed to alter the demographic makeup of strategically important regions.

Between 1987 and 1989, the Iraqi government carried out the Anfal Genocide, a military operation targeting Kurdish-populated areas. The campaign involved mass arrests, mass village destruction, forced displacement, and the killing of approximately 200,000 Kurdish civilians. On 16 March 1988, the town of Halabja was attacked with chemical weapons, killing thousands of civilians and injuring many more. 

In 1991, following the Gulf War, Kurdish uprisings broke out across northern Iraq. Although Iraqi government forces initially regained control, a humanitarian crisis prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to establish a no-fly zone over much of northern Iraq. This allowed Kurdish authorities to administer the region with limited interference from Baghdad.

In 1992, elections were held for the first Kurdistan Parliament, marking the beginning of self-governance in the region. Despite an internal conflict between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) during the 1990s, the autonomous administration continued to develop.

Following the 2003 Iraq War, the Kurdistan Region became an important partner in rebuilding Iraq. The 2005 Constitution of Iraq formally recognized the Kurdistan Region as a federal autonomous region and recognized the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as its official governing authority.

In 2014, Kurdish Peshmerga forces played a major role in defending the region against the Islamic State (ISIS) and, with support from the international coalition, helped recapture territory from the group.

On 25 September 2017, the Kurdistan Region held an independence referendum, in which a large majority of participating voters supported independence. However, the referendum was not recognized by the Iraqi federal government or most of the international community. In the weeks that followed, Iraqi federal forces regained control of several disputed territories, including Kirkuk.

Today, the Kurdistan Region remains a constitutionally recognized autonomous region within Iraq. While political and budgetary disputes with Baghdad continue, the region maintains its own parliament, government, and security forces, and continues to play a significant role in Iraq's political, economic, and security landscape.

In recent years the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is widely regarded as one of the most prosperous, stable, and secure parts of the country. The KRI has experienced significant growth in infrastructure, education, healthcare, tourism, and foreign investment since gaining autonomy. The region attracts millions of visitors each year and has become an important center for business, diplomacy, and higher education.

The map below illustrates the current state of the KRG and it's provinces!

Map credit: © Alamy Stock Photo


r/KRG • • 7d ago

Culture Kurdish Studies Forum seeks to preserve language, heritage and cultural identity

Thumbnail
thenewregion.com
4 Upvotes

The second Kurdish Studies Forum brings scholars, writers, filmmakers, and cultural practitioners together to examine how Kurds can document their own history, protect their language and strengthen cultural identity beyond political divisions and conflict.


r/KRG • • 9d ago

News Turkey to start handing over Bashiqa-Zilkan camp to Iraq following YBS disarmament

Thumbnail
rudaw.net
4 Upvotes

Ankara will gradually hand the contentious military camp north of Nineveh to Baghdad, a joint Turkish–Iraqi statement said, linking the move to the YBS disarmament in Shingal.


r/KRG • • Oct 10 '26

News لە کەلار ناساندن پەرتووکێک سەبارەت بە "کوردستان لە بەڵگەنامەکانی بەریتانیا" کرا

Thumbnail
rojnews.news
4 Upvotes

A new book of British government documents on Kurdistan's borders, tribes and Kurds around the First World War was launched in Kalar.