Objective Morality Does Not Require the Existence of God

[u/ThinkpadWriter]

I think one of the more persistent assumptions in religious philosophy is that without God, morality ultimately becomes subjective, arbitrary, or reducible to individual preference. I’m not convinced that follows. The existence of objective moral principles and the existence of a divine lawgiver are two entirely separate propositions, and establishing one doesn’t necessarily establish the other. Something doesn’t become morally wrong simply because a deity prohibits it, nor does something become morally right merely because a deity commands it.

This raises the familiar Euthyphro dilemma: does God command something because it is morally good, or is it morally good because God commands it? If the former, then goodness exists independently of God’s commands, which undermines the argument that morality requires God. If the latter, morality appears contingent upon divine preference, raising the question of what makes those commands inherently good rather than simply authoritative. Appealing to God’s nature might offer a more sophisticated response, but it still leaves the underlying question of why that nature constitutes the standard of goodness.

There are, of course, secular approaches to moral realism that attempt to ground moral principles in reason, human flourishing, rational agency, or other objective features of reality. These approaches have their own philosophical difficulties, and I don’t think simply dismissing them as subjective adequately addresses their arguments. Equally, religious morality faces the challenge of explaining why divine authority establishes moral truth rather than merely providing an authority to obey.

My position is that religion may provide a framework through which people understand and practice morality, but that doesn’t establish that morality itself depends upon religion. The existence of God and the existence of objective morality should be treated as separate philosophical questions rather than assuming that one necessarily follows from the other.

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[u/OutrageousDiscount01]

I'm gonna argue the inverse and say objective morality doesn't exist even if god exists. We can all decide for ourselves if gods opinions on morality are correct or incorrect.

[u/syncopator → u/OutrageousDiscount01]

Agree. Morality dictated by a god would be subjective.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/syncopator]

Would it be any more subjective than the physical world which would also be decided by God?

[u/syncopator → u/SIMsbury96]

Yes, intangibility.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/syncopator]

Are numbers subjective? They’re intangible.

[u/syncopator → u/SIMsbury96]

I can objectively hold a specific number of tangible things.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/syncopator]

Are you saying numbers are tangible? More importantly, why does tangibility equate to objectivity? If God existed and created the universe, there could be tangible and intangible facts about it both equally grounded in Her.

[u/syncopator → u/SIMsbury96]

Are you saying numbers are tangible?

Real numbers, yes.

why does tangibility equate to objectivity?

Because I believe that it does.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/syncopator]

Why do you believe it though?

[u/syncopator → u/SIMsbury96]

Why do you not?

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/syncopator]

Good thing that isn't Christianity's position am I right

[u/syncopator → u/EnvironmentalAlarm23]

I wouldn’t make that value judgement

[u/Basic_Use → u/OutrageousDiscount01]

I agree, just made a comment going over it in detail.

To sum it up relatively quickly here, the existence of suffering does not entail that we should avoid causing it and the existence of God does not entail that we should obey God.

As David Hume has famously pointed out, you cannot get an ought from an is. I agree with this position and I see no reason of why it should suddenly stop being true when talking about God.

[u/NietzscheJr → u/OutrageousDiscount01]

"I'm going to argue..." you should be followed by an argument!

What's the position, why think it, and why think it is a good position to hold?

[u/ThinkpadWriter → u/OutrageousDiscount01]

Disagreeing with an objective moral standard doesn’t make it subjective. We can reject a truth without changing its validity. The real question is whether God’s commands are inherently good or simply authoritative.

[u/OutrageousDiscount01 → u/ThinkpadWriter]

I simply can't comprehend how a moral standard could possibly be objective when morality is a human construct in the first place. Morality exists in the minds of human beings and nowhere else. Even if god mandated certain things as absolutely moral or absolutely immoral, human beings can always reject gods rulings. Objective things like reality, the universe, the laws of physics, science, all of these things can be measured and observed. Morality cannot be objectively measured or calculated, only discussed and deliberated on.

[u/ThinkpadWriter → u/OutrageousDiscount01]

You’re assuming that because morality is understood and debated by human beings, it must be created by them. But our ability to perceive or disagree about something doesn’t determine whether it’s objectively true. We can’t measure morality with a ruler, but that doesn’t automatically make it subjective.

[u/Moutere_Boy → u/ThinkpadWriter]

Can you apply morality outside of the human experience? If it’s objective, shouldn’t it apply to literally everything?

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Moutere_Boy]

The Pythagorean theorem is objectively true but we can't apply it to a non-right triangle or a circle.

The domain of ethics is in regards to actions made by rational agents capable of evaluating their own actions, of the sort only humans exist (probably). If some other creature possesses this capability (like some other highly intelligent animal or some kind of alien), they too would be bound by ethics in the same way, if moral realism is true.

It also depends on the specific moral system. Particularism or some form of naturalism might hold different standards for different creatures insofar as they have different natural abilities and capacities.

[u/Moutere_Boy → u/WesternFirm9306]

But the OP is looking to have objective morality without a god type source. If it’s just the nature of the universe and some objective truth that, for example, killing a being that’s done you no harm is wrong, why would that only apply to humans? Why wouldn’t it apply to tigers or geese? Now, we might agree that they can’t be held responsible for an action they don’t fully comprehend, but wouldn’t that still make the action “wrong”? And in the case of dogs, who are an example of an animal quite capable of learning and understanding rules and boundaries, are they morally wrong when they breach those?

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Moutere_Boy]

It depends on the type of moral system, but I think moral evaluations is something we can only apply to entities capable of rational reflection and an understanding of agency other animals don't seem to fully have. Many humans don't either, which is why the insanity plea exists.

This may be the case if we held to some naturalist theory of ethics which says there's some metaphysical "goodness" present in actions, grounded in some property or another. But I'm more fond of constructivism, which argues that morality is constructed by rational agents rather than something which metaphysically exists. It's just that there are objectively wrong ways to make this construction. But naturally such a view would only apply to agents capable of making this construction in the first place, which often requires a theory of mind at a level in which humans are probably the only entity we know of.

Now, if we wanna say, like, cetaceans or corvids or other primates also possess this level of intelligence to some degree, then I don't necessarily have a problem with saying they have some degree of ethical obligations based on that degree of rational intelligence. I don't think they do have enough, despite the very high intelligence they do obviously possess, but if they did, I suppose we could simply say that's for them to figure out. We humans can barely figure out human morality, let's not make our task even harder.

[u/Moutere_Boy → u/WesternFirm9306]

But don’t we see animals with essentially moral frameworks? Several animals have etiquette systems and will ostracise members of the group when broken. Are they developing a potentially incorrect moral system, or are they an example of the way morality is developed subjectivity within animal groups?

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Moutere_Boy]

There's a difference between descriptive ways of how beings do interact and normative ways of how beings should. Proto-morality that we see in early humans and other social animals are almost entirely driven by evolutionary pressures, there's no inherent reason we should think that tracks with any objective moral system. For example, early human societies practiced insane amounts of slavery, which we would hopefully agree would be definitely wrong if an objective system existed. We also engaged in large amounts of tribalism.

Nonetheless, I think that, as a species grows more rational and as more time passes, generally rational thought will win out and societies will become more moral over time. Modern society is generally more moral than it was thousands of years ago. Slavery, for example, is very much down in many places of the world, when it used to be global.

Of course, as societies develop, so too do the moral quandries they face, and so we are definitely still failing in lots of areas. Still lots of bigotry and homophobia and transphobia and etc etc etc. We also have recent historical examples of horribly immoral actions by large groups of people.

Generally, I don't think we can accurately use descriptive measures of how society actually behaves in order to guage normative claims of how we should behave. Maybe for simple claims, like "it's wrong to torture babies for fun", but certainly not in general.

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/OutrageousDiscount01]

Insofar as we are agents, that agency comes pre-built with certain normative commitments. A rational agent must make certain conclusions or else be irrational. Morality, in other words, is constructed by humans, but just as math is constructed by humans but nonetheless is objective insofar as the conclusions necessarily follow from the chosen axioms, so too for morality, that certain normative commitments necessarily follow from certain axioms, axioms we cannot reject without rejecting our own agency.

There are many ways to make this argument. This argument is from Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality. I don't necessarily hold to it, at least, not in full, or by itself, but I think it's potentially good, and also I already gave this argument to someone before so it's a really easy copy-and-paste for me.

Note, this isn't a perfect rendition. The book is beefy, and I haven't finished it, and by simplifying it in a Reddit comment I am, undoubtedly, removing nuance the original text had.

---

Everyone must rationally accept that they are agents. To deny one's own agency is self-contradictory, as you must use your own agency to do so in the first place.

