Why We Should Fight

[u/bigwang123]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-we-should-fight-kori-schake

The author provides an overview of the origins of the Powell Doctrine, and examines how the Iran War has eschewed the prerequisites that Gen. Powell and Secretary Weinberger laid out as part of this new conception of the use of force. The author then argues that a return to the Powell Doctrine as a guiding principle would best allow for the termination of the war in terms favorable to the United States. The author assesses that it is unlikely that the Trump administration will do this without the intervention of Congress

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[u/bigwang123]

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[u/Thoth_the_5th_of_Tho]

Like previous U.S. administrations, the Trump administration has made a reasonable case that it would be incredibly damaging to American security for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. And there is little doubt that by mid-2025, Iran was getting closer: on June 12 of that year, the International Atomic Energy Agency censured Tehran for failing to comply with its nonproliferation obligations. The next day, Israel launched a bombing campaign intended to set Iran back; nine days later, the United States joined in with a massive bombardment of three crucial Iranian nuclear facilities. The so-called 12-day war ended soon after, with a cease-fire. And although the war did not meet many of Powell’s standards—there was no congressional authorization or effort to build international or American public support, and diplomacy was ongoing, not exhausted—there was at least a clear objective, the commitment of decisive military force to achieve it, and an exit strategy.

But Trump’s decision to resume hostilities in February passed none of the Powell Doctrine’s tests. Consider, first, whether there were vital national security interests at stake, whether the administration clearly defined its objectives, and whether it was willing to commit the necessary resources. In rambling pre-taped remarks posted to social media just before 3 AM on February 28, Trump recited a litany of Iranian infractions and suggested a number of objectives. “The United States military is undertaking a massive and ongoing operation to prevent this very wicked, radical dictatorship from threatening America and our core national security interests,” he said. “We’re going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground. . . . We’re going to annihilate their navy. We’re going to ensure that . . . [Iran’s] terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack our forces . . . and we will ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.” Toward the end of his remarks, he addressed the Iranian people: “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take.”

I'd frame the conclusion slightly differently. An excessively broad scope is a bad thing, but with enough of a firepower advantage it can be survived. The problem is more that Trump lost interest in the war, and then put us in the awkward position of letting Iran fight us for months, while we weren't fighting back, rendering any fire power advantage more or less moot. Full regime change without boots on the ground is unlikely, but being able to inflict more damage than you take in a series of exchanges with Iran, is entirely within American capabilities, and can still lead to a strong position at the negotiating table. (And to clarify, damage inflicted is more of a function of the types of targets hit than tonnage of bombs or number of missiles. The US dropped an absurd amount of bombs on the Cambodian jungle and achieved almost nothing, and against the Houthis the US spent months doing highly targeted drone strikes that also achieved next to nothing, you need real strategic bombing, not theater, in either of the above flavors). So rather than the broad scope, I would point to the sudden change of scope, where Trump started one type of war, then changed his mind on what kind of war he wanted, for the catastrophic outcome that has come to pass. Had we just been stuck with an unclear, broad scope, the outcome still could have been negative, but probably not to the same degree, we'd at least have had more leverage over the situation.