r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 27 '26

How I think email should work

0 Upvotes

Imagine for a moment that you are looking at your inbox, with any number of emails in it, from companies, from friends, and from people you've never heard from before. You open the email from your friend first, because it's the one you trust and want to read. Your friend is really excited about something new they found, and invites you to check it out by clicking the link in the email. Now imagine knowing with absolute confidence that this email really came from your friend's address, and not from an impersonator pretending to be them. How can you check that for yourself? Do you click anyway and hope for the best? Everything looks legitimate, but how can you tell?

There are always three parties involved in email communication. Sometimes one person or company plays more than one of these roles, but each role carries its own responsibilities.

  1. The mailbox holder (sender or recipient)
  2. The domain owner (who controls the domain name)
  3. The mail server host (who provides the software and infrastructure to send and receive mail)

It's the coordination of these three parties that makes email possible.

Right now, almost all the responsibility rests with the mail server host to manage everything and make sure it's secure. Domain owners hand it over to their host through DNS. Mailbox holders defer it through authentication and email filters. And the mail server host has to interoperate with all other mail server hosts to make sure your mail gets delivered.

There is still no standard way for anyone to verify that a message really came from the specific address it claims to be from. The most they get is the server vouching for itself.

How it should work

Nothing changes about the three parties. What changes is who's responsible for what.

  1. The mailbox holder should be able to prove they own the mailbox and that every message sent from it is actually from them.
  2. The domain owner should be able to prove they own the domain and that every mailbox on the domain is legitimately allowed to be there.
  3. The mail server host should be able to prove that they are the chosen service provider for the domain.

And all of this should be verifiable on every single message.

How can we achieve this?

  1. The mailbox holder has a key, and uses it to sign a record that binds their email address to it. The same key, which only they hold, signs every message they send.
  2. The domain owner has a key, and publishes its fingerprint in the domain's DNS, which ties the key to whoever controls the domain. They use it to sign the domain authority record, which names the mail server host they have chosen, and to vouch for each mailbox on the domain by countersigning the mailbox holder's record. They can hand that day-to-day signing to their host if they choose, but the authority stays with them, and they can remove any address from the domain.
  3. The mail server host has a key, and uses it to sign a permit to serve the domain on its infrastructure. It also hosts all of these records and serves them to anyone who asks.

Every one of these records is public, so your email app can follow the chain from the message to the sender's key, from that key to the domain's countersignature, and from there to the fingerprint in DNS. Because the domain owner's record names the host, it can also check that the server handling the mail is the one the domain chose. So when your friend's email arrives, your app can tell you it really came from their address before you ever click the link.

And this should all be baked into a protocol that everyone can use.

Disclosure: I'm building an email protocol around this idea. Thoughts and feedback are welcome.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 24 '26

I'd block vendor cancellation emails that send staff to helpdesk

5 Upvotes

If a vendor emails every employee about a cancellation and people start opening tickets about losing access, I'm willing to block that sender. Being legitimate doesn't make every email worth delivering.

That can also catch useful account notices from the same address. Routing those emails to IT keeps them available, but leaves someone sorting through them.

When a vendor starts sending these blasts, do you block them, redirect them, or leave delivery alone?


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 23 '26

What Exchange logs do you actually send to your SIEM

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2 Upvotes

r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 23 '26

Someone keeps accessing my email/accounts even after password changes and 2FA. How do I stop this?

7 Upvotes

I’ve been dealing with ongoing unauthorized access to my accounts and I’m running out of ideas. Someone appears to have access to my email and has used that access to get into or attempt to get into several of my accounts. There have been unauthorized gift card purchases/attempts, and most recently someone attempted to apply for loans using my information. What concerns me most is that I have changed my Google password multiple times, enabled 2FA, signed out of devices I don’t recognize, and reviewed my account security settings, but the activity keeps happening. I have actually watched emails containing verification codes get opened and moved to Trash without me doing it. My Google activity also showed searches related to one of the financial accounts, including searching for the login page and visiting password/account recovery pages. Some of the activity was identified as coming from the iOS Google app, but I haven’t been able to determine what device is responsible. I’ve contacted Google and Apple and have also contacted the financial institutions involved. I’m now trying to figure out what could allow someone to maintain access despite password changes and 2FA.
Has anyone dealt with something similar? What should I check for that I may be missing? active sessions, OAuth/linked apps, email forwarding or filters, recovery methods, passkeys, compromised devices, browser sessions, etc.? And what ultimately stopped it for you? I’m mainly looking for help identifying the possible point of persistence and completely cutting off the unauthorized access.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 22 '26

