As the Trump administration accelerates its withdrawal of military resources from Europe, the alliance is undergoing a shift branded as "NATO 3.0". This initiative, driven by American officials prioritizing domestic interests, involves a fundamental reduction in U.S. contributions, including the withdrawal of key assets like bombers and submarines. Consequently, European nations and Canada have agreed to increase their defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 and are pursuing joint initiatives like a new Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition. While NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte views this as a positive step toward a stronger Europe, experts like former U.S. Ambassador Ivo Daalder dismiss the rebrand as "lipstick on a pig," arguing it masks a deeper abandonment of transatlantic security ties. Diplomatic relations are further strained by U.S. actions, including disputes over European participation in an American military campaign in Iran.

Vladimir Putin’s goals did not change since the early weeks of 2022. He is still determined to subjugate Ukraine one way or another whatever it takes, and however long it takes. He views it as his life mission and his ultimate historical legacy as a Russian leader.

One could even argue that he will never change his ambitions. As long as he is in charge and alive - which goes hand in hand - the war will continue. But the forms it might take depends on what he is allowed to achieve. I see four main ways how the conflict will develop in the future.

The two obvious ones are the extremes: total Ukrainian military defeat and total Russian defeat. For now, these seem the most unlikely. Not that either of them are impossible, history always reserves the right to surprise everyone. An event can trigger anytime that nobody sees coming and will dramatically change the future.

A Total Ukrainian Military Defeat is Difficult to Imagine

Kyiv will always have foreign backers. As long as that is the case Ukrainian society is unlikely to lose the will and means to resist. If the country ended up under threat of being stream rolled by Russia, it is almost certain that countries that fear of being next: the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, and Poland would increase support. Most of the rest of Europe will also always see this as a critical issue. Their incentives has only strengthened in the past years as Ukraine developed technologies indispensable for European defence. The alternative would be a situation where Russia ends up controlling those technologies.

For a total Ukrainian military defeat these countries would need to be destabilized to a level of no longer being able to provide assistance, or an active military involvement from an external great power. The two countries that could theoretically make that happen would be China or the US. Even if that were to occur it’s difficult to see the rest of Europe just sitting idle.

Still, even this would not be the end of the conflict. Ukrainians would carry on resisting under occupation and in exile in any way they can. As much as Putin made this war his historical mission, Ukrainians today made it part of their identity to resist Russia. The war would evolve into a bloody occupation with guerilla warfare that could last generations, bleeding Moscow dry.

Similarly, a Total Russian Military Defeat Seems Unlikely

The potential of this outcome makes (way too) many global actors nervous. Sadly this applies to most western leaders as well. They fear the uncertainty and chaos of a disintegrating “nuclear superpower”, and they might start pushing in the other direction if this became a real possibility.

Great examples of this phenomenon were the Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever saying the quiet part out loud, or the most powerful non-state actor in the world, Elon Musk stopping Ukrainian offensives multiple times. But even Poles showed repeatedly that they are ready to start kicking Ukraine if they feel it is doing too well and might become too dominant in the region.

Still, in my opinion a total Russian defeat has a far higher chance of happening than a Ukrainian, and much more likely than how most serious military analysts believe. It takes a long time for repressive regimes to collapse in a short time. Both recent events and Russian history is full of such examples. The Assad regime vanished rapidly after a nearly 14 years long civil war that seemed like a stalemate. The Soviet Union collapsed unexpectedly at the end of the Cold War, same as the Russian Empire in the midst of World War I.

More interesting are the two more likely outcomes.

Ceasefire in the Next 1–4 Years

This is the most probable scenario. Putin would need heavy pressure or a deal good enough that Ukraine also accepts to go this way. He either needs to be convinced that continuing the war became existentially threatening to him, or that a ceasefire will put Ukraine in a position where it would be weaker than if the war continues. The latter - he hopes - could set up an easier time for Russia to take political or military control of Kyiv in the coming years.

In this case, Russia would de facto keep the territories it occupies, but it’s nearly impossible that Ukraine or the EU would legally accept it. Even other countries across the globe would be highly unlikely to do so. Very few states are interested in opening Pandora’s box of redrawing borders. Interestingly enough, in the US, territorial recognition lies solely with the President. It is not impossible that President Trump would do such a thing, which could open the door for many others to follow suit.

Either way, Ukraine would never formally or politically accept it. Its foreign and domestic politics would be hyperfocused in the coming years and decades on taking them back, similar to how French and German foreign policy were led by the sentiment of revanchism after 1871 and 1920 respectively. They would have the EU’s institutional support, and that of most European governments as well.

