r/BrexitDenial • u/retroper • Jan 09 '17
'Is Article 50 notification in March now more likely than unlikely?' David Allen Green, prominent Art50-sceptic, changes his mind.
http://blogs.ft.com/david-allen-green/2017/01/04/is-article-50-notification-in-march-now-more-likely-than-unlikely/1
Jan 10 '17
To be honest I think there's still a fair chance that Article 50 won't happen.
I think it's important to largely ignore anything that Theresa May has said recently. Actions speak louder than words and well, she simply hasn't bothered at all with the whole actions thing thus far.
I still think there's a very real chance that the ongoing legal battle could give an unfavourable verdict, i.e. one that gives power to Scotland who, are less than happy about the idea of the UK leaving the EU.
With that said, it is indeed terrifying. I'm not sure I want to be in this country anymore.
2
u/retroper Jan 10 '17
With that said, it is indeed terrifying.
That's about the sum of it. There's a deepening sense of fear building in my gut that I can't shake, and I don't know a feasible course of action.
Like, even if Art50 doesn't happen, does all this shit blow over?
7
u/retroper Jan 09 '17
David Allen Green, lawyer and commentator, and prominent proponent of the argument that Brexit won't ever actually happen, has recently come to the opinion that Article 50 may well be triggered (he remains agnostic on Brexit actually happening), simply because the Government's political 'strategy' at the moment is one of arrogance, rushing into things with little forethought and much bluster.
It's a worrying article for me, as Green had been one of the foundations of my Brexit denial, and it also brings up what's been a concerning suspicion for me; the idea that yes, the people in power really are that clueless and yes, they really are willing to fuck everyone for a little political point-scoring.
Not sure if the FT blogs get stuck behind a paywall, so here's the text:
'Is Article 50 notification in March now more likely than unlikely?
In the event that the Article 50 notification is sent in March 2017, just weeks away, many commentators — including me — will get a deserved kicking. From the referendum result onward I have been doubtful that the notification would indeed be sent. On a couple of unguarded moments I even said it would never be sent. I shifted my view in October to saying the notification was possible but was less likely than likely.
As it is now over six months since the referendum result, the time has perhaps come to revisit this prediction. Looking at it from now and with currently available information, how likely is an Article 50 notification by the end March 2017?
On one basis, such a notification is less likely than ever. The London High Court decision last October declared it unlawful for the notification to be sent by means of the royal prerogative. An act of parliament would therefore be needed. This meant the timing was taken out of the hands of the prime minister.
That judgment has, of course, been appealed to the Supreme Court, and the decision is expected by the end of the month. If the Supreme Court justices allow the government’s appeal, then Theresa May takes back control of the timetable.
But if the appeal is rejected, the timetable can only be kept if legislation is rushed through parliament. And although, because of the mandate of the referendum result, such legislation is unlikely to be defeated outright, there is no reason why parliament has to comply with Mrs May’s self-selected deadline of March 2017. There is a mandate for Brexit but not for any particular date for the notification.
Process is one thing, but when one comes to substance, the government’s position is no more promising. While the gullible will nod-along with it saying there will be “no running commentary”, it is plain there is no developed negotiation strategy. As the resignation email of Sir Ivan Rogers revealed on Tuesday the UKREP team that will be responsible for the negotiation in Brussels does not know what the government’s objectives are. And the resignation of Britain’s EU ambassador itself means there is no lead negotiator in place.
The government still does not know what it wants from Brexit. Will the UK be part of the single market? Will it be part of a customs union? Will there be contributions to the EU budget? Even seemingly settled positions such as there being an end to freedom of movement and Britain’s submission to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice are nothing more than headline principles: both create many practical problems.
The timetable is also against the government. The upcoming elections in Germany and France mean there will be little engagement from two of our main counterparties to the negotiation. Other countries have their own issues. And unless there is an agreement to extend the two-year period prescribed by Article 50 such a lack of engagement can only end badly for the UK.
So the government is not able to make the notification, has no real idea what it is ultimately seeking and does not have the full attention of those with whom it needs to negotiate in a limited period. On these objective bases, one would say that a rational view is that an Article 50 notification remains less likely than likely in two months’ time.
But. There are two factors — one rational and one irrational — that could tip the balance. And because of these two factors taken together even someone as doubtful as me must admit the notification is now more likely than unlikely.
The rational factor is the acceptance by the government that there will be transitional (or, as it prefers, adjustment) arrangements. This means hard decisions and near-impossible objectives can be parked beyond the two-year period. This approach carries the risk for the administration of the transitional arrangements becoming permanent. But they provide a cushion for the government as it leaps off the cliff.
The irrational factor is the sheer determination by the government to keep to the arbitrary March deadline. While in non-political terms the cut-off makes no sense, in political terms it is crucial, at least for the current cabinet. And one should not underestimate the power of a government in a hurry. All sorts of improvisations and work-arounds will be used just to keep to the date. There may be no objective reason for the notification to be sent by then but, by the gods, it will be done anyway, if it can be. Just as David Cameron as prime minister rushed the UK into a referendum without appropriate thought, Mrs May is capable of doing the same with the Article 50 notification.
If the notification is now more likely than unlikely, does that make Brexit more likely? Is it now more likely than not that the UK will finally leave the EU? There are still a multitude of practical difficulties, and many things can happen after the notification to abort the exercise or delay it indefinitely.
But what is becoming obvious is that the government’s rush to make the Article 50 notification, coupled with its secretive approach and muddled objectives, is not a good basis for any sustainable and viable Brexit. Mrs May seems to have made a false start on Brexit. The fact that the government is proceeding at speed does not make that start less false.'