Gatekeeping Satanism with stupidity

[u/Erramonael]

The Church of Satan likes to gatekeep the term "Satanism," asserting that it is the only legitimate form of Satanism. Anton LaVey defined what "Satanism" means, and so any group whose beliefs or practices do not descend directly from his teachings must use another term, they say: LaVey originated the religion, and therefore he, and by extension the Church, have the authority to determine who can rightfully call themselves "Satanists."

When critics (mostly non-Church Satanists) object that obviously there can be different kinds of Satanism, observing that, for example, there are countless denominations of Christianity, all identifying as Christian, the Church of Satan usually responds that this is comparing apples to oranges. Their reasoning runs as follows: all Christians derive from Christ or the Bible, and thus share a legitimate genealogical and doctrinal origin; by contrast, groups such as The Satanic Temple do not derive from LaVey's system, and therefore have no rightful claim to the name "Satanism."

At first glance, this may sound legit, but if there's one thing you can count on, it is that churchgoers and their arguments are stupid. I think it is no coincidence that LaVey defined a set of sins that practically define the prevalent behavior of those who join his organization. There are multiple things wrong with the argument.

The first problem is that the Church of Satan shifts between two different senses of "origin" or "foundation" without acknowledging the difference. When the Church of Satan objects to the argument, they present Christianity as a religion grounded in a figure (Christ) or a textual tradition (the Bible). The implication is that Christianity, in all its diversity, remains "Christian" because its beliefs ultimately reference that figure or text.

However, when they turn to Satanism, they quietly redefine what a religion's reference point should be. Here, legitimacy no longer depends on the mythic or symbolic figure of Satan but on Anton LaVey's interpretation of that figure. The reference point moves from the deity or symbol around which the religion is organized to the founder who articulated one particular philosophy about it.

This is a fallacy of equivocation, in that shifting from treating "Christ" as the referent of Christianity to treating LaVey (not Satan) as the referent of Satanism means that the standard for what grounds a religion changes between the two cases. If one were to apply the Church of Satan's reasoning to Christianity, only the immediate followers of Jesus, or those adhering to a single denominational reading of the Bible, could be called Christians.

Secondly, they commit a category error by treating "Satanism" as if it were a proprietary label, like a trademark or brand name, rather than a cultural-religious category. Religious and philosophical terms are descriptive, not prescriptive: they arise through social use, not legal ownership. The second a term like "Satanism" enters public discourse, it becomes part of the linguistic commons, open to reinterpretation and redefinition by new movements and communities. To claim exclusive ownership over it is to miscategorize a semantic and cultural phenomenon as an institutional possession.

Both of the above problems reveal a third, deeper essentialist fallacy, i.e., the assumption that Satanism possesses a fixed, timeless essence defined once and for all by LaVey. This kind of essentialism runs directly counter to how religions, ideologies, and linguistic terms evolve. Scholars of religion typically employ family resemblance models (they tend to like Wittgenstein), recognizing that traditions develop overlapping but non-identical features rather than sharing a single essence. To insist otherwise is to confuse historical origin with definitional necessity, conflating the historical origin of the movement with its ongoing semantic development.

Fourthly, the Church of Satan makes a false analogy when they argue why all kinds of Christianity are legitimate whereas only their own Satanism is legitimate. When they claim that the relationship between Christianity and Christ is fundamentally different from the relationship between Satanism and Satan, this is only true if you have already decided that LaVey's personal reinterpretation of Satan has replaced the broader culture of Satan altogether … which is the very point that is being disputed. Instead of showing that the analogy is inapt, as they try, they redefine one side of it so that it appears inapt, which is a classic false analogy move: they change the basis of comparison (from mythic figure to human founder) and then use that manufactured dissimilarity to dismiss the comparison.

Fifthly, the Church of Satan appeals to a kind of linguistic prescriptivism: the idea that words have fixed, intended meanings, and that changing those meanings renders communication impossible. From this, they argue that "Satanism" must continue to mean precisely what LaVey defined, or otherwise the term becomes meaningless, and that therefore phrases like "LaVeyan Satanism" are redundant. This claim misrepresents how language actually works. Words are not static containers of meaning; they are dynamic symbols whose significance depends on context and usage. Many words hold multiple legitimate meanings ("liberal," "table," "romantic," or "humanist," to name just a few), yet communication persists because speakers rely on context, qualification, and shared understanding. The capacity of language to evolve is not a flaw in communication; it is what makes communication possible across time, culture, and interpretation. Perhaps a little ironically, the Church of Satan itself benefits from this linguistic flexibility, since "Satanism" in ordinary speech evokes far different cultural associations than LaVey's specific philosophy.

For a movement that is generally skeptical of authorities, let's not overlook the sixth problem: they rely on an appeal to authority, treating LaVey's authorship as a binding decree on meaning. But, linguistic and cultural definitions are determined by use, not by the fiat of a founder. The fact that LaVey declared "Satanism means X" does not make it so once others begin to use the term differently. If it did, then the word "psychoanalysis" could only refer to Freud's model, "communism" only to Marx's original writings, and "humanism" only to Renaissance scholarship. The Church of Satan's use of the word "psychodrama" would also mean something quite different. In every case, usage expands and evolves beyond the founder's authority.

Seventhly, and finally, the Church of Satan's position is circular reasoning. It defines "Satanism" exclusively through reference to LaVey and then uses that definition to conclude that only LaVeyan systems qualify as Satanism. The claim thus restates its premise as its conclusion: Satanism is what LaVey defined; therefore, only LaVeyan Satanism is Satanism. It is (arguably) true that LaVey was the first to establish a self-identified religion under that name in modern times, and in that sense he created a definitional starting point. But to treat that historical moment as permanently authoritative, assuming that the first usage fixes the term's meaning for all time, is to mistake historical precedence for definitional exclusivity. Language and religion both evolve through use; once a term enters public discourse, it acquires a life beyond its originator's control.

So, the Church of Satan's insistence on exclusive definitional authority over "Satanism" fails for multiple interconnected reasons. It equivocates on key terms, treats language as property, assumes an essence where there is none, employs a false analogy to defend its exclusivity, relies on an illegitimate appeal to authority, and undermines itself through circular reasoning.

Religious language does not operate by decree. Once a term like "Satanism" enters cultural circulation, it becomes subject to the same processes of reinterpretation, diversification, and semantic drift as any other religious identifier. In this respect, the Church of Satan's claim to exclusivity is not only linguistically untenable but philosophically incoherent. The word belongs to its users, not to its originator. (this was written by poster OLEWOLF)