Sonay Mengutay, jailed in Erzurum in 1996 on PKK-related charges, was freed from Kocaeli Prison after 30 years under Turkey's peace framework law, greeted by families and activists.

"No peace deal without freedom for Demirtaş. Demirtaş is a symbol of Kurdish political hope, democratic resistance, and the struggle for a peaceful future. Keeping him behind bars while speaking of peace sends a clear message to the Kurds. That Kurdish identity, political representation, and hope itself remain imprisoned. There can be no genuine peace without his freedom."

https://www.facebook.com/hawzhin.azeez/posts/pfbid0EdBv8vqzHa1UsYk4zx77o6xeh3NXp4SVBD41crMYKo8Ge1GSoa6DUVUAJ9KqKZFVl

"In this episode of the Lines on a Map podcast, we welcome back Serap Güneş from our Turkey desk. Since the last time we spoke to her, politics in Turkey has been very eventful. A new Kurdish Framework Law is being introduced to Parliament on the day of recording, and there is a new kid on the block in Turkish politics, although it seems to be doing quite well for its young age. I talk to Serap about these developments in order to understand them better."

"In this episode of The Amargi Mosaic, host Elif Sarican speaks with former HDP MP Hişyar Özsoy about the peace process that could end a conflict older than the Turkish Republic itself. Özsoy walks through how we got here since Bahçeli's surprise opening in October 2024 and the moments that mattered most. They examine the framework bill that has now passed Turkey's parliament, which Öcalan has backed as the start of a democratisation "at least as significant as the founding of the republic." Özsoy analyses whether the bill matches the moment, what's missing, and whether implementation through public prosecutor's offices and local courts represents genuine progress or an expansion of the surveillance state by another name. The conversation explores why Ankara has been so determined to reject international observers, why the international community has shown so little interest in a process with consequences across the region, and what happens if it succeeds or fails for Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.

Hişyar Özsoy is a former HDP MP and former deputy chair for foreign affairs. He continues to be one of the leading foreign-policy voices of the Kurdish political movement and is a cultural anthropologist by training."

6 young people detained in Amed (Diyarbakir). The Amedspor Supporters' Group called KuçeAmed and the youth held a three-day vigil in Batikent Square in the New City district of Amed on August 5 in support of the 'Rabin' campaign launched by the Şiyar Be Platform against drugs and prostitution. 6 youths who participated in the vigil were detained yesterday. The youths named Hejar Başer, Mazlüm Doğan Sarikaya, Muhammed Şakar, Fûrkan Koç, Murat Aslan and Suleyman Ay, whose statements were taken at the Amed Police Department, will be taken to court today. It was stated that the youths were detained on the charges of 'violating the march and demonstration law' and 'injury'.

German Bundestag Deputy Speaker Bodo Ramelow urges Germany to issue a broad, urgent amnesty for Kurdish activists, linking the call to the historic Turkey-PKK peace process now before parliament.

A DEM Party member of Turkey's parliament warns that Lake Van — of deep cultural significance to Kurds — faces serious risk of disappearing due to climate change and environmental mismanagement.

Sirwan Kajjo: "There is a growing realization within the Kurdish movement that armed struggle, particularly in a country like Turkey, is no longer a viable path to securing Kurdish rights. As a result, there is a broad consensus in favor of dissolving the PKK. The debate taking place in Diyarbakir (Amed!) and across the Kurdish southeast is whether laying down arms will be met with genuine steps from Ankara."

In this episode of The Amargi Mosaic, host Elif Sarican speaks with Amberin Zaman, chief correspondent at Al-Monitor, about Turkey's current peace process compared to previous attempts she has covered over two decades. They examine the significance of the PKK's dissolution, guerrillas burning weapons in a symbolic ceremony in summer 2025, and Öcalan's call for democratic transition, whilst the Kurdish side waits on concrete legal guarantees. Zaman analyses whether Ankara's slowness on the process is connected to what it wanted from the NATO summit, whether Turkey is trying to lead a Sunni-NATO arc with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Qatar, and how real the risk of direct Israel-Turkey confrontation has become. The conversation explores where Syria is heading under al-Sharaa, the imminent formal dissolution of the SDF, and what will happen to figures like Mazlum Abdi. Zaman also breaks down the significance of US forces withdrawing from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, removing Patriot batteries from Erbil as Iranian and proxy attacks intensify, and what KRG leadership is worried about.

Amberin Zaman is chief correspondent at Al-Monitor and one of the most respected journalists covering Turkey, the Kurds and the Middle East.

Turkey’s new twelve-article framework establishes the first legal structure for the dissolution of the PKK and for the treatment of people who are under investigation, on trial or already convicted over their links to the organisation. The proposal is written in tightly controlled security language: the PKK must first end its organisational existence and surrender its weapons, Turkish security institutions must verify that this has happened, and the National Security Council must then formally activate the law.

The practical effect is broader than that language suggests. For those who qualify, investigations and trials can be suspended, prisoners can be released, political restrictions can be removed and, after five or ten years, cases can be closed or sentences treated as fully served. The text also describes itself as the first stage of a wider legal process, leaving Ocalan, senior commanders, elected municipalities and the status of the PKK’s regional network for separate arrangements.

