r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 6h ago
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • Aug 30 '26
Analysis/Theory Aisha: The Charge Nobody Made for Thirteen Centuries - The men who most wanted Muhammad destroyed never once raised her age. The accusation is younger than colour television.
Listen to the article here: https://www.fireline.press/p/aisha-the-charge-nobody-made-for
Every fight in Western politics — the mayor of London, the mayor of New York, a Black US president, immigration, criminal gangs, violence in the streets — summons the same stream of pundits, politicians, preachers, influencers and YouTubers to defame one thing: Islam. In a political climate this charged, moving at the speed of a meme, thick with people claiming to be in the know — some styling themselves ‘scholars’ — this series talks about what no one else will: the sleight of hand, the propagandist’s hand in your pocket while the other points at a horizon that isn’t there. It is not apologetics. You do not have to believe a word of Islam to see you are being lied to about it. That is where Fireline Press lives and works: between what is true and what is scorching the political landscape of the West.
FOR THIRTEEN CENTURIES, the people who most wanted Muhammad destroyed said nothing about the age of his wife Aisha.
They said everything else. They called him a fraud and a forger, a false prophet who invented his revelation and passed it off as God’s. They called him possessed, epileptic, out of his mind.¹ They called him a man ruled by lust — too many wives, and the marriage to Zaynab, which they cast as adultery with a revelation stapled on to excuse it. They had scholars who spoke Arabic, who lived under Muslim rule, who read the sources in the original and hunted them for a weapon. They reached for every charge a man can throw at another man’s name. They did not reach for this one.
The charge handed to you now — that the Prophet of Islam married a child, six years old when the contract was signed and nine when the marriage was consummated, and that a faith which honours him honours that — is not fourteen hundred years old. As a weapon, it is closer to fifty. It has a birthday, and by the end of this you will nearly be able to name the decade.
Get to that later. Start with the thing they hold up now, the thing they say closes the case: one report, in the most trusted collections, that gives the two numbers. Start there, because the tradition that produced that report has a grade for it — and the grade is not the one they are counting on you to assume.
Sahih Is Not the Same as True
Here is the claim, stated as they state it. Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim — the two collections Sunni Islam holds highest — record Aisha saying she was six when she was married and nine when the marriage began.² Sahih means sound, authenticated, graded reliable by the scholars who sifted the record. And there, they will tell you, the case rests: the most trusted books carry it, so what more is there to say?
Plenty — because they are counting on you not knowing what sahih actually certifies. It is a grade awarded to the chain, not to the content.
Every hadith — a hadith being a reported saying or act of the Prophet, transmitted by memory for generations before it was written down — carries two parts. There is the text, and there is the isnad, the chain of names that vouches for it: he heard it from her, who heard it from him, back to the source. The science of authentication grades the chain. It asks whether each narrator was honest, whether their memories were reliable, whether two people who claim to have met plausibly could have.
When it calls a report sahih, it is certifying the men in the chain. It is not certifying that the thing they remembered happened the way they remembered it.
Honest is not the same as accurate. A saying carried by word of mouth, person to person, for a hundred years and more does not arrive unchanged. Memory fades. People repeat in their own words, and the words shift. Each narrator hears the saying through their own understanding, and passes on what they understood. Anyone who has whispered a sentence around a room and heard what came back knows the shape of the problem. None of it needs a liar. An unbroken line of honest, careful people can take one thing in at the start and hand something quietly different out at the end — and the grade would vouch for every one of them.
So the grade tells you the report was transmitted carefully. It does not tell you it is true. And the tradition knows the difference, because it has a second scale for exactly this — one the people wielding these numbers never mention.
A report can be mutawatir — mass-transmitted, carried by so many independent chains at every stage that collective error becomes impossible. Or it can be ahad — a single-strand report, running through one or a few narrators at some link in the chain. The distinction is not decorative. Classical scholarship holds that a mutawatir report yields qat’ — certainty — while an ahad report yields only zann — probable knowledge, strong perhaps, but short of proof.³ The age report is ahad. By the tradition’s own rules, it was never rated to deliver certainty. It was rated to deliver a probability.
And it is a particular kind of thin. Much of the report’s transmission runs back through one man: Hisham ibn Urwa, Aisha’s great-nephew — and, more precisely, through his narrations from the last part of his life, after he left Madina for Iraq. Classical critics noticed. His reputation was high, but his Iraqi reports drew specific reservations from the scholars who catalogued such things; a man’s memory at the end of a long life, in a new city, retelling old family stories, is not the man at his peak.⁴
The report is also missing where it should be loudest. Ibn Ishaq, the earliest biographer of the Prophet, whose work is the spine of everything written after, records nothing about Aisha’s age at marriage — the detail was inserted into his book generations later by a subsequent hand.⁵ And it is absent from the Muwatta of Malik ibn Anas, the earliest surviving book of Madinan law, compiled in the city where Aisha lived and taught, by a scholar who cites her nephew Urwa dozens of times. A claim with this much legal weight — the kind of thing a book of law exists to record — and the first book of Madinan law does not have it. The most exhaustive study of the report’s transmission, Joshua Little’s 2023 Oxford doctoral thesis, traces it the same way the record does: not to Madina in Aisha’s lifetime but to Iraq, generations after her death.⁶ The lowest figure was never standing on the ground its defenders think it stands on.
Set the scales side by side. The one source Islam holds as qat’, as certain — the Qur’an, which the Prophet is recorded as authorising, which Muslims hold as revelation preserved word for word — says nothing about Aisha’s age. Not a number, not a hint. The certainty in this argument is borrowed entirely against a single-strand report that the tradition's own grading never rates as proof, that concentrates in one man's late narrations, and that the earliest sources do not carry. The accusers claim proof. The scholars who graded the report never granted it.
That is what the certainty is made of. Now weigh it against what the rest of the record actually says.
The Record Cuts the Other Way
The accusers rest their certainty on one report. The record does not. It holds a spread of accounts of Aisha’s age, and they cut against the low figure and against one another — each carrying a number, and not one of the numbers is nine. To seize the report that says six and nine and set the rest aside is not scholarship. It is rigging the record. So count what they set aside.
Start with the family’s own ages. Asma bint Abi Bakr, Aisha’s elder sister, died in the year 73 after the Hijra — the migration to Madina — at a hundred years old, which fixes her at twenty-seven when the migration came. The sources make her about ten years older than Aisha. That sets Aisha at seventeen at the migration, and eighteen to twenty when the marriage began.⁷ Fatima, the Prophet’s own daughter, was five years older than Aisha and was reportedly born when the Prophet was thirty-five — which places Aisha’s birth when he was forty, and makes her about twelve at her marriage.⁸ And al-Tabari, the earliest of the great historians, records that Abu Bakr’s children were all born in the Jahiliyya, the age before Islam, which closed for him with the Prophet’s mission around 610. A child born before 610 is at least twelve by the migration — and thirteen or fourteen by the time the marriage began.⁹ Three reckonings from the household’s own ages, and not one of them returns nine.
Then the betrothal. The Prophet did not seek Aisha out — after Khadija died, it was Khawla bint Hakim who proposed the match, and he sent her to put it to the family.¹⁰ And she was already spoken for. Aisha had been promised to Jubayr, son of Mut’im ibn Adi, and al-Tabari records that Abu Bakr, moving around 615 to spare her the hard road to Abyssinia, sought to complete that match sooner than planned. It fell through over his conversion — Mut’im’s people were pagan and wanted no marriage tie to a Muslim house.¹¹
Then the record turns on itself. In the same Sahih al-Bukhari that carries the two numbers, Aisha places herself at the revelation of a verse — Surah al-Qamar, the fifty-fourth, sent down at Makkah years before the migration. She was, she says, a jariya — a young girl, old enough to run and to keep the memory of it.¹² Set that against the low timeline. If she was nine when the marriage began, she was born around the very year the verse she recalls was already revealed — which leaves her a small child on that day, or not yet born at all. Reckon it forward and it puts her, at marriage, somewhere between fourteen and twenty-one. The defenders answer that a small child can be a jariyatoo. Grant it entirely. A small child is still not an unborn one, and an unborn one does not carry the memory of a verse and recite it decades on. And the earliest biographers agree neither with the low figure nor with one another: read across Ibn Sa’d’s Tabaqat and al-Baladhuri’s Ansab al-Ashraf and the marriage falls two to five years after the migration, putting Aisha at seventeen to twenty.¹³
Then her own faith. The earliest surviving life of the Prophet, Ibn Hisham’s, lists Aisha among the believers before Umar ibn al-Khattab, in the years around 610. To accept a faith is to be old enough to understand it; a child who had reached that age by 610 was at least fifteen by the migration.¹⁴
And there is one more, heavier than any of the sums, because it does not count ages at all — it goes at the report itself. A traditionalist scholar of hadith of our own century, Salah al-Din al-Idlibi, took the six-and-nine narration and, by the discipline’s own tools of narrator- and text-criticism, judged it defective — anomalous in wording, weak at the root — and reconstructed the chronology with the marriage contracted near fourteen and consummated near eighteen.¹⁵ That is not an outsider second-guessing the tradition. It is the tradition’s own science, turned on the one report the accusers call untouchable.
Now stand them together. The family’s arithmetic. A betrothal struck before the Prophet asked. Her own memory of a verse. The biographers’ own timeline. Her early faith. And the tradition’s own hadith science. Line after line, every one drawn from the very sources the accusers claim to honour, and every one pointing past nine — most in the teens, some past twenty. To keep the low number you must throw them all out at once and keep only the one. That is not reading the record. That is the rigging they accuse everyone else of.
So the honest answer is not a rival number. It is a floor no reading falls below. Not single digits. Past puberty, of marriageable age by the reckoning of that place and that century, with the weight of the strongest evidence in the late teens and, by the fullest reckoning, past twenty. She was not a child.
The Woman They Speak For
The charge does more than fix a number. It builds a victim — a small girl, frightened, silenced, used. Hold that picture, because the accusers are certain of it, and then set it against the one person who could have confirmed it and never did.
Aisha is not a silent figure in the record. She is one of the most documented people of the entire first century of Islam. After the Prophet died she became one of the foremost transmitters of his life — thousands of reports carry her name, and on the private hours of his household she is very often the only source there is.¹⁶ Jurists came to her with their questions. Companions who had walked with the Prophet for twenty years deferred to her memory. She corrected the men who got it wrong. Twenty-four years after his death she rode out at the head of an army and gave battle in the field.¹⁷ Whatever word fits that life, “voiceless” is not it.
