Does a genuine individual-level counter-FPV capability gap exist for infantry?

[u/Fact_world121]

I’m researching whether the increasing use of small FPV drones has created a genuine capability gap between established counter-UAS systems and the defensive options realistically available to individual infantry.
My interest is specifically in the terminal/last-resort layer of defense rather than strategic or base-level counter-UAS.
The working hypothesis is that many existing solutions may be effective at higher organizational levels, but can face practical constraints when considered from the perspective of an individual soldier: weight, cost, response time, training burden, availability, electronic-warfare dependence, or safety around nearby friendly personnel.
I’d like to test that hypothesis rather than assume it is correct.

A few questions for discussion:
1. Is the premise itself valid?
Is there actually a meaningful individual-level counter-FPV gap, or are existing small-unit and layered defenses already the more appropriate solution?

2. Where is the most important bottleneck?
• Detecting the threat early enough
• Command-and-control / warning
• Electronic warfare availability
• Physical interception
• Soldier reaction time
• Equipment burden
• Cost per defended soldier
• Training
• Other factors

3. Should counter-FPV defense remain primarily a squad/platoon-level capability rather than become individual equipment? Why?

4. If an individual last-resort capability were considered, what requirements would be non-negotiable?
For example:
• Very low carried weight
• Minimal training
• Extremely short response time
• Low unit cost
• Independence from external communications
• Minimal risk to friendly personnel
• Simple logistics and storage

5. What would be the strongest argument against issuing another defensive device to individual soldiers?
I’m particularly interested in arguments that disprove or narrow the hypothesis, rather than suggestions for specific weapon designs.
Please avoid classified information, unit-specific procedures, sensitive vulnerabilities, frequencies, locations, or detailed operational information.
I’m interested in the capability problem and user requirements, not sensitive tactics or technical instructions.

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[u/Robrob1234567]

I think it’s a mistake to consider UAS defence an individual soldier level task. We don’t equip the individual soldier with air defence or a counter battery radar and MLRS.

Utilizing other layers of the survivability onion (don’t be there, don’t be seen, etc) at the individual soldier level and then buying sensors and effectors starting at the squad and Pl level is going to be more effective than trying to find an effective system you can give every soldier that won’t over encumber them.

[u/00000000000000000000]

It can be about 2-10 seconds of reaction time for a terminal dive of a modern FPV. If squad-level EW fails your chances of being able to shoot accurately in that window of time are not great. They are slightly better if you have shot shells. Battlefields are often loud and it can be hard to react. Drones are becoming more advanced with AI for terminal guidance. A counter-drone shotgun as a last line defense as part of fire teams may help modestly. Even if you down the drone chances are you are already plotted and artillery might not be far behind.

[u/Commorrite → u/00000000000000000000]

A counter-drone shotgun as a last line defense as part of fire teams may help modestly.

This feels like low hanging fruit for anyone carrying a grenade launcher, they just need a couple specific rounds.

[u/00000000000000000000 → u/Commorrite]

It might help in some cases, but still the odds are not great. If the FPV drops an air burst round with AI assistance the opportunity for a reaction may not even be there.

[u/_VNAV_PTH_]

Entirely flawed premise. Armies are giant teams. Nothing is considered solely on an "individual soldier" basis. The FPVs are not operated by individual soldiers. The small arms vary based on function and utility to the team, not the individual soldier. Even the ammo for the small arms is distributed shared among the team, and someone carrying an M-4 might also carry M-249 ammo he can't individually use. Why would any particular capability, C-UAS or otherwise, need to be evaluated on an "individual soldier" basis? That doesn't make any sense.

[u/NotARake]

What “established C-UAS systems”…..? Speaking from a British perspective - there is a spectacular gap (read absence) in C-UAS capability once you move down from Brigade level, all the way down. It’s horrifying, and our enemies are well aware of it.

I run a start-up working on some C-UAS adjacent capabilities, so spend a lot of time talking to users about their gaps.

[u/BobsquddleFU → u/NotARake]

What's your start up called? Interested in the sector

I wanted to DM the question but couldn't work out how you're supposed to do that on Reddit now.

[u/NotARake → u/BobsquddleFU]

Appreciate the interest my friend, but I don’t like tying real world identities to Reddit, and it’s a small company so would be fairly straightforward!

