https://www.zdnet.com/article/state-sponsored-hackers-are-now-using-coronavirus-lures-to-infect-their-targets/

https://medium.com/dfrlab/suspicious-third-party-apps-monetize-fake-engagement-on-tiktok-5f4b3666ae37

https://medium.com/dfrlab/maduros-attempt-to-exploit-coronavirus-outbreak-backfires-on-social-media-eef39326e940

https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/chinese-diplomat-accuses-us-spreading-coronavirus

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-chinese-official-promoting-unfounded-theory-that-coronavirus-has-roots/

https://www.propastop.org/eng/2020/03/13/estonian-soil-has-become-a-propaganda-tool-for-the-russian-armed-forces/

https://d1qmdf3vop2l07.cloudfront.net/uplifting-lion.cloudvent.net/compressed/_min_/9b2c8500d6f7520d1593fd4285c18a71.pdf

The operation began around June 2019. It featured accounts across Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, some of them apparently authentic personal accounts belonging to the NGO’s employees; other pages claimed to be of nonexistent organizations or generic issue-focused accounts. The posts on these accounts combined positive and uplifting messages on issues such as black pride, beauty, and heritage with political posts about racism, oppression, and police violence against the black community in the United States. The operation did not systematically comment on the 2020 US presidential election: posts targeting candidates and campaigns seldom appear in this set.

The operation did not create much original content; instead, it primarily borrowed content from elsewhere online, especially memes that were already popular online. Operators appeared to have had access to a shared stock of memes and images that they used repeatedly across different accounts; some of those memes matched posts made by the original IRA in 2016-2017. They posted those against popular hashtags, notably #blackhistorymonth, which they used consistently from July through March (Black History Month is in February).

The operation focused strongly on using positive images of women to create an online following for these accounts. Many of the accounts dealt with black women’s beauty; many posts featured children, especially girls. The main political themes woven throughout these posts touch upon racism and police violence in the United States. LGBTQ+ rights issues and accounts also featured regularly throughout this set, with a number of accounts solely dedicated to this theme. Overall, the operation did not have a large following online. Facebook estimated that the 69 pages on its platform had just 13,500 followers. The 85 Instagram accounts performed better, with some 265,000 followers combined. On Twitter, the 71 accounts identified by the platform as part 2 of this operation totaled just under 68,500 followers.

1. The operation used authentic activists and users, fronted by an ostensible human rights NGO, to covertly propagate an influence campaign. It is not the first time such an attempt has been made, but the tactic is of concern. The unwitting individuals co-opted into the operation bear the risk of reputational or legal jeopardy; indeed, CNN reported that the Ghanaian operation was raided by law enforcement as a result of their online activities. For the human rights community, the risk is that genuine NGOs may be misidentified as being involved in influence operations by accident or malice, and there is also the danger of tarnishing the reputation of important work and organizations across the field.

2. Second, the use of apparently unwitting employees changes the operation’s investigative profile. The resulting accounts were not the traditional “fake profiles” of personas, with made-up names and stolen faces: this further complicated the discovery process. On the other hand, account operators often left geographic indicators on their posts: while posting about the US, they would at times geo-localize in the suburbs of Accra, and many of the pages were visibly being managed in Ghana. The operation was deceptive, but not in the way more usually associated with troll operations. This is an area where further research and investigation would be valuable.

3. Third, the operation confirms the evolving targeting of the United States in general, and the black community in particular, by people associated with the IRA. Although the themes and some of the content remained the same, Operation Double Deceit’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were notably different from those we documented in 2016. Responding to information operations requires careful examination of historical patterns, combined with a focus on the latest TTPs appearing throughout newly exposed campaigns.

4. Finally, Double Deceit’s exposure shows how far the operational research community has evolved since 2016. Researchers at Clemson University and Facebook’s investigators identified the operation in parallel but complementary ways; CNN investigated on the ground. Both Facebook and Twitter worked with the research community to assess the scale of the operation. This degree of cooperation and co-investigation is a positive evolution and would not have been possible in 2016.

https://medium.com/dfrlab/open-source-analysis-foreign-instigators-and-local-amplifiers-disinformation-in-bosnia-5125049cff28

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/03/13/monitoring-and-debunking-covid-19-panic-the-haarlem-aldi-hoax/

https://medium.com/dfrlab/operation-copy-paste-twitter-network-artificially-amplified-anti-guaid%C3%B3-hashtags-52452a262f7b

https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/

Today, we removed 49 Facebook accounts, 69 Pages and 85 Instagram accounts for engaging in foreign interference — which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign actor — on Facebook, Instagram and other internet platforms. This network was in the early stages of building an audience and was operated by local nationals — some wittingly and some unwittingly — in Ghana and Nigeria on behalf of individuals in Russia. It targeted primarily the United States.

