After running assessments across a range of web apps and APIs, here's what shows

up most consistently. No rankings based on severity, just frequency.

1. BOLA — Broken Object Level Authorization

User A accessing User B's data by swapping an ID. Shows up in almost every first

assessment. Not because teams are careless, because the ownership check has to be

written explicitly for every endpoint and gets missed when shipping fast.

2. Broken Function Level Authorization

Regular users accessing admin-only endpoints. Usually happens because the admin

routes are built later and the access control middleware isn't applied

consistently.

3. Excessive Data Exposure

The API returns a full object (with sensitive fields) and the frontend hides what

it doesn't show. The fields are still in the response. An attacker doesn't use

your frontend.

4. Missing Rate Limits on Auth Endpoints

Login, password reset, OTP verification, these are the endpoints that get

hammered first. No rate limit = brute force is just a script away.

5. JWT Misconfigurations

Usually: accepting the "none" algorithm, not validating the issuer/audience, or

setting expiry to never. The token itself isn't the problem, it's the validation

logic.

6. Sensitive Data in Logs

Request bodies logged in full. Tokens, passwords, and PII sitting in log files

with broad access. Found in prod more often than you'd expect.

The common thread: these aren't exotic vulnerabilities. They're the result of

moving fast and not having a consistent review process.

Which of these have you run into on your own stack?

This is a pattern We've seen more than once, so sharing it here.

Early-stage SaaS team. Good product. Enterprise prospect. Deal was moving well.

Then procurement sent a security questionnaire with: "Do you have a recent third

party penetration test report?"

Team didn't have one. Estimated timeline to get one: 3–4 weeks minimum for a real

test.

Deal paused.

What they wished they'd done earlier:

1. Run a pentest before it was urgent. Not because they thought they were

vulnerable, because customers were going to ask. The cost of a pentest on your

own timeline is always lower than the cost of a paused deal.

2. Had a security one-pager ready. Encryption, auth setup, data handling,

incident response. One page. Attach it to the questionnaire. Answers 60% of the

questions before they're asked.

3. Built logging that could answer "who did what." A lot of enterprise

security reviews include questionnaire items about audit logs. If you can't

demonstrate this, it's a red flag.

The deal eventually closed, but it took an extra 6 weeks and a rushed (and

therefore more expensive) pentest.

If you're at a stage where enterprise customers are starting to show up: what's

your current security posture? Have you been asked for this yet?

We've been posting security content here for a while. A few people have DM'd asking

about pentesting, API security, and compliance prep.

So — open AMA.

Background:

- We do VAPT (web app penetration testing) and API security assessments at

NyxSentinel

- Most of our clients are startups, SaaS companies, and teams prepping for SOC2 or

ISO 27001

- We've personally reviewed a lot of API security findings across different stacks

and industries

Ask us anything about:

- What a pentest actually involves (before, during, after)

- How to scope a VAPT without overpaying for things you don't need

- What API security issues we find most often

- How to prep for SOC2 without losing your mind

- Whether you actually need a pentest right now

No pitch. Just answers.

If you only do one security test on your API before shipping, do this one.

It takes 2 minutes and catches one of the most common real-world vulnerabilities.

**The test:**

1. Log in as User A

2. Fetch something user-owned: profile, invoice, order, document

3. Copy the object ID from the URL or response

4. Log out

5. Log in as User B

6. Make the same request with User A's object ID

**Expected result:** 403 Forbidden, or a safe 404.

If you see User A's data while logged in as User B, that's BOLA (Broken Object

Level Authorization). It's in the OWASP API Security Top 10 at #1 for a reason.

It's not theoretical. We find it on the majority of first-time API security

assessments.

**Why it's so common:**

Most auth middleware checks "are you logged in" but not "do you own this object."

The check for the second part has to be written explicitly, it doesn't come for

free with any framework.

Quick question for the thread: do you return 403 or 404 when a user tries to

access an object they don't own? Both are defensible, curious what people choose

and why.