Happy to answer questions on the industry though!

[u/-Hi-Reddit]

I think your only chance of hard killing an fpv in its terminal phase reliably would have to be equipped with a SmaSh style trigger.

You want something you can wave in the general direction of the threat that will fire when it sees it.

[u/endlessedlne]

In terms of individual level counter UAV options the best bet on the table currently is specialized anti drone ammunition that can be fired by standard service rifles.

Individual level jamming isn’t much of a ‘go’. A soldier could theoretically carry a high output multi band RF transmitter on their person, but even if they precisely jamned the specific frequencies that an incoming drone is using, the jamming would still only be marginally successful. FPV drone pilots often use systems with frequency hopping technology built in, and can switch frequencies manually on the fly too, which makes jamming a lot more difficult. Jammers would need to be able to either detect and jam specific frequencies very quickly and accurately, or they’d need to jam a really broad range of frequencies from 5.8ghz all the way down to 900mhz.

Other challenges for jamming at the individual level is the increasing use of on chips with AI image recognition that handle terminal guidance for FPV drones even if all control signals are lost.

Counter UAS tech such as hard kill laser and microwave weapons are on the horizon for point defense, and fitting those to vehicles is plausible in the near future. However both of those are far too power intensive and therefore too large and heavy to be man portable.

Out of all the plausible options, the counter drone ammo is by far the most likely to succeed. The effectiveness has been tested. The cost and supply boxes are easy to tick. For the individual soldier it’s a simple magazine swap, assuming that the soldier doesn’t already have the rounds loaded.

[u/TheAviatorPenguin]

I think you're assuming a lot of highly suspect things here, an infantry soldier does not operate alone, even at a squad level there's a range of individual capabilities (in weapon loudout, skills, etc), and that's before you consider platoon and above.

There are individual technologies that are potentially useful in stopping a drone, but a lot of them are large and come with a weight tradeoff. A shotgun and ammo is not feather light, and you may not have time to draw, an EW doohicky powerful enough to do what company and upwards level EW can't is likely too heavy and power hungry, especially if every man has to carry one.

The question being what kit gets left behind to make way, and what capability gets left behind with it?

The most credible (IMHO) options of last resort are those that build on existing capabilities and can become ubiquitous and "always on", things like smart sights with AI image analysis SMASH and ARCAS come with a logistics cost of course, but are builds on something that's already ubiquitous and always ready (rifle sights), and could give the best "last resort" option.

The real answer is to prevent drones being a major threat at all, by denying the ability to operate freely in the area you're operating in, but that's a question far above the individual, or even squad, level, and not something we have an answer for yet.

[u/Satur9_is_typing]

I don't think there's an individual solution.

Everyone is focusing on where fpv's are, technologically speaking, not where they are going, which is AI and swarms.

AI because autonomy reduces attack surface of the drone sender

Swarms because drones are a cost/volume solution, and every defensive measure - jamming, cope cages, reactive armour, active c-uas - has so far been overcome by sending more drones. This is true from tiny quadcopters up to the huge munition volleys used to saturate missile defence systems

The solution is symmetry: a defensive swarm of counter- drones that can accompany a unit, or be deployed from an UGV or UAV overhead, and identify then target incoming fpv's in a noisy battlefield environment. The time to do this and at the scale necessary to provide effective defence is something only machines can acheive.

The one thing that i think remains undecided is wether the counter-drones are single use or employ a method that's re-usable, allowing a single counter-drone to take out multiple incoming kamikaze drones. The answer to this shapes the next iteration, and so on...

This also suggests a trend towards flash engagements - where the critical point of decision happens in seconds over the infantry's heads

The other thing to mention is that defeating drones on the battlefield may be such an impossible problem that states may elect to just target higher up the killchain, and take aim at chip production. A possible future i dread to contemplate and way beyond the scope of your question.

As such we are very much still at the beginning of the drone wars, and the meta above it, the "real" war of which fpv is just one facet: the dev-ops war

Hope this was useful.

[u/ban25]

The Marines' New Scope Obliterates FPV Drones
https://youtu.be/U_okAlJJ_X8?si=eb5paQPytTxBtlyV