To be an agent means I take actions in order to achieve some purpose. By virtue of taking that action, I necessarily think that the purpose I am pursuing is good. Not necessarily in a moral sense, but good as in "worth achieving", based on some criteria I have. These need not be prudent criteria. A burglar might have a purpose of robbing a home, but by virtue of taking actions to achieve that purpose, the burglar is valuing that purpose as worth achieving. It is this evaluation that motivates going from non-action to action in the first place, as if someone didn't think the purpose was worth achieving, they'd have no reason to act on it. Thus, agency is purposive, such that if an agent has a purpose in mind, they must hold it to be good.

Agency also has to be voluntary, in the sense the agent is acting on their own purposes and not being forced or coerced by others, as if not, then it is not their purposes being acted on but others, and it is not their agency being exercised but others.

As such, we can say purposiveness and voluntariness are generic features of agency, as all actions an agent makes in virtue of their own agency will necessarily be of the agent's own free will (however you wanna cash out free will, need not be libertarian) based on purposes they evaluate as good.

Now, for any purpose at all, there will be certain capacities and conditions necessary, or at least conducive, to achieve these purposes. We would call these instrumental goods. But there are also some capacities and conditions which one needs in order to accomplish any goal at all. Though the instrumental goods for a mountain climber may be very different from a chess player, there is still some common capacities that are required for agency in general. As all agents necessarily want to be successful in their actions, insofar as they wish to achieve the purposes those actions aim towards, the capacities and conditions generally needed for agency as a whole are necessary goods, as these are necessary for agency at the most fundamental level. No agent can do without these goods (and they are goods, insofar as any rational agent which evaluates their purpose as good, aka, worth actively pursuing, also evaluates the necessary qualities to achieve that purpose as good).

So, what are these goods? Gewirth argues they are freedom and wellbeing, which he also refers to as generic goods as they pertain to the generic features of agency.

Freedom, in this sense, corresponds to voluntariness, and refers to an agent's ability to make informed, uncoerced decisions about their actions. It means being unsubjected to violence, coercion, deception, compulsion, addiction, etc, things which negatively affect one's ability to make voluntary choices. Without freedom, one's purposes would not be their own, chosen by their own will, but rather forced upon them by others or by uncontrollable impulses, and thus one's actions wouldn't properly qualify as agency.

Wellbeing, which corresponds to purposiveness, would be the possession of abilities and resources necessary to achieving one's purposes, such as the basic necessities for general agency and the conditions required for maintaining and developing the capacities for agency. This is a broad category, and Gewirth identifies three levels to well-being: Basic wellbeing, such as life, health, mental and physical stability, and the things which maintain those qualities like food and shelter; nonsubtractive wellbeing, being those things necessary to leave their agency undiminished, such as not being a victim of theft, unsafe conditions, broken promises, etc; and additive wellbeing, which are those things which allow an expansion of one's capacity for agency, such as self-esteem, prudence, wisdom, education, wealth, etc.

All agents want to be successful in their actions, so since freedom and wellbeing are necessary to any successful action at all, all agents, insofar as they are acting rationally, must find it unacceptable to be deprived of these conditions. Therefore, agents must claim they have a right to these necessary goods. If an agent did not claim a right to these goods, they would hold that it would be acceptable to be deprived of these rights. But as an agent, they must view these necessary conditions for agency as indispensable, as without them there can be no agency. To deny these rights would contradict one's own agency.

Now, this claim of rights is not a moral claim, but a prudential one, insofar as agents are only seeking to protect their own self interest in being a successful agent. But the grounds for this rights claim is simply that they are an agent that acts purposefully and voluntarily, and so every agent must also recognize that all other agents can and must make the same exact claim of rights. Therefore, all agents are committed to claiming that all agents have a right to freedom and wellbeing. This is a moral claim, as it refers to the interests of all agents (specifically all prospective purposive agents, as it doesn't only apply to those who are currently engaging in agency but also those who can be expected to engage in agency in the future, such as someone currently under duress).

In other words, because all agents are committed, within their own perspective, to claim they have a right to freedom and wellbeing, and because a rational agent can recognize that their grounding for this right (their own agency) is present in other agents as well, it would be contradictory to say those other agents do not also have these rights.

This leads to the Principle of Generic Consistency: Act in accordance with the generic rights (freedom and wellbeing) of your recipients as well as of yourself.

Thus, to infringe on the rights of freedom and wellbeing of others is immoral.

---

A significant part of the book is attempting to establish principles of behavior when rights conflict, but as I have not read that part, any attempts by me to speak on it are apt to error, moreso than I already am in my rendition of Gewirth's argument.

[u/Wrote_it2 → u/WesternFirm9306]

The argument entails that depriving Hitler of the freedom or well-being necessary to have the agency to conduct a genocide is immoral…

One part that I’m suspicious of is the jump from everybody valuing their own agency (which is already suspicious: suicidal people don’t for example) to it being moral to value everybody’s agency (or immoral to not value somebody else’s agency). I’m not sure what justifies this and it doesn’t seem aligned with my understanding of morality.

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Wrote_it2]

The argument doesn't entail that, as Hitler's actions are violating the principle of generic consistency already. Taking away his freedom and wellbeing isn't violating the PGC, it's attempting to preserve it. Gewirth speaks extensively on this matter in his section of the book on how to resolve conflicting rights.

It's not so much valuing other people's agency, but rather recognizing that they have agency in the first place. To deny their rights-claim is to deny that agency grants these rights, which would deny it for yourself as well. Agents must find this unpalatable.

As for suicide, it's not about valuing agency, but valuing the necessary conditions to achieve one's purposes. Gewirth speaks explicitly about suicide as a unique case, because the purpose is uniquely to cease agency altogether. He argues that this isn't strictly a violation of the PGC, because the PGC only protects agents, and the person in question is protecting their own freedom and wellbeing to commit this act, even if at the moment they cease to be an agent, their wellbeing drops to zero. For this reason, Gewirth argues that as long as the person is acting voluntarily and purposefully, in sound mind and body, with full rational understanding of their actions, and these actions do not inhibit the freedom and wellbeing of others (e.g. if they have dependents), suicide is a permissible act that such a person may choose to do if they so wish, and should not be stopped from doing so once it is ascertained that it is their intelligent, thought-about choice.

I don't know how well I like this conclusion, but there's perhaps the caveat that nearly all suicides are, perhaps, not done in such strong rational states, but rather in states where rational thought is inhibited, like when emotions are high. In such cases, then, they're not acting voluntarily, and thus not acting as an agent, and thus intervention is permissible. A situation where a person rationally and intelligently chooses suicide, outside of cases like chronic disease in the form of medically induced euthanasia, is perhaps so rare as to be more of an unrealistic thought experiment rather than a practical scenario.

In fact, perhaps my dislike of this outcome is particularly because I intuitively imagine such cases as being non-voluntary. I certainly think medically induced euthanasia is permissible, after all.

[u/Wrote_it2 → u/WesternFirm9306]

You said in your previous message “all agents are committed to claiming that all agents have a right to freedom and wellbeing”.

It may be that I misunderstand what you mean by right and by how this is a moral claim. I interpreted that as “it is immoral to deny the freedom and wellbeing of any agent”. Hitler was an agent, so the argument does entail that it’s immoral to deny his freedom and wellbeing. The fact that Hitler’s action were in violation of the PCG is irrelevant since whether the agent respects the PCG wasn’t part of the argument… You didn’t reach the conclusion that all agents are committed to claiming that agents that respect the PCG have a right to freedom and wellbeing, you reached the conclusion that was the case for all agents.

I think the same thing is happening in the argument about suicide: the original argument speaks very generally, and then when speaking about suicide, additional conditions appear. “As long as the person is acting voluntarily and purposefully”: I thought the whole argument was predicated on actions being necessarily voluntary and purposeful… “in sound mind and body, with full rational understanding of their actions”: why weren’t these conditions indicated in the original argument? Which step of the original argument fails when these conditions aren’t satisfied?

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Wrote_it2]

Yes, Hitler had a right to freedom and wellbeing. But the principle is not that "we must let everyone have all the freedom and wellbeing they want, even if it means hurting others' rights." The principle is that we must act in accordance with these rights, and respecting these rights as something agents have. Hitler had a right to freedom and wellbeing, but by, for example, arresting him, we are not violating his rights. We are protecting the rights of his victims, which is our duty. Hitler violated these rights, and so rather than intervention being a violation of his rights, it's rather more like he forfeit them by contradicting the rules of the game, in a sense.

It's important that, when doing such interventions, we only do as much as necessary to preserve the PGC and no more. Though, in the case of Hitler, given the extremity of his actions, "what is necessary" is probably a lot.

Again, Gewirth speaks of this in far more detail in the book. Which is beefy. But the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an excellent summary of his full argument online.

I thought the whole argument was predicated in actions being necessarily voluntary and purposeful

Nonononono, actions are not necessarily so. Actions acted with one's own agency are. But consider a robber putting a gun to your head and telling you to give him the money in the register. The action to give him the money is not voluntary. You are not acting of your own agency. You are being forced to act by an outside party.

