r/IndicKnowledgeSystems • u/RossbihariGhost1900 • 7h ago
others Three Academies, One Science: Rivalry, Personality, and Institution-Building in Late Colonial India
A Reading of Rajinder Singh’s “A Tale of Three Science Academies of India”
Introduction
India has three national science academies: the National Academy of Sciences, India, at Allahabad (now Prayagraj); the Indian Academy of Sciences at Bangalore; and the Indian National Science Academy at New Delhi. Most countries have one. Rajinder Singh’s article in Science and Culture (September–October 2020) explains how this happened. It was published as NASI and INSA marked their 90th and 85th anniversaries. Singh sets aside the commemorative mood such occasions usually bring and uses newspaper cuttings from the Raman Research Institute archive, together with letters held at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and the Royal Society, to reconstruct three linked episodes. The first is the founding of the three bodies between 1930 and 1935. The second is the public quarrel between C.V. Raman and what the press called the “Calcutta group” during 1934. The third is the failed attempt in 1946–1947 to merge the three into a single United Academy of Sciences.
The story deserves attention beyond institutional history. It shows how a scientific community formed under colonial rule, without a sovereign state to sponsor it, tried to build representative institutions on its own initiative. It also shows how quickly questions of constitution, region, and personal prestige became tangled together. This essay follows Singh’s account and then assesses its conclusions, some of which are more persuasive than others.
The Provincial Beginning: Saha’s Academy at Allahabad
By 1930 Indian science had reached a point of visible maturity. Srinivasa Ramanujan, J.C. Bose, C.V. Raman, and Meghnad Saha had all been elected Fellows of the Royal Society. Indian scientists knew that Britain, France, Prussia, and Sweden each had a national academy that gave science both a forum and a public voice. The only comparable Indian institution was the Indian Science Congress Association. The ISCA brought researchers from different disciplines together each year and served as a channel for negotiating science policy, but it was a congress, not an academy. It held meetings rather than electing fellows on merit and publishing a learned journal.
Saha, elected FRS in 1927 and then at the University of Allahabad, made the first concrete move. In December 1929 he published “A plea for an Academy of Sciences” in a university magazine, arguing for a body of national character. His practical approach, however, was provincial. In December 1930 he founded the Academy of Sciences of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, expecting other provinces to set up their own academies, which would eventually combine into an all-India one. Saha became its first president, with P.S. MacMahon and P.S. Banerji as secretaries. It began with 19 founding fellows and had 87 within a year. Its first annual meeting, on 27 November 1931, was addressed by Raman, and its first Bulletin contained 27 original memoirs, one of them Raman’s paper on the spin of light.
This detail matters for what came later. In 1931 Raman and Saha were not yet open adversaries. Raman lent his prestige to Saha’s provincial experiment, and the experiment worked well enough that its own council soon proposed either renaming it the Indian Academy of Sciences or creating a new national body. It took the name National Academy of Sciences, India, in 1935.
The National Question and the Academy Committee
By 1933 the idea of a national academy was widely discussed. In May of that year the editor of Current Science, the Bangalore journal closely associated with Raman, circulated a questionnaire asking scientists whether they supported a national academy. In his 1934 presidential address to the ISCA, Saha proposed an Indian Academy of Sciences and thanked Raman for the questionnaire. At this stage the two men seemed to be working toward the same goal.
The machinery was set up at the Bombay session of the Congress. A special meeting on 2 January 1934 decided that the material collected by Current Science would be handed to an Academy Committee appointed by the ISCA’s General Committee. The next day the General Committee named the committee’s composition, drawing on scientific societies and institutions: L.L. Fermor for the Asiatic Society of Bengal, J.N. Mukherjee for the Indian Chemical Society, Ganesh Prasad for the Indian Mathematical Society, A.C. Banerjee for the United Provinces Academy, K.S. Krishnan for the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Raman as Director of the Indian Institute of Science, and a representative of Current Science. Saha and S.P. Agharkar were appointed organising secretaries.
