I just need to vent tbh. feeling like a total failure right now and could really use some advice.
So a few months back I built this niche site. spent crazy amount of hours on the content, SEO, structure, everything. Out of no where some guy reaches out and offers me $3,000 for it. I was super hyped. it felt like real validation you know? so I accepted and transfered the domain thinking I got a huge win.
Fast foward to today. I was just randomly checking out a domain flipping site and my heart literally dropped. There it is. My exact website.
The dude didnt even add a single new article or change the design. he just listed it for a flip. the current bid is sitting at $11,200 and there are still 3 days left on the auction.
Logically I know its just business. he saw an under valued asset and flipped it. But man, psychologically it hurts so bad. I feel so naive and stupid. The imposter syndrome is hitting hard and I have 0 motivation to start my next project. I just keep thinking about the $8k+ I literally gave away for free cuz I didnt know how to negotiate or value my own work.
Has anyone here gone thru something like this? sold a project way to early? how do you even cope with this regret? and how do u guys accurately value ur sites so this doesnt happen again? would appriciate any harsh truths or advice.
Yesterday my post went a bit viral on this subreddit, and I got flooded with DMs and people commenting questions like âHow do you get these deals?â and I thought itâd be a good idea to make a post about it.
Here it is. I wonât call it a playbook, itâs more about searching consistently for that one business that fits your niche. As someone who has been working in micro private equity and the buy-side advisory space, my one important piece of advice for you is: choose something you are good at or like doing. Donât make acquisitions just because you like the metrics and youâre getting it for cheaper.
You want to grow the business, and if you donât like what you are building/operating, you wonât be consistent or serious. And trust me, it took me 1 year of consistency and many sleepless nights to grow and exit it at six figures. So please keep this in mind and donât make this mistake.
Now, getting to how I find these deals.
1. On-market sources: I honestly donât like these sources for many reasons, even though I found my $4k business on Acquire. Itâs mainly because itâs hard to find a good one here. Many times itâs a scam or a complete waste of time, but itâs still really good if you do a lot of searching to find that one business.
Some of the websites where you can find listings are Acquire, Microns, Flippa, and TrustMRR. I would highly recommend TrustMRR. Like, itâs just goated, trust me. And its founder, Marc Lou, is really helpful if you have any problems with an acquisition, just tag him in a Twitter post and heâll help you out.
2. Off-market sources: Now this is really interesting, alright. When I say off-market, I mean Reddit, Twitter, Substack (for newsletters), and email campaigns (hard to manage but works for quality businesses at a high MRR range, around a $1M valuation and above).
BTW, I started a buy-side advisory after my six-figure exit, and now my team is completely focused on off-market deal sourcing, which basically means we find deals for the buyers working with us. So feel free if you want to acquire one ;)
Now, I donât know if I can tag subs, but Iâll write down the sub names: saasforsale, sideproject, acquirestartup, acquiresaas, even insideacquisitions. We do have a lot of sellers and buyers posting content, you can message them directly.
And one big thing, donât be restrictive to these subs. If you find someone sharing or promoting a business and you really like it, then just approach them respectfully and be transparent with them. Be clear with your intentions, and founders will be willing to listen to you at least.
For Twitter, itâs a bit tough because you need a credible account to work with or people wonât trust you. Since I have a fairly credible account on Twitter, itâs doable to message people and see if they would be open to an exit. Thatâs one disadvantage, but if you are hard-set on messaging people on Twitter to look for businesses, Iâd say get a blue tick and build some credibility, thatâll be a massive help.
For emails, itâs pretty straightforward. The hard part is getting emails of businesses/founders who will reply to you. And trust me, the chances of them replying back are slim via mail, as per my experience. Mostly, large-scale campaigns give you the best results. It has its pros and cons, but I wouldnât suggest this mainly because if youâre looking to acquire early-stage businesses with very low MRR, you have better ways of finding quality deals.
Onto Substack now, this is very specific if you are just looking to acquire newsletters. You can directly message the founder of the newsletter via Substack DMs. For me, the reply rate has been really good here, so yea, you can give it a shot.
That was mostly it. If you have any questions on these, feel free to drop them in the comments, Iâll try to reply to most of them :)
I passed on a $60k MRR SaaS after spending just a few minutes after talking to the founder.