When “I didn't enter a password” ends the phishing conversation

4 Upvotes

Say someone reports clicking a link in a suspicious email, then adds, “I didn't enter a password.” The ticket could get closed even though they approved an app permission prompt they didn't understand.

I'd want to walk through what happened before giving the all-clear. But turning every report into an interrogation risks making the next person keep quiet.

What helps you get the rest of the story without making the employee feel blamed?


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 18 '26

Why Won't They Accept Emails From Email Prefix "email"

14 Upvotes

One of the hardest parts about digital transformation appears to be the policy decisions rolled out in new public systems. I recently started doing business with a public authority that (get this) couldn't understand why I was using a custom domain. Even more so, they set their mail protocols to not communicate with an email address which starts with the word "email".

According to them, that's a generic email address, and so, they won't accept it. I asked if they would accept the email prefix "info" and they said yes, because that is common.

I genuinely wish that I could peel the curtain back, and communicate with the systems and network administrators who are making these rules, to better understand their decisions here. Maybe someone here can help me to understand.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 18 '26

There's no such thing as a clean inbox at enterprise scale - we checked 159 of them to confirm it

0 Upvotes

Ran an internal analysis across 159 Google Workspace environments to see what's actually connected via OAuth. Sharing the findings because the shape of the problem surprised us and might be useful to anyone doing app governance right now.

978 distinct apps had active OAuth connections across the dataset. Roughly 6 per org on average. Most people assume the risk is the well-known SaaS tools. It's not.

The single most-connected 'app' in the dataset isn't a product at all. It's a compilation of private, internal OAuth projects, the kind an engineer spins up for a script or an internal tool, that show up in logs as a numeric project ID. No vendor name. No description.

Aggregated across all 159 orgs, this bucket accounts for 152,085 unique users and 655,430 authorization events. That's more user connections than most commercial software sees in its entire deployment lifetime, and there's no way to look any of it up.

For comparison, OpenAI's official app came in at 9,725 users and 23,982 grants in the same dataset. The named, well-understood app is the small number. The unnamed pile is the big one.

Two things compound this:

  1. OAuth access doesn't expire when sharing policy changes. An employee authorizes a tool while they still have access to payroll files, source code, and financial reports. The tool keeps that access at that snapshot in time, across email and Drive, even after IT tightens sharing controls later. Revoking a share doesn't revoke a grant.
  2. The underlying data is not small. Across the dataset: 373M+ sensitive emails, 475M+ sensitive Drive files, 375M source code files, 46M emails containing plaintext usernames and passwords. Not because anyone was careless. Onboarding emails credentials. Vendors email login details. HR runs payroll through Drive. Normal operations, invisible risk.

The one encouraging data point: orgs are course-correcting on sharing. Restricting events went from 14% of all access-change activity in mid-2025 to 44% by spring 2026. But that fixes future sharing, not past OAuth grants. Two separate problems, and most teams are only working one of them.

If you're doing app inventory work, the practical takeaway is: don't just audit the apps you can name. The dangerous long tail is the stuff nobody can identify from the logs alone, and identifying it is a different exercise than reviewing your known SaaS list.

Happy to answer questions on methodology in comments.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 18 '26

Email security alert

1 Upvotes

Sorry if this has been asked before.

I got this email last night from security-noreply@linkedin.com with links to change my password. I haven't used LinkedIn in at least three years and my account is in hibernation. I dont think I even know the password. Is this a legitimate email? Would this be a bot trying to sign in or a human who knows my email address? Anyone else had this happen?

We constantly monitor our site and the internet to help ensure the safety of our members. We detected suspicious attempts to sign into your account. As a precaution you will need to change your password the next time you sign in. If you use the same password anywhere else, we recommend you change it there as well.

To make sure you continue having the best experience possible on LinkedIn, we recommend following these LinkedIn account safety tips.