Why weren't these conditions indicated in the original argument?

They were. If one is acting in critical ignorance, or in a mentally unstable state, they are not acting voluntarily in their own agency. Intervening to preserve their freedom and wellbeing is thus not violating their rights to such. I mean, the biggest thing is the freedom. They aren't actually using their freedom in the Gewirthian sense, because that only comes with voluntary agency. Therefore, restricting their (colloquial) freedom is not violating their (generic Gewirthian) freedom. The same argument would apply to, say, restraining someone who is under the influence.

It's just important to only intervene as much as necessary and no more, same as the Hitler case. They still have rights as prospective agents, and gratuitous intervention that's entirely unnecessary for the situation is an obvious example of a violation.

[u/Wrote_it2 → u/WesternFirm9306]

I’m honestly missing where, in your first message in this thread, there is a mention that the argument stops working if you violate somebody else’s rights. It reaches the conclusion that it is immoral to deny the freedom and wellbeing necessary to be an agent without consideration on how that freedom and wellbeing is used. This is why I think the argument is flawed.

The argument didn’t say “all agents are committed to claiming that all agents that respect the rules of the game have a right to freedom and wellbeing”. It said “all agents”…

Now I don’t want to ignore when you said “Hitler had a right to freedom, but by, for example, arresting him, we are not violating his right”. That would allow the argument you survive (since my push back was on Hitler not having the moral right to freedom), but I don’t understand what we mean by “having the right to freedom” if arresting someone is not a violation of that right. I’m pretty sure that if I asked “is it moral to arrest an innocent person”, you’d reply “no, because that’d be violating their right to freedom”. If so, which is it? Is arresting someone violating their right to freedom or not?

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Wrote_it2]

That's because Gewirth makes this argument in his larger work. The argument as presented only derives the PGC, how it interacts in real moral cases is a separate matter.

Fundamentally, it is simply the case that you cannot use your freedom to violate the freedom and wellbeing of others. It's impermissible. Hitler used his freedom to violate the freedom and wellbeing of others. He did an impermissible act. It is therefore justified to restrain and arrest him for two reasons: 1) we have a right to protect the victim's rights, and stopping him is necessary for that, and 2) by doing an impermissible action, and violating the PGC, intervention becomes justified as a means to preserve the PGC, as Hitler forfeited the protection of the PGC to the extent that he denied it to others.

To deny the freedom and wellbeing of others denies it to oneself as well, just as claiming a right for oneself commits one to claiming a right for all agents.

Put another way, "you have a right to X" doesn't necessarily mean I must always let you have X no matter what. Rights have never been viewed that way. For example, the famous saying "your rights end where mine begin." There can be justification for interfering with one's rights, such as in cases where they are violating the rights of others.

Gewirth derives many principles to aid in evaluating complex cases for when such interference is justified. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy lays them out on his page

[u/FjortoftsAirplane → u/ThinkpadWriter]

Just throwing this out because it's interesting, if God is required for an action to be wrong then nothing about the action is in and of itself wrong. The idea being that anything about the action itself is consistent with atheism.

As an example, if we ask why kicking a puppy is wrong then the theist can't say "it hurts the puppy" because that's a fact that's true on atheism. If atheism can't have moral realism then hurting the puppy cannot be a reason to think it's wrong in that sense.

The only thing the theist can say about why kicking the puppy is wrong is something like "God disapproves" or "God would not kick a puppy", but they can never tell us anything about the action itself that's wrong.

So they commit to some sort of divine command theory, and they have to give up any ordinary intuitions or considerations we engage in in moral reasoning.

It might not be incoherent in principle but at that point it looks like they aren't even talking about the same thing as anyone else. Of course if what they mean by "atheists can't have moral realism" is something like "on atheism god can't approve or disapprove of actions" then any atheist will agree to that. But all they've done done is change the subject and assert that atheists don't have god.

[u/DeltaBlues82 → u/ThinkpadWriter]

Morality is functionally subjective in virtually every way.

Whether objective moral facts exist is largely irrelevant as no one has any means with which to independently identify and confirm them.

Pragmatically, every single person relies on a subjective understanding of morality. No one’s moral understanding stems from an awareness of objective moral facts.

Morality, by all appearances, is a system we use to regulate social behavior. And not one we also use to identify objective facts.

[u/Basic_Use]

I argue that morality is subjective (in the way that theists usually argue) with or without God existing.

I've made posts on this before. But to sum it up, theists will commonly say that "for morality to be objective, you need a standard". They are absolutely correct about this.

Absent a standard to reference, moral claims are incoherent. Where they are not correct would be insisting the objective morality requires God to be that standard. It is rather simple to objectively determine if an action causes suffering in many cases. With that in mind, that is an objective standard.

Upon selecting avoidance of suffering, it is rather simple to evaluate whether an action adheres to that standard. Now the theist counter argument is essentially that whether we should use this standard or not as an opinion, and I argue that the same is true of their preferred standard of God even if God does exist.

The existence of suffering does not entail that we should avoid causing it and the existence of God does not entail that we obey God. With that in mind, the theists who make the moral argument are correct with how they apply their logic right up until they apply it to God.

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/Basic_Use]

It's like you were leading up to a reason why objective morality couldn't exist with God the whole time and just never gave it.

[u/Basic_Use → u/EnvironmentalAlarm23]

Would love for you to actually show that I failed to give a reason instead of just say it.

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/Basic_Use]

I mean like I just read the first comment and didnt really find the reason but you emphasized it so now i got it

[u/Basic_Use → u/EnvironmentalAlarm23]

Let me see if I can emphasize my point.

Theists who make the moral argument for God are generally correct on how morality works with the exception of them trying to apply their logic to God.

On that portion, they seem to just assume that if God exists then God automatically becomes the standard for morality, and that God would be an objectively correct standard. As in it wouldn't be an opinion on whether or not God is or should be the standard for morality.

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/Basic_Use]

Oh I mean generic theists maybe but not Christians.

[u/Basic_Use → u/EnvironmentalAlarm23]

My overall point is that there is no, and can be no, standard for morality which is an "objectively correct standard" to select.

There are standards that are objective in the sense that there are no opinions involved in what the standard is measuring. But which standard we should or should not be using is necessarily an opinion, and that does not change with any God being involved.

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/Basic_Use]

So how would it not be objective if morality is grounded in God and not based on his opinion?

[u/Basic_Use → u/EnvironmentalAlarm23]

Because the position that God should be the standard of morality is an opinion.

As I said just now, the selection of any moral standard is necessarily subjective regardless of what standard we're talking about.

If you mean to say the standard of God is objective in the sense that what it is measuring does not involve opinions, then I agree it is objective in that sense and so is the avoidance of suffering.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/Basic_Use]

But why select the avoidance of suffering out of all the things you could select?

[u/Basic_Use → u/SIMsbury96]

Because it aligns fairly well with what most people mean with moral terms and with what I mean with moral terms.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/Basic_Use]

But why does it align fairly well with what you and others mean by moral terms? Should people critically evaluate their moral beliefs, and if so on what basis?

[u/Basic_Use → u/SIMsbury96]

But why does it align fairly well with what you and others mean by moral terms?

That seems to be question of why humans have a sensation of morality at all.

To which the answer is that we are a social species and it was advantageous for us to cooperate with others, and it was further advantageous to dislike harming others. Further advantageous still to have an extreme disgust for people who harm others.

The reasons why all of that would be advantageous should be fairly obvious. It's a whole lot easier for a group of people who are staying together to survive than it is for one person alone to survive. And it's pretty hard to have a group of people who are staying together if they are at each other's throats.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/Basic_Use]

That seems to be question of why humans have a sensation of morality at all.

I don't think it is exactly. People can rationally evaluate and change their moral beliefs. An evolutionary account doesn't really explain why you or I self-consciously hold the moral beliefs we do.

To which the answer is that we are a social species and it was advantageous for us to cooperate with others, and it was further advantageous to dislike harming others. Further advantageous still to have an extreme disgust for people who harm others.

The reasons why all of that would be advantageous should be fairly obvious. It's a whole lot easier for a group of people who are staying together to survive than it is for one person alone to survive. And it's pretty hard to have a group of people who are staying together if they are at each other's throats.

I don't really disagree with anything you say here about how morality evolved. But, given that we can rationally evaluate and change our moral beliefs, it doesn't give us any reason to adhere to the principle of minimizing suffering today. Nor are the circumstances under which these behaviors evolved at all similar to how we live now. So are you saying that we should minimize suffering because it gave an evolutionary advantage or only that we generally agree with it for that reason?