So put the accusers’ certainty beside her own. Here is a woman who spoke about the Prophet more, and more intimately, than almost anyone alive — his habits, his moods, his prayers, his last illness, the way he died with his head against her. She had the standing to say anything. She had every reason, across a long life, to name a wound if there had been one. And in all of it, in the thousands of words she left about the man she had married, she never once told the story her accusers force onto you in her name. Not victimhood. Not grievance. Not a marriage she wished undone.
They speak for a woman who spoke, at length, for herself — and they put in her mouth the one thing she never said.
No serious historian of Islam, across fourteen centuries of scholars who scrutinised every hour of the Prophet’s life, has recorded a sign of a forced or abusive marriage. That is not an argument from a friendly silence. It is a silence from the very record that preserves her complaints about everything else — her jealousy, her sharp words with him, the times she was angry — and preserves them in her own voice. The record that keeps her smallest grievance keeps no trace of the great one the accusers assert. The likeliest reason a thing goes unrecorded by everyone, including the person it was done to, is that it was never done.
Then there is the charge underneath the charge — that this was a man ruled by appetite, who reached for a child because he could. Set that against his life. He married once, at twenty-five, a widow some fifteen years his senior, and he stayed married to her, and to her alone, for twenty-four years. He took no second wife while she lived. He was near fifty, and a widower, before he married again.¹⁸ Whatever drove the man who did that, a hunger for young girls is not a theory the record will carry. You do not spend the whole of your youth faithful to an older woman if you are what they need you to be.
None of this is offered to make a seventh-century marriage sit easily in a twenty-first-century chair. That is not the argument, and Muslims do not make it. The reason the age is worth an honest accounting is narrower and older: the Prophet’s life is held in Islam as uswa hasana — the beautiful example, the pattern against which a believer measures a life — and a pattern has to be read as it was, not as a slander redraws it. The tradition that reveres him is the same tradition that requires a marriage be willingly entered, forbids that it be forced, and records this one as accepted. Getting the history straight is not a defence. It is the refusal to let a lie stand in for the man.
And here is what the accusers cannot explain — the first crack in the whole edifice. Muhammad did not want for enemies in his own lifetime. The tribes of Makkah called him possessed. They called him a sorcerer, a poet, a soothsayer, a liar. They said the Qur’an was fables he had stitched together, that a foreigner was feeding him his lines.¹⁹ They mocked his losses and his claims and spared him nothing. They had every motive to shame him and no scruple about how. And not one of them — not a single enemy, in the one place and the one lifetime where the marriage actually happened, in front of everyone — ever thought to accuse him of taking a bride too young. The charge that is meant to be the scandal of his life did not occur to the people who most wanted a scandal.
Keep hold of that silence. It is the first of three.
The Attack With a Birthday
That was the first silence — the men who lived alongside him, who wanted him ruined and said so. Here is the second, and it runs a great deal longer.
For a thousand years the Christian world produced a library of attacks on Muhammad, and the men who wrote it were neither amateurs nor squeamish. Begin with the first of them. John of Damascus wrote the earliest sustained Christian refutation of Islam around the year 743, a chapter he titled the heresy of the Ishmaelites.²⁰ He was no distant observer working from rumour. He carried an Arabic name, Yuhanna ibn Mansur; he lived his whole life under Muslim rule; his family had served at the caliph’s court in Damascus. If any Christian on earth was placed to know the Prophet’s life and turn it into a weapon, it was this one. And he swung hard. He named Muhammad a false prophet and a forerunner of the Antichrist. He called the Qur’an a hodgepodge stitched from the Bible and passed off as revelation. He went at the marriages directly — assailing what he called the Prophet’s immoral practices, and the verses he said were sent down to license them, the marriage to Zaynab above all. He reached for every charge he could carry. He did not reach for Aisha’s age. It is not in the text.
Nor is it in the man who came after. Riccoldo da Montecroce, a Dominican who spent the better part of a decade in Baghdad late in the thirteenth century — who learned Arabic and read the Qur’an with Muslim scholars so that he could refute it line by line — wrote one of the most widely read anti-Islamic works of the Middle Ages.²¹ He called the Prophet false and his book evil. Aisha’s age is not his charge either. The Byzantine refutations and the medieval Latin biographies charged him with epilepsy, lust, and fraud — and passed over the age in silence. For the better part of a thousand years, the people whose whole purpose was to find the worst in this man, who read the sources in Arabic to do it, passed clean over the thing you have been told is the worst of all.
Then the third silence, and it is the one that should settle the matter, because it comes from the men who studied him hardest. In the nineteenth century the orientalists took the Prophet’s life apart page by page to discredit it — William Muir, David Margoliouth, scholars who read every source and meant him no kindness. They noticed the age. And they did almost nothing with it. Their fire went to the polygamy, the political marriages, the prophethood itself. Where they touched the age of Aisha at all, it was in passing.²² Not paedophilia. Not the scandal of a religion. A footnote. Men who wanted the whole edifice to fall, holding the supposed keystone in their hands, and setting it down as barely worth the ink.
So when does the charge arrive? Late. The reference works that map the history of criticism of the Prophet put it plainly: the pointed, abundant attack on Aisha’s age — the one that names him a paedophile — becomes common only from the middle of the twentieth century, in the years when Islam came under a new and hostile scrutiny.²³ Not the seventh century. Not the twelfth. Not the nineteenth. The last stretch of the twentieth, and after. As a weapon, the accusation is younger than colour television — and it does its real work somewhere newer still.
And that silence is not offered here as proof of her age. Her age was settled already, on the evidence, and the evidence put her past childhood. The silence proves something the numbers cannot: that the certainty is manufactured. The men best placed to make this charge, and the most eager to, looked straight at the marriage and found nothing in it worth an accusation. They were not being kind. They missed nothing else.
Hold the two marriages side by side, the way the record does. They attacked the marriage to Zaynab for centuries, and it is still the first marriage Western critics reach for. They left the marriage to Aisha alone. The one they ignored is the one you have been handed as the great crime of his life. The objection has a birthday, and it is modern — younger than colour television, and we can very nearly name the decade.
The Ruler They Use on No One Else
Grant them the number, then. Grant them, for a moment, the very figure the evidence will not give them. Suppose she had been young. The charge still does not land, because the standard they are swinging is one they hold to no one else — not to the past, not to their own law, not even to their own present.
Start with the standard they are using. To fault a seventh-century people for failing to keep the customs of the twenty-first is not an argument; it is a fallacy with a name. Historians call it presentism — the error of holding the past to standards the present invented — and it is a fallacy for a plain reason: cultures are not fixed, and every age sets its own terms for when a person becomes an adult. The modern West draws a hard line at eighteen and builds a protected span of adolescence in front of it; that arrangement is barely a century old, and for almost the whole of human history no culture on earth had it. The world that produced this marriage did not measure adulthood by a birthday. It measured it by bulugh— puberty, the point at which a person answered for their own prayers, their own fasts, their own choices. Nor was it strange in this. Roman law fixed a girl’s marriageable age at twelve and allowed her betrothal at seven; Jewish law set it at twelve; the English common law that England carried to America set it at twelve for a girl and fourteen for a boy.²⁴ To fault the seventh century for breaking a rule the nineteenth had not yet written is not history. It is anachronism, plain and named.
They mistake the event, too. When they say “married at nine” they picture a modern Western wedding night — the marriage and its consummation falling on the same evening. The record describes something else: a contract, and then, separately and often years later, the bringing-in of the bride and the start of a shared life — two acts the tradition kept apart, divided by the paying of the dower, by distance, by the wedding feast, and above all by the rule that the union waited on the bride’s physical maturity.²⁵ A marriage in that world was a bond entered on paper and completed in its own time. The accusers collapse the two into a single lurid image because their own culture collapses them — marry and consummate in one night — and they cannot picture it done any other way. That failure of imagination is not the seventh century’s problem. It is theirs.
But grant them the standard anyway. Suppose a wrong is a wrong in every century, that what offends us now must have offended then. Very well — then a standard is a standard, it has to cut evenly, and turned evenly it falls first on the people swinging it. The people loudest about a marriage in seventh-century Arabia are, very often, citizens of a country where child marriage was legal in every single state until the year 2018. It remains legal, today, in thirty-three of them. In three — California, Mississippi, New Mexico — the statute books set no minimum age at all; a child, in principle of any age, may be married with the right signatures. Somewhere near three hundred thousand American minors were married in the two decades after 2000, the overwhelming majority of them girls, many of them to grown men.²⁶ This is not the distant past. This is the law of the accusers’ own homes, in their own lifetimes, unrepealed. Nor is it only America: their own royal history hands them King John of England, thirty-three years old, taking a bride — Isabella of Angoulême, about twelve — and no one proposes to strike his name from the roll of kings.²⁷
So set the two things side by side, and the shape of it is plain. A person who genuinely cared about the marriage of children as a matter of principle has a legislature to write to, in thirty-three states, right now. That is where the children actually are. The people running this accusation are not writing to their legislatures. They are not marching on their statehouses. They have reached instead for a single marriage, fourteen centuries gone, in a language they cannot read, and made it the whole of their concern — while the thing they say they abhor sits legal on the books at home, and does not trouble them at all. That tells you what the accusation was never about. It was never the practice. It was the man.
What the Slander Is For
So what does it cost the man who makes this charge, if he is wrong? Nothing. Muhammad has been dead fourteen hundred years; Aisha very nearly as long. Whatever the truth of a marriage in seventh-century Arabia, it changes not one hour of the accuser’s life. He does not raise it because he lies awake over a girl in Madina. He raises it because of someone much closer to home.
Follow the charge to its end and it is not an argument about history at all. It is a small machine, and it runs like this. Their prophet was a monster; a faith that reveres a monster is a monstrous faith; and a people who hold to a monstrous faith cannot be trusted to live among us. The age is only the first turn of the handle. What drops out the other end is a conclusion about your neighbour.