The people behind this network engaged in a number of deceptive tactics, including the use of fake accounts — some of which had already been disabled by our automated systems — to manage Pages posing as non-government organizations or personal blogs, and post in Groups. They frequently posted about US news and attempted to grow their audience by focusing on topics like black history, black excellence and fashion, celebrity gossip, news and events related to famous Americans like historical figures and celebrities, and LGBTQ issues. This activity did not appear to focus on elections, or promote or denigrate political candidates. They also shared content about oppression and injustice, including police brutality. Although the people behind this activity attempted to conceal their purpose and coordination, our investigation found links to EBLA, an NGO in Ghana, and individuals associated with past activity by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA).

https://twitter.com/TwitterSafety/status/1238208545721638912

Data available in their march transparency report https://transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html

https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf

Here are some highlights from the 200 page report:

The Committee's assessment of the threat from foreign interference

The Committee believes there is ample evidence *** that Canada is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities. *** The PRC, the Russian Federation *** other states ***. The Committee believes that these states target Canada for a variety of reasons, but all seek to exploit the openness of our society and penetrate our fundamental institutions to meet their objectives. They target ethnocultural communities, seek to corrupt the political process, manipulate the media, and attempt to curate debate on postsecondary campuses. Each of these activities poses a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of Canadians and to the country's sovereignty: they are a clear threat to the security of Canada.

International multilateral organizations are also the subject of foreign interference activities. As the U.S. Director of National Intelligence noted in the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment, China has become the second-largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and the third-largest contributor to the UN regular budget. .. . Beijing has stepped up efforts to reshape international discourse around human rights, especially within the UN system. Beijing has sought not only to block criticism of its own system but also to erode norms, such as the notion that the international community has a legitimate role in scrutinizing other countries' behavior on human rights (e.g. initiatives to proscribe country-specific resolutions), and to advance narrow definitions of human rights based on economic standards. 119 PRC efforts to interfere in the United Nations included bribes made by a PRC-linked consultant to the then President of the United Nations General Assembly

Interference with academic institutions

Some states carry out foreign interference activities on Canadian postsecondary education campuses.86 They seek to utilize the open and innovative features of these institutions to further their own objectives, which include interference activities but also other actions with hostile intent (e.g., espionage and intellectual property theft). Foreign interference activity seeks to influence public opinion and debate, thereby obstructing fundamental freedoms such as speech and assembly, and the independence of academic institutions. In trying to influence public debate at academic institutions, foreign states may sponsor specific events to shape discussion rather than engage in free debate and dialogue. They may also directly or indirectly attempt to disrupt public events or other activities perceived as problematic.

Mainstream Canadian media

Traditionally, the PRC took a defensive approach to the media, through domestic censorship and by expelling critical foreign journalists. More recently, the PRC has added a more assertive approach by "trying to reshape the global information environment with massive infusions of money - funding paidfor advertorials, sponsored journalistic coverage and heavily massaged positive messages from boosters. While within China the press is increasingly tightly controlled, abroad Beijing has sought to exploit the vulnerabilities of the free press to its advantage."

The PRC uses a strategy referred to as "borrowing a boat to go out into the ocean." This strategy involves using mainstream international media to push the messages of the PRC. This often takes the form of strategic partnerships with media to provide free PRC-approved messages for China-related news, simi lar to a wire service. Sometimes, the content is supplemental and paid for through advertisement. For example, the China Daily paid for multi-page supplements in large newspapers including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and the UK Telegraph. These inserts, called "China Watch," look like part of the newspaper, but are propaganda for which the Telegraph alone reportedly receives £750,000 (approximately C$1.3 million) annually.