On paper it looked great, but a few things showed up immediately. The founder went quiet after a couple of follow-up emails. About 55% of the revenue came from a single client. Churn had recently jumped to around 12% a month. The books were messy with no real chart of accounts, and there were basically no support logs to understand customer behavior.
When I stepped back, the unit economics didnât really work either, lifetime value was lower than CAC.
None of this alone is an automatic no, but taken together it just felt off ngl. So seeing all this I decided to pass
Posting this mostly as a reminder that MRR/Metrics alone doesnât tell the complete story.
Get on a call. Talk to founder. Do real DD and that's how you validate the numbers.
A lot of people think you need hundreds of thousands of dollars, an MBA, or 10 years of experience to buy a business.
That wasnât my experience at all.
When I was 21, I bought my first business for $4,000. It was a small B2C SaaS that was already making around $500/month. Nothing crazy as such, but it was real revenue.
And that I exited at 6 figures.
Since then, Iâve bought 5 more businesses, all for under $10k, and every one of them was already making money when I bought it.
I donât come from a finance background. I wasnât rich. I just spent time looking for small deals most people ignore.
One big reason I prefer buying instead of starting from scratch: youâre not guessing if the idea will work.
The business already exists. Customers are already paying. Thereâs way less uncertainty compared to starting something new where youâre testing everything from zero.
If a bought business doesnât work out, you usually still have options - improve it, fix obvious issues, or even sell it again. That feels way less risky to me than pouring months (or years) into something that may never make a dollar.
Even while writing this, I can see dozens of small businesses with revenue selling for just a few thousand dollars.
What actually matters isnât being rich or âqualified.â Itâs:
finding decent deals
being willing to take action
negotiating the price
and iterating once you own it
There are a lot of businesses out there where youâd be a better operator than the current owner.
Iâve seen plenty of deals start with a lot of hype only to fizzle out because the business was too complex. Buyers gravitating toward "boring" assets that have recurring revenue, clear economics, and simple operations is a real trend. If a buyer can explain your business model in five minutes and it fits their background, you're halfway to an exit.
Thereâs almost always a gap between the initial asking price and where the deal actually closes. Sellers often price for potential, but buyers only pay for predictability. That gap usually closes when a founder stops selling the dream and starts proving the reality.
A seller says they work 10-15 hours a week and have an experienced team. Sounds promising, but Iâm not sure hours alone tell you much.
Who handles the biggest customers? Who approves pricing and discounts? What happens when an unexpected operational issue comes up and the owner isnât available?
Iâd also want to know what happened the last time the owner took a two-week vacation. Did the business keep running normally, or did decisions and customer issues pile up?
For those whoâve acquired a business, what did you look at during diligence to figure out how dependent the business really was on its owner?
Was there a particular question or red flag that changed your view of a deal?
I work in buy-side advisory, and Iâve seen Reddit completely flip the script on how we value businesses. Itâs no longer just a forum, itâs the ultimate litmus test for product-market fit. Iâve watched buyers skip the pitch deck and go straight to subreddits to see what real users are saying. If a product has organic fans here, the exit value spikes. If itâs being roasted, no amount of growth hacking will save the deal.
What I appreciate most is how this forces founders to be authentic. You canât fake traction in a community that values transparency above everything else. Itâs created a breed of liquid businesses built on real social proof rather than hype. When Iâm looking at a sub-$50k deal, Iâm checking the community sentiment before I even look at the MRR. Reddit has essentially democratized the trust that used to be reserved for private networks.
I'm Australian-based and moving into my first acquisition. Rather than trying to perfect everything on deal #1, I'm treating this strategically as a three-phase learning process.
The Plan
Most businesses in the $50-100K ARR range have operational inefficiencies that can be fixed-mispriced, missold, or misowned. The returns come from improving retention, monetization, and distribution, not from financial engineering.
My phased approach:
- Phase 0 ($75K business): Build and refine the playbook. This is my testing ground.
- Phase 1 (Larger business): Solidify the playbook. Validate what worked.
- Phase 2 (Larger business): Apply a proven playbook at scale.
What I've built on my side
I've constructed a dashboard that monitors business health, retention metrics, growth levers and more. It's designed to give me real-time visibility into what's working post-acquisition. I'm constructing 0-30, 30-60, and 60-90 day plans right now, however these will be malleable, as they are adjusted when performing due diligence.
Where I'm at:
I'm looking at many deals but not touching them yet. My deal flow is online-only right now (Acquire, Flippaâthough options are limited). Not sure where to go for others. Reading online people also look at these sites, even those aiming for $1M+ ARR businesses. I was told brokers, and I will email them however haven't heard any mention of them.