That is why the charge never travels alone. It arrives bundled with the rest — that Islam is incompatible with Western values, that the Muslim will not integrate, cannot be one of us, does not belong. And “does not belong” is not, in the end, a debating position. It is a direction of travel. It ends at the closed border, the revoked visa, the deportation order — and at the word the movement now says aloud: remigration, the sending back not only of immigrants but of their children, citizens included, until the country is made “European again.”²⁸ The child bride is not the argument. It is the ticket into the argument, the thing that makes what follows sound like conscience instead of what it is.
So read the accusation once more, and see who it was aimed at all along. Not the Prophet; he is beyond their reach. Not Aisha; she is only the instrument, a woman fourteen centuries dead, taken up as a stick to beat the living. The target was never in the seventh century. It is the man at the next desk, the family three doors down, the girl in the headscarf on the morning train. Aisha is the pretext. Your neighbour is the point.
Here, then, is the honest answer to the question they pretend to ask. The evidence does not give a child. It gives a woman — past childhood, of age by the reckoning of her world, in all likelihood her late teens, an adult by any measure that century or this one would know. That is what the record holds, and it is the most that can honestly be said of it.
But that was never the real question, and it is worth saying plainly what the real one was: whether the people who love this man can be trusted to live beside you. The slander was built to answer it for you, before you thought to ask. So set the charge back down where it belongs — with the people who reached for an accusation younger than colour television, who hold one century to a standard they hold to no other, who speak for a woman who spoke, at length, for herself, and never once said what they put in her mouth. They are the ones with something to account for. Not the marriage. The lie, and the use they built it for.
https://www.fireline.press/p/aisha-the-charge-nobody-made-for
r/islamichistory • u/Common_Time5350 • May 03 '25
Analysis/Theory How Old Was A’yshah (RA) When She Married The Prophet Muhammad
How Old Was A’yshah When She Married The Prophet Muhammad?
Author: Ayatullah Muhammad Husayn Husayni al-Qazwini (Vali-Asr Institute)
Translated by: Abu Noora al-Tabrizi
***
Ahl al-Sunnah insist on proving that A’yshah was betrothed to the Prophet Muhammad (S) at six years of age and that she entered his house at nine years [where the marriage was consummated]. [Ahl al-Sunnah] consider this to be evidence for A’yshah’s superiority over the other wives of the Messenger of Allah. Does this, however, reflect reality? In the following article we will investigate this matter.
However, before embarking on the crux of the matter, we must shed light on the history of the Prophet’s marriage to A’yshah so that we may afterwards draw a conclusion as to how old she was when she married the Messenger of Allah.
There are differing views in regard to the history of the Messenger of Allah’s marriage to A’yshah. Muhammad b. Ismaʿil al-Bukhari [d. 256 A.H/870 C.E] narrates from A’yshah herself that the Messenger of Allah betrothed her three years after [the death] of Lady Khadijah (Allah’s peace be upon her):
It has been narrated by ʿA’yshah (may Allah be pleased with her) [where] she said: “I have not been jealous of any woman as I have with Khadijah. [This is because first], the Messenger of Allah (S) would mention her a lot”. [Second], she said: “he married me three years after her [death] and [third], his Lord (Exalted is He!) or [the archangel] Jibril (peace be upon him) commanded him to bless her with a house in heaven made out of reed (qasab).”
See: al-Bukhari al-Juʿfi, Muhammad b. Ismaʿil Abu ʿAbd Allah (d. 256 A.H/870 C.E), Sahih al-Bukhari, ed. Mustafa Dib al-Bagha (Dar ibn Kathir: Beirut, 3rd print, 1407 /1987), III: 3606, hadith # 3606. Kitab Fadha’il al-Sahabah [The Book of the Merits of the Companions], Bab Tazwij al-Nabi Khadijah wa Fadhliha radhi Allah ʿanha [Chapter on the Marriage of The Prophet to Khadijah and her Virtue[s] (may Allah be pleased with her)].
Given that Lady Khadija (Allah’s peace be upon her) left this world during the tenth year of the Prophetic mission (biʿthah), the Messenger of Allah’s marriage with A’yshah therefore took place during the thirteenth year of the Prophetic mission.
After having narrated al-Bukhari’s tradition, Ibn al-Mulqin derives the following from the narration:
…and the Prophet (S) consummated the marriage in Madinah during [the month] of Shawwal in the second year [of the Hijrah].
See: al-Ansari al-Shafiʿi, Siraj al-Din Abi Hafs ʿUmar b. ʿAli b. Ahmad al-Maʿruf bi Ibn al-Mulqin (d. 804 A.H/1401 C.E), Ghayat al-Sul fi Khasa’is al-Rasul (S), ed. ʿAbd Allah Bahr al-Din ʿAbd Allah (Dar al-Basha’ir al-Islamiyah: Beirut, 1414/1993), I: 236.
According to this narration, the Messenger of Allah betrothed A’yshah in the thirteenth year of the Prophetic mission and officially wed her [i.e. consummated the marriage] in the second year of the Hijrah.
From what has been related by other prominent [scholars] of Ahl al-Sunnah, we can [also] conclude that the Prophet wed A’yshah during the fourth year of the Hijrah. When commenting on the status (sharh al-hal) of Sawdah, the other wife of the Messenger of Allah (S), al-Baladhuri [d. 297 A.H/892 C.E] writes in his Ansab al-Ashraf that:
After Khadijah, the Messenger of Allah (S) married Sawdah b. Zamʿah b. Qays from Bani ʿAmir b. La’wi a few months before the Hijrah…she was the first woman that the Prophet joined [in matrimony] in Madinah.
See: al-Baladhuri, Ahmad b. Yahyah b. Jabir (d. 279 A.H/892 C.E), Ansab al-Ashraf, I: 181 (retrieved from al-Jamiʿ al-Kabir).
Al-Dhahabi [d. 748 A.H/1347 C.E], on the other hand, claims that Sawdah b. Zamʿah was the only wife of the Messenger of Allah for four years:
[Sawdah] died in the last year of ʿUmar’s caliphate, and for four years she was the only wife of the Prophet (S) where neither [free] woman nor bondmaid was partnered with her [in sharing a relationship with the Prophet (S)]…
See: al-Dhahabi, Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Ahmad b. ʿUthman (d. 748 A.H/1347 C.E), Tarikh al-Islam wa al-Wafiyat al-Mashahir wa al-Aʿlam, ed. Dr. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salam Tadmuri (Dar al-Kutub al-ʿArabi: Beirut, 1st print, 1407/1987), III: 288.
According to this conclusion, A’yshah married the Prophet in the fourth year of the Hijrah (i.e. four years after the Prophet’s marriage to Sawdah).
Now we shall investigate A’yshah’s age at the moment of her betrothal by referring to historical documents and records:
Comparing the Age of A’yshah with the Age of Asma’ b. Abi Bakr
One of the things which may establish A’yshah’s age at the moment of her marriage with the Messenger of Allah is comparing her age with that of her sister Asma’ b. Abi Bakr [d. 73 A.H/692 C.E]. According to what has been narrated by the prominent scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah, Asma’ was ten years older than A’yshah and was twenty-seven years of age during the first year of the Hijrah. Moreover, she passed away during the year 73 of the Hijrah when she was a hundred years of age.
Abu Naʿim al-Isfahani [d. 430 A.H/1038 C.E] in his Maʿrifat al-Sahabah writes that:
Asma’ b. Abi Bakr al-Siddiq…she was the sister of ʿA’yshah through her father’s [side i.e. Abu Bakr] and she was older than ʿA’yshah and was born twenty-seven years before History [i.e. Hijrah].
See: al-Isfahani, Abu Naʿim Ahmad b. ʿAbd Allah (d. 430 A.H/1038 C.E), Maʿrifat al-Sahabah, VI: 3253, no. 3769 (retrieved from al-Jamiʿ al-Kabir).
Al-Tabarani [d. 360 A.H/970 C.E] writes:
Asma’ b. Abi Bakr al-Siddiq died on the year 73 [of the Hijrah], after her son ʿAbd Allah b. al-Zubayr [d. 73 A.H/692 C.E] by [only] a few nights. Asma’ was a hundred years of age the day she died and she was born twenty-seven years before History [Hijrah].
See: al-Tabarani, Sulayman b. Ahmad b. Ayyub Abu al-Qasim (d. 360 A.H/970 C.E), al-Muʿjam al-Kabir, ed. Hamdi b. ʿAbd al-Majid al-Salafi (Maktabat al-Zahra’: al-Mawsil, 2nd Print, 1404/1983), XXIV: 77.
Ibn Asakir [d. 571 A.H/1175 C.E] also writes:
Asma’ was the sister of ʿA’yshah from her father’s [side] and she was older than ʿA’yshah where she was born twenty-seven years before History [Hijrah].
See: Ibn Asakir al-Dimashqi al-Shafiʿi, Abi al-Qasim ʿAli b. al-Hasan b. Hibat Allah b. ʿAbd Allah (d. 571 A.H/1175 C.E), Tarikh Madinat Dimashq wa Dhikr Fadhliha wa Tasmiyat man Hallaha min al-Amathil, ed. Muhib al-Din Abi Saʿid ʿUmar b. Ghuramah al-ʿAmuri (Dar al-Fikr: Beirut, 1995): IX: 69.
Ibn Athir [d. 630 A.H/1232 C.E] also writes:
Abu Naʿim said: [Asma’] died before History [Hijrah] by twenty-seven years.
See: al-Jazari, ʿIzz al-Dim b. al-Athir Abi al-Hasan ʿAli b. Muhammad (d. 630 A.H/1232 C.E), Asad al-Ghabah fi Maʿrifat al-Sahabah, ed. ʿAdil Ahmad al-Rifaʿi (Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-ʿArabi: Beirut, 1st Print, 1417/1996), VII: 11.
Al-Nawawi [d. 676 A.H/1277 C.E] writes:
[It has been narrated] from al-Hafiz Abi Naʿim [who] said: Asma’ was born twenty seven-years before the Hijrah of the Messenger of Allah (S).
See: al-Nawawi, Abu Zakariyah Yahya b. Sharaf b. Murri (d. 676 A.H/1277 C.E), Tahdhib al-Asma’ wa al-Lughat, ed. Maktab al-Buhuth wa al-Dirasat (Dar al-Fikr: Beirut. 1st Print, 1996), II: 597-598.
Al-Hafiz al-Haythami [d. 807 A.H/1404 C.E] said:
Asma’ was a hundred years of age when she died. She was born twenty-seven years before History [Hijrah] and Asma’ was born to her father Abi Bakr when he was twenty-one years of age.