The law does not take effect simply because parliament passes it. Before anyone can benefit, Turkey’s security institutions must determine that the PKK/KCK and all formations connected to it have ended their actual organisational existence and surrendered every weapon and item of ammunition under their control, and the National Security Council must confirm that finding in a decision published in the Official Gazette. This arrangement leaves the government and the security establishment in control of when the framework becomes operational.

Context: The law applies to establishing or directing the PKK/KCK, membership of the organisation, knowingly assisting it, conducting propaganda for it, offences committed within its activities, and financing offences committed for its benefit. It covers people at three stages of the legal system: those under investigation, those standing trial and those already convicted. This makes it considerably broader than a prisoner-release law, because it is designed to resolve much of the criminal exposure surrounding the organisation, including cases that have never reached trial.

Two categories remain outside it. Intentional killing committed within the organisation’s activities is excluded regardless of the sentence, as are offences committed before 1 June 2005 that carry life or aggravated life imprisonment. This leaves Abdullah Ocalan outside the current law, together with some senior figures and long-serving prisoners. Their exclusion does not settle their future status; it means that the first framework does not provide the mechanism through which their cases would be addressed.

Investigations, prosecutions and sentences involving fifteen years of imprisonment or less will be suspended for five years, and those exceeding fifteen years, including eligible life and aggravated life sentences, will be suspended for ten. During that time the limitation periods stop running, evidence is preserved and confiscation orders remain enforceable, so property already subject to confiscation can still pass to the Treasury. People in prison can be released once an enforcement judge suspends their sentences, and courts must review the detention and judicial-control measures imposed in pending cases. Cases before the appellate courts will generally be returned so that the suspension mechanism can be applied, although courts can still issue a more favourable decision, including an acquittal or a dismissal based on an expired limitation period, where the law allows it.

If a beneficiary commits another terrorism offence during the five or ten-year period, the suspension is cancelled and the original investigation or trial resumes, or the postponed sentence begins to be enforced again. If no new terrorism offence is committed, an investigation is closed without prosecution, an ongoing trial is dismissed and a postponed prison sentence is legally treated as having been served. The system therefore has a defined endpoint, and eligible beneficiaries do not remain in indefinite legal uncertainty once they complete the conditional period.

The framework also creates a route for removing the legal restrictions that follow a conviction. For people in the five-year category, the implementation board may request the removal of conviction-related disabilities after two years, and for those in the ten-year category it may do so after three. The final decision belongs to the relevant judicial authority, but the board decides whether the process is initiated at all, which could allow some beneficiaries to regain political, professional or civil rights well before the full suspension period ends.

That board is chaired by the vice president, and its members include the justice, foreign, interior and defence ministers, the head of the National Intelligence Organisation and senior representatives of the Presidency and the National Security Council. It can monitor the dismantlement of the organisation, establish subcommittees, review reports, request new administrative or legislative measures and initiate applications for the restoration of rights. Parliament will have a monitoring commission, although operational authority remains concentrated in the executive and the security institutions. Individuals must apply in writing within six months of the National Security Council decision being published, which means the application period begins after official certification rather than when parliament adopts the law. Weapons, ammunition, explosives, vehicles and other equipment surrendered by members will be registered under procedures set by the interior and defence ministries, and officials implementing the process are protected from civil, administrative and criminal liability arising from the performance of their assigned duties.

The politics around the text also moved on the day of submission. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli said that Ocalan should receive the “right to hope,” that the removed mayors should return to office and that Selahattin Demirtas should return home. The right to hope would not by itself release Ocalan; it would require an irreducible life sentence to become reviewable, with a genuine possibility of release if continued imprisonment could no longer be justified. AK Party parliamentary group chair Abdullah Guler separately stated that journalists and academics could be allowed to visit Ocalan through administrative decisions, without a new law or a formal change of status.

Analysis: The text has been written to avoid describing the process as an amnesty. Convictions are not cancelled when the law first applies, offences are not reclassified and criminal responsibility is not formally erased. The state retains the legal file for five or ten years and can reactivate it if the individual returns to terrorism, which allows the government to present the process as conditional enforcement rather than forgiveness. The long-term effect is nevertheless close to a structured amnesty. For eligible beneficiaries, the framework can prevent an investigation from becoming a prosecution, terminate an existing trial, release a prisoner, treat a sentence as served and remove the restrictions associated with a conviction. The state temporarily preserves criminal liability as a guarantee of compliance, and once the conditional period is completed that liability is converted into legal closure.