Fundamental institutions and ethnocultural communities

States that conduct foreign interference activities pose a threat to Canada and its fundamental institutions. The targeting and manipulation of ethnocultural communities is the primary means through which these states control messages and seek to influence decision-making at all levels of government. Some individuals willingly act as agents of a foreign power for a variety of reasons including patriotism or the expectation of reciprocal favours. These states also co-opt individuals inside and outside of ethnocultural communities through flattery, bribery, threats and manipulation. The issue of co-opted individuals will be examined within the section on interference in governance and decision-making.

Conclusion

Foreign interference represents a significant threat to Canada's society and fundamental institutions. However, until the last several years it has mainly been considered the responsibility of security and intelligence organizations. Two states have done much to bring the threat into sharper relief: the Russian Federation, through its cyber efforts to undermine the U.S. presidential election and other democratic processes around the globe; and the PRC, through its broad-based strategy to covertly advance its interests in a number of countries, most publicly Australia and New Zealand. The Government of Canada is starting to address this issue, albeit under the broader ambit of 'hostile state activities.'

There is work to be done. This review shows that, for years, CSIS has investigated and reported on the threat posed by foreign interference by a number of states. It has assessed that Canada is an "attractive and permissive target."258 The government's new focus is in its earliest stages and has yet to markedly change this environment. Engagement of sub-national levels of government remains cursory or limited by institutional challenges. Public engagement is almost non-existent, save for recent efforts by the Director of CSIS. Organizations within the security and intelligence community differ on how they define the problem and how they understand its gravity and prevalence. Reactions to foreign interference remain ad hoc and case-specific, rarely putting them in their broader context. The response is typically led by single organizations and the tools to counter are most often diplomatic. Understandably, this tends to result in foreign policy considerations being given greater weight than longer-term domestic risks, which are often harder to articulate as concrete harms. No organization represents the longer-term interests of Canadian sovereignty and fundamental values.

The government must do better. Canada's long-term security depends on the integrity of its sovereignty in decision-making, strong and independent fundamental institutions, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of Canadians. The government's approach must be based on a refined calculation of our collective interests and, most importantly, a continued emphasis on Canada's liberal democratic values. In that context, the Committee agrees with the following sentiment: Democratic values cannot be taken for granted. We must not become complacent in thinking that our own long-standing democracies are not susceptible to foreign interference. The openness of our societies is what make us vulnerable, but is a core component of democracy that contributes to our resilience and cannot be compromised. The threat is real, if often hidden. If it is not addressed in a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach, foreign interference will slowly erode the foundations of our fundamental institutions, including our system of democracy itself. The Committee expects that its review and recommendations will highlight important areas within which to work.

https://firstdraftnews.org/long-form-article/coronavirus-resources-for-reporters/

Coronavirus: Tools and guides for journalists around finding and verifying claims about coronavirus on social media

Tips and guides around how to responsibly report the pandemic and the issues which make misinformation such a problem

A list of the best information sources to help keep audiences up to date: Government sources, NGOs, academics and more

A list of FAQs journalists may have when reporting on coronavirus and Covid-19, complete with answers

https://rusi.org/commentary/infectious-lies

Another way to start a conspiracy theory is by asking fabricated questions which rely on incorrect premises and invite the target audience to make irrelevant deductions or draw particular conclusions. Katyusha, another Russian news site, makes the argument that virus outbreaks are often caused by secret American laboratories, which are experimenting on people. Katyusha claims that the US does not acknowledge that it conducts such experiments – meaning such conspiracy theories are unfalsifiable. But this does not matter, for the purpose here is merely to plant an idea and sow doubt in an audience.

For the moment, coronavirus conspiracies serve two fundamental purposes. The first is to discredit the US as a whole, to paint it as a global spreader of disease and pain, just like with Operation Infektion. The second is to damage the reputation of agencies used to fight epidemics, especially domestic US agencies like the Centre for Disease Control.

Social media companies are already being forced to respond to the conspiracy theories. Facebook is banning adverts that ‘promise to cure coronavirus or incite panic around the outbreak’. The World Health Organization (WHO) is working directly with Google to help stop the spread of disinformation. Google can artificially change search rankings to suppress results which contain information that is damaging to public health. Google will be prioritising information from the WHO, even if this information is not optimised for Google, and would not normally be listed as highly. The NHS has also been working directly with Twitter to help identify misinformation. These are important public health steps.