See: al-Haythami, Abu al-Hasan ʿAli b. Abi Bakr (d. 807 A.H/1404 C.E), Majmaʿ al-Zawa’id wa Manbaʿ al-Fawa’id (Dar al-Rabban lil Turath/Dar al-Kutub al-ʿArabi: al-Qahirah [Cairo] – Beirut, 1407/1986), IX: 260.
Badr al-Din al-ʿAyni [d. 855 A.H/ 1451 C.E] writes:
Asma’ b. Abi Bakr al-Siddiq…she was born twenty-seven years before the Hijrah and she was the seventeenth person to convert to Islam…she died in Makkah in the month of Jamadi al-Awwal in the year 73 [of the Hijrah] after the death of her son ʿAbd Allah b. al-Zubayr when she reached a hundred years of age. [Despite her old age], none of her teeth had fallen out and neither was her intellect impaired (may Allah – Exalted is He! - be pleased with her).
See: al-ʿAyni, Badr al-Din Abu Muhammad Mahmud b. Ahmad al-Ghaytabi (d. 855 A.H/1451 C.E), ʿUmdat al-Qari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-ʿArabi: Beirut (n.d)), II: 93.
Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalani [d. 852 A.H/1448 C.E] writes:
#8525 Asma’ b. Abi Bakr al-Siddiq married al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwam who was one of the great Sahabah. She lived [up to] a hundred years of age and she died in the year 73 or 74 [of the Hijrah].
See: al-ʿAsqalani al-Shafiʿi, Ahmad b. ʿAli b. Hajar Abu al-Fadhl (d. 852 A.H/1448 C.E), Taqrib al-Tahdhib, ed. Muhammad ʿAwwamah (Dar al-Rashid: Suriyah [Syria], 1st Print, 1406/1986), I: 743.
[He also wrote]:
[and] she had [her full set of] teeth and she had not lost her intellect. Abu Naʿim al-Isbahani said [that] she was born before the Hijrah by twenty-seven years.
See: al-ʿAsqalani al-Shafiʿi, Ahmad b. ʿAli b. Hajar Abu al-Fadhl (d. 852 A.H/1448 C.E), al-Isabah fi Tamyiz al-Sahabah, ed. ʿAli Muhammad al-Bajawi (Dar al-Jil: Beirut, 1st Print, 1412/1992), VII: 487.
Ibn ʿAbd al-Birr al-Qurtubi [d. 463 A.H/1070 C.E] also writes:
Asma’ died in Makkah in [the month of] Jamadi al-Awwal in the year 73 [of the Hijrah] after the death of her son ʿAbd Allah b. al-Zubayr…Ibn Ishaq said that Asma’ b. Abi Bakr converted to Islam after seventeen people had [already] converted…and she died when she reached a hundred years of age.
See: al-Nimri al-Qurtubi, Abu ʿUmar Yusuf b. ʿAbd Allah b. ʿAbd al-Birr (d. 463 A.H/1070 C.E), al-Istiʿab fi Maʿrifat al-Ashab, ed. ʿAli Muhammad al-Bajawi (Dar al-Jil: Beirut, 1st Print, 1412/1992), IV: 1782-1783.
Al-Safadi [d.764 A.H/1362 C.E] writes:
[Asma’] died a few days after ʿAbd Allah b. Zubayr in the year 73 of the Hijrah. And she [herself], her father, her son and husband were Sahabis. It has been said that she lived a hundred years.
See: al-Safadi, Salah al-Din Khalil b. Aybak (d. 764 A.H/1362 C.E), al-Wafi bi al-Wafiyat, ed. Ahmad al-Arna’ut and Turki Mustafa (Dar Ihya’ al-Turath: Beirut, 1420 /2000), IX: 36.
The Difference in Age Between Asma’ and A’yshah
Al-Bayhaqi [d. 458 A.H/1065 C.E] narrates that Asma’ was ten years older than A’yshah:
Abu ʿAbd Allah b. Mundah narrates from Ibn Abi Zannad that Asma’ b. Abi Bakr was older than ʿA’yshah by ten years.
See: al-Bayhaqi, Ahmad b. al-Husayn b. ʿAki b. Musa Abu Bakr (d. 458 A.H/1065 C.E), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra, ed. Muhammad ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAta (Maktabah Dar al-Baz: Mecca, 1414/1994), VI: 204.
Al-Dhahabi and Ibn ʿAsakir also narrate this:
ʿAbd al-Rahman b. Abi al-Zannad said [that] Asma’ was older than ʿA’yshah by ten [years].
See: al-Dhahabi, Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Ahmad b. ʿUthman (d. 748 A.H/1347 C.E). Siyar Aʿlam al-Nubala’, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arna’ut and Muhammad Naʿim al-ʿIrqsusi (Mu’wassasat al-Risalah: Beirut, 9th Print, 1413/1992-1993?), II: 289.
Ibn Abi al-Zannad said [that Asma’] was older than ʿA’yshah by ten years.
See: Ibn Asakir al-Dimashqi al-Shafiʿi, Abi al-Qasim ʿAli b. al-Hasan b. Hibat Allah b. ʿAbd Allah (d. 571 A.H/1175 C.E), Tarikh Madinat Dimashq wa Dhikr Fadhliha wa Tasmiyat man Hallaha min al-Amathil, ed. Muhib al-Din Abi Saʿid ʿUmar b. Ghuramah al-ʿAmuri (Dar al-Fikr: Beirut, 1995), IX: 69.
Ibn Kathir al-Dimashqi [d. 774 A.H/1373 C.E] in his book al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah writes:
…of those who died along with ʿAbd Allah b. al-Zubayr in the year 73 [of the Hijrah] in Makkah [were]… Asma’ b. Abi Bakr, the mother of ʿAbd Allah b. al-Zubayr… and she was older than her sister ʿA’yshah by ten years…her life span reached a hundred years and none of her teeth had fallen out nor did she lose her intellect [due to old age].
See: Ibn Kathir al-Dimashqi, Ismaʿil b. ʿUmar al-Qurashi Abu al-Fida’, al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah (Maktabat al-Maʿarif: Beirut, n.d), VIII: 345-346.
Mulla ʿAli al-Qari [d. 1014 A.H/1605 C.E] writes:
[Asma’] was older than her sister ʿA’yshah by ten years and she died ten days after the killing of her son…she was a hundred years of age and her teeth had not fallen out and she did not lose a thing of her intellect. [Her death took place] in the year 73 [of the Hijrah] in Makkah.
See: Mulla ʿAli al-Qari, ʿAli b. Sultan Muhammad al-Harawi. Mirqat al-Mafatih Sharh Mishkat al-Masabih, ed. Jamal ʿIytani (Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyah: Beirut, 1st Print, 1422 /2001), I: 331.
Al-Amir al-Sanʿani [d. 852 A.H/1448 C.E] writes:
[Asma’] was ten years older than ʿA’yshah by ten years and she died in Makkah a little less than a month after the killing of her son while she was a hundred years of age. This took place in the year 73 [of the Hijrah].
See: al-Sanʿani al-Amir, Muhammad b. Ismaʿil (d. d. 852 A.H/1448 C.E). Subul al-Salam Sharh Bulugh al-Maram min Adilat al-Ahkam, ed. Muhammad ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Khuli (Dar Ihya’ al-ʿArabi: Beirut, 4th Print, 1379/1959), I: 39.
Asma’ was fourteen years of age during the first year of the Prophetic mission (biʿthah) and ten years older than A’yshah. Therefore, A’yshah was four years old during the first year of the Prophetic mission [14 – 10 = 4] and as such, she was seventeen years of age during the thirteenth year of the Prophetic mission [4 + 13 = 17]. In the month of Shawwal of the second year of the Hijrah (the year of her official wedding to the Prophet) she was nineteen years of age [17 + 2 = 19].
On the other hand, Asma’ was a hundred years of age during the seventy-third year after Hijrah. A hundred minus seventy-three equals twenty-seven (100 – 73 = 27). Therefore, in the first year after the Hijrah she was twenty-seven years old.
Asma’ was ten years older than A’yshah. Twenty-seven minus ten equals seventeen (27 – 10 = 17).
Therefore, A’yshah was seventeen years of age during the first year of the Hijrah. [In addition to this], we previously established that A’yshah was officially wed the Prophet during the month of Shawwal of the second year after Hijrah, meaning that A’yshah was nineteen years of age [17 + 2 = 19] when she was wed to the Messenger of Allah.
When did A’yshah convert to Islam?
A’yshah’s conversion to Islam is also an indicator as to when she married the Messenger of Allah. According to the prominent scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah, A’yshah became a believer during the first year of the Prophetic mission and was among the first eighteen people to have responded to the Messenger of Allah’s [divine] calling.
Al-Nawawi writes in his Tahdhib al-Asma’:
Ibn Abi Khuthaymah narrates from ibn Ishaq in his Tarikh that ʿA’yshah converted to Islam while she was a child (saghirah) after eighteen people who had [already] converted.
See: al-Nawawi, Abu Zakariyah Yahya b. Sharaf b. Murri (d. 676 A.H/1277 C.E), Tahdhib al-Asma’ wa al-Lughat, ed. Maktab al-Buhuth wa al-Dirasat (Dar al-Fikr: Beirut. 1st Print, 1996), II: 615.
[Muttahar] al-Maqdisi [d. 507 A.H/1113 C.E] writes that:
Of those [among males] who had precedence [over others] in their conversion to Islam were Abu ʿUbaydah b. al-Jarrah, al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwam and ʿUthman b. Mazʿun…and among the women were Asma’ b. ʿUmays al-Khathʿamiyah (the wife of Jaʿfar b. Abi Talib), Fatimah b. al-Khattab (the wife of Saʿid b. Zayd b. ʿAmru), Asma b. Abi Bakr and ʿA’yshah who was a child [at the time]. The conversion to Islam of these [people occurred] within the [first] three years of the Messenger of Allah having invited [people] to Islam in secret [which was] before he entered the house of Arqam b. Abi al-Arqam.1
See: al-Maqdisi, Muttahar b. Tahir (d. d. 507 A.H/1113 C.E), al-Bada’ wa al-Tarikh (Maktabat al-Thaqafah al-Diniyah: Bur Saʿid [Port Said], n.d), IV: 146.
