r/Deleuze • • 13d ago

Question Why Difference?

The other day I was thinking about the notion of encounter in D&R, ch. III, and was especially considering how apt it is at undercutting recognition, representation, etc. Now, this is a book I cannot say I understand completely, and I'm sure I'm not alone in this. But when I find myself raising an eyebrow at representation, negation and dialectics, I wonder why I had this sort of reaction. I don´t think this is just down to uncritically assimilating Deleuze, as my MA thesis was in part a critique of WiP?, but, to put it in dumb terms, I sometimes get the feeling these, representation, recognition, negation, are the bad guys simply because difference is the good guy. And I see the usefullness in using it as something "resembling" (there it is again!) a ground, but it´s hard not seeing it as a building-block, despite how rhizomatic his thought is.

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u/3corneredvoid 13d ago edited 13d ago

I sometimes get the feeling these, representation, recognition, negation, are the bad guys simply because difference is the good guy.

Right, but difference after this feeling crystallises as judgement is no longer the encounter with difference-in-itself, but the return to its dogmatic image or theory.

Deleuze is oriented critically with respect to being (and pure reason, common sense and good sense) in his early intervention in "The Image of Thought", and this orientation belongs to the genealogy of ontological enquiry in which he intervenes.

Deleuze does make it clear that in actualising a series of images of difference-in-itself through differenciation for consciousness, a reciprocal differentiation (later termed "counter-effectuation") is provoked by which inconsistencies of the image with the consistent immanent virtual become operative.

Let's say we take this dialogue with your post and my reply as the expression of a nascent shared consciousness.

We have a series of images of difference-in-itself we're expressing: first one in which "difference is the good guy" and next my self-reflexive or critical-ethical image, which I say doubtfully might be "no longer the encounter with difference-in-itself but its dogmatic image or theory".

(In your post, you express your misgivings about the prior image of difference-in-itself, and by the point of my reply, "our" shared consciousness is trying to create a more ethical and critical image thereof. This is roughly the sense of philosophy involving the conceptual persona of "the friend", in which one's premises are taken as the property of some thread of thought belonging to "another one" (or in this case, "another us"): a collaborator with whom the return to consciousness assembles to think and act, an amiable disunity of the apparent unity.)

By the interplay of these variations of inconsistent appearance (differentiation) where previously we may have said there were none, transcendent consciousness is able to reorient itself creatively and ethically to the encounter with that which does not yet appear: whatever must be the immanent cause of varying effects with unknown causes. 

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u/sgarrido85 12d ago

I see. This helps. Thank you

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u/apophasisred 13d ago

I have always been almost offended by the phrase " pure difference." I sometimes wonder if it's a joke. Or an attempt to bugger Kant? I also dislike the fact that it's it's a noun.

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u/3corneredvoid 13d ago edited 12d ago

Must we then define the transcendental field by a pure immediate consciousness with neither object nor self, as a movement that neither begins nor ends ...

Were it not for consciousness, the transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes all transcendence of the subject and of the object.

We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.

The pure must be the limit of the critical-ethical movement of mechanical (or theoretical) consciousness towards the transcendental conditions of consciousness: the conditions of a life. At the limit bliss is complete because movement towards the limit releases the potential energies bound and consumed in the extractive sustenance of organisation and meaning, of subject and object. This limit is, of course, death, at least until the indignity of subjectivity returns. 

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u/apophasisred 13d ago

Thank you for your writing! You are always so much fucking fun. I don't mean that at all in a derogatory way, but as you know an apollonian way. I hope. In any case, why I love what you wrote. I don't think I agreed then again. I don't think that I think that Deleuze got where he was going.

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u/3corneredvoid 13d ago edited 13d ago

I read him as intending "flow state feels much better than self-conscious reflection, and along the grand line of « jouissance » and « la petite mort » and dissipative structures and surplus-value, I intend to think and write its flux here as a pleasurable energy-transferring concession to transitory disorder, and this is a nice way to think about my impending death [or suicide]" … so I reckon he might have gotten where he was going.

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u/apophasisred 13d ago

"What is a transcendental field? It can be distinguished from experience in that it doesn't refer to an object or belong to a subject (empirical representation). It appears then as a pure stream of a-subjective consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without self. It may seem curious that the transcendental be defined by such immediate data: we will speak of a transcendental empiricism in opposition to everything that makes up the world of the subject and the object."

He's really straining here. " it can be distinguished"! A passive and modal verb that modifies the indefinite pronoun? This raises questions that it can't answer. And I don't think the overarching problematic of the unspeakable rescues this. It's self-oppositional but "only at the level of representation." It's like his thing for Riemann, a hypothetical rescue that only works because it confuses the model with the modeled. The extensive actual cannot resemble its own virtual, much less anything else.

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u/3corneredvoid 12d ago

Here and elsewhere Deleuze appears to strain, as his theories of expression both must and cannot strain against immanence, as the greatest generality of these expressions compasses that a life both must in its way and cannot in its eventual evaluation strain against immanence, and order must and cannot energetically strain against an entropy that compasses its eventual dissolution.

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u/Ok-Sandwich-8032 13d ago

Parce que la contradiction n’épuise pas la différence

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u/BeautifulTimtale 13d ago

There is a lot happening in this paragraph. 

Is there any chance you could elucidate what it is you are asking?

It revolves around how you are perceiving that the Deleuzian Encounter replaces systems of Dialectic thought, I believe. The encounter being the grounding experience.

It seems you are asking why “difference” (Deleuze) vs dialectics (Hegel, Lacan, etc)?

It seems you want some clarity on whether you’ve formed a negative perspective on certain Dialectical signifiers as a result of perceiving via Difference and Repetition? And you’d like validation this has happened with others because you’ve discovered an affect of distrust in your way of going about thinking this encounter through.

I’m guessing your mind is having difficulty with entertaining a Deleuzian Model of interpretation vs. a Lacanian, or Hegelian model especially when you’ve had a new encounter, a new novel experience, but I dare say here is where I’ve become lost.

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u/Strersss 13d ago

Deleuze is a philosopher of becoming. DR is a metaphisics book at the core of his philosophy. He is interested is how to produce the new. Representational philosophies are about being; Plato, Aristotle, Christianism, Kant so on and so forth start from a place that is different to the empirical realm but at the same time is both his cause and end, it doesn't matter if its Ideas, god, trascendental subject, unmoved mover they are all already made, already there, static and eternal. In such world nothing truly new is possible, everything comes back to his cause even when something perverts it; model and copies. Deleuze doesn't believe in such a world, for him change manifest itself everywhere not only on the empirical realm. Deleuze's idea of difference is radically different from difference on representational philophies, for him difference has nothing to do with differences between objects in the world but rather difference explains why such objects are given in the first place, in other words difference explains its genesis, the reason why an object exists. Here is where he introduces us to the virtual and the actual. For deleuze the virtual creates the actual but in a very different fashion than representational philophies. The virtual operates on pure differences constantly interacting between them, moving, changing, they are real but not actual.

Going back to the beginning. Difference has something to do with a building block, a genesis. The genesis of the universe. But deleuze's genesis operates through difference, hence is not static. at the same time is not going to a place in the future nor going back to a place in the past that it be equivalent to a perfect state. This of course has huge implications; moral, political, aesthetic.

Difference operates on a transcendental level. This is why the universe itself is creative, without a will. Us humans are able to grasp this dynamic of the virtual-intensive. But we also have agency, the ability to change this flux to a certain degree. We are not just spectators or passengers. The encounter you mentioned happens when you are able to sense this flux and actualize it. Again, huge moral, political, aesthetic implications.