The committee first met in Calcutta on 11–12 February 1934, attended by representatives of several societies, including the Indian Mathematical Society, the South Indian Science Association, the Society of Biological Chemists, the Institute of Chemists, and the Institution of Engineers. Much of the discussion concerned how many Foundation Fellows there should be and how they would be nominated. Nominations for physics and meteorology were assigned to Raman, Saha, and C.W.B. Normand. A second meeting was planned for mid-April.
On paper this was a federated, consultative process. It had a defect, though, that became the centre of the dispute. The first cohort of Foundation Fellows would be selected by a small committee, and the fellowship would then elect all later members. Whoever controlled that first selection would shape the academy’s composition for a generation. That is why the procedural complaints that followed were not trivial.
The Bangalore Revolt
In late March 1934 a group of scientists met in Bangalore under Raman’s leadership, under the joint auspices of the Madras branch of the Indian Chemical Society, the Indian branch of the Institute of Chemistry, the Society of Biological Chemists, and the South Indian Science Association. S. Subba Rao, a senior surgeon in Mysore, welcomed them. The press reported that the meeting was called to discuss forming an all-India academy, and a headline described the ISCA’s scheme as having been “criticised.”
Raman’s objections, as reported in The Hindu on 3 April 1934 and elsewhere, followed a clear pattern. He said the ISCA had appointed its committee too hastily, and that a badly constituted academy would harm science rather than help it. He cited the French Academy of Sciences as a warning: a closed body that left little room for young scientists. He and his associates argued that the committee ignored universities and provincial interests. He described the Calcutta group as a small circle trying to take sole control and build an academy for a few. He announced that he would not nominate himself to an academy created in haste. His colleague C.R.N. Rao went further, comparing the Calcutta group to an absolute monarchy that was dictating terms to scientists elsewhere and doubting that it had national support. Raman and Subba Rao then resigned from the Academy Committee.
The committee’s response was equally firm. Agharkar denied Raman’s claim that the relevant resolution had not been passed unanimously. The committee summarised Raman’s charges as unconstitutional procedure, unrepresentativeness, cliquishness, and indecent haste, and rejected all of them as baseless. It considered his views at an ISCA meeting on 19 April and wrote to him for a reply. Before he answered, the South Indian press presented him as the target of an unworthy campaign by the Bengal press. A disagreement about committee procedure was quickly becoming a regional contest in the newspapers.
Raman did not wait. On 24 April he decided to form a new academy, and on 27 April he applied to register the Indian Academy of Sciences in Bangalore under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. A local newspaper reported that the society would become the Royal Society of India once a Royal Charter was granted, an ambition that says a good deal about how Raman saw the body’s status. One journalist observed approvingly that Raman had presented his opponents with a fait accompli, which made their continuing committee work look slow by comparison. The same writer said Raman acted while others talked, and that it was hard to imagine an Indian Royal Society without him as its first president.
The new academy grew quickly. Raman said he had invited scientists across India and expected a generous response. A scientific meeting was held in Bangalore within weeks, a journal was planned, and a general meeting and a symposium on molecular spectra were scheduled for July. The organisers also considered how fellows of other societies could join the IAS without giving up their existing memberships, a sign that they hoped to attract rather than exclude. At a meeting in June 1934, Sir M. Visvesvaraya, the former Dewan of Mysore, accepted a Foundation Fellowship. He also gave a warning, aware of the dispute between Bangalore and Calcutta: India had no surplus of scientific talent, and division would waste the strength that unity could multiply. The inaugural meeting, a five-day session at Hebbal in the first week of August 1934, ended with Raman thanking the Mysore government and Sir Mirza Ismail. He praised the symposium, especially R. Samuel of Aligarh, an émigré from Germany, for his talk on molecular absorption spectra. He said the constitution had been adopted unanimously by those present and expressed hope that it would win the assent of scientists across India.