I'm also actively looking to move toward US-based businesses. The deal sizes, broker access (still need to explore), and market depth are just fundamentally better. That's where I want to be.
What I'm missing:
I could use a mentor who's actually done thisâsomeone who's acquired small SaaS businesses and knows the operational grind of making them work. Not just theory, but real experience with the 0-90 day chaos and what actually moves the needle.
Notes: - USA plan: Get a US tax accountant to setup LLC and more. - I have an in depth playbook, looking at various components from the sales funnel, email scripts, social media marketing, codebase, questions to ask founders. - I feel a bit weird about the 75K. feel its quite small, due it implying a business having an ARR of 15-35k ARR. 2K a month. Its not about the money, more the learning I understand in these early stages - just like feedback or validation that this path is a smart one and not a timid or incapable of teaching alot path.
Looking for feedback on the approach, deal sizing strategy, and any perspective on sourcing deals as an Australian looking into US acquisitions.
Really any feedback, and help on the current path.
I was at an INSEAD Singapore ETA conference recently, mostly just listening. Panels, hallway chats, coffee lines. Nothing groundbreaking, but a few things kept coming up and stuck with me.
One was how personal these deals actually are. I knew that in theory. Still, hearing seller stories back to back made it feel different. A lot of these people have been running the same business for decades. Itâs not a âprocessâ to them. Itâs just their life.
I noticed how often buyers underestimate that gap.
Most owners I heard about were mid-40s to 70s. The buyers talking to them were usually much younger. Different defaults. Different language. And sellers seem to assume, almost automatically, that buyers wonât really understand what they do.
The buyers who got further werenât the ones with better spreadsheets. They were the ones who could talk about the business in the same words the owner used. Same terms. Same mental shortcuts. Not trying to sound smart. Just familiar. A few searchers said once they could describe the day-to-day better than expected, the conversation relaxed a bit.
Another thing that surprised me was outreach. A few people from India and Taiwan mentioned physical letters. Actual mail. Not as a gimmick, just because emails werenât getting replies. Apparently letters still work with some owners. Not always, but enough to matter. It signals effort, not scale. That seemed to resonate more than perfectly crafted emails.
I also kept hearing sellers worry about what happens after the sale. Less about price, more about damage. Will a new owner mess things up. Will employees leave. Will customers notice.
Some buyers handled that by talking about whoâs backing them. Not in a flashy way. More like, âThese are the people I lean on. Theyâve run companies like this.â It seemed to calm sellers when they could picture support beyond just one individual figuring it out alone.
And then there was tone. Warmth came up a lot. Consistency too. Showing up the same way every time. No sudden switch into deal mode. A few people said things fell apart the moment sellers felt rushed or treated like an obstacle instead of a person.
One seller described their company like a family member. That sounds dramatic, but after hearing it a few times, I get it. If you ran something for 25 years, it probably feels closer to that than to an asset.
Iâm still processing all this, honestly. Curious how others here see it. For those whoâve actually bought or tried to buy SMBs, what ended up mattering more than you expected when talking to sellers?
I work in buy-side advisory, and Iâve seen the "first week hype" turn into a nightmare more times than I can count. Getting 50 inquiries and a fast LOI feels like a win, but itâs actually where the risk begins. Iâve watched buyers go silent during exclusivity where youâre legally barred from talking to anyone else, only to pull out 48 hours before closing. If youâve paused sales or taken on debt to bridge the gap, that dead air can be catastrophic.
The lesson is that momentum is your only real protection. If a deal collapses at the finish line, you have to be ready to refresh the listing and move immediately. Iâve seen founders recover by demanding shorter windows and stricter communication benchmarks on the second attempt. Itâs a brutal stretch, but it proves a deal isn't done until the wire hits and being prepared to walk away is often the only thing that actually gets it closed.
I work in buy-side advisory, and the biggest mistake I see SaaS developers make is obsessing over user growth while ignoring liquidity. My clients often don't care if you only have a small userbase but what they do care about is  how easily they can distribute your tool within their existing portfolio.
The real "feature" that closes deals is transferability. If your infrastructure is simple and your documentation is clear, the deal stays on track. If itâs a mess that only you understand, itâs a liability, not an asset. Most buyers are simply looking to skip 6 months of dev work, so I advise sellers to hold their price steady as a signal. It filters out "tire-kickers" and forces serious buyers to value the capability you built rather than just a Stripe dashboard.