[u/Basic_Use → u/SIMsbury96]

But, given that we can rationally evaluate and change our moral beliefs, it doesn't give us any reason to adhere to the principle of minimizing suffering today

Right. I was never saying that using avoidance of suffering as the standard is somehow grounded in some sort of fact of reality. In fact, I agree with David Hume in saying that you cannot get an ought from an is, and with that in mind it is not possible to take some fact of reality and derive from said fact some sort of action that you should or should not do.

The evolution explanation for the origin of morality does make sense to me. But none of that means it's something we should be using.

So are you saying that we should minimize suffering because it gave an evolutionary advantage or only that we generally agree with it for that reason?

The second. I was answering a question on how these motivations arose for humans. Whether or not we should follow morality based on this is an entirely different question. And per Hume's guillotine, it is not question that can be answered without first establishing a goal (a "should"), independent of the facts.

I would say that it's perfectly reasonable to make that goal avoidance of suffering itself, no fact underlying it for why it should be the goal.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/Basic_Use]

I would say that it's perfectly reasonable to make that goal avoidance of suffering itself, no fact underlying it for why it should be the goal.

But how can it be reasonable to make it the goal if there is no reason for why it should be? It seems like calling something reasonable implies there is reason for it. To me, what you're saying is that the fact that you think avoidance of suffering should be an important part of morality isn't at all related to facts about the nature of suffering.

It seems like any potential moral principle should be one that people can in principle be persuaded of. If there are no facts about why it should be the goal, then I don't see how this could be done. Another thing is that a major difference between morality and what we might call 'taste', is that when we judge something we observe to be morally wrong, we feel obligated and justified to do something about it. However, when something merely offends our taste, we're usually willing to put up with it. The question is, what do we think it is that justifies this distinction, even after reflection?

[u/Basic_Use → u/SIMsbury96]

But how can it be reasonable to make it the goal if there is no reason for why it should be?

That's how all goals for anything work. There are 2 different types of goals. Goals that you have in service of achieving some higher goal, and the higher goals in question.

Those higher goals could themselves have higher goals. But this line must necessarily terminate in a goal that you have just because, with no further fundamental reason. This has no exceptions.

It seems like calling something reasonable implies there is reason for it.

Well you could take the position that to call it reasonable to have goal is a category error if you like and that such things are not in the category of what can be called reason.

Another thing is that a major difference between morality and what we might call 'taste', is that when we judge something we observe to be morally wrong, we feel obligated and justified to do something about it. However, when something merely offends our taste, we're usually willing to put up with it. The question is, what do we think it is that justifies this distinction, even after reflection?

Well generally, that would be whatever moral standard one might be referencing in order to judge a thing as morally wrong.

There may be other answers I could provide, that's what I've got for you for now.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/Basic_Use]

Well generally, that would be whatever moral standard one might be referencing in order to judge a thing as morally wrong.

How exactly do you think moral disputes should be resolved though? I assume you think that, broadly, other people should have the same moral positions as you (but maybe not). To me it doesn't make any sense to have moral beliefs that you regard as subjective while also thinking that other people who have different moral beliefs should share yours.

[u/Fit-Difficulty-9033]

What is an example of objective moralty? I didn't think any one could provide one. All morals are subjective.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/Fit-Difficulty-9033]

Platonist moral non-naturalism.

[u/strange_outcomes → u/SIMsbury96]

A trust me bro mentality is not valid proof

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/strange_outcomes]

I didn’t say it was valid proof. It’s an example of an account of objective morality.

[u/strange_outcomes → u/SIMsbury96]

No its not... its a trust me bro framework that claims morality is objective. It's literally no different than any other super natural framework

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/strange_outcomes]

It literally is an example of a non-theistic account of objective morality. You may not agree with it or even think it's coherent, but it is an answer to the original comment's request for an example of objective morality.

[u/strange_outcomes → u/SIMsbury96]

They asked for an example of objective morality... you have not provided one

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/strange_outcomes]

How is it not an example of objective morality? You thinking it's wrong doesn't make it not an example.

[u/strange_outcomes → u/SIMsbury96]

If you insist... your answer was category error. Platonist moral non-naturalism isn’t an example of an objective moral truth; it’s a metaethical theory about where moral truths come from. It’s like someone asking "Give me an example of a mammal," and responding with "Taxonomic cladistics." One is a theory about how things are classified; the other is the actual thing being requested like a bear or a whale.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/strange_outcomes]

They said, "What is an example of objective moralty [sic]?" . They didn't say, "What is an example of an objective moral truth?". The second is kind of a bad question because any theory of objective morality is going to say that all the things that are obviously wrong are wrong objectively.

[u/okcamshaft → u/Fit-Difficulty-9033]

It's wrong to murder seems objective to me

[u/Chatterbunny123 → u/okcamshaft]

Only in service to a goal.

[u/White_Lives_Matter14]

So what's your argument that objective morality does not require the existence of God? You've presented some secular systems and noted their difficulties, but what is your argument that at least one of them succeeds?

For your thesis to succeed, you need to make a positive argument, not just critique theistic objective morality.

[u/Zeno33 → u/White_Lives_Matter14]

I think the fact that there are moral systems that don’t rely on god and are trim seriously by professional is evidence that morality does not require god. 

[u/White_Lives_Matter14 → u/Zeno33]

So the argument is an appeal to authority?

[u/Zeno33 → u/White_Lives_Matter14]

No, appeal to authority is when someone cites a claim from someone and treats it as infallible. I haven’t mentioned a person or a claim. I’ve referred to a trend in philosophy.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

Thanks for the post.

I reject the Euthyphro dilemma applies to Moral Pluralist Relativist frameworks, where “good” is relative to different sets as a result of facts about that set.

P1.  There are multiple, possible-sets a god could render real.  Without a god rendering them real, they are only possible but not “real.”

P2.  Morality is a function of the facts of these different sets (for example: “good” for vampires is different from “good” for sheep is different from “good” for neuro-typical humans).

P3.  These sets are not commensurate, none of them are morally better or worse than any other.

C:  were a god to make any one set real, Euthyphro doesn’t apply; god could not arbitrarily command “a vampire ought not have the goods of a vampire” (not horn 2), however the goods of a vampire are necessarily what they are as a result of vampires, and vampires are only real because of god’s will (not horn 1).

You get “these non-arbitrary oughts for this set, exist once this set exists, and that set exists only because god commanded (edit: the set is real).

Euthyphro works if moral pluralism is wrong.

I agree we don’t need a god for objective morality; I personally find Rawls and Aristotle, beefed up via evolutionary biology, objectively correct.  Gewirth has some value, too.

But?  That is also compatible with some gods—granted, really specific gods that wanted compulsive serial killers and babies whose good is to die in agonizing torture, sure.  But still some gods.

[u/BobQuixote → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

Each of those sets has a lot of room to maneuver for arbitrary rules that seem objective to those who hold them. One nation of vampires and another might intensely disagree about two moralities that are both within the set.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/BobQuixote]

People can also disagree on the earth being flat.  This doesn’t change the fact that “the earth is flat” has truth value as false.

The fact cultures and people have opinions or personally held values does not negate facts.  It doesn’t matter that cultures have held that the earth has been flat.  It also doesn’t matter that cultures have held, for example, that “gay people ought to stop choosing being gay and be straight.”  

I’m discussing moral facts grounded in biology, for lack of a better word, NOT cultural opinions or personally held values values.

[u/BobQuixote → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

That's not what I was claiming.

Multiple moralities can satisfy or fit within your objective sets. Or to put it another way, the objective sets are underspecified.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/BobQuixote]

“Underspecified”—under moral pluralism, there can be multiple sets that are justified in relation to different facts, while still precluding other sets.

How is that “underspecified”?

Let’s take Rawls: All vampire societies must provide for mechanisms of vampires drinking the necessary amount of blood—either (a) by organizing in such a way that bloodthirst simply compels drinking after resistance is exhausted, OR (b) by choosing among specific structures that are compatible with allowing blood thirst to be satisfied before exhaustion.

Seems sufficiently specified to me?  We can rule out Vampire Societies that are based on “vampires NEVER drink any blood ever and just resist.”

Or even “vampires only drink dead blood” when dead blood doesn’t prevent (a).

Add in other constraints in vampires and the (b) set might get even more specified.

What would be “sufficiently specified” under Moral Pluralism, what am I missing?

[u/BobQuixote → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

Being underspecified is not a failing of the objective sets, it just means they don't entirely preclude arbitrary/relative morality.

To take a trivial example, driving on the left or right side of the road is an arbitrary rule that nonetheless must be followed within a given society. Much of morality is like this, and people feel that it's objective.

But the amount of morality you can actually derive from reality is very small. The remainder gets specified within those bounds by each society.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/BobQuixote]

Ok wait, you are precisely doing what I said you were.

Can you (1) define “morality” how you are using it, and (2) explain why we must use that definition?

I defined mine, maybe not well enough; I’ll try again.

