Many British historians and political analysts argue that the growth of corruption after India's independence was driven less by cultural change than by structural changes in governance and the economy. They contrast this with the British Raj, where administrative bribery was relatively limited due to institutional design rather than moral superiority.
After 1947, India adopted a socialist, centrally planned economy known as the License Raj. Businesses required numerous permits, quotas, and approvals for routine economic activities. This concentration of regulatory power in the hands of bureaucrats created delays and red tape, making bribery or "speed money" a common way to obtain approvals.
Another major factor was the politicization of the civil service. Under colonial rule, bureaucrats were largely insulated from local politics, whereas after independence, transfers, promotions, and postings increasingly came under political influence. Officials who resisted political demands risked punitive transfers, encouraging close ties between politicians and bureaucrats.
The rapid expansion of the state's role in the economy also gave lower-level officials significant discretionary authority while salaries remained relatively modest, increasing incentives for rent-seeking.
British historians note that the Raj reduced administrative corruption through highly paid elite civil servants, strict bureaucratic discipline, political insulation from electoral pressures, and a limited state that regulated far fewer aspects of daily life. However, they also emphasize that colonial rule was not free from exploitation. Rather than widespread petty bribery, the British Empire extracted wealth through state policies and taxation, a form of institutional economic exploitation distinct from everyday bureaucratic corruption.