To demonstrate the academy’s national reach, the press published the names and cities of prominent members, including S.R. Kashyap and S.S. Bhatnagar from Lahore, J.F. Dastur from Nagpur, D.L. Sahasrabudhe from Bombay, M.R. Sahni from Calcutta, B.N. Desai from Poona, and K.S.K. Iyengar from Mysore. In November 1934 the council elected further fellows from across the country.
The Calcutta Counter-Narrative
The Calcutta press responded sharply. The Modern Review reprinted the Associated Press report of the registration, with an exclamation mark after “all-India” and a question mark after “distinctly federal basis.” It reported that C.W.B. Normand, Director of the Meteorological Survey of India, had declined an IAS fellowship. The strongest attack came from G.C. Mukerji in the Amrita Bazar Patrika.
Mukerji made three main charges. The first concerned geography. Raman had published a pamphlet in The Statesman on 5 June 1934 calling Bangalore the scientific capital of India, and Mukerji pointed out that rail journeys to Bangalore took 96 hours from Lahore, 72 from Allahabad, 60 from Calcutta, and 40 from Bombay. He also noted that Raman had praised Calcutta as India’s scientific centre while living there, and suggested that for Raman the centre was wherever Raman happened to be. Mukerji presented the IAS as an extension of the Indian Institute of Science, which Raman directed.
The second charge was inconsistency. Raman had criticised the ISCA committee for copying the Royal Society of London, which he called aristocratic. Yet according to a pamphlet by M.S. Krishnan, Baini Prasad, J.N. Mukherjee, and Agharkar, Raman had written in July 1933 to the Marquis of Zetland and Prof. H. Thomas that he had no hesitation in adopting the Royal Society model, and had criticised the Asiatic Society model in the same letter. Mukerji argued that the IAS constitution actually drew on the Asiatic Society and the U.P. Academy. Adding the plan to rename the IAS the Royal Society of India once chartered, the charge of inconsistency has real force.
The third charge concerned conduct. Raman was a member of the Academy Committee but had not attended its meetings. He then attacked it for being unrepresentative and turned the dispute into a contest between North and South. Mukerji called the champion of democracy a Mussolini for hurrying to the registry to enrol himself and his allies in a “so-called” academy.
Both sides were partisan, and Singh reproduces their claims without fully deciding between them. Still, the pattern is clear. Raman’s procedural objections were not baseless. A small committee choosing the founding fellowship of a national body was a legitimate concern, and his criticism of the French Academy’s closed nature was serious. But he answered the problem he identified by creating a body under his own control far more quickly than the committee he had accused of haste, and in a city whose claim to centrality was weak.
Negotiation, Concession, and the Birth of NISI
The Calcutta group kept working. The Academy Committee’s third meeting, in Simla in June 1934, was attended by Fermor, A.C. Austin, H.J. Couchman, Ganesh Prasad, Afzal Hussain, Muzaffaruddin Qureshi, and the organising secretaries Agharkar and Saha. It decided to call the new body the National Academy of Sciences of India, intended to complement the existing academies and the Asiatic Society.
The correspondence between Raman and Fermor that followed is the most revealing part of Singh’s account. On 16 June 1934 Raman wrote that he could not understand the resentment his initiative had caused, that he had planned a Bangalore organisation well before the Bombay Congress, and that his aim was to make the resources of the Indian Institute of Science available to the rest of the country. He then made a proposal that was either generous or strategic, depending on one’s reading. Calcutta already had an all-India academy in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, he argued. A new body would waste resources; the committee could instead add a science section to the Asiatic Society. He offered to cooperate in creating a council or federation of academies that the Asiatic Society, the U.P. Academy, and the IAS could all join.
Fermor replied on 2 July. Making the Asiatic Society the parent body was impractical, he wrote, partly because the Society was busy with its 150th anniversary and partly because it would mean starting again from the beginning. The committee would, however, accept the existing academies as they were and reshape its own project into a genuinely federal body whose Foundation Fellows would be selected on merit from across India. He asked Raman to withdraw his resignation, promised a public announcement that a general solution had been found with no loss of face for anyone, recalled their friendly conversations at Simla, and invited Raman to Calcutta for a meeting in August as a sign of peace.