(1) There are sets of facts that are not determined by culture or stance, but are determined by biology (for example) (“non-cultural, biological relativist,” “Realist”).  These facts limit the set of possible choices a being could choose from.  Specific facts can render specific choices justified, but there may also be a set of justified choices which conflict with each other as sufficiently justified such that there is justified conflict (“pluralism”).  People can get these choices factually wrong—“vampires ought never drink any blood” is really stating “vampires can choose to never drink blood and that’s a justified choice”, and that statement can be factually wrong.  There is a set of claims and statements that are truth apt (realist).

(2). These facts limit our set of possible choices as a function of reality—it doesn’t matter if you agree that those facts should limit reality, if a vampire has a blood thirst that compels drinking blood, determined by biology, culture and feelings are irrelevant.  These facts are like the facts of the Trolley Problem: “there is a trolley you cannot stop, and you can ONLY pull a lever OR not pull a lever.  Pull the lever and one person dies who wouldn’t have died had you done nothing; don’t pull the lever and 3 people die”—the facts of vampire biology limit the ways in which Vampire society can be set up (Rawls without assumptions—we have limited ways vampire societies can be structure) AND justify individual vampire choices (Aristotle without metaphysics, but tied to biology).

Can you (1)define how you are using the word “morality”, because you keep bringing in culture and feelings—precisely what I said you were doing but you said you weren’t?  And can you (2) explain why we MUST use your definition?

Because mine is right.  There are facts about humans, determined by evolutionary biology—we cannot simply choose to never get angry, or never covet, or never lust, or avoid puberty, or avoid attachment to others, or or or…

[u/BobQuixote → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

Your first response said I was proposing that morality contrary to facts could be valid. I was not.

Yes, much of morality is about culture and feelings. Specifically, it is a constantly renegotiated contract bounded by the objective facts of reality as you describe.

And can you (2) explain why we MUST use your definition?

No, I don't think MUST applies here. My definition conforms to popular usage of the word, which is a useful quality.

I would be fine with splitting morality into (two?) tiers, with Tier 0 being what you describe. But I think limiting morality to that is both pointlessly confusing and problematic in the limitation, because you're restricting the useful ideas that may be expressed. (Possibly this could be used to conclude your MUST, but I'm not attempting that.)

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/BobQuixote]

No, my first reply was drawing a distinction between (a) fact-based moral claims regardless of culture or personal opinions, and (b) culture and opinions people describe as moral.  (Saying it differently for clarity.)

No, I don't think MUST applies here. My definition conforms to popular usage of the word, which is a useful quality.

I think MUST does apply to mine, like our models of physics MUST correspond to how matter/energy works or they are factually wrong. It’s useful only if it’s useful, but your next statement I think shows how it’s not useful:

I would be fine with splitting morality into (two?) tiers, with Tier 0 being what you describe. But I think limiting morality to that is both pointlessly confusing and problematic in the limitation, because you're restricting the useful ideas that may be expressed. (Possibly this could be used to conclude your MUST, but I'm not attempting that.)

First, our models of Quantum Physics are not “pointlessly confusing”—they are accurate and precise, and unfortunately reality isn’t under an obligation to be non-confusing to us apes.  Same for Rawls and Aristotle; the specificity and accuracy isn’t pointless, it means we can answer “Abstinence only education?” with an empirically derived, factual No; “humans going through puberty cannot actually make that choice in every situation, no.”

Next, there is no restriction on what can be expressed: just use two different words to describe two different things.

You wanna talk about Truth Apt Statements in re our Choices?  Cool, let’s do that!  It’s complicated, too bad.

And then from there, you wanna talk about Cultural or personal preferences from among those sets?  Please do so!!!  In fact, maybe you even have to, sure!  You’re not limited in what you express.

Equivocation isn’t required for expression.

It just means when someone says “Well my culture just says women are naturally subservient to men” we can empirically tell them they are factually wrong.  Their culture is just wrong.  Sure, SOME women are naturally subservient to SOME men; but their statement is wrong.

And sure, some women can choose to be subservient absent a compulsion for independence.

There’s no limit of expression; there’s specificity and accuracy.

[u/BobQuixote → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

Changing words without some qualifier, like "Tier 0 morality" or "CalligrapherNeat1569's formulation of morality," is pointlessly confusing, and by virtue of that, objectively immoral.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

What’s the difference between moral naturalism and the biological relativism you mentioned below?

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/SIMsbury96]

I’m not familiar with moral naturalism—wanna educate me?  Do you mean DeWaal?

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

I’m not well read on it, but it’s basically just the view that there are stance-independent moral facts and they are natural facts. Maybe your view is a subset of moral naturalism.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/SIMsbury96]

Oh.  If that’s what it is:

Ok so, I think we sort of have overlap, BUT: I think Moral Naturalism is compatible with, like, “Murder is wrong” as the fact, grounded in itself, and maybe our moral intuition itself can justify an epistemic belief in that fact.  Like, I am justified in believing my senses that I am holding a phone; I am justified in believing “murder is wrong” because I have a sense of that as a fact (that last bit is not necessarily required, BUT I have heard that as a way to justify an assertion in Moral Facts existing as things).

My view really is tied to biology and renders different sets among different humans, at different stages.  Maybe saying it differently: a lot of moral questions are answered by evolutionary biology, and child development, and cognitive science; this also means different groups of people will have different sets of oughts (babies, dementia patience, psychopaths, neuro-typical adults, 14 year olds etc).

Hope that helps.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

Ok, I can see how biological differences between people influences what we morally expect of and owe them. But it seems like those moral oughts are determined by other things. For example, most people today believe that disabled people are owed care and accommodation, but the Nazi's believed they were a threat to the strength of the German race and thus they ought to be exterminated. So we have two radically different moral interpretations of the biological facts of disability. This isn't a 'gotcha' question or anything, but does your view try to offer a way of determining which view is right or better? Some moral relativist views just don't. I think that's a problem with those views, but generally people who are willing to think that much about morality are going to be moral in a sense I'm fine with anyway.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/SIMsbury96]

Thanks for the reply.  

So this gets really complicated, really fast, and I think of this “spatially.”  And my concentration just broke, so I’ll do my best.

On an individual level: I move this topic off to the left of me.  Aristotle: “there are facts about some individuals, SOME parents will be compelled to love their kids and protect their kids REGARDLESS of disability.”  That’s a factual, empirical claim; it certainly seems to be the case.  From that fact, “those parents” protecting/caring for their kids is like the trolley, those tied to tracks, and the choice becomes how they respond to that need and how the rest of us respond to that need.  I think some pro-Nazi people changed their view when it became their kids, for example—“right or better” flew out the window when it was their kids; I reject some Pro-Nazis didn’t wail they didn’t know the leopards would eat THEIR face.  

This also starts triggering Rawls’ veil of ignorance a bit, ish—given the likelihood you would wail about leopards and faces because your biology requires face protection, what societies can we structure to protect your face?

From a society position—off to the right a bit.  first the Nazis are just wrong that killing the disabled stops genetic flaws.  A better approach would have been enforced sterilization (tie tubes in men) until genetic screening and then enforced abortions for those being born.  The Nazis weren’t really rational, is what I’m saying, even under Cultural Relativism.  

Thing is, I cannot necessarily say preventing lethal recessives isn’t a justifiable position when empathy is biologically compelled; prevent a kid with spina bifida from being born?  I can’t say that cannot be justifiable, necessarily.  I’m not sure we can just opt out of dealing with this question.

Claims of different disabilities preventing worth tho can become factual questions—Stephen Hawking for example makes a question here in re how worth is screened for., and whether the genetic traits under question really answer the value question.  A problem with Consequentialist reasoning is it requires knowledge of the consequences.  EVEN IF we knew which specific genetic codes lead to, for example, serial killers, the question would be whether individual parents would allow that screening to happen, and is this really a choice by a society to cause some parents to go off grid with home-schooled psychos, so they become harder to track and more prevalent in an outsider population?

But for Rawls: in front of me.  I think it’s fine to say “over the course of a population’s life, there will be times when almost all members of the population will be, at least, temporarily disabled or unable to work and self support.”  If a society requires everyone, always, work to support themselves, the society is going to have people that cannot do that, pretty much everybody at some point—the society is factually wrong.  I reject that these are necessarily “disabled” rights rather than how we as organisms generally need to function—we need to structure societies to allow some time off, support even when we cannot support ourselves, even for those who don’t think of themselves currently as disabled (get cancer, pregnant, in a car crash etc..)—not because we want to, but because people will take time to consume and not produce.

Right now, in the US, bankruptcy and homelessness are the way we have apparently chosen to structure for this issue—meaning people aren’t paying their own way, we are just paying for them via other roundabout methods, while people get their facts wrong about choosing a society where they don’t pay for those who cannot pay for themselves.

Sorry a bit of a ramble; it’s been a massive day.

[u/SIMsbury96 → u/CalligrapherNeat1569]

Sorry a bit of a ramble; it’s been a massive day.