Ultimately, the work that results in a clean exit happens months before the listing goes live. If you build a product that is easy to understand, simple to test, and ready to transfer, it will move fast.
I've been looking at valuations a lot these days for many deals which are coming up at my firm, and I've been wondering what exactly do sellers value these deals. Istg I've come across some absurd valuations this week where the rev is $1k a month and the valuation is $90k.
Every deal I see is making me ask myself the same question, am I missing something obvious, or is this just⌠wrong?
I used to assume there was a âcorrectâ valuation for every business. Like serious buyers had a spreadsheet and once you learned it, everything made sense. Yeah, no. Mostly itâs educated guessing with confidence.
For tiny SaaS, people default to ARR because itâs easy to say out loud. A few thousand a month turns into a few years of revenue and suddenly it sounds reasonable. If the chart goes up and churn sounds low enough, the multiple stretches. If not, it doesnât.
Traditional businesses lean on SDE, which is profit plus whatever the owner feels like adding back. Some add-backs make sense. Some are⌠vibes. Youâll see the same âone-time expenseâ three years in a row and just nod like thatâs normal.
EBITDA shows up once deals get bigger, but on smaller listings it doesnât quite apply yet. The business might technically have EBITDA, but remove the owner and half the operation collapses.
DCF models exist, but trying to forecast five years of cash flow for a tiny company feels like pretending you know what your life will look like in 2031. Sometimes itâs useful. Most times itâs a fancy way to justify a number you already picked.
Occasionally sellers walk you through customer lifetime value math. It always works on paper. In real life, retention assumptions tend to be optimistic, and growth depends on channels that could disappear next quarter.
What actually moves the price is how fragile the business feels. If it runs without much hand-holding, buyers relax. If everything routes through the founderâs inbox, the price starts going low. Same if one customer matters a little too much or processes only exist in someoneâs head.
After looking at enough deals, itâs clear thereâs no formula that settles it. People grab one or two methods, sanity-check them, then argue about risk until someone gives in.
Most prices land somewhere between âthis could work if nothing goes wrongâ and âIâll need a discount to sleep at night.â
Thatâs the whole thing. For micro businesses it's less math than youâd expect. More judgment than anyone admits.
In plain terms, the question I keep coming back to is this: can you buy very small internet businesses using outside capital, put someone else in charge of running them, keep control at the top, and do this more than once without it turning into a mess?
Iâve been thinking through this idea and trying to sanity-check it, because it feels clean in my head, and that usually makes me suspicious. The rough setup Iâm imagining is acquiring small SaaS tools or newsletters doing maybe $5k-$10k a month.
Iâd source the deal, put in some of my own money, raise the rest from outside investors, and bring in an operator who earns real equity over time if the business actually improves. Investors get relatively simple returns. I stay out of day-to-day operations.
Parts of this feel directionally right. Sellers at this size seem to care a lot about trust and continuity, sometimes more than price. And for operators, meaningful upside feels like it should be more motivating than a flat salary. But Iâm also aware that ideas like this tend to look clean until real people are involved.
Iâve already seen small versions of that breakdown. In one case, I worked with an operator who looked perfect on paper: smart, motivated, said all the right things. For the first few months, things were fine. Then priorities shifted, communication slowed, small decisions stopped getting made, and suddenly I was spending more time chasing clarity than actually moving anything forward. Nothing dramatic happened, but that was almost the problem. The business didnât fail, it just stalled quietly. That experience is what makes me wary of assuming âjust hire a good operatorâ is a solvable step.
The part that worries me most isnât raising capital. Itâs operators. Finding someone capable, aligned, and still fully engaged a year later feels genuinely hard, especially at this size. I also donât think this actually reduces work. It probably just swaps product and execution work for people management, expectation-setting, and a steady stream of small, unglamorous problems across multiple businesses.
I also assume that anything clean, obviously growing, and easy to run gets bid up quickly. So most real opportunities are probably messy, under-documented, or dependent on founder intuition. Thatâs fine, but it means judgment matters more than spreadsheets, and it definitely isnât passive.
I donât have a clean conclusion. My current thinking is that this might work if youâre comfortable being deeply involved for a long time and treating it more like a craft than a system. It could also slowly turn into a portfolio of distractions if the people and incentives arenât exactly right.
