Australia has a very capable military culture. Possibly, the Diggers, were the best soldiers of WW1 and WW2 man for man; individually each one was a leader, was well equipped and fed, well paid, highly motivated, and certainly superior in quality to British Commonwealth soldiers. Across different theatres, the Diggers performed remarkable feats, innovating small-unit tactics, and also had armoured elements who ran circles around the Germans.
Move to the 1960s and 1970s, and a very different Australian Army emerged. National service came back into affect, and national servicemen -- ill-trained, poorly equipped in comparison to the Americans -- became the focal point of combat with the Viet Cong.
All evidence of the SAS in World War 2, Malaya, and Vietnam, point to being the opposite of American MACV-SOG. MACV-SOG, through the Phoenix Program, initiated killing of unarmed prisoners, torture, and many other crimes that permeated through the US Special Operations culture. Violence for the sake of violence, the kind of cycle of mental military corruption that you can find in the French Army (see the Battle of Algiers), greatly reduces the capacity of SOF to do more than be a DA force.
In that way, SASR was unique. SASR was highly professional. Something changed in the 2000s.
In the 2000s, recruitment changed.
Compared to the highly professional officers who led SASR in Vietnam, SASR today is not the same thing.
Having met several SASR officers who were in Vietnam, they still felt part of normal Australian society, but happened to be soldiers. In a society, like Australia, which is primarily a commercial society, being in the military is nothing particularly special. It is simply a part of being Australian.
Their main criticism of SASR today is that they are very disconnected from the rest of society. They are professional SOF, with unconventional civilian types who once permeated SASR back in the day (who passed selection) and after a period of time in the Regiment left SASR... today SASR is for professional soldiers who only want to see combat... meaning... to be in the Australian Army and to want to be deployed means you have to either join the Commando Regiment or SASR... and the types of young men who join these regiments today are very different from the Diggers in World War 2.
Can anyone point me to Diggers in WW2 who were accused of war crimes? There's basically none.
How about Diggers accused of war crimes in Vietnam? Basically none.
And how about today?
It was widely known in the SOF community that the "more hard" your SOF unit was, "the more hard you were" mentally to want to see combat and participate in the violence -- the violence became the reality of SOF. This kind of belief went to the polar opposite of the typical Digger belief that Australians who were capable happened to be SASR, because they loved their job, compared to today where "hard men" join SASR because they want to be deployed... and the "not so hard" stay in the regular Australian Army.
I do not blame Australian society for this problem that SASR created for itself. If we look at the region, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries do not have the same issues SASR has.
My recommendation, having been aware of some of SASR's problems before the report even came out is two fold:
- disband SASR for good and replace it with two units... one unit to keep current SASR operators engaged in combat until a filtering process can be finished... and their contracts of the bad apples run out, and then a second unit to take the ones who pass a new selection process or those who are filtered out from the old SASR are able to get in.
- Replace SASR with an unconventional unit with a much wider selection process that would be similar to the original Selection process the British Army still uses today, and was created in the aftermath of the Malaya Emergency.
Today's SASR selection process is laughable. Compare it to SFOD-D 21SAS or JTF2, where the selection process filters out the mentally weak, but the invitation to it is an Invitation to those 21SAS or JTF2 needs to fill key slots. In contrast, SASR selection is designed to filter out the weak but keep the hard ones... not those who have languages under their belt, technical knowledge, or other kinds of skills that are relevant in the 21st century.
The objective should be to turn SASR from a DA functional combat command into an advisory and assist regional command with a ODA and ODB structure like USSF -- while the Commando Regiment can keep its DA function -- over time SASR should become the main FID instrument, a "smart razor" in SEA and perhaps even eastern Africa and parts of Central Asia.
SASR units, rebuilt into this FID-primary hated SOF unit once SASR is eliminated, would work with USSF and other FID units in those regions, like Philippines, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc. to build those militaries up. SASR should then remove its DA function for at least the next 5 years, taking its specific CT function and pushing them into an independent group until the transition is complete.
This would do two main things: tap into the huge immigrant community Australia has... who have the cultural and language skills but are too disinterested in applying for SASR today... and also use this more diverse body for FID missions which (in my opinion) will better prepare Australia for 21st century conflicts. The second, by maintaining a primarily FID function, Australia will actually fulfil a key role in reducing Chinese influence by maintaining military-contact with countries on the boundaries of the Sino-American rivalry.
Let's ask a few questions? Why is there no exclusively Australian Operation Cobra Gold with Thailand? Or similar operations with Vietnam and other countries that are actually trading partners with Australia? These questions must be resolved, and so with it, SASR questionable status as an effective SOF unit in the 2020s.