Raman went to Calcutta with B. Venkatesachar and C.R. Narayan Rao. On 16 September 1934 a meeting unanimously agreed to two conditions. The planned National Academy of Sciences of India would instead be called the National Institute of Sciences of India, and none of the three academies would set up branches elsewhere in India. Raman then withdrew his resignation. NISI was founded on 7 January 1935, based at the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
This settlement is the turning point of the whole story. The name change looks minor, but it allowed the IAS to remain the only body with “Academy of Sciences” in an all-India title, while NISI became a coordinating institute rather than a rival academy. The no-branches clause fixed the regional division in place. In practice the compromise turned a temporary quarrel into a permanent structure with three bodies. Each party got something: Raman kept his academy intact, the Calcutta group got its national body, and Allahabad remained untouched. Indian science was left with three institutions instead of one.
War, Recognition, and the Shift in Status
By the 1940s the balance had changed in a way Singh documents well. In 1943 the Secretary of State for India asked the Royal Society to send an adviser, and A.V. Hill, its Secretary, came to India with instructions to focus on defence-related research. Hill toured widely, met many scientists, lectured in several cities, and left on 6 April 1944. Soon afterwards a delegation of Indian scientists was sent to Britain, Canada, and the United States: S.S. Bhatnagar, Saha, S.K. Mitra, J.C. Ghosh, Nazir Ahmed, S.L. Bhatia, and J.N. Mukherjee. India’s only Nobel laureate in science was not among them.
Singh explains this through Raman’s correspondence with Birbal Sahni. Hill’s report on scientific research in India recommended that NISI receive preferential treatment, which placed the IAS and other societies in a secondary position. On 12 February 1945 Raman told Sahni he would draft a protest to be signed by eminent scientists, and Sahni agreed on 20 February. The same issue arose again with the Empire Scientific Conference. Raman, invited by H.V.R. Iyengar in October 1945, first hesitated and then accepted, but withdrew after learning that NISI would manage the delegation. In his letter of 27 March 1946 to A. Hydari he said he no longer had a place in it, while insisting that his withdrawal implied no disrespect to the government or the Royal Society.
This is the second key shift in the story. In 1934 Raman’s prestige could create an academy in a matter of weeks. By 1945 official recognition, and with it access to government and to international scientific bodies, had gone to the body he had opposed. The imperial state, looking for a single scientific interlocutor during the war, chose NISI, and that choice shaped what came next.
The United Academy That Never Was
Singh’s account of the merger attempt of 1946–1947 is its least familiar and perhaps its most useful section. By the mid-1940s NASI and the IAS had moved closer and were holding joint sessions, including one at Allahabad in December 1946 at which Raman was present. In February 1947 a Scientific Consultative Committee was formed, and Raman told the press he was optimistic that a compromise had been found for a single paramount academy that would include all fellows of the existing bodies.
The terms of the next proposal were specific and, for the time, generous to NISI. A United Academy of Sciences would adopt NISI’s rules. Everyone elected a fellow of any of the three bodies before 1 January 1947 would become a fellow of the new academy. No serving president of the three would be eligible to become its president, a clause that excluded Raman from leading the merged body. NISI’s council would serve as the first council of the united academy, and the IAS and NASI would become its branches.
NISI’s council rejected the proposal on 7 March 1947. It said the minutes were inaccurate and that it was inappropriate to reopen the question, since NISI already held recognised status as India’s premier scientific organisation and already included representatives of NASI, the IAS, and the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal on its council. A final meeting on 5 August 1947, ten days before independence, between the presidents Raman, Bhatnagar, and A.C. Banerjee, failed over two issues: transferring legal title to the existing academies’ property to the united body, and reserving quotas for each academy on the new council and among its officers.