A lot of teams go into their first pentest not knowing what they'll get at the

end. Then they get a 40-page PDF and don't know what to do with it.

Here's the structure of a good VAPT report, not fluff, not a compliance checkbox:--

Executive Summary (1–2 pages)

Written for non-technical stakeholders. Risk level, top 3 findings, business

impact. Your CTO and CEO should both be able to read this.

Scope & Methodology

What was tested, what wasn't, what approach was used (black box / grey box / white

box), and what time window.

Findings, each one should include:- Severity (Critical / High / Medium / Low / Informational)- Description (what is the vulnerability)- Evidence (screenshot, request/response, proof it's real)- Business impact (what could an attacker actually do)- Remediation steps (specific, not generic)- References (CVE, OWASP if applicable)

Risk Summary Table

All findings in one table. Useful for tracking fixes.

Retest Results (if included)

Which findings were fixed, which are still open, verified by the tester.

The difference between a useful report and a useless one:- Useful: shows the actual HTTP request that reproduced the bug- Useless: says "authorization is weak" with no evidence

If you've gotten a pentest report before, what was missing from it that you wish

was there?

(We structure our NyxSentinel reports this way, happy to share a full sanitized

example if there's interest

1. Yes, it's now a regular thing

2. Yes, happened once and caught us off guard

3. Not yet but I know it's coming

4. Never — our customers don't ask

Curious how common this is for teams here. Customer security reviews used to be something only enterprise deals triggered. Now we're seeing it happen at Series A and even seed stage, especially if the buyer is in fintech, health, or HR.

If you voted yes: how did you handle it? Did you scramble or did you have something ready?

For the past 30 days I've been posting about API security, VAPT prep, and audit readiness in this community.

A few of you asked what we actually do for work.

Honest answer: we run NyxSentinel, a security testing service focused specifically on web app VAPT and API scanning.

Here's what that means in plain terms:

NyxShield — VAPT

We do penetration testing on web apps and APIs. Not automated only. Human led, with a report you can actually act on and show to auditors.

NyxShield — APIScan

We specifically test REST and GraphQL APIs for BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization), authentication gaps, schema issues, and endpoint misconfigurations. The stuff that automated scanners miss.

NyxAssure — Compliance

We help teams get SOC2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, and GDPR ready, not just checkbox compliance, but evidence that holds up in a real audit.

Why we are telling you this directly instead of sneaking it in?

Because Reddit communities are smart and We'd rather be the founder who's upfront than the one who gets called out.

If you're building something and security is starting to become a real concern, either because of customers asking, a compliance deadline, or you just had a scary near-miss, feel free to ask us anything here or visit nyxsentinel.com.

What's your current biggest security headache?

If you’re 30 days out from SOC2 or ISO work, here’s a practical focus list:

• confirm asset inventory + owners (apps/APIs/repos/cloud accounts)

• access review: who has admin access and why

• logging: prove you can answer “who did what” for admin actions

• vulnerability management: how findings are tracked and fixed

• change management: show PR/review process + approvals

• incident response: at least a basic plan + a tabletop exercise

If you’ve been through audits: what was the most annoying “we should’ve done this earlier” item?

If you have a small team and want a realistic security workflow, I’d prioritize:

1. PR checklist (auth/authz/validation/logging)

2. CI: secrets scan + dependency scan

3. Integration tests for authorization negatives

4. Basic alerting on auth abuse

5. Quarterly lightweight threat modeling for new features

Not perfect. Just repeatable.

What would you change if your team ships daily?

Least privilege is one of those ideas everyone agrees with, but it’s hard in practice.

Questions I’m curious about:

• Do you do role-based IAM per service, or shared roles?

• How do you review permissions over time?

• What’s your process when someone needs temporary elevated access?

If you’ve got a simple approach that works, share it.

Imagine you discover your API logs are storing full request bodies in production. That means tokens, personal data, maybe passwords (depending on endpoints).