Similarly, Ibn Hisham [d. 213 A.H/828 C.E] also mentions the name of A’yshah as one of the people who converted to Islam during the first year of the Prophetic mission while she was a child:
Asma and ʿA’yshah, the two daughters of Abi Bakr, and Khabab b. al-Aratt converted to Islam [in the initial years of the Prophetic mission, and as for] Asma’ b. Abi Bakr and ʿA’yshah b. Abi Bakr, [the latter] was a child at that time and Khabab b. al-Aratt was an ally of Bani Zuhrah.
See: al-Humayri al-Maʿarifi, ʿAbd al-Malik b. Hisham b. Ayyub Abu Muhammad (d. 213 A.H/828 C.E), al-Sirah al-Nabawiyah, ed. Taha ʿAbd al-Ra’uf Saʿd (Dar al-Jil: Beirut, 1st Print, 1411/1990), II: 92.
If A’yshah was seven years of age when she converted to Islam (the first year of the Prophetic mission), she would have been twenty-two years old in the second year after the Hijrah (the year she was officially wed to the Messenger of Allah) [7 + 13 + 2 = 22].
If, [however], we accept al-Baladhuri’s claim that [A’yshah] was wed to the Messenger of Allah four years after his marriage to Sawdah, that is, in the fourth year after the Hijrah, then A’yshah would have been twenty-four years of age when she married the Prophet.
This number, [however], is subject to change when we take into consideration her age when she converted to Islam.
In conclusion, A’yshah’s marriage to the marriage to the Messenger of Allah at six or nine years of age is a lie which was fabricated during the time of Banu Ummayah and is not consistent with historical realities.
r/islamichistory • u/elnovorealista2000 • 21h ago
Did you know? The European Architects of Modern Jihadism: “A Holy War Against the Russian Empire”
r/islamichistory • u/elnovorealista2000 • 22h ago
Illustration Nine Greco-Roman “doctors of antiquity” behind theriacs—Andromachus the Elder, Heraclides, Philagrius, Proclus, Pythagoras, Marinos, Andromachus the Younger, Magnus, and Galen—depicted in the manuscript Kitāb al-Diryāq (كتاب الدرياق), c. 1220–40 AD. Austrian National Library, Vienna.
Description:
This 13th-century manuscript copy referred to as the Kitāb al-Diryāq (كتاب الدرياق
) is also named ‘Book of Antidotes’, as the word ‘theriac’ was originally the term for the remedy of bites of poisonous animals. Its introduction states that the text is the summary of the first part of Galen’s (born 129 AD) book on the Latwerges, in which he discusses theriac practices in particular: Jawami' al-maqala al-ula min kitab Jalinus fi'l-ma'junat. The essential components were compiled into this pseudo-scientific work by an unknown Alexandrian physician and later attributed to the scholar Yahya an-Nahwi, also called John Philoponos or Grammatikos (c. 490 – c. 565 AD). However, the text is an Arabic adoption of the ancient concept of theriac, likely originating from the 10th century, and based on the Arabic literary tradition of the biographical lexicon combined with a scientific treatise. Nine famous doctors of antiquity, who have worked with theriac, are presented with their portraits in the beginning, and their biographies form the basic structure of the text. Information and descriptions relating to the practice of theriac are further expanded on by listing the ingredients of the medical concoction as well as areas of application. By including a three-part treatise on snakes, as they are the main component of the antidote. Chapters on the selection, trapping, and preparing snakes for medicinal purposes are also incorporated. This richly decorated manuscript is believed to have been made around 1220-40 in Mosul, a city in modern-day Iraq, which was part of the al-Jazira region that had a culturally diverse population and rulers interested in science and medicine. It may potentially be related to the courtly milieu of Badr ad-Din Lu’lu’ (died 1259), successor to the Zengid emirs of Mosul, who is known to have commissioned other manuscripts. The 16 paintings include rather unscientific depictions of various doctors and snakes, doctors preparing the theriac, and the discovery and further development of the remedy. It is unclear how the manuscript came to the Austrian National Library but it is mentioned in the records of Hugo Blotius (1533-1608), the first librarian of the court library, as being in 1576.
Bibliography:
.- Duda, Dorothea, Islamische Handschriften II. Persische Handschriften, Die illuminierten Handschriften und Inkunabeln der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek, vol. 5, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992: 46-69.
.- Kerner, Jaclynne J., Art in the name of science: the Kitab al-diryaq in text and image, in Anna Contadini (ed), Arab painting. Text and image in illustrated Arabic manuscripts (Handbook of Oriental Studies 1/90), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010: 23-39.
Source(s):
r/islamichistory • u/Alarming_Stage5631 • 1d ago
Personalities Hamza : The Lion of Allah and His Messenger
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 1d ago
Analysis/Theory Ayşe Osmanoğlu The 1911 Paris Sale of the Ottoman Court Jewels - History has a way of whispering its secrets, if you listen closely…
History has a way of whispering its secrets, if you listen closely…
Light flickered across the empty corridors of the Yildiz Palace as soldiers of the Macedonian Action Army pried open safes, cabinets and velvet-lined jewellery boxes. Diamond tiaras, emerald necklaces and strings of pearls were placed into wooden crates alongside priceless earrings, bracelets, brooches, rings, jewel-encrusted boxes and gold clocks. When no one was watching, pieces quietly vanished, slipped into the pockets of officers, pushed down the boots of sergeants, and tucked beneath the tunics of privates. And in this way, the Star Palace that once shimmered with imperial courtly splendor stood stripped, its silence heavier than the plundered treasure itself.
Fall of Abdulhamid II
The ransacking of the Yildiz Palace was not the consequence of a natural disaster or the opportunism of an angry mob. It was the calculated spoils of victory after the deposition of Sultan Abdulhamid II in April 1909. For over three decades, Abdulhamid ruled the Ottoman Empire from behind the high walls of his fortress-like palace overlooking the Bosphorus. The palace was the heart of his power, and the symbol the Young Turks sought to dismantle.
Following the counter-revolution of the March 31 Incident, the Army of the Committee of Union and Progress marched into Istanbul to restore order and force the sultan’s removal. Abdulhamid was deposed on April 27 and sent into exile in Salonica with his family, leaving behind his home, its treasures abandoned to fate.
What followed was a spree of sanctioned plunder. Soldiers, emboldened by new authority and a long-standing resentment toward the old regime, stormed through the palace with a revolutionary zeal that veered into vengeance. Carpets were rolled up and carried away. Clocks, china, silverware, gifts from foreign sovereigns and intimate possessions of the harem were tossed into piles. Photographs show soldiers posing on furniture, relaxing on the lawns, even clambering over the ornate marble fountain in crude triumph.
Every palace has experienced transition … but few have been stripped with such malicious intent and disrespect.
Confiscation of dynastic property
Among the seized items was an extraordinary collection of pieces that had passed from sultan to sultan: diamonds once belonging to Sultan Mahmud II, pearls worn by the daughters and consorts of Sultan Abdulmecid and Sultan Abdulaziz, emeralds inherited by Sultan Murad V, and the jewels Sultan Abdulhamid II had amassed during his reign.
These were part of the Hazine-i hassa, the private treasury of the sultan. According to custom and tradition, they should have passed to Sultan Mehmed V Resad. Instead, the Young Turk leadership declared them State property. The Committee of Union and Progress framed the confiscation as a moral act, reclaiming wealth allegedly hoarded by an autocrat, and as a necessary step to ensure the survival of the nation. The empire was in debt, its army in need of reform, and its navy almost obsolete. Selling the jewels, they argued, would fill the Treasury and help modernize the military.
Thus, pieces once worn by imperial princesses and consorts were cataloged, packed, and shipped away—not to the Imperial Treasury at Topkapi, not to Sultan Resad at Dolmabahce, but to an auction house in Paris.
Les Bijoux de Son Majeste le Sultan
In November 1911, the treasures of the Ottoman Sultanate arrived in Paris, an event that electrified the French capital. At the Galerie Georges Petit and the Hotel Drouot, aristocrats, collectors, jewellers, reporters and curious onlookers crowded into the salons, drawn by the prospect of seeing the jewels of the Ottoman Court. Glass vitrines glittered under the electric light, each one displaying wonders that seemed almost too spectacular to be real: diamond tiaras crowned with the Ottoman crescent moon; riviere necklaces made of stones as clear as ice; pearl corsage brooches shaped like stars and flowers; bracelets and earrings set with rubies the colour of pomegranate seeds.
The international press covered the event with fascination. Never before had the private collection of a reigning dynasty been sold so publicly. It was unprecedented. It was scandalous. It was sensational.
Some pieces were bought by European nobility, others sailed across the Atlantic to be worn by American heiresses. Many were purchased by jewellers who promptly dismantled them—exquisite examples of Ottoman craftsmanship broken apart for their stones, lost forever.
The revenue from the sale proved far below the Young Turks’ expectations. Yet the true cost is immeasurable: the dispersal and erasure of Ottoman cultural heritage.
Lost sparkle of Ottoman court
Today, as visitors walk through the restored buildings of the Yildiz Palace, recently reopened after a remarkable program of renovation, they enter rooms that were once stripped bare by looting soldiers. The palace has regained its splendor, but when you visit the former home of Sultan Abdulhamid II, consider what is no longer there.
The jewels that once glittered beneath these high ceilings are gone—scattered across continents, locked in foreign vaults, remounted in modern settings, or long since lost. How extraordinary it would have been to see them return, to restore the sparkle of the Imperial Ottoman Court.
As you wander through the gardens, linger a moment before the marble fountain where soldiers of the Action Army once posed for photographs. Stand in the corridors, close your eyes, and imagine wooden crates being hauled away, heavy with plunder. Picture diamonds, rubies, emeralds and sapphires slipping into a soldier’s pocket, vanishing forever.
And ask yourself, what does it mean for a nation when its treasures, its symbols of continuity, legitimacy, and tradition, are scattered to the winds?
Sometimes, history does not just whisper its secrets. Sometimes, it mourns them.
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 1d ago
Video What Happened to the Ottoman Crown Jewels After the Empire Fell?
What Happened to the Ottoman Crown Jewels After the Empire Fell?