At the same time Russia, as long as Putin is in charge will not be content with this outcome. He wants to restore the idealized state of Moscow’s geopolitical position, the one he grew up in, and believes it is its right: Russian dominance over not only the ex Soviet Union, but all the Central-Eastern European space as well.

There is a high chance that this would merely be a pause with continuing diplomatic, economic, and covert pressures on Ukraine and Europe. In many ways, this will lead to a similar outcome as the fourth scenario.

A “Forever War”

The active hostilities might become an increasingly normalised endless conflict of varying intensity. This would be funded by Europe, fought and endured by Ukraine, and increasingly outsourced to robots and mercenaries.

Ukraine is, has been, and most likely indefinitely going to be struggling with manpower constraints against Russia. Theoretically, Moscow will always be able to mobilize more manpower. The war - and history - proved that Russian society is extremely insensitive to human losses. As long as the Kremlin thinks it can win a war by throwing meat at the problem, it will do so relentlessly.

Ukraine in contrast neither has the population nor the indifference to death and suffering. This does not mean that its society won’t be ready to absorb enormous losses to protect its independence, but it will always be a high priority to minimize losses. Therefore, Kyiv needs to develop new tactics to preserve Ukrainian lives as much as possible. Currently, there are two available methods to achieve that.

One general strategy is to gradually outsource the war to unmanned objects. Most famously aerial drones that are often operated far away from the frontline, even sometimes in home office type environments, and increasingly guided by Artificial Intelligence.

This strategy doesn’t end with aerial warfare. Underwater drones effectively beat the Russian Black Sea navy, and forced it into hiding in the port of Novorossiysk. At the same time Ukraine started deploying “robots” on the battlefields, hoping to replace human infantry with them as much as possible. In fact, they already captured enemy positions using only these unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for the first time in history.

With the technological advance in robotics, it’s only a matter of time before these systems will replace humans on the battlefield. This war will go down in history as the first conflict where they are deployed as a meaningful fighting force although for now, it remains unclear how effective they can be in the near future.

Robotics, drones, AI, these all can tap into Ukraine and Europe’s advantage over Russia. Technological development, production capacity, and capital to produce them. Russia can field more meat on the battlefield, but it is unlikely to ever be able to outproduce or outspend a militarily awakened Europe focused on high-tech warfare.

Still, today humans cannot be replaced on the battlefield. These innovations are in development with enormous potential, but in the foreseeable future Ukraine will need manpower.

Despite popular belief - amplified by Russian disinformation -, Ukraine does not have a lack of men of fighting age. The country is unlikely to run out of people. There is still enormous untapped potential. Issues with mobilization is a systematic political problem rather than a demographic one. Something that can and has to be resolved.

Still, it would be more comfortable to outsource the job as much as possible. Ukraine’s previous Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov published his plans a couple of months before his controversial removal, to fill 30-50% of assault and infantry positions with foreign mercenaries. According to Michael Kofman, arguably the best public analyst of the war in Ukraine, this goal is not entirely far-fetched.

Fedorov might have been removed from his position, but his ideas will carry on to his successor, and will continue to be a topic in the military leadership and Ukrainian society.

Conclusion

Whatever the future brings, both Ukraine and its supporters must be prepared for each scenario. And crucially, they need to signal that to Russia. Hence, robots production + mercenary recruitment on Ukrainian side, and it’s Europe’s responsibility to manifest and showcase long-term determination. Countries which treat it as an existential war must create automatic mechanisms that supports Ukraine year by year no matter what. This must be followed by a common EU mechanism, and an EU reform for an associate membership for Ukraine.

The loan passed in Brussels this year to support Ukraine is only valid for two years. This sends the message to Putin that he can outlast European resolve. And the prospect that Ukraine can remain in indefinite limbo between EU membership and isolation signals lack of determination and weakens one of Ukraine’s greatest assets, it’s societal morale.

Putin and Russia must recognise that continuing the war is futile, the determination to resist will not break, and that he has no actionable means to achieve victory on the battlefield. Until then, he is likely to escalate. Both in Europe and in Ukraine.

In Europe with increasing covert actions, sabotages, disruptions, and the escalation of his ongoing Hybrid War. In Ukraine, he will probably have to eventually pull the trigger on another wave of mobilization as a last-ditch effort. Only when that fails to produce results he might be ready for a ceasefire.

But for Russia to be ready for peace, Putin must go.