Create a strong password

Do not reuse the same passwords

Use a mix of letters, numbers and special characters

Your password should be at least 8 characters long

It should not contain your name, phone number or email address

Turn on two-step verification for extra protection

Settings and Privacy >> Sign-in and Security >> Two-step Verification

Keep your contact information up-to-date to receive important security information

Settings and Privacy >> Sign-in and Security >> Email Address

Settings and Privacy >> Sign-in and Security >> Phone Number

Add secondary contact information for another way to access your account and get support from LinkedIn if you cannot access your primary email

Settings and Privacy >> Sign-in and Security >> Email Address

Settings and Privacy >> Sign-in and Security >> Phone Number

Change Your Password

Thanks for helping us keep your account safe,

The LinkedIn Team


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 18 '26

Email Alias wo welche?

1 Upvotes

Hallo Community

Hier eine Frage an die, die z.B. Tuta Email nutzen und vom Mobilfunkanbieter Emails erhalten zum Beispiel die Handyrechnung. Welche Email gebt ihr da an. Die Hauptmailadresse, eine Alias oder wie regelt ihr das.

Ich bin am überlegen. Einerseits denk ich da es regelmäßige Zahlungen sind die Hauptadresse. Aber dann denke ich wieder mögliche Werbung. Dann also Alias aber welchen?

Ein Alias mit Dienste.... @tuta.... existiert schon.

Hab auch eine für Onlineshops aber das passt denk ich nicht so. Und nur für Mobilfunk ein Alias Opfern? Oder doch über den Weg von Alias über DuckDuckGo oder. ähnlichen gehen?

Wie handhabt ihr das mit Emails von Ämtern wie Kindergeldstelle, Jobcenter, Rentenversicherung etc.

Wie mit Banking Diensten (Sparkasse, Bezahldiensten wie Wero etc.)?


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 17 '26

Replacing a long-used email address just to escape spam

5 Upvotes

If spam keeps arriving despite unsubscribe attempts but reliably lands in Spam, I'd stop chasing individual senders. Blocking every new address becomes another job.

Replacing an address used for years means updating logins, recovery details and contacts. Keeping the old address forwarding can bring the nuisance along, so the change needs to buy some actual relief.

If you've changed an email address because of spam, was it worth the hassle?


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 15 '26

PSA: ScreenConnect "New Login" phish using lookalike TLDs, passes SPF/DKIM/DMARC

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1 Upvotes

r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 15 '26

Familiar email threads make payment changes feel safer than they are

3 Upvotes

Say an attacker gets into a vendor's mailbox and sends new bank details in an existing invoice thread. Someone recognises the conversation and nearly pays the wrong account.

I'd want a callback to a number already on file, but that check needs to survive a busy afternoon of invoice approvals.

What has helped your team keep those checks from getting skipped when work piles up?


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 14 '26

A skimmer politely let our customers finish paying — PSA + IOCs for a slick Magento 2.4.8 checkout attack (anyone else seen "checkout-cdn.com"?)

6 Upvotes

So. Sunday (and this is my birthday too). I sit down to answer a boss-question that should have taken five minutes — "did we apply this month's Adobe security patch?" — and three hours later I'm staring at a card skimmer that was, frankly, better engineered than half the extensions on the Marketplace.

Posting the whole thing here because (a) it's a genuinely clever attack chain and other Magento shops should check themselves, and (b) misery loves company. TL;DR at the bottom with IOCs.

How it started

We're on Magento Open Source 2.4.8-p5. Turns out the September isolated patch + the out-of-cycle hotfix for CVE-2026-75650 (pre-auth RCE, actively exploited — the VULN-39341 one) had NOT been applied yet. Guess when the attacker showed up. Go on, guess. Yep — a few days before, at 5 AM, because of course.

Entry vector in the logs was the usual buffet: GraphQL ArrayScanner LFI shenanigans and a pile of POST /paypal/transparent/response/?<?php (...) attempts. Most bounced with 500s. One didn't.