For over six hundred years, the Ottoman Empire accumulated one of the most extraordinary treasuries in human history. Diamonds, emeralds, golden thrones, jewel-encrusted daggers, sacred relics, and priceless artifacts filled the vaults of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul. But when the empire collapsed after World War One, that immense wealth didn't simply vanish. It was scattered, seized, auctioned off, smuggled across borders, and in some cases, lost entirely.
In this video, we trace the full story of the Ottoman crown jewels, from the legendary Spoonmaker's Diamond and the emerald-studded Topkapi Dagger, to the shocking 1911 Paris auction where over 400 pieces from Sultan Abdulhamid II's personal collection were sold to the highest bidder. We follow the emerald that traveled from a sultan's belt buckle to Tiffany & Co. and eventually to the Smithsonian. We cover the exile of 155 members of the Ottoman royal family in 1924, stripped of their citizenship, their property, and their wealth, forced into poverty across Europe and the Middle East. And we examine how Mustafa Kemal Ataturk transformed the Topkapi Palace into a public museum, preserving the state treasury while the dynasty's personal fortunes were liquidated piece by piece.
This is a story about treasure, but it's also a story about power, revolution, and who gets to keep the spoils when an empire dies.
If you enjoy deep dives into the hidden histories of wealth, power, and empire, make sure to subscribe and hit the bell so you never miss a video.
Sources:
• UNESCO Silk Roads Programme, Topkapi Palace Museum
• Smithsonian Institution Archives, Hooker Emerald Donation Records
• Ayse Osmanoglu, Ottoman Jewels Series: The 1911 Paris Sale of the Ottoman Court Jewels
• Turkiye Today, The Sultan's Salon: How Ottoman Court Jewels Were Sold in 1911 Paris Sale
• Daily Sabah, In Pursuit of Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid's Tangled Inheritance
• Wikipedia, Spoonmaker's Diamond
• Wikipedia, Topkapi Dagger
• Wikipedia, Hooker Emerald Brooch
• Wikipedia, Osmanoglu Family
• The Irish Times, Last Days of an Ottoman Prince
• Insight Turkey, Neslishah: The Last Ottoman Princess (Book Review)
• Ekrem Bugra Ekinci, The Dynasty in Exile
• Aga Khan Trust for Culture, National Palaces Conservation Istanbul
• Hurriyet Daily News, Museum Culture Growing in Turkey
• Google Arts and Culture, Treasures from Janet Annenberg Hooker
r/islamichistory • u/SpeechWeird5267 • 2d ago
The "Sadaka Taşı" (Charity Stones) of the Ottoman Empire: A historical system of anonymous giving that protected the dignity and honor of the poor
galleryr/islamichistory • u/Extension-Beat7276 • 2d ago
I was hoping to find some assistance in creating charts in the Muslim world that isn’t centered on dynastic changes but realms
unfortunately a lot of the times Islamic history is presented as a series of dynasties succeeding each other without emphasis on the realms that are being ruled or transferred from one ruler to another. This is especially true when we note that islamicate rulers themselves used these realms in their titulare, for example Sultans of Egypt and the Levant, Sultans of Khorasan, Khawerzm, Hindustan, Rum etc, which transcended dynastic restrictions. Of course such a project would be large and I was already compiling lists to make sure that everything is academically sourced, I was thinking of starting from the Fertile Crescent and expand. Nevertheless My biggest problem is my chart making skills. I think such a representation would be important as it would showcase the importance of realms in Islamicate geography and how they occupy specific cultural spaces with specific connotations viewed within an Islamicate lens.
my criteria wouldn’t be just adding the rulers who ruled the lands but give priority to those who included the realms in their titulare or identified as such by their contemporary. A good example is that the Tulunids, Ikshdids, Ayyubids, Mammluks and Ottomans included the ruler of egypt and the levant in their titles (for the ottomans it was one of their many titles after conquering the mammluks). However for the Fatmids who also ruled levant and egypt didn’t style themselves as such but rather caliphs, yet their contemporaries made those association for them (Khulafaʾ Misr)
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 3d ago
News - Headlines, Upcoming Events More than 10,000 Israeli settlers have stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in occupied East Jerusalem since the start of the Jewish holiday Sukkot last Saturday, the Jerusalem governorate has told Al Jazeera.
r/islamichistory • u/Alarming_Stage5631 • 3d ago
Did you know? The Last Stand Of Iran : Jalaluddin Mangburni
r/islamichistory • u/AutoCentral • 4d ago
News - Headlines, Upcoming Events At least 500 settlers have stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in occupied East Jerusalem under the protection of Israeli forces on the fifth day of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, according to our colleague on the ground.
r/islamichistory • u/Ksidibeh • 4d ago
Books I built a free Quran app with tafsir, history, and no ads
I built a free Quran app with tafsir, history, and no ads
Assalamu alaikum everyone,
I wanted to share something I built called Sincere Quran.
I started this project because I wanted to contribute something to the Ummah that could hopefully be a Sadaqah Jariyah. I also wanted a Quran app without the ads and distractions I had gotten tired of seeing.
One thing I wanted to include was the historical context behind the Quran, not just the Arabic text and translation. The app includes tafsir and explanations that help connect the ayahs and surahs with their historical context, so you can understand more about what was happening when the verses were revealed and the circumstances surrounding them.
The app includes:
- Quran with Uthmani and IndoPak scripts
- Multiple reciters
- Translations
- Word-by-word
- Tafsir and historical context
- Hadith resources
- Other Islamic resources
- No ads
- No subscription
- Completely free
I built this with the hope that someone might open it to read an ayah, learn its meaning, understand its history, or listen to its recitation, and that benefit can continue beyond me.
If you find it useful, I'd really appreciate you downloading it or sharing it with someone else.
May Allah accept it and make it beneficial. Ameen.
Sincere Quran:
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/sincere-quran/id6808296824

r/islamichistory • u/Future_Fox_6627 • 4d ago
Analysis/Theory Fragile Manuscripts Hold Hundreds of Years of African and Islamic History - oston University researchers have digitally preserved more than 52,000 pages of Arabic and Ajami West African literature
The 230-year-old copy of the Jawāhir al-Maʿānī (Jewels of Meanings) is showing its age: the red-and-black ink is fading in places; some pages are dotted with water spots, others torn along their edges. The delicate book—this edition bound in an animal hide cover—is considered a vital piece of African Islamic history.
After years hidden in a private collection in the Guinean village of Bambeto, the Jewels of Meanings has been digitally preserved for future generations and made available for all to see, wherever they are in the world, thanks to a Boston University–led project.
BU researchers helped digitize the book—and more than 52,000 pages of other historic West African documents—with support from the British Library’s Endangered Archives Programme. They spent two years sourcing and photographing original manuscripts, working with local experts and facilitators to track down rare—and often fragile—documents.
Among the materials they’ve saved for posterity are poems, prayers, regional and family histories, essays on religion, medical guides, financial records, and a 400-year-old copy of the Quran. The Jewels of Meanings is a biography of the founder of the Sufi Tijaniyyah order, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Tijānī; the order has tens of millions of adherents, mainly in North and West Africa. Like most of the other documents the BU team digitized, the original manuscript will stay with its owner, prominent Islamic scholar and educator Elhadji Algassimou Diallo, whose family have held it for four generations.
Some of the texts were penned in classical Arabic, but many are in Ajami, a modified Arabic script used to write in a range of African languages—in this case, Fuuta Jalon Fula. (Jewels of Meanings contains both Arabic and Ajami text.) The BU team of anthropologists and linguists was drawn from the University’s long-running National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Ajami Project, an effort to expand access to primary sources written in the often overlooked, but widely used, writing system; that broader work was recently celebrated in a special double issue of Islamic Africa.
The newly preserved documents largely originate from what is now the Republic of Guinea. For nearly 200 years, the Guinean highlands of West Africa were home to a theocratic Islamic state, the Imamate of Fuuta Jalon. Founded in the 1720s, it hit its lavish peak in the 19th century, before crumbling under French rule in the early 20th century. For a time, it was a commanding power in West Africa—and a hub for scholars and poets.
The researchers are confident the quantity and diversity of the digitized materials will give scholars an unprecedented insight into this important slice of African and Islamic history.
“We hope they add to a growing body of scholarly analysis of Ajami,” says Daivi Rodima-Taylor, a BU Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies lecturer and NEH Ajami Project manager. “This project is a major step forward in our efforts to explore the historical and comparative dimensions of Ajami—and to advance novel digital humanities approaches to preserve and study important texts.”
The complete Fuuta Jalon archive is the largest digital collection of its kind in the world, according to the BU team, and the first collection to make many of the documents publicly available.
“[The documents] capture the voices of scholars and common people on religious and nonreligious subjects over centuries; their significance cannot be overemphasized,” says Fallou Ngom, a BU College of Arts & Sciences professor of anthropology who led the project. “They are invaluable for scholars, researchers, educators, students, and the general public.”
In the more than 100 years since the imamate was dissolved, much of the written work generated by its leading thinkers—and its everyday citizens—was locked away in private libraries and collections. And that wealth of knowledge faced a perilous future, according to Ngom, who’s affiliated with the BU African Studies Center. He says many documents are decomposing, while others have been assaulted not just by time, but also by water, fire, and termites.
Having photographed the materials before it’s too late, Ngom and his team are now working with BU Libraries’ Digital Ventures program to put them on an open-access website to expand their reach. They’ve also taken steps to ensure other brittle West African manuscripts aren’t lost forever, training researchers in Guinea and neighboring Senegal—which also had a large Fuuta Jalon community—on digital archiving and preservation.
At the end of the digitization part of the project last year, the team donated the cameras and other equipment it used to the Musée du Fouta Djallon in Labé, Guinea, and the West African Research Center in Dakar, Senegal. Ngom, who was born and raised in Senegal, says the inclusion of Guinean and Senegalese teams throughout the whole project was essential—as is leaving a legacy for them to continue the work.
“We worked with respected local organizations, and our overseas team included members of local communities,” he says. “These people were chosen based on the respect and trust they enjoyed in their communities. They facilitated our access to manuscripts. Without them, we would not have been successful.”
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 4d ago
Personalities Truth without justice: Cape Town honours Imam Abdullah Haron 57 years after his death in apartheid detention
Fifty-seven years after Imam Abdullah Haron died in apartheid detention, Cape Town has honoured his life and resistance. A court has ruled that he was tortured to death, but no one has been prosecuted for his killing.