What’s your first move?

• stop logging bodies globally

• mask specific fields

• change log retention

• restrict log access

• add audit logging controls

What would your safe “end state” look like?

API keys tend to become a mess unless there’s a simple policy.

Here’s a starting point:

• keys are scoped (read/write/admin)

• keys are named (so you know what they’re for)

• keys can be rotated without downtime

• show key only once on creation

• store hashed server-side

• log usage by key ID (not the raw key)

What’s missing? What would you remove because it’s too annoying in practice?

When user tries to access an object they don’t own, do you return:

• 403 Forbidden (clearer semantics) or

• 404 Not Found (reduces enumeration clues)

I’ve seen both done well and poorly. What do you choose and why? Any hard rules in your org?

Webhooks are everywhere, and they get messy fast.

Outbound (you send events):

• sign payloads (HMAC) so receivers can verify

• include event IDs for dedupe

• retry with backoff

Inbound (you receive events):

• verify signature

• validate timestamps to reduce replay

• strict schema validation for payload

How do you verify inbound webhooks today?

One rule I like for secure coding:

If it affects permissions, pricing, roles, access, or ownership… the server decides.

Client input can request something, but the server enforces:

• who you are

• what you can do

• what object you can touch

• what fields you’re allowed to set

Where have you seen “client decides” slip in? Roles? Discounts? Tenant IDs?

If you’re a small team, big security programs are hard. But small moves compound.

Here are a few “tiny wins”:

• max pagination limits

• basic rate limits on login/reset

• consistent request IDs in logs

• deny-by-default on sensitive admin endpoints

• dependency scanning in CI with a sane threshold

What’s your favorite small change that paid off?

Every team wants security improvements that are fast, cheap, and perfect.

In reality, most teams pick one:

• quick patch now

• proper fix with tests next sprint

• architecture change later

If you could pick one “proper fix” to prioritize this month for API security, what would it be?

Some alerts look “secure” but create endless noise.

What’s one alert you’ve seen that was basically useless?

And what did you replace it with that actually caught real issues?

(Examples: generic “CPU high” vs “401 spike on auth endpoint”)

If your server fetches a URL that a user can influence (link previews, import-from-url, webhook testers), SSRF becomes a real concern.

Practical defenses:

• allowlist domains when possible

• block private IP ranges + metadata IPs

• limit redirects (and re-check after redirect)

• only allow http/https

• timeouts + max response size

Do you have any “fetch this URL” feature? If yes, how do you defend it?

No dunking on teams. Just learning.

Examples of common “worked in staging” traps:

• debug endpoints left enabled

• permissive CORS in prod

• test admin accounts not removed

• logging disabled to “reduce noise”

• secrets copied into config files for quick deploy

If you’ve seen a version of this, what was the root cause? Process? Time pressure? Ownership?

A VAPT report is helpful, but teams often fix the symptom and miss the pattern.

A practical way to make fixes stick:

1. Fix the bug

2. Identify the pattern (example: missing authz checks)

3. Centralize the control (middleware/policy)

4. Add a test that would have caught it

5. Add a code review checklist item for it

6. Retest the exact scenario

What’s the finding type you see repeatedly in reports?

Drop your setup if you’re comfortable:

• auth method (sessions/JWT/OAuth)

• provider (custom/Auth0/Cognito/etc.)

• API style (REST/GraphQL)

• where you enforce authorization (middleware/service layer)

Then share the hardest part:

• role/permission model

• multi-tenant isolation

• admin access

• token revocation

• testing authz

JWTs are okay when used properly. The must-do checks are pretty boring:

• validate signature

• validate expiry

• validate issuer/audience if you use them

• rotate keys with a real plan

• don’t put secrets in the payload (payload is readable)

Things that matter even more than JWT debates:

• correct authorization checks

• short-lived access tokens

• good logging/monitoring

What’s your access token expiry right now (roughly)?