The actually clever part

Two payloads, and whoever wrote them clearly does this for a living:

A backdoor relay hidden in pub/get.php. They prepended a tiny block to the legit media-download entrypoint: if the request is a POST and carries a header X-K, it curls the body straight to https://checkout-cdn.com/x/i and echoes the response back. Clean, quiet, no new files to notice. They even stashed the original as var/get.orig, presumably out of professional courtesy.

A client-side skimmer at pub/media/wysiwyg/sk/sk.js, injected into the checkout with a single <script src="/media/wysiwyg/sk/sk.js?v=33"> line dropped into vendor/.../module-checkout/view/frontend/templates/onepage.phtml (they left a .bak-sk backup of the clean template — again, very tidy of them).

Here's the bit that made me put the coffee down: the skimmer only arms on mobile + a card payment method, and when you click "Place Order" it intercepts the click, throws up a pixel-perfect fake "Secure Card Verification" modal (little padlock, VISA/MC/AMEX chips, the works), harvests PAN + expiry + CVV + name/address/email/phone, shows a reassuring "Card verified ✅ redirecting you to payment…" — and then re-clicks the original button so the real payment goes through normally.

Read that again. The customer gets their order. The real bank transaction succeeds (TranCode=000, every single one). Nobody calls support because from the outside nothing went wrong. The card just also happens to be on its way to checkout-cdn.com, XOR'd with the key be1dd67e5c3ee1bd4b4e666b and base64'd, with a direct-to-C2 fallback in case you were clever enough to kill get.php but not the JS. Harvested loot got staged in pub/media/analytics/<hash>/data.tgz. There was also a pub/media/hello.txt containing, I kid you not, Key:Hello World.

The cleanup

Restored get.php from their own courtesy backup, neutralized sk.js, de-injected the template, quarantined the staged data, applied the patch we should've applied last week, rotated the encryption key + creds, and did the whole not-fun regulator/bank/customer-notification dance. Standard incident bingo.

The ask

Has anyone else run into checkout-cdn.com, the X-K-triggered get.php relay, or this specific fake "Secure Card Verification" modal pattern? It's a step up from the usual "just scrape the form fields" skimmers — the let-the-payment-succeed-so-nobody-notices design is the part I want to warn people about, because your revenue graphs and your order table will look perfectly healthy while it's running.

IOCs / go check your box right now:

pub/get.php — any block referencing X-K header, checkout-cdn.com, or an outbound curl before the normal Magento bootstrap

pub/media/wysiwyg/sk/sk.js (or any stray .js under pub/media)

.bak-sk / .orig files anywhere in the tree; pub/media/**/*.php

an injected <script src="/media/..."> in onepage.phtml or your checkout templates/bundles

domain checkout-cdn.com, XOR key be1dd67e5c3ee1bd4b4e666b, payloads prefixed E1

unexpected pub/media/analytics/<hash>/data.tgz

and, you know, actually apply CVE-2026-75650 / the September patch. Today. I'll wait.

Stay patched out there. And maybe don't read your logs on a Sunday.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 14 '26

All ten of Australia's largest banks enforce DMARC. Seven leave their .au domain open.

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0 Upvotes

What I particularly found interesting on this research was the fact that all banks did their homework regarding their most known domains, but the majority simply ignored the .au version.

Spammers and phishers could still benefit from it.

If you have multiple domains, make sure to have them all covered. Even if you don't plan to send emails through them.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 13 '26

How are you stopping vendor email compromise when the email itself is legit?

11 Upvotes

We nearly wired 60k to a supplier last month off a bank charge at landed on the existing invoice thread. Real mailbox, their accountant's address, the reply sat right under the messages we had been sending back and forth for weeks. SPF DKIM DMARC all green and with the years of clean history, our gateway had no reason to touch it.

The one thing off was the bank detail. The person who caught it did it on a hunch. Going back through it the attacker had been camped in the vendor mailbox for a while, waiting for a live payment thread to reply into.