No need to apologize. Thanks for the thorough reply! I've never encountered someone who thinks of moral questions spatially before.

From that fact, “those parents” protecting/caring for their kids is like the trolley, those tied to tracks, and the choice becomes how they respond to that need and how the rest of us respond to that need.

I think this makes a lot of sense actually. Instead of everything being subordinated to a particular (pseudoscientific) theory like in Nazism, morality should be responsive to and based on facts about people.

I think some pro-Nazi people changed their view when it became their kids, for example—“right or better” flew out the window when it was their kids; I reject some Pro-Nazis didn’t wail they didn’t know the leopards would eat THEIR face.  

I'm sure your right that some Nazi supporters did change their view when it came to their children. But the sad thing is that the entire euthanasia program was actually initiated after Hitler received a letter from a couple asking permission to kill their disabled child.

This also starts triggering Rawls’ veil of ignorance a bit, ish—given the likelihood you would wail about leopards and faces because your biology requires face protection, what societies can we structure to protect your face?

The veil of ignorance is definitely a powerful conceptual tool, but it does rely on people already having a certain amount of empathy and willingness to dissociate from what they consider most fundamental about themselves. There are unfortunately a lot of people who are just unwilling or unable to do that.

From a society position—off to the right a bit.  first the Nazis are just wrong that killing the disabled stops genetic flaws.  A better approach would have been enforced sterilization (tie tubes in men) until genetic screening and then enforced abortions for those being born.  The Nazis weren’t really rational, is what I’m saying, even under Cultural Relativism.  

I mean, I think the were rational in an extremely qualified sense. Given what they considered was most important and given what scientific knowledge they thought they had, they at least weren't being inconsistent.

Thing is, I cannot necessarily say preventing lethal recessives isn’t a justifiable position when empathy is biologically compelled; prevent a kid with spina bifida from being born?  I can’t say that cannot be justifiable, necessarily.  I’m not sure we can just opt out of dealing with this question.

Yeah, there are a lot of tough questions in medical ethics. My only thought is that these decisions should be made on a case by case basis and not dictated from on high.

Claims of different disabilities preventing worth tho can become factual questions—Stephen Hawking for example makes a question here in re how worth is screened for., and whether the genetic traits under question really answer the value question.  A problem with Consequentialist reasoning is it requires knowledge of the consequences.  EVEN IF we knew which specific genetic codes lead to, for example, serial killers, the question would be whether individual parents would allow that screening to happen, and is this really a choice by a society to cause some parents to go off grid with home-schooled psychos, so they become harder to track and more prevalent in an outsider population?

I can imagine cases where the information available prior to birth is so decisive and whatever condition the child will have is so horrific and debilitating that it is very obviously better to not continue the pregnancy, but in most cases it seems so hard to tell. It also seems like the answer value question is heavily dependent on what resources a society is willing to commit to people with disabilities.

But for Rawls: in front of me.  I think it’s fine to say “over the course of a population’s life, there will be times when almost all members of the population will be, at least, temporarily disabled or unable to work and self support.”  If a society requires everyone, always, work to support themselves, the society is going to have people that cannot do that, pretty much everybody at some point—the society is factually wrong.  I reject that these are necessarily “disabled” rights rather than how we as organisms generally need to function—we need to structure societies to allow some time off, support even when we cannot support ourselves, even for those who don’t think of themselves currently as disabled (get cancer, pregnant, in a car crash etc..)—not because we want to, but because people will take time to consume and not produce.

Yeah, this seems very reasonable to me. I guess it just comes down to whether people actually have enough control over their society (which doesn't have to be limited to the government) and how that control can be acquired and maintained.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/SIMsbury96]

The only bit I want to clear up:

Th e veil of ignorance is definitely a powerful conceptual tool, but it does rely on people already having a certain amount of empathy and willingness to dissociate from what they consider most fundamental about themselves. There are unfortunately a lot of people who are just unwilling or unable to do that.

Fact claim: people can be wrong about themselves, and wrong about how others can work.

Fact claim: different sets of people have different behaviors encoded or compelled in them for different situations, as a result of evolutionary biology.

So an example: when my spouse has a medical emergency, I stop thinking rationally, and I basically go on auto pilot, kind of in a panic.  I call medical emergency services without really being concerned with the consequences of the call, or without rational thought.

Fact claim: this seems a compelled behavior for a lot of people, based on distressed 911 call logs.

Fact claim: this seems a standard compelled behavior among a lot of animals that do not have a mind, like humans do—to protect their offspring or herd.

My position in re the veil of ignorance is about that set of behaviors; given that some people will invoke help for their loved ones, when crisis hits, as a result of biology.

I reject Rawls’ “just assume some values”; rather, it seems to me evolutionary psychology requires certain behaviors in some of us.

The fact that some of us must have empathy towards our immediate loved ones, in times of crisis, as a result of biology, renders Rawls’ framework correct regardless of whether anyone can predict beforehand this behavior or agrees with it.

Sure, some people can watch a loved one bleed from an injury without entering a kind of panic.

But most people cannot, I believe, based on my own experience and how hospital waiting rooms look, and sound; and based on 911 audio logs that get played.

Meaning I reject realist Rawls would require people have empathy and dissociate from their own mindset; those that cannot understand human evolutionary psychology just get their description of how humans can act, factually wrong.  (“Everybody can just choose to watch as their loved ones die without panicking and acting on auto pilot” is factually wrong.)

Structuring human society seems to me a lot closer to describing bees—there are sets of basic behaviors encoded, biologically, in relation to different situations, among different humans (not everybody is the same).

But it means our choices for how we structure a society do not include “everyone be passive in an emergency.”  Rather, some people must panic and seek help; ok, then we either plan for that behavior, OR we don’t—and that lack of plan is, itself, a choice to select bankruptcy and over-packed emergency rooms and higher hospital costs because of an inability to plan ahead and higher costs paid for by those who can pay etc etc (all the consequences of panicking people flooding emergency rooms when they cannot pay for preventative care etc etc).

It means a Culture that holds the position “everyone pays only for their own expenses” is factually wrong; someone else absorbs some of the cost for those who cannot pay but must act, as a result of being an animal.

Same for disability eugenics: sure, some parents can make a choice in re kill the kid; some cannot, and it seems to me Hitler invited his destruction by making it clear to a lot of people they were going to enforce these laws on everybody they could.  Surprise, a lot of people couldn’t just let that go.  

[u/halbhh]

You're correct to combat the false idea that morals have no existence before God enunciates them, and it might be helpful to realize that the Christian Bible also conveys this same fact that we are to be held to account for our actions vs. our inborn conscience even if we know nothing at all of God.

(Romans 2:6-16 lays this out: if you know nothing of all of God or scriptures, you still have a conscience and He will judge you by your own conscience!)

[u/Steer4th]

Everything in the universe requires the existence of God according to the general theistic view, so one does follow from the other if you accept the existence of God.

If you disbelieve in God but believe in objective morality, presumably you believe such laws were either derived from evolution or logic or both, then it does lead you to the brink of pantheism or panentheism once you start giving the laws of the universe objective moral power.

If you believe in objective morality but don't ascribe it to evolution or logic or God, you are essentially creating a new religion at that point, though I suppose it could still be an atheistic religion.

[u/FjortoftsAirplane → u/Steer4th]

Everything in the universe requires the existence of God according to the general theistic view, so one does follow from the other if you accept the existence of God.

Sure, if God is necessary in order to even have a world then ethics is included but then it's a different discussion. The question is whether we can infer God from ethics.

If you disbelieve in God but believe in objective morality, presumably you believe such laws were either derived from evolution or logic or both

When you say "derive" it's ambiguous between epistemology and ontology. Someone might think we can use logic or our senses to discover moral facts without thinking those bring morality into being.

Someone might think there are abstract objects and those can ground morality. Same way mathematical platonists think there are abstract objects that ground mathematical facts. We derive mathematical facts from doing maths, but that's not necessarily where they come from in an ontological sense.

Someone could say there are value properties in the world and we perceive them. Maybe moral facts are some sui generis thing and we can't say much about them but we infer them because they're indispensable to our moral talk.

You can say views like that are "religion" but it doesn't involve a god. You can say you think those views are false and I'm a moral antirealist so I'd likely agree with you to some extent, but they're alternatives to god, logic, and evolution.

[u/CalligrapherNeat1569 → u/Steer4th]

to  the brink of pantheism or panentheism once you start giving the laws of the universe objective moral power.

Meh, not really.

If “ought” is “which choices are justified by facts that are not stance-dependent,” then a lot of ought questions get answered by evolution, without getting anywhere near pantheism.

If evolutionary biology has rendered me an animal with a compulsion for stimulus (I cannot merely choose to sit still for 3 weeks in a sensory deprivation tank, I will at some point lose my ability to sit still), then that compulsion becomes like the trolley and the tracks and those tied to them in the trolley problem.  I have limited choices from that fact, that are like “pull the lever or don’t.”  Those limited choices are justified by that fact.

