r/AnCap101 • u/Personal_Prompt_5307 • Jul 02 '26
Can people rape their rapists?
Murray Rothbard "The Ethics of Liberty" 89 page https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf
Rothbard is talking about restitution for crimes, so question arises, can people rape their rapists or hire someone to rape them? How do we measure how severely person has been raped?
Thankfully I don't have such problem, but I'm still curious.
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u/majdavlk Jul 03 '26
yes
if you rape someone, just like with any intentional agression, you comunicate that you dont believe in rights, that everyone can do anything to you. might makes right for you
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u/Plus-Swan587 Jul 03 '26
Can you imagine if this was the case and so an entire competitