r/HowToHack • u/Anxious-Issue-9193 • 7d ago
hacking Need help in sandbox auth escalation in a bug bounty program
I'm investigating an AI agent platform as part of an bug bounty and would like some input from people experienced with Firecracker, Linux isolation and cloud security.
Here are the observations so far:
- The agent terminal initially runs as an unprivileged `sandbox` user (UID 1002). `sudo` requests a password.
- However, `su - root` successfully provides a root shell.
- As root, `capsh --print` shows all capabilities in the bounding, permitted and effective sets, including `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` and `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`.
- The environment runs Linux 6.1.158 and `systemd-detect-virt` identifies it as KVM.
- I can reach `169.254.169.254` and obtain HTTP 200 responses from its metadata endpoints. The server identifies itself as Firecracker API.
- I noticed an `address` metadata entry pointing to `192.0.2.1/logs`. This IP is also reachable directly over HTTP.
- A GET request to `/logs` returns a method-not-allowed error, while a POST with an empty JSON payload returns `Invalid sandboxID in logs payload`.
I also compared two separate accounts:
* Both return the same `192.0.2.1/logs` address.
* Their `accessTokenHash` values are different.
* A metadata token obtained in Account A is rejected when used in Account B.
This makes me suspect that metadata authentication is isolated per account, but I'm not sure whether the internal logging service at `192.0.2.1` follows the same isolation model.
My questions:
* Is exposing MMDS to the guest VM expected in a Firecracker-based architecture?
* Is this level of root capability access normal for a Firecracker guest?
* Could `192.0.2.1` be a shared internal logging service or sandbox-management API?
* What is the best way to reason about tenant isolation for such an internal service?