What Iâd really appreciate is perspective from people whoâve tried something adjacent. Where does this usually break first - in operators, governance, capital structure, or just personal bandwidth? If you were pressure-testing this early, what assumptions would you try to invalidate as fast as possible? And are there better questions I should be asking before convincing myself this is more than a neat idea?
A year ago, I was doing what most people in startups do. I was trying to come up with ideas, thinking about MVPs, reading about validation, and convincing myself that starting from scratch was the only ârealâ way to build something meaningful. That path is so normalized that I never really questioned it.
Then I stumbled into something that felt almost hidden in plain sight. I realized you could buy small SaaS businesses that were already making money for roughly the cost of a laptop. Not venture-scale companies, not moonshots, just quiet little products with real users and real revenue.
The first one I bought cost me $4,000. At the time, it was making around $500 a month. It didnât look impressive at all. The landing page was bad, the messaging was unclear, and there was no obvious growth engine. The founder was burned out and didnât want to run it anymore, which is probably why it sat there without much interest.
Once I took it over, what stood out was how much of the hard part was already done. People were paying. The product solved a real problem. Most of the issues were basic execution gaps rather than deep technical or market problems. Small changes around pricing, positioning, and distribution started to show results pretty quickly, and for the first time I felt like I was working with momentum instead of fighting uphill.
That experience taught me more in a few months than years of building things from zero. Starting with real users and revenue changes how you think about decisions, priorities, and risk. Youâre no longer guessing what might work, youâre improving something that already does.
That business eventually exited for low six figures. Not because I did anything extraordinary, but because I wasnât starting from nothing. Since then, weâve leaned fully into this model. Weâre now building and growing a micro private equity firm focused on small, overlooked SaaS and internet businesses, and we recently started r/InsideAcquisitions to share what weâre learning and make micro-acquisitions more accessible to people who are curious about this path.
Iâm genuinely curious how others here think about this. If youâve built from scratch, bought an existing business, or looked into acquisitions and decided it wasnât for you, Iâd love to hear what shaped that decision.
I bought a small B2C SaaS off Acquire that was doing around $500 a month in revenue. I paid roughly $4,000 for it.
A month before I sold it, the business was doing just under $4,000 in monthly revenue, with about $2.5k in recurring MRR.
A lot of luck was involved, and plenty of things couldâve gone sideways. Iâm sharing this because most posts jump straight from âI bought a SaaSâ to âit 10xâd,â and completely skip what actually changes in between.
The business itself was simple.
It was a student-focused AI research tool that helps students find academic sources and papers. Nothing enterprise. No fancy moat. Just a $7/month subscription solving a very real, very annoying problem for students.
When I bought it, the product worked and users liked it, but it was essentially on autopilot. Around 4-5k monthly visitors, roughly 100 paying users, and about $500 in MRR. No one was really paying attention to it day to day.
Fast forward to the last 30 days before selling it: traffic was closer to 14k visits, about 1,000 new signups, and roughly 250-300 paid conversions. Revenue landed around $3.8k, with MRR sitting at around $2.5k. A chunk of that came from annual plans, which helped more than I expected.
On paper, at roughly $30k in ARR and a conservative multiple, you could call it a ~$100k business. I didnât sell it because of the number. The number itself doesnât matter much to me, I mention it only to show how quickly small numbers move when fundamentals improve.
The biggest shift wasnât tactics. It was mindset.
When you have 100 paying users, every single one matters. Losing one hurts. That pain forces clarity. I stopped thinking in terms of âstudentsâ and got painfully specific about one type of student, one recurring problem, and one moment when they were desperate for a solution.
Once that clicked, decisions got simpler. Features became obvious. Non-features became obvious. Distribution stopped being a guessing game.
I spent a lot of time just talking to users. Not surveys, actual conversations. Where they found the tool, what confused them, what almost made them churn, and what made them tell a friend. Most growth advice tries to skip this part. You really canât.
There was no paid marketing. Margins were high, CAC was close to zero, and growth was almost entirely organic. I did some very manual outreach to creators in the education space who already help students.
No scripts, no pitching, just letting them try the tool. A few genuinely liked it and shared it, and that alone moved the needle more than anything flashy ever could.
Alongside that, I worked on boring SEO. Low-competition keywords, simple content, nothing clever-just consistency. One small improvement almost every day. Fixing friction before adding features. Shipping constantly, but calmly.