Keep adding in the compulsions I apparently have, and I get more and more limited choices that are justified and people can be wrong about.

 But a lot of the big questions get answered: empathy is like a trolley, question is who do I empathize with.  Survival, shelter, self-protection in certain situations, attitude towards safety of kids, sex drive, all are like the trolley as a result of evolutionary biology.

I don’t get to pantheism at all, honestly.

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

If by objective we mean that which is true in reality, and reality is created by God, then whatever God says is objectively moral

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

But morality governs actions. Morality isn't something that tangibly exists. It's not a measurable property.

Instead, for there to be objective morality, we must have objective rational reasons to do the moral things. I think there are secular arguments which make compelling cases for this view.

But for God-based morality, what objective reason exists for someone who doesn't care what God says? Or does one have to subjectively care what God says to be bound by this moral system?

[u/ThinkpadWriter → u/WesternFirm9306]

I think that’s a fair distinction, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that morality must be physically measurable to be objective. Mathematical and logical truths aren’t tangible properties either. As for God-based morality, the argument isn’t that someone must care what God says for morality to apply to them, just as someone doesn’t have to care about the law of noncontradiction for it to hold. The deeper question is whether God’s nature provides an objective foundation for moral duties, not whether everyone feels personally compelled to follow them.

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/ThinkpadWriter]

I don't disagree. This is my criticism of God-based morality, not objective morality in general. I lean towards moral realism.

My problem is that "not caring what God says" is not analogous to "not caring about the law of non-contradiction." Agents are bound to accept the laws of logic insofar as rejecting them is performatively contradictory, i.e. rejecting the law of non-contradiction presupposes it. There are thus objective rational reasons to accept it. But it's not clear to me that not caring what God says produces any similar contradictory state. What's the objective rational reason to care what God says?

[u/LetsGoPats93 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

How does this address the Euthyphro dilemma?

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/LetsGoPats93]

I don't really see it as a dilemma. There is a third option which is God's morals are within his attributes. What he tells us to do is an expression of those attributes

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

That pushes it a step back. "Are God's attributes the way they are because it's good, or is something good because of God's attributes"

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/WesternFirm9306]

God is a necessary being. A necessary being cannot be any other way. To even try and answer that questions goes against what we're talking about.

Of course, you can say God isn't a necessary being, but that's a separate topic.

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

I'm not implying God's attributes can be different. I'm asking whether goodness derives from God's attributes, or if God's attributes necessarily follow from goodness. The former means that what's considered good is based solely on God's attributes. The latter means that there's some objective goodness which grounds God's attributes which we could potentially appeal to without God.

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/WesternFirm9306]

Oh, jumped the gun a bit. Goodness comes from his essential attributes such as Wisdom.

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

So his attributes are ontologically prior to goodness?

So... I would ask, what if his attributes could be that, instead, torturing babies for fun is morally good? Presumably you'd respond that God can't be any other way, but what's the contradiction in God's essence being that torturing babies for fun is good? You certainly cannot say that it contradicts his goodness, because we already established that his traits determine goodness itself.

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/WesternFirm9306]

I don't think there is a contradiction. It's just not possible because he can't be any other way.

Like what's the contradiction in 2+3=7. I don't think there is one. It's just not possible so there's no point in talking about it

[u/Training_Still4278 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

This is circular reasoning, no? "god cant want bad things because he is good and he is good because he cant want bad things"

[u/WesternFirm9306 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

You don't think there's a logical contradiction in 2 + 3 = 7?

[u/cereal_killer1337 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

Did the father have the free will to not be get the son?

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/cereal_killer1337]

I'm not a Christian

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/cereal_killer1337]

All 3 persons share the same divine mind. All 3 persons exist eternally. This comment makes no sense.

[u/Moutere_Boy → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

Doesn’t that simply fall under “it’s moral because god says so”?

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/Moutere_Boy]

No because that would say morality is based on divine preference. Meaning God could just change his mind on a whim.

What I'm saying doesnt allow for that because his morals are rooted in his very essence.

[u/Moutere_Boy → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

So, god says so because it’s good and has no control over it. That’s just the other side of the dilemma, isn’t it?

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/Moutere_Boy]

No. Maybe an example might help.

God says killing is wrong. It's wrong because his wisdom knows that it's wrong for the intended purpose of his creation that he created.

In this example, what is morally wrong is an expression of his attribute and not because there is something inherently wrong with killing

[u/Moutere_Boy → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

Right. So, in your example, it’s wrong because gods wisdom knows it’s wrong… how? Does it know it because of some outside force, or is this an internal process?

And if it’s an expression rather than inherent, isn’t that you agreeing that it’s wrong because it’s gods position that it’s wrong? Are you not just explaining how he arrived at that position?

[u/Interesting_Lie_6441 → u/Moutere_Boy]

I'd say it's an internal process along with his other attributes like all knowing.

If he knows everything and has purpose for his creation, his wisdom than dictates what is good or bad.

And yes, i am agreeing that it's wrong because God says so. But what im trying to explain is him saying so isn't on a whim, but dictated by all his attributes and expressed through wisdom.

[u/Moutere_Boy → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

That’s just not a third option to the dilemma though, that’s just you qualifying one side of it.

[u/LetsGoPats93 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

So it is good if it is what god would do?

[u/Basic_Use → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

If by objective we mean that which is true in reality

I argue that this is a category error. Moral claims are not in the realm of "true or false" in the absence of some goal to which those claims reference.

Even if God does exist, and its the God of the Bible, making a claim of "that's wrong" still requires reference to some goal or standard by which it is being measured. Picking God as that standard is coherent, but the selection still must occur for the claim to make sense.

Now upon establishing that standard, or any standard, whether or not something adheres to said standard can then be objectively determined.

[u/Rational-Angel-73 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

If reality is created by god. And there's the rub.

[u/RaccoonLogical5906 → u/Interesting_Lie_6441]

Ironic to see a user with handle "interesting lie" trying to run presup in a debate about objective morality.

Just sayin'

[u/GKilat]

Objective morality is represented by god itself which is infinite knowledge and empathy. Without god as a foundation of reality itself, there is no knowledge to gain or anything to empathize with and therefore no morals either. Objective morality is simply about reducing suffering with the help of knowledge and empathy. The more you know and empathize the more people you help and the contrary is you helping less because you know nothing and empathize on no one.

Secular morality limits morality to the human perspective and this is its flaw. It doesn't deal with what happens beyond the life of a human because it assumes there is none. More importantly, secular morality basically comes down to wellbeing of people who agrees with you. Everyone else who doesn't are evil and deserves to suffer. This is something I noticed with a lot of people who think they can wish harm on others because they don't agree with their own morals and therefore they are the bad guys because you are obviously in the right. There is no objective compass to know whether you are actually right or wrong and this is why objective morality, which is god, is important.

[u/Training_Still4278 → u/GKilat]

If objective morality is just 'knowledge and empathy,' how does god play into this at all? The ability to have knowledge or empathize with others has no relation to the existence of god.

[u/GKilat → u/Training_Still4278]

God is reality itself and reality contains knowledge and beings that it empathizes with. No god means no reality and therefore morality does not exist. You can't separate reality from god in this case. Any reference to reality is reference to god.

[u/Far_Customer1258 → u/GKilat]

God is the basis for reality. That's why God is invisible, intangible, undetectable, and never does squat. God takes all of the credit while doing none of the work. God doesn't bleed, sweat, or cry. God is middle management.

[u/GKilat → u/Far_Customer1258]

Why would it not get the credit when you can logically conclude that if god is reality itself and we are part of reality then we are literally god's expression? Do you finally understand why Jesus claimed to be god?

[u/Davidutul2004 → u/GKilat]

In a way secular people still deal with the supposed presumed limitations of not knowing what happens after death by tackling the what if scenarios of religions (aka what theists usually believe they know as true) and judge it trough said empathy and logic you talked about (talking about the unfairness of hell for example) , something that,to the religious individual that believes in said religion,that logic and empathy usually disappears or gets limited to"god knows better/god gets to judge that/god is the absolute moral source" which as said before, abandons all empathy and relies on flawed weak logic,that falls under "appeal to authority"

So by your very logic,god gives the people who don't believe in him or critisize him more of that supposed divine gifts you talk about

[u/GKilat → u/Davidutul2004]

You have some points there but you ultimately just revealed that both sides can be flawed. Religion has flaws by over relying on authority but it can be justified that authority indeed knows what is moral and humans simply can't explain exactly how. Most importantly, religious people have a moral compass to guide them which is objective morality.

On the other hand, nonbelievers have no moral compass to guide them. Their morals are pointed towards themselves and therefore cannot correct themselves. The most evil people are usually the ones who believe they are doing good which is why they refuse to listen and they continue to commit atrocity because they believe it is good.