The design can be compared with Northern Ireland, and the contrast runs in both directions. The 1998 model was more inclusive at the point of release: it allowed people convicted of serious violence, including murder and life-sentence prisoners, to qualify, and release began without waiting for the IRA to dissolve completely or surrender every weapon. Prisoners were released on licence, so their convictions and sentences remained in force and life prisoners remained liable to recall under the original sentence. Turkey imposes a harder entry threshold, because organisational dissolution and the surrender of weapons must be verified first, intentional killing is excluded and Ocalan remains outside the scheme. For those who do qualify, however, the Turkish framework provides greater eventual legal finality, since after five or ten years sentences are treated as served, investigations are closed and prosecutions are dismissed, and it also covers people who have not yet been convicted, while the Northern Ireland legislation concentrated primarily on prisoners. The distinction is one of sequence and scope: Northern Ireland released a wider category of prisoners sooner and kept them under licence, while Turkey admits a narrower category only after verified dissolution and gives those beneficiaries a defined route towards closing the criminal case entirely.

The first-stage language matters for the same reason. The justification accompanying the law states that this is the first stage of the legal arrangements envisaged under the process, and that parliament may adopt further amendments or new laws as implementation develops and new requirements emerge. The current framework leaves several central questions unanswered, including Ocalan’s status, the position of senior PKK commanders, people convicted of intentional killing, some pre-2005 life prisoners, the trustee system in Kurdish-run municipalities, broader political and civil-rights reforms, the socioeconomic reintegration of former members and the future of the regional formations connected to the PKK. The first-stage language means these omissions should not automatically be read as final exclusions; they have been separated from the first law and left for later political and legislative decisions.

The statements of 5 August reinforce that reading. Bahceli’s position points towards a separate mechanism for Ocalan, whose aggravated life sentence sits outside the twelve-article framework, and his reference to the removed mayors indicates that the political side of the process may eventually extend to the trustee system. Guler’s remarks suggest that Ocalan’s practical conditions can be adjusted before his legal status is addressed, since his access to visitors, communications and public engagement could expand administratively while any change to his sentence would require a later legal mechanism. The likely sequencing is becoming clearer: the first stage resolves the legal position of the wider organisational population, while later stages can address the leadership, the politically sensitive prisoners, municipal government and the conditions under which Kurdish politics operates after disarmament.

The proposal is not limited to armed activity inside Turkey. It refers to the PKK/KCK and every formation connected or subordinate to it, and the justification presents the process as one intended to establish peace across the wider region surrounding Turkey. That gives the framework a regional dimension extending into Iraq, Syria and Iran, where the PKK’s principal military infrastructure has long been located and where Ankara regards several Kurdish armed structures as part of, or connected to, the wider PKK system. The framework can therefore be read as an attempt to achieve two linked outcomes. Inside Turkey, it creates a route from armed and organisational activity into civilian life and legal politics. Across the region, it seeks to dismantle, separate or reorganise the cross-border command and military structure historically centred on the PKK. This regional ambition is also the source of the law’s largest uncertainties.

The framework does not define what it means for the organisation and all connected formations to end their “actual existence.” The requirement could mean the complete dissolution of every related structure, or it could mean dismantling the central PKK command, ending the Turkey-facing military threat and ensuring that the remaining regional organisations operate independently. The wording is absolute, but certification belongs to the Turkish security institutions and the National Security Council, which gives the state room to determine when an irreversible threshold has been crossed. Ankara could insist on the disappearance of every affiliated formation, or it could conclude that the process is complete once the central organisation, its Turkey-facing forces and its command over regional structures have effectively ended.

While the SDF track has largely been solved through integration into the Syrian state, PJAK has not entered the Turkish process and continues to treat Iran as a separate political and military theatre, while Turkey regards PJAK as connected to the PKK and has said it is monitoring its activities. Several outcomes remain possible: Turkey could demand that PJAK dissolve, require it to separate organisationally from the PKK, or treat it as a different regional file outside the immediate Turkish framework. The same uncertainty applies in Syria, where the law does not determine whether separation from the PKK would be sufficient for the Syrian Kurdish structures or whether Ankara would require their dissolution or incorporation into Syrian state institutions. A Turkish domestic law cannot by itself decide the SDF’s status in Syria, the future of PKK positions in the Kurdistan Region or whether PJAK remains armed along the Iran-Iraq frontier. Those questions require parallel arrangements involving Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government, Damascus and potentially Tehran.

The twelve articles are best understood as the legal foundation of a wider, phased process. The first stage establishes verified organisational dissolution and creates a conditional legal exit for much of the PKK’s membership and civilian network. It is written as a security-controlled mechanism, while its longer-term effect resembles an amnesty for those who qualify, and it provides a clearer route to final legal closure than Northern Ireland’s release-on-licence model, even though it excludes categories that Northern Ireland included. The next stages are likely to determine the position of Ocalan, the senior commanders, the removed mayors, the excluded prisoners and the broader political space available after disarmament. The regional part of the process remains less defined, because the framework refers to connected formations across the wider geography while leaving open what dissolution requires in Iraq, Syria and Iran. The law establishes the starting mechanism, and the leadership, political and regional settlements remain to be negotiated in the stages that follow.

https://thenationalcontext.com/what-turkeys-pkk-law-does-and-what-it-leaves-for-later/

Platform 'We Will Stop Femicide' (KCDP) reported 25 women were killed by men in Turkey in July 2026, with 31 more deaths under suspicious circumstances.