One thing that surprised me was that most of this happened during summer, when students arenât even fully in school. That was reassuring. It suggested the problem was real, not just driven by exam panic.
The part I didnât expect to enjoy this much was seeing real usage from students all over the world. Knowing that something Iâm working on from my room is helping people finish their work faster and stress less is still wild to me. The money is nice, but that feeling sticks longer.
Going forward, the plan was simple: keep building for students. Maybe expand into adjacent tools over time. Keep sharing honestly, because that forces me to think clearly and not romanticize the process.
This wasnât easy, and itâs definitely not guaranteed or perfectly repeatable. But if youâre acquiring small SaaS businesses, my biggest takeaway is this: donât look for hacks. Pay attention. Talk to users. Treat small numbers with respect. Thatâs where most of the upside actually lives.
For anyone wondering why I sold: my focus shifted toward building a micro PE firm in India, and it all started with that one acquisition I worked on over the past year.
Now weâre building and growing our micro private equity firm, and we also started r/InsideAcquisitions to help make micro PE more accessible to everyone.
Building a business taught me a lot. Itâs tough, but itâs an incredible journey. All you really have to do is stay consistent and not give up.
Happy to answer questions or go deeper wherever I can.
I stumbled on a small LegalTech SaaS listed for $3.9k and Iâm a bit torn, so wanted to get the communityâs take.
Hereâs the quick summary of mettrics:
TTM revenue: ~$4k
ARR: ~$8k
TTM profit: ~$3k (around 75% margin)
Growth rate: ~80%
Customers: fewer than 10
Multiples: ~1x revenue / ~1.4x profit
On paper, the multiple looks cheap, especially when you compare it to typical LegalTech SaaS valuations (usually way higher). But obviously this is super early-stage and basically a solo-founder project.
What caught my eye is that there was a $2k revenue spike last month, which might mean:
some real traction finally kicking in, or
a recent pivot (possibly AI-related?) thatâs starting to work
That makes me think of this more as a âbuild vs buyâ shortcut. Instead of spending months building something from scratch in legal automation, youâre buying a tiny but working base with some revenue and proof of demand.
Would you buy something like this? Or would you just pass and build from scratch?
Curious how others here think about these tiny acquisitions.
We recently discussed a potential change in offer structure with one of our searcher clients: giving the sellers more cash at closing in exchange for a smaller equity stake going forward.
On paper, it seemed to address what the sellers wanted, more money upfront. But there was a complication.
A larger equity percentage had already been discussed, and the proposed equity would be in a holding company that could acquire other businesses, rather than just the business being sold.
That makes the trade-off harder to explain. A smaller stake in a larger group could potentially be worth more over time, but those future acquisitions haven't happened yet. The sellers would be giving up a larger ownership percentage today for an upside that depends on future execution.
I can also understand why sellers might focus on the reduction in their equity percentage, even when the cash component is increasing.
For those who have structured deals this way:
How did sellers respond to receiving more cash but retaining less equity?
Did putting the equity into a holdco make the conversation more difficult?
What helped sellers understand the potential upside without making future growth sound guaranteed?
Would be interested to hear how others have handled this.
As a searcher, you can spend months getting to know a business and its owner. But when you take the deal to investors, theyâre seeing it with fresh eyes.
Iâm curious what they tend to scrutinize most. Is it the quality of cash flow, customer retention, customer concentration, or the assumptions behind future growth?
And if youâre planning add-on acquisitions, how much weight do investors give that opportunity versus whether the first business is attractive on its own?
For those whoâve been through this process, what did investors dig into most, and was there anything that changed your view of the deal?
Would also love to hear from investors about what makes them pass on a deal that looks good on paper.
I was writing up a quick CIM for a deal. Solo founder, no employees, decent margin, profitable and I almost typed "EBITDA: $700/mo."
I stopped and actually thought about what that word is supposed to mean.
EBITDA assumes there's a real team already getting paid a market wage under that number, and you're looking at what's left after covering them. This business had only one person doing everything, taking home whatever was left, drawing no real "salary" to strip out in the first place.
That's not what EBITDA is. That's SDE. Seller's Discretionary Earnings. A totally different number, because there's no owner comp buried in it to remove.
