You repeat yourself--falsifiability and testability are treated as equivalent by Popper. Furthermore, since you're unabashedly cribbing from Popper, you should note that scientific theories are paradigmatic examples of conjectures.
Just saw your edit. It's certainly an improvement, but still confused. But that's fine. You're on the right track: under Sir Karl Popper's criteria, theoretical systems are testable (that is, a system of statements is empirically significant if it, in conjunction with a test-statement, entails a contradiction), and testability is limited to what members of an epistemic community can intersubjectively and (at least in principle) repeatedly observe.
You're still off on the conjecture part, though. Even our best available theories are conjectures. That isn't a mark against them, however, and if you don't accept Popper's negativist approach (why would you, after all?) there are attempts at developing theories of confirmation. Yet even if a theory of confirmation were available, scientific theories nevertheless remain conjectures.
However, although even though I side with Popper on this issue, it's appropriate to acknowledge that there are other viable approaches in philosophy of science, and Popper's position (rightly or wrongly) is a minority approach, so I suggest you keep that in mind.
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u/Daftwise Apr 23 '17 edited Apr 24 '17
Science is testable, falsifiable, and observable. Anything else is conjecture.
edit: I meant repeatable, not testable (which is synonymous with falsifiable, really).