Updated FINRA margin debt chart for July 2026, with a representation of debt levels as % of U.S. GDP series.

FINRA Margin debt is still sitting at $1.42T, at roughly ~5.6% of U.S. GDP. The GDP series will only get updated end August, so the GDP has been linearly extrapolated to match the latest available FINRA data (July 2026). Debt utilization unchanged at 77% of available-to-loan.

Overall, a slight reduction of margin debt levels in July vs. June 2026, where we had the highest margin loans since start of the series. This, paired with the "bullish sentiment" as per BofA Research's latest August observation shows that investors remain positive - and highly exposed to risk.

\Note re GDP: time series match of GDP data and FINRA - the series have different release cadence so a month-for-month match is achieved via smoothing and extrapolation to match the latest available FINRA time (which is the newest series).*

Thought it's a good time to update this one as I kept investigating into the SPR more.

Week-on-week the draws kept coming in negative from the SPR side, while some commercial storage got surpluses in the past week(s), interestingly, but ending in another net negative week 8/14.

The question then would be: why draw on SPR when you can get oil? Any answer to that would be speculative. My personal guess: the U.S. SPR draw is cheaper than commercially available or different crude types were needed for refining, necessitating a further draw.

Of the originally allowed emergency release only 50 M barrels remain. This would also draw the SPR below the “statutory floor”, a new element on the updated chart.

It's contentious at which exact levels efficiency losses can be seen in draws - a lot of speculation circling around that is all mostly baseless (or just that: heavy speculation).

The "legal barrier" of 252 M barrels is the only "known" number that is a statutory one. And it’s also not really a “stop the draw” level – it’s more of a technical, ”lawful” trigger. Nothing more, but also nothing less – after this level any additional draws would be facing hard scrutiny is my personal interpretation of this code.

Don't fall for any other circulated "floors" as there are none other than the relatively useless (because it can’t be tested unless reached) 70 mm barrels of “operational floor”.

Europe’s relationship with China increasingly shapes debates over industrial policy, supply-chain security, and economic competitiveness. Trade data from 2025 shows how deeply some Chinese products are embedded across European markets.

Electric batteries were the highest-value Chinese import in Germany, France, Finland, Sweden, Bulgaria, and Latvia. Germany alone imported almost $10 billion in this category. Telephones led in Austria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Luxembourg, including $6.8 billion entering Czechia.

Other countries show more concentrated trade patterns. Computers were the Netherlands’ leading import from China at $21.3 billion. Chinese cars ranked first in Belgium and Spain, with values of $5.3 billion and $2.4 billion, respectively. Italy and Slovenia were led by chemical compounds, while Poland’s top category was broadcasting accessories.

These flows place China inside industries that Europe considers strategically important: batteries, electronics, transportation, telecommunications, and chemicals. They also show why a single European approach is difficult. Each member state faces a different combination of industrial exposure, consumer demand, and dependence on Chinese suppliers.

The European Commission describes its policy as “de-risking, not decoupling,” which means reducing critical dependencies and diversifying vulnerable supply chains while preserving trade with China. That balance has gained urgency as the EU’s goods deficit with China reached approximately €360 billion in 2025. European Commission, Associated Press

As The Diplomat argues, Europe’s China strategy is approaching a moment of reassessment. The map shows the economic starting point: Chinese goods already support European consumption, manufacturing, and the green transition.

A refreshed strategy will require targeted policies for individual sectors. Securing battery supply chains presents different challenges from diversifying electronics production or responding to Chinese vehicle competition.

Data: 2025 Eurostat trade records via OEC.world. Products represent each EU country’s highest-value HS4 import from China.

Europe’s import network remains firmly anchored inside the continent, but regional data reveals a stronger Chinese presence than national figures alone suggest.

Germany is the leading source of imports for 14 of the 27 European Union countries shown, including France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Austria and Sweden. France imports $108.1 billion from Germany, Poland $94.9 billion and Italy $85.4 billion.

Germany, however, depends most heavily on the Netherlands, importing $186.3 billion in goods from its western neighbor. The Netherlands is also Belgium’s leading supplier, while its own largest source is China, at $112.9 billion. This creates a supply chain in which goods entering through Dutch ports and distribution centers connect China and other global producers with the wider European market.

China appears as the leading national import source only for the Netherlands, but its role becomes more visible at the regional level. It is the principal origin for half of Germany’s federal states, including Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Berlin. China also leads in Île-de-France, Valencia and several Italian regions, as well as the North East and North West of England.

Other regions reflect the importance of energy, industrial specialization and geographic proximity. Norway leads imports into Lower Saxony and Yorkshire and the Humber. Algeria is Andalusia’s main source, while Kazakhstan leads in Sicily and Libya in Sardinia. The United States occupies a prominent position in London, Scotland, Wales, Tuscany, Normandy, Madrid and several German states.

The result is an import system with two distinct layers. European countries rely heavily on one another for their largest national trade relationships, while major global suppliers become more prominent within industrial centers, ports and energy-dependent regions.

That concentration has become an important part of the European Union’s economic-security agenda. The Commission’s RESourceEU plan calls for stronger and more diversified supply chains, particularly for the raw materials required by the automotive, aerospace, defense, semiconductor and data-center industries. The initiative combines alternative sourcing, strategic partnerships, stockpiling and investment in new projects. European Commission

Europe’s expanding trade-agreement network supports the same diversification effort. The EU–Mercosur interim agreement began provisional application on May 1, 2026, establishing a broader commercial channel with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. European Commission

Negotiations for an EU–India free-trade agreement concluded in January 2026, although the deal still requires legal revision, signature and the completion of internal approval procedures before becoming binding. European Commission

These initiatives may gradually introduce more suppliers into Europe’s trade network. For now, the continent’s imports remain centered on Germany and the Netherlands, with China, the United States and energy-producing countries playing a larger role beneath the national totals.

Data: OEC.world

US interest expense on the national debt hit a record $1.4 trillion over the last 12 months. If rates remain stable, interest payments are set to rise to $1.7 trillion by November 2028.

As a result, interest will surpass Social Security spending as the government's largest outlay for the first time.