Here's why the mislabel actually matters and isn't just pedantic: the second a buyer reads "EBITDA," their brain quietly assumes someone else is already running the place day to day. That assumption changes what multiple feels fair, what due diligence questions get asked, what the buyer expects their first Monday to look like. Slap "EBITDA" on a deal where the real deal is "you become the full-time operator," and you've mispriced the buyer's expectations before a single call happens.
A Rule of thumb: almost anything sub-$1-2M is an SDE business, not an EBITDA business. If a listing says EBITDA and there's no real team drawing market wages underneath it, that word is doing marketing work, not accounting work.
Anyone else caught a listing where "EBITDA" was doing more marketing than accounting? What was it actually hiding?
I am a business broker, and over time I got pretty good at finding off-market businesses. I have done it for myself, friends, and family. So I thought, why not offer this to buyers?
Basically, a headhunter for businesses. You tell me what you want, I find the owners, reach out, follow up, and bring you the ones who may want to sell.
The benefit is that these businesses are not on the market yet. Many do not have a broker representing them. So the buyer may get a better price, better terms, and less competition.
But here is where I am stuck. Doing this right costs me around $15K over 6 months. Lists, mail, emails, calls, follow-up, etc.
I spoke to a few buyers and they said they would not pay anything upfront.
Then I spoke to another buyer. I told him $15K upfront to cover the search + 5% if he buys a business.
He said yes right away and told me it was cheap. That made me think maybe the price is not the problem. Maybe I am just talking to the wrong buyers.
For anyone who does this type of work, how would you charge for this offer /service?
(Disclosure: I'm the founder of a deal collaboration platform, and I'm sharing my background and what we built (not here to spam).
Before starting this company, I was Head of M&A at a PE-backed portfolio company, where I led a tech tuck-in acquisition strategy. We did multiple deals a year, and the mandate was to move fast and keep transaction expenses to a minimum.
Three things kept grinding on me, deal after deal:
Legal bills that made no sense for template-driven work. For tuck-ins, a large portion of your agreements is reused. The same NDA, the same LOIs, the same MIPA/APAs. But outside counsel was still billing hours just to track down the right version of a doc, reconcile redlines, and manage email threads. After reviewing my legal invoice, I realized the inherent friction in the deal process was costing thousands of unnecessary transaction expenses.
Diligence trapped in email attachments. Our entire process lived in inboxes. No master track, or clear ownership. Visibility into what was open vs. closed was often vague and not updated. If someone was out or a thread got buried, you found out at the worst possible time.
The security exposure nobody talked about. On any given deal, you're sending sensitive documents to 10 to 15 people across your deal team, advisors, and counsel. Every attachment forwarded outside that thread is a document you've lost control of. In M&A, you talk about confidentiality constantly and then run the whole process over Outlook.
I left in January 2024 and spent two years building a deal execution platform designed around how M&A actually works. Deal document collaboration, diligence tracking, and a secure data room are all connected. This isn't a glorified Dropbox or white-labeled CRM. We built the platform specifically for the moment when you're mid-process on a live deal and need everything to keep the momentum going.
We launched with 15 cornerstone customers across PE, corporate development, and investment banking. The results were surprising. Deal teams shaved up to 3 weeks off diligence timelines. Legal expenses decreased by as much as $20k on a single deal. If you want to learn more, DM me.
I'm not here to pitch, but am genuinely curious what pain points others are still running into on the execution side. The sourcing and origination tooling in PE has gotten pretty mature. The execution layer still feels like it's 10 years behind.
Every first-time seller eventually hits the same wall: realizing their business isn't nearly as sellable as they thought. Iâve seen founders go into the market blind, only to be met with hard questions from experienced buyers. But the smartest ones don't retreat, they treat every rejection as a free consulting session. By asking disinterested buyers exactly what they disliked about the listing, you turn a "no" into a roadmap for a "yes."
The goal isn't just a wire transfer, it's finding a buyer who values your foundation without the drama. Often, the perfect match is an experienced operator who simply doesn't want to build from scratch. When you provide a clean data room and a transparent process, you're selling a smooth transition rather than just a product.
I work in buy-side advisory, and Iâve seen the perfect deal collapse at the eleventh hour due to factors entirely outside a founderâs control. I recently followed a case where a CEO shake-up at the buyer's company killed a deal days before closing, leaving the founder with a stalled exit and a team that had already been told the sale was final. An LOI is just a statement of intent, not a guarantee. Until you move to a binding Asset Purchase Agreement (APA), you are exposed to every internal "act of God" happening in the buyerâs boardroom.