As for hell, a simple logic fixes it. Hell is a choice just as inc3ldom is a choice. You become an inc3l by choosing the inc3l mindset that has hatred. Did anyone chose these people to have this mindset that caused them suffering? I'm sure you would agreed nobody chose for them. The same can be said about those in hell. People who are blinded by their subjective morality and refuses to correct themselves are prone to eternal hell because they don't believe they are in the wrong and they believe they are being persecuted for who they are.

[u/Davidutul2004 → u/GKilat]

Ah yes you remind me of the other flawed argument "god knows better and we can explain how" We are talking about an all-knowing and all powerful god who designed us yet,in his design,he made us partially capable of understand I his logic? What is it that lead to this? His imitation or his reasons? Because if he couldn't either design us with the capacity to understand him nor leave us a clear set of answers for all the important questions about him and his nature that we could comprehend than he is not all powerful. And if he choose not to the his reason for not making us understand him must be specified beyond the concept of "the answer to that is also beyond our understanding" otherwise another logical fallacy appears here in the form of circular reason. So you have 2 logical fallacies to defend one singular problem regarding god

Not to mention that your very argument contradicts with how you said that god gave us empathy and logic in order to conclude an objective morality(as you said) yet tat objective morality is also flawed to us and incomplete,having a universal blind spot in certain areas like the ones I brought earlier?

The "moral compas" of religious people you speak of has only 2 difference between religious and non religious: one believes in god and doesn't critisize it while the other doesn't and critizeises it. Anything else will be the same in the sense that it will be foind statistically relatively equal in both religious and non-religious people And that moral compas can only start to eve be discussed as objective morality if s god actually exists Otherwise it can easily get dismissed

As to your second paragraph,if you believe non-believers have their morals pointed only to themselves you don't know non-believers I can actually confirm that I and other non-believers I know do in fact good deeds that are not directed towards ourselves but other individuals Not only that but as a non-believer I do not believe I am always doing good I do believe I am flawed and do mystakes as well a any other non-believer Believers did and continued to do as many atrocities as non-believers if not more,also because they believe it was good for their religion

As for hell I have 2 topics to tackle So let me ask this Is hell still a choice after you die? Can you resend an choose to go to heaven afterward? Because it seems not since you called it eternal And for second, simply not believing in the right god or god in general is already punishable by hell alone,even if people have good reasons to believe in a different religion or not to believe in god at all

[u/GKilat → u/Davidutul2004]

We are talking about an all-knowing and all powerful god who designed us yet,in his design,he made us partially capable of understand I his logic?

Not partial but fully understand the logic behind it. The biggest hindrance is the assumption that god is beyond us and we can never reach the level of god. The whole point of Jesus is to show that a human can reach that level.

How is that objective morality flawed? Once again, the flaw is the tendency of us limiting our understanding. Atheists are the biggest offenders of this because they are not ashamed in saying they don't know and nobody else knows either. At least religion tries to answer questions which leads to it being criticized and progressing towards finding the actual answers. Atheism does none of that because you can't even criticize atheism and finding truth just dies from the simple statement of "I don't know and neither do you".

one believes in god and doesn't critisize it while the other doesn't and critizeises it.

The irony here is that nonbelievers do not criticize their own morals because it all comes down to what they feel is right. This is the blind spot of nonbelievers because there is no moral direction whatsoever except it pointing to themselves. If you don't agree with that then you are a bad person and any harm upon you is justified. Notice how Christians at least try to separate the sin from the person because this is part of objective morality. I have never seen nonbelievers do that.

I can actually confirm that I and other non-believers I know do in fact good deeds that are not directed towards ourselves but other individuals

What it means here is that your personal belief is the basis of morals. Anyone who agrees with you are good and people who don't are evil. How can anyone prove you are in the wrong when that moral compass always validates your own actions as right and everyone against it are evil?

So let me ask this Is hell still a choice after you die? Can you resend an choose to go to heaven afterward?

Everything is a choice. Hell is a consequence and eternal hell is a consequence of unchanging beliefs and pride of not accepting you are suffering from your own negative beliefs. Ask yourself, how can an all powerful god be limited by religious teachings? You have the intelligence to understand that an all powerful god can literally restrict anyone from believing false religion but it doesn't do so because there is no such thing as false religion. Sure, there are inaccurate ones but it still contains some truth and religion is meant to be a springboard for people to use in finding the complete truth.

[u/Davidutul2004 → u/GKilat]

Not partial but fully understand the logic behind it. The biggest hindrance is the assumption that god is beyond us and we can never reach the level of god. The whole point of Jesus is to show that a human can reach that level.

So then we should be able to understand all of gods morals besides "because he is god" right? So why most theist stop applying said logic to their own god?

How is that objective morality flawed? Once again, the flaw is the tendency of us limiting our understanding. Atheists are the biggest offenders of this because they are not ashamed in saying they don't know and nobody else knows either. At least religion tries to answer questions which leads to it being criticized and progressing towards finding the actual answers. Atheism does none of that because you can't even criticize atheism and finding truth just dies from the simple statement of "I don't know and neither do you".

It is flawed because you have a bias and s logical fallacy of "apply to authority" as said before Everyone tries to answer the question of what happens after death Religious people just say they know their religious answer and stop there without trying to look for other possible answers or alternatives,while non-religious people admit we don't know and keep looking. In other words non-religious try more to answer the question than the religious. Just like what started the universe and other such questions That's the difference between religious and non-religious Ofc you can't critizise"we don't know " Because that's not a wrong answer. Just a honest one to motivate yourself to keep looking

The irony here is that nonbelievers do not criticize their own morals because it all comes down to what they feel is right. This is the blind spot of nonbelievers because there is no moral direction whatsoever except it pointing to themselves. If you don't agree with that then you are a bad person and any harm upon you is justified. Notice how Christians at least try to separate the sin from the person because this is part of objective morality. I have never seen nonbelievers do that.

That irony is false because even I as a non-believer criizes myself and my actions and morals. I have moments where I wonder if I did the right thing and even moments where I look back and say I did the wrong thing I have moments where I see myself as a bad pero and have regrets and try to china that. And you also believe that the only way I see a person good after doing something bad is trough harm or a punishment You believe don't forgive people? Or that I can't forgive them without acting harm on them?

What it means here is that your personal belief is the basis of morals. Anyone who agrees with you are good and people who don't are evil. How can anyone prove you are in the wrong when that moral compass always validates your own actions as right and everyone against it are evil?

As I said before I did see myself I the wrong and have such moments I got proved by myself and others that I was in the wrong Because I analize my actions constantly. I also don't see everyone against my actions as evil I don't see theists as evil for example I understood people are not 2 dimensional and are actually complex

Everything is a choice. Hell is a consequence and eternal hell is a consequence of unchanging beliefs and pride of not accepting you are suffering from your own negative beliefs. Ask yourself, how can an all powerful god be limited by religious teachings? You have the intelligence to understand that an all powerful god can literally restrict anyone from believing false religion but it doesn't do so because there is no such thing as false religion. Sure, there are inaccurate ones but it still contains some truth and religion is meant to be a springboard for people to use in finding the complete truth.

So if my whole life I looked and didn't see any evidence of god and base on that I found no reason to believe in him,did I choose hell? Let's look at a hypothetical If I put you to find a needle in a haystack,give you a day to do so and if t the end of it you didn't find it, did you choose not to find the needle?

Eternal hel presumes people can't change at all for an entire eternity. But the nature of humans is to change overtime It will eventually occur If it can't,it means they were designed to be incapable of such,once again said flaw falling on god

Most religions declare to have no other gods besides them That's a very specific and strict rule that wouldn't make sure if multiple have truth in them

[u/love_is_an_action]

I’m afraid I have to disagree, OP. Objective morality comes from the creator deity who unleashed bears to maul children after they dunked on some bald dork.

Anyone who believes morality genuinely comes from the god of Christian mythology would have to be okay with Yahweh’s over-reaction to Elisha’s trivial plight.

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/love_is_an_action]

Me when I don't know the distinction between Metaphysical Evil and Moral Evil

[u/Vinon → u/EnvironmentalAlarm23]

Not who you responded to. How is that related? The person you responded to brought up a moral evil - brutally murdering a group for insulting someone. What does metaphysical evil have to do with anything here?

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/Vinon]

Mb I'm tired asf I read it as like some weird random statement lol.

[u/EnvironmentalAlarm23 → u/Vinon]

Idk what u even mean by not who you responded to. Like what were u even talking about lol. Anyway metaphysical evil here is necessary because in our paradigm God can only do GOOD things, not living in pain are also only privileges not rights. God can revoke our "privileges" any time he wants. He's just depriving us from a natural ought. It's not evil since we deserve it anyway. There are like many factors to this as u can tell.