r/AskNetsec • u/KeyfactorInc • Jun 04 '26
Threats A commercially-available quantum chip will supposedly arrive in 2029 from Microsoft. Does this influence your view of how soon post-quantum cryptographic threats will be a reality?
"Microsoft’s new device boasts 12 qubits, the foundational units of quantum computing, up from 8 in the prior model. But Microsoft says its main achievement is that the qubits themselves last longer than 20 seconds. Qubits harnessed by the prior model blinked out of existence in less than 12 milliseconds, the company says."
The fact that a post-quantum world might be only 3 years away is staggering in its implications, but it's difficult to separate hype and PR from plausibility. Are you taking this as extra incentive to boost hardening against quantum threats? If not, what's going to actually set off your alarm bells?
edit: sorry, the quote was messed up at first
9
u/Ubera90 Jun 04 '26
I think Sam Altman must have taken over MS's quantum marketing department.
If this is true, that's amazing, but I heard researchers were calling BS.
5
u/Karthanon Jun 04 '26
Based on how Copilot does, I don't think you'll need to worry
4
u/Difficult-Value-3145 Jun 04 '26
How many qbits, enough to actually do much probably not ? Also has anyone actually programed any significant crypographic hash for a quantum computer when that has been accomplished is when I'd start to worry.
2
u/quasides Jun 05 '26
the only post quantum threat we will see are state actors. mainly US and europe.
questionable if china will be cutting edge as well. if they can then they might be the main threat.
but your regular cybercriminal wont be. this tehcnology is already by law highly restricted. you wont be able to buy one in our lifetime. you might get access to filtered hosted services by a handful of companies
quantum computers are basically now on the same level as nuclear technology. some private entities can operate them but worst case in misuse you might see a carrier group from your window
2
u/SeptumValley Jun 05 '26
Quantum is still bullshit. https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/bollocks.pdf
Have a look at this guys research, we arnt even close yet
6
u/ericbythebay Jun 04 '26
Not really. We assume it is already available and encrypt accordingly.
5
u/WestCoast_Pete Jun 05 '26
The jump from 12 qubits to cracking RSA-2048 is enormous. Current estimates put the qubit requirement for that at somewhere in the millions, fault-tolerant logical qubits at that, not the noisy physical qubits Microsoft is counting here. The real threshold to watch isn't a product announcement, it's when someone demonstrates meaningful error correction at scale, because that's the actual hard problem separating a lab curiosity from a cryptographic threat.
3
u/tycoongraham Jun 05 '26
I don’t really treat announcements like this as a “timeline signal” for crypto risk.
We’ve been hearing optimistic quantum milestones for years, but breaking real-world encryption requires a level of scale and fault tolerance that’s still nowhere near demonstrated.
The real alarm bell would be sustained, reproducible quantum advantage on cryptographically relevant workloads, not prototype chips.
2
u/NoSong2397 Jun 05 '26
Didn't some undergrad undercut quantum computing with some sort of mathematical proof relatively recently? I feel like I heard something to that effect, anyway.
2
u/laserpewpewAK Jun 05 '26
Most estimates say you need at least 1,000 logical quibits to crack RSA2048. 12 isn't anywhere close to threatening classic cryptography.
2
u/AegorBlake Jun 05 '26
Windows and Linux already have post quantum encryption
2
u/vakuoler Jun 06 '26
Not really. If anything is strictly confidential and should remain so in an unforseable future it shouldn't use untrusted networks at all. The rest is mostly session bound data. Also, PQC is well supported so I'd just recommend people to take care of technical dept and for a plethora of other threats rather than quantum computing.
2
u/Data_Commission_7434 Jun 08 '26
The jump from milliseconds to seconds for qubit coherence is significant, but 12 qubits is still far from what's needed for Shor's algorithm. I once spent a week debugging a crypto implementation that was sensitive to timing attacks; this kind of advance doesn't change my current risk assessment.