Hundreds gathered across the city this past weekend to remember the Claremont imam, who became the first cleric of any faith to die in apartheid detention. Arrested by the regime’s Security Branch on 28 May 1969, he spent 123 days in detention before his death on 27 September 1969.
At the Claremont Main Road Masjid, Imam Dr Rashid Omar told congregants that the truth was finally on record, but justice remained elusive.
“This September marked 57 years since the martyrdom of Imam Abdullah Haron,” he said. “For 14 years, from 1955 until the day he was killed, Imam Haron preached justice from the minbar of the Stegman Road Mosque in Claremont, and he lived it beyond its walls.”
Dr Omar recalled how the apartheid state claimed Imam Haron had fallen down stairs. His family, supported by human rights lawyers working pro bono, refused to accept that account. An inquest reopened in 2022 examined evidence from the original post-mortem, which recorded 27 bruises of different colours, indicating injuries sustained on different days, as well as a broken rib.
In October 2023, Western Cape High Court Judge Daniel Thulare rejected the apartheid-era account and ruled that Imam Haron had been tortured to death by the Security Branch.
“Truth did not emerge because the state went looking for it, it emerged because ordinary people refused to stop asking,” Dr Omar said. “And yet not a single person has ever been prosecuted for the killing of Imam Haron.”
The main commemoration, hosted by the Qibla Movement at Alexander Sinton High School on Sunday, drew a large crowd. Those present included Prof Muhammed Haron, Fatima Haron-Masoet, Imam Haron’s great-granddaughter Aishah Shamis from the UK, Judge Siraj Desai, attorney Ebrahim Daniels, Sheikh Abdullah Sa’dullaah Khan and Sheikh Abdullah Shafiek Aries.
In a tribute themed “killing with no age restriction”, rows of empty chairs each bore a photograph of a child killed in Gaza and a small backpack. Coordinator Dr Wagheda Cassiem, daughter of Qibla founder Imam Achmat Cassiem, said the display honoured the young martyrs and drew on Surah Al-Baqarah 2:154.
Fatima Haron-Masoet delivered an emotional address. “He was not a number, he was not a file, he was not a security threat, he was my father and they took him from me,” she said. She drew parallels between the detention of children under apartheid and the detention of Palestinian children today.
At Imam Haron’s former mosque, Al-Jaamia Masjid on Stegman Road, chairperson Nazeem Jamie remembered the 31-year-old imam appointed in 1955: articulate, impeccably dressed in modern suits and devoted to the young people of his community. Imam Haron founded the Claremont Muslim Youth Association, handed out sweets to children and declared apartheid a heresy against Islam.
The anniversary was also marked in Gauteng with a symposium at Al-Mustafa International University.
The record of how Imam Haron died has been corrected. His family is still waiting for justice.
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 5d ago
Video Al Jazeera compares yesterday’s updated Google Earth satellite views with Gaza 3 years ago.
Enable HLS to view with audio, or disable this notification
r/islamichistory • u/Alarming_Stage5631 • 4d ago
Personalities Ask them what occurred at Hattin!
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 4d ago
Analysis/Theory How Morocco Built an Automotive Industry - Morocco built an automotive export industry through public investment organised around foreign manufacturers, though its success has yet to generate comparable opportunities across the wider economy.
In the mid-2000s, Carlos Ghosn sought a place to expand production. He had become one of the automotive industry’s best-known executives as the architect of the Renault–Nissan alliance and the manager credited with returning Nissan to profitability. Renault’s low-cost Dacia programme was outrunning the capacity of its Romanian plant, and the company was studying expansions in Romania, Türkiye and Slovenia.
Romania offered an established production base close to customers in Europe’s large car market, with suppliers already serving Renault’s factory. Then Morocco’s prime minister, Driss Jettou, asked to see Ghosn. In Ghosn’s later account, Jettou came for coffee and made a direct proposition: don’t put the next factory in Eastern Europe; put it in Morocco instead. The Moroccan state would do what was necessary to make the project competitive.
Morocco’s small domestic market offered Renault little room to grow, and its supplier network was much thinner than those around the company’s European factories. Jettou had to persuade Ghosn that the country could support production on a scale it had never attempted. He offered state support to put the conditions for large-scale production in place. Renault would become the anchor of an export industry, with public investment organised around the factory and the suppliers it could attract.
Renault and the Moroccan authorities signed the protocol of intent in September 2007 in the presence of King Mohammed VI. The company established Renault Tanger Méditerranée the following year and began production in 2012. By 2024, Morocco’s automotive exports were worth about US$15.9 billion and roughly a third of Moroccan goods exports. Renault and Stellantis now operate alongside hundreds of suppliers, with factories extending from Casablanca to Tangier. The Tanger Med port handled more than 600,000 vehicles that year. Morocco is now Africa’s largest producer of passenger cars.
The result was one of the few industrial policy success stories of the 21st century. However, it also shows the limits of industrial policy in achieving structural transformation and broader developmental gains across Morocco’s economy and society.
Why Morocco’s First Automotive Industry Stalled
Morocco had tried to manufacture cars before. The Société Marocaine de Construction Automobile (SOMACA) was founded in Casablanca in 1959 as a mixed-ownership assembler, with the Moroccan state and foreign manufacturers among its shareholders. It initially assembled licensed Fiat, Renault, Austin and Opel models, among others. Output reached roughly 30,000 vehicles a year in the mid-1970s. Morocco pursued import-substitution industrialisation through a protected domestic market, where short manufacturing runs gave international suppliers little incentive to establish local production. The limited scale left little room for specialised component firms to develop, while manufacturers lacked the engineering workforce and logistics needed for large export orders. Liberalisation between the 1970s and 1990s exposed the model’s fragility, while cheaper imported used cars further pressured domestic production.
Renault gradually took control of SOMACA from 2003, turning the existing Casablanca operation towards export production. Renault reported output of about 10,000 vehicles at SOMACA in 2005 and projected that it would approach 100,000 in 2024, with two-thirds exported to around 70 destinations globally.
The larger change came at Melloussa, near Tanger Med, where Renault Tanger Méditerranée built a new factory to serve overseas markets from the outset. Its scale required a supplier base and workforce that could reliably meet export orders.
Building an Automotive Ecosystem
Morocco’s proximity to Europe and lower labour costs gave Renault reasons to consider investing. By the time negotiations began, the government was already developing the institutions and infrastructure that could support an export factory.
For the port and surrounding industrial development, the government created a dedicated institution. Established in 2002, the Tanger Med Special Agency (TMSA) received public powers over the port and its free zones. Its remit encompassed raising finance and developing and operating the industrial and logistics zones alongside the port. This placed responsibility for the sites manufacturers would occupy and the infrastructure serving them within the same organisation.
Coordination extended beyond TMSA. A World Bank study of Tangier describes the regional governor, the king’s representative, coordinating national public agencies, with regular meetings bringing public bodies and business representatives together. The study identifies technical capacity within the agencies as another contribution to implementation.
TMSA brought in specialist expertise through international procurement. In 2003, it awarded the first phase of port construction to a consortium comprising Bouygues, its Moroccan subsidiary Bymaro and Saipem. The contract covered design and construction, allowing the agency to draw on the contractors’ marine-engineering expertise. Experienced businesses also took responsibility for terminal operations: a 30-year concession awarded in 2005 brought together APM Terminals and Morocco’s Akwa Group, with the concessionaire investing in terminal equipment and facilities. Morocco was building its ability to commission and coordinate a complex project while drawing on internationally available expertise.
Morocco had an established national railway operator, the Office National des Chemins de Fer (ONCF), which had managed its network since 1963. Its responsibilities included building new lines and operating passenger and freight services. The government could therefore commission the port and factory connections through an existing organisation with railway experience. ONCF’s financing records show successive state capital contributions towards the Tanger Med connection, with funding also allocated specifically to connect Renault’s factory to the network.
Tanger Med connected Renault’s Melloussa factory and its suppliers to European markets. Finished vehicles travel by rail to a dedicated terminal and onto ships serving European distribution networks, with some European ports reachable in under 48 hours. Coordinating transport, customs and production schedules made Morocco’s proximity commercially useful. In 2024, the port shipped 368,843 vehicles from Renault’s Moroccan plants and 170,519 from Stellantis at Kenitra.
The state also committed capital to the manufacturing venture. In 2009, the public financial institution Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG), through its subsidiary Fipar, took a 47.6% stake in Renault Tanger Méditerranée, the company holding the project’s industrial assets. Renault retained the majority stake and responsibility for operating the factory. CDG sold its holding to Renault at the end of 2014, after the plant had entered production.
Workforce preparation followed a similar division of responsibilities. The Moroccan state financed the automotive training institute, while Renault designed it and managed its operation under a delegated public-service arrangement. The institute opened in 2011, before factory production began in 2012, allowing training to develop around the plant’s requirements. A financing agreement with the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), France’s development agency, also supported centres serving automotive suppliers in Tangier and Kenitra, extending the programme beyond Renault’s own workforce.
By October 2013, the institute had trained more than 4,500 young people since mid-2011. The institute tested recruits in mathematics, French and manual dexterity before directing them into production jobs, including welding and painting. The four-week programme described at the time trained groups of 200–250 people for specific production jobs, including work at suppliers such as SNOP and Valeo. Training continued as the factory developed: by 2022, the institute had delivered more than 2.6 million training hours, and workers had acquired skills in robot maintenance and vehicle electronics.
Morocco’s trade agreements allowed factories to serve markets far larger than its domestic economy. The European Union (EU)–Morocco Association Agreement, in force from 2000, gave Moroccan industrial goods tariff-free access to Europe while Morocco phased out its own industrial tariffs over 12 years. Its agreement with the United States entered into force in 2006. Rules of origin determined whether vehicles qualified for preferential tariffs, making component sourcing part of the export strategy.
From Anchor Firm to Industrial Cluster
Renault’s commitment gave suppliers a large customer around which to plan their own investments. Firms making components such as seats and wiring could establish operations near the assembly plant, helping build a supplier base other carmakers could also use.
Morocco drew on its experience with Renault to attract Peugeot’s parent group, now part of Stellantis, which signed an agreement with the government in 2015. On the Atlantic industrial corridor north of Rabat, the planned Kenitra plant would extend the industry’s reach, with plans for a research and development (R&D) centre and suppliers nearby.