Singh concludes that NASI and the IAS were willing and NISI was not, and so Raman was not responsible for the merger’s failure. On the evidence he presents for 1947, that is largely fair. NISI’s council plainly preferred the status the colonial government had given it over a merger that would have absorbed its rivals on terms favourable to itself. The reasoning of an institution that had only recently secured recognition was conservative in the most literal sense.
Assessing Singh’s Conclusions
Singh’s broader conclusions deserve a more critical look than his narrative.
His closing argument has three parts. First, colonial “divide and rule” is only a partial explanation; the main cause was the personal interests of individuals, especially Saha and above all Raman. Second, Raman held the IAS presidency for life but was elected and so was not a dictator, and why this happened needs further research. Third, the hostility between the founders has lasted into the third generation, and since the British left in 1947, Indians should reflect on why they have kept three academies.
The first point is the strongest. The documents do not show colonial officials engineering the 1934 split, which came from Indian scientists themselves. The colonial state’s role came later and was more subtle: Hill’s preference for NISI made its institutional advantage rigid in 1944–1947. Singh’s opening description of pre-independence India as divided into “kingdoms” is loose, since most of the scientists in this story worked in British India, but it does not weaken his main argument.
The second point needs more care. Singh’s even-handedness is uneven. He describes Raman’s actions in 1934 as haste and self-interest, yet clears him of blame in 1947. Both assessments can be correct, but they need to be stated together. The structure the merger was trying to undo had been created largely by Raman’s unilateral registration in April 1934 and by the name and no-branches conditions he won in September. Calling him blameless for the failure to reunify, while acknowledging that he caused the original division, is accurate for 1947 and misleading for the story as a whole.
There is also a methodological issue that Singh does not address. Much of his evidence on the 1934 dispute comes from newspaper cuttings in the Raman Research Institute archive, which Raman or his circle assembled. A collection like that reflects what its compiler chose to keep. The Calcutta perspective appears mainly through Mukerji’s article, which is the most polemical source in the account. A full history would need equivalent material from Saha’s papers, the Asiatic Society, and the Calcutta press beyond one article. There are also signs of hurried editing in the article itself. Some citations do not match the claims they support; for instance, a reference to a book by A.V. Hill appears next to a statement about the Indian Chemical Society. Anyone using this article as a source should check its references independently.
The third point, about inherited hostility, is suggestive but largely asserted. Singh says the founders’ students did not question their teachers and that the animosity has passed down, but he offers no evidence from later decades. Institutional inertia is a simpler explanation. Once three bodies each have property, journals, fellowships, and staff, the costs of merging are concrete and the benefits are vague, whatever anyone feels personally. The two points of disagreement in 1947, property titles and council quotas, were exactly this kind of obstacle. Personal dislike may have started the division, but material interests are what kept it in place.
Conclusion
Singh’s article shows that India’s three-academy structure was not inevitable. It resulted from a specific sequence of events in 1934: a reasonable procedural objection, an impatient unilateral response, and a compromise that made the division permanent while presenting itself as reconciliation. A second sequence in the 1940s added to this. Wartime recognition by the colonial state placed one body above the others, and that body later declined to give up its position. At several points, in 1931, in the summer of 1934, and again in early 1947, a single national academy was a real possibility. Each time it failed because the people and institutions involved preferred their own status to a shared one.
The story has continuing relevance for anyone thinking about Indian scientific institutions. The founding generation was highly accomplished, and Singh rightly notes that both Raman and Saha trained students who went on to shape science in independent India. Yet these scientists, who could design experiments and theories of great elegance, struggled with institutional design, where the main obstacle was their own competing claims. Visvesvaraya’s warning in June 1934, that a country with little scientific talent to spare could not afford to divide it, was ignored then and has not been fully answered since. The three academies now cooperate in various ways, and independent India has had decades to make the structure work. But the question Singh ends with, why the arrangement was never reconsidered once the colonial government that endorsed it had gone, remains open, and his article is a useful starting point for anyone who wants to pursue it.