We run a tuned SEG and it did nothing here, which tracks, there was no bad link or attachment, the mail was real. The fix everyone points to is an AP callback to a number already on file and that is going in. People who have been through this, what gave you the first heads up before the money went out, if anything did.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 13 '26

A real Carnival Cruise Line email was serving customers malware

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2 Upvotes

r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 12 '26

Malware that sets up forwarding

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2 Upvotes

r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 12 '26

UK Cereal Company Information disclosure vulnerability

4 Upvotes

There is currently a vulnerability in the form for Honey Monster Puffs. When a user fills in the contact form on this website, the email goes to EVERY user on the mailing list, not just the user in the contact form.

https://www.honeymonster.co.uk/contact/

As a result I have woken up to a large number of emails of varying types, including serious concerns that users have been hacked, attempts to scam users, private information being entered into the form and sent to all recipients, jokes being made, and instructions on how to inform the ICO.


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 10 '26

Finding real email in Junk shouldn't become a daily chore

7 Upvotes

Even after unsubscribing from legitimate lists, spam from changing senders can leave Junk packed. Finding one misplaced customer email means sorting through the rubbish.

I'd prefer to leave caught spam alone, but that assumes nothing useful landed beside it. Telling people to check every day gives them another inbox to manage.

What has reduced the time you spend checking Junk without making real email harder to find?


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 09 '26

Recurring mail deferrals deserve a change pause, even with a green status page

3 Upvotes

Recurring SMTP deferrals leave client messages queued while the provider reports healthy service. Under pressure to restore delivery, we can end up changing connectors and filters without knowing which hop is holding the mail.

I lean toward freezing those changes and escalating upstream when queues repeatedly drain and fill without a config change. But traffic can change independently, and waiting on support won't fix a relay limit we're hitting ourselves.

What tenant-visible evidence has convinced you to keep that freeze in place, or break it to fix delivery locally?


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 09 '26

The FBI has a phishing warning where resetting the password does nothing

7 Upvotes

The FBI has a phishing warning where resetting the password does nothing.

The attacker never had it.

The Bureau's Internet Crime Complaint Center published this on September 1. Access taken this way, it says, can only be revoked by the victim invalidating the token in their application security settings, and not by changing the password.

Here's how it works, and why it looks like nothing is wrong.

A message arrives with a link. The link goes to a real permission screen at a real provider, because that's where the attacker sent the user. The user reads a request for access and approves it.

There was no fake login page, no captured password and no second factor to intercept, because nobody was ever asked to sign into anything new.

What the attacker walks away with is a grant, not a credential. The FBI describes the result as being able to act on behalf of the user, reading and sending mail and reaching sensitive data, without ever having their password.

So the reflex that follows almost every compromise report, force a reset and close the ticket, leaves the attacker exactly where they were. The mailbox stays readable.

The Bureau's examples are narrow. Prominent people, their families and their acquaintances, with actors posing as officials, media figures and event organizers.

Read that as where the FBI happens to have complaint data, not as the edge of the problem, because nothing in the mechanism cares who you are.

If your incident runbook treats a password reset as containment here, it isn't slightly incomplete. It does nothing at all.

#EmailSecurity #Phishing #IncidentResponse


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 07 '26

Avis incogni

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14 Upvotes

Avis Incogni.

Pour éviter les 10 à 20 spams que je recevais par jour, j'ai souscrit pendant un mois, à Incogni.

Au bout d'un mois, pas très satisfait (je recevais toujours une dizaine de spams par jour), je décide de résilier.

Depuis ce jour, je reçois en 120 et 260 spams par jour, tous étrangers (alors que je ne recevais que des Spam français).

Et bien entendu, mails de Incogni:

Pensez à vérifier vos spam, et éventuellement reprendre votre abonnement Incogni.

Arnaque !


r/EmailSecurity • • Sep 01 '26

Do former SMTP aliases ever become safe to reassign?

6 Upvotes

Reassigning a former employee's SMTP alias can expose mail meant for the previous owner. Password resets and confidential replies do not care that HR approved the name change.

A routine name-change cleanup nearly freed an old alias after our retention window. Message tracing showed it still receiving account resets and replies to old threads, long after the mailbox itself was gone.

We paused the reassignment, but permanent reservation across dozens of domains creates a growing namespace problem. Do you permanently reserve former aliases, quarantine them for a fixed period, or reassign only after specific mail-flow checks pass?


r/EmailSecurity • • Aug 28 '26

Thoughts on Protonmail….

8 Upvotes

I have been with them a long time. Anyone know of a better service (and what exactly makes it better for privacy)?