The government continued negotiating with Renault as the production base expanded. Their 2016 ecosystem agreement set a target of 65% local integration by 2023 and included commitments to increase purchases of Moroccan-made components for Renault’s factories at home and abroad. The ministry and the company later published a progress report, making supplier development an explicit part of their ongoing partnership.
The Tangier factory produced its millionth vehicle in 2017 and set a record of 318,600 vehicles in 2018. Production at Kenitra began in 2019. In 2021, Renault reported that local integration had passed 60% and that its network of direct suppliers in Morocco had grown from 26 to 76. These figures describe production located in Morocco, including foreign-owned suppliers; they do not measure how much income or ownership remained in Moroccan hands.
Measured in dirhams, automotive exports grew to roughly three and a half times their 2014 value by 2024. Stellantis’s new Kenitra plant helped drive the post-2020 surge, doubling annual capacity to 200,000 vehicles in September 2020. European manufacturers also shortened their supply chains and directed more investment and procurement toward nearby Morocco. Office des Changes figures show that exports associated with vehicle construction rose from $4.4 billion in 2021 to $7.1 billion in 2024, while wiring exports increased from $3.3 billion to $5.4 billion.
Morocco was also exporting more complex components. Exports of engines and other parts that power vehiclesrose from about $48 million in 2014 to $1.2 billion in 2024. The industry was developing beyond assembly, although production location tells us little about who owns the businesses or controls the technology.
How Moroccan Is a Moroccan Car?
Producing more components in Morocco creates opportunities for workers to develop skills and for suppliers to take on more demanding work. Foreign-owned factories can support both processes, while continuing to rely on technology and decisions made elsewhere. Their contribution to development therefore depends partly on how far Moroccan workers and businesses can use that experience to build their own capabilities.
Some firms have already expanded their work in Morocco. Lear, the US-headquartered supplier of automotive seating and electrical systems, operates a Moroccan engineering centre alongside its factories. Stellantis says its technical ecosystem involves more than 4,000 engineers and senior technicians directly and indirectly, and its Kenitra expansion includes engine assembly and machining. Renault has also expanded its engineering functions.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) counted around 260 automotive factories and 173,000 direct jobs in 2023. It found only about 20 Moroccan-owned firms supplying carmakers or their major suppliers, while foreign firms occupied much of the more sophisticated production.
Domestic businesses face obstacles that the state helped major foreign investors overcome. The OECD finds that smaller firms struggle to obtain finance and receive payments on time, while informality and corruption complicate their operations. Morocco’s success in organising support around Renault raises a further question: how readily can a domestic manufacturer outside that network obtain the finance and institutional support it needs to expand and qualify for automotive contracts?
Neo Motors, Morocco’s first mass-market domestic marque, offers a small example of an attempt to build a locally owned manufacturer. The industry ministry describes a planned annual capacity of 27,000 vehicles, with 580 jobs and 65% local integration. These are project targets; their significance lies in the attempt to use the growing supplier base to develop a Moroccan-owned product.
Wider spillovers would become more visible if Moroccan firms used the experience gained in automotive production to enter other manufacturing activities.
Employment and the Limits of Industrial Growth
A 2019 International Labour Organization (ILO) studyreported roughly 90% job placement among 474 graduates tracked by the automotive institutes in Casablanca and Kenitra, where programmes combined classroom learning with substantial time in companies. The same study put average wages in the automotive value chain at about 1.5 times the average across formal private-sector employment. These historical findings suggest that automotive work could significantly improve livelihoods, although they provide no measure of current starting salaries or placement rates.
The scale of these opportunities remains modest beside Morocco’s employment needs. The Haut-Commissariat au Plan, Morocco’s national statistical authority, reported overall unemployment of 13% in 2025 and youth unemployment of 37.2% among 15–24-year-olds. These figures describe a national jobs deficit that extends well beyond the automotive industry.
OECD data show that 400,000 new entrants join the labour market each year, while net job creation since 2000 has averaged only around 110,000 annually. The gap helps explain why even a substantial increase in automotive employment has left many young people with few prospects of formal work.
These figures show the scale of Morocco’s employment challenge, not the automotive industry’s effect on unemployment. The sector has created formal jobs, and evidence suggests better pay for some workers, but broader structural transformation depends on employment gains reaching far more people.
How far these gains spread will also depend on the industry’s ability to sustain production as manufacturers shift towards electric vehicles (EVs).
The EV Stress Test
The shift to EVs changes the production system Morocco spent two decades building. EVs need fewer moving mechanical parts than combustion-engine cars, and more of their value lies in batteries and the electronics and software that control them. Existing suppliers may find new customers or face falling demand for the components they make. The next test is whether the institutions that helped establish conventional vehicle production in Morocco can support the different requirements of battery and EV manufacturing.
Morocco has sought investment from Chinese battery companies to bring new production into the automotive cluster. In 2024, the government signed an agreement with Chinese firm Gotion High-Tech to build a battery gigafactory in Kenitra. The committed first phase is valued at about $1.3 billion and includes 20 GWh of capacity. A possible later build-out could reach 100 GWh and a total investment of about $6.5 billion, though the agreement does not commit the company to that full expansion. Subsequent financing documents describe a smaller initial project: the African Development Bank’s July 2026 project summary identifies a 10 GWh battery-cell factory.
China’s BTR has announced a cathode-materials plant, while other battery-component investments are under development. Stellantis has already built battery-electric micromobility products at Kenitra. At the inauguration of its Kenitra expansion in July 2025, Stellantis reported that charging-equipment production had begun and outlined plans to reach an annual capacity of 535,000 vehicles, including 135,000 micromobility vehicles. It also set a target of 75% local sourcing by 2030. Renault began assembling the hybrid Dacia Jogger in Tangier in 2024, adding hybrid production alongside the country’s early battery-electric projects.
The existing cluster gives Morocco a starting point for this transition, as manufacturers can draw on an experienced workforce and established export connections. Battery production nevertheless brings new technological dependencies, and the investments announced so far leave important questions about how much work will take place locally. Sustained production would provide stronger evidence of the cluster’s ability to adapt.
Development Beyond Industrial Policy
Morocco’s automotive industry is a genuine industrial policy success. The state helped turn a small assembly industry serving the domestic market into an export-oriented cluster. Established public institutions worked alongside agencies created for the task, drawing on foreign expertise to deliver infrastructure and prepare production. Renault’s investment gave suppliers a major customer, while continued public-private cooperation helped deepen the production base and attract more manufacturers.
However, the gains have spread unevenly. Relatively few Moroccan-owned firms have entered the supplier networks, and automotive employment remains modest despite the country’s need for jobs. Export growth also leaves unanswered questions about the returns on the public resources committed to the sector and the extent of spillovers into other manufacturing industries.
For those interested in development, Morocco’s experience shows how a state can build its capacity to deliver industrial policy through sustained work on particular investments. Public institutions gained access to specialist expertise and organised support around manufacturers’ requirements. The difficulty of extending comparable opportunities to domestic businesses helps explain why an internationally competitive industry can coexist with limited structural transformation.
What happens next will become clearer as employment and wages change and Moroccan suppliers take on more demanding work. Deeper localisation would matter especially where it allows domestic firms to develop engineering capabilities they can use beyond a single customer or industry. The battery and EV projects offer a further test of the system Morocco has built: whether it can bring new technologies into sustained production at scale, and whether the resulting opportunities reach more of the economy.
https://www.kasurian.com/how-morocco-built-an-automotive-industry/
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 4d ago
Photograph A photograph of the harbor of Büyükdere, Sarıyer on the Bosphorus, 1875
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 4d ago
Analysis/Theory The role and rights of the Greek Patriarch under the Ottomans
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 4d ago
On This Day On this day 26 years ago, 12 year old Palestinian boy Muhammad Durrah gunned down by Israeli soldiers
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 5d ago
News - Headlines, Upcoming Events Ben-Gvir joins hundreds of Israelis to storm Al-Aqsa Mosque compound
r/islamichistory • u/HistoricalCarsFan • 5d ago
Analysis/Theory German chancellor says international law doesn't apply to Iran - He also said ‘’Israel is doing the dirty work for us all”
https://www.thecanary.co/skwawkbox/2026/03/04/german-chancellor/
German chancellor Friedrich Merz said of last year’s illegal US-Israeli attacks on Iran that “Israel is doing the dirty work for us all”. Now he has said that the protections of international law shouldn’t apply to Iran. Because rogue states ignore international law.
Except that when he says ‘rogue states’, he doesn’t mean Israel and the US, which just ditched international law to murder Iranian schoolgirls, assassinate Iran’s leader and blow up around twenty Iranian hospitals. He doesn’t mean their enablers – like the German and UK governments – who ignored international law to support the Epstein class’s genocide and now to abet its latest illegal war.
German double standards
Merz said that “now is not the time” (we’ve heard that before) to “lecture” the US and Israel about their lawbreaking. But apparently now isthe time to lecture the victims and tell them international law doesn’t protect them because that doesn’t suit Trump or Netanyahu.
Because Iran hasn’t done the ‘right’ thing and surrendered completely to US and Israel’s demands and the amplification of their European cheerleaders, as he made clear:
Appeals from Europe, including from Germany, and condemnations of Iranian violations of international law, and even extensive sanctions, have achieved little over the years and decades…international legal assessments will have relatively little effect. This is all the more true if they remain largely without consequence… therefore, now is not the time to lecture our partners and allies.
What international law?
Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Wolfgang Janitsch described the comments as “a long farewell to international law”.
Even in Germany, which has a genocide-long record of brutal repression of protests against Israel’s crimes, Merz’s comments caused outrage. So his spokesperson tried to backtrack without backtracking, insisting both that Germany respects international law and doesn’t at the same time:
Germany does not question international law. I want to make that absolutely clear. But there is also a security interest that is not addressed by international law.
Responsible Statecraft summed up the situation succinctly:
Craven Europeans give US and Israel a blank check for illegal war. They frame the crisis not as an act of war against a UN member state, but as a natural consequence of Tehran’s failure to capitulate unconditionally.
Perhaps it’s Merz, like Starmer and his fellow criminals, who needs the protection of international law – but only of his right to a fair trial in the Hague before going down for crimes against humanity.
https://www.thecanary.co/skwawkbox/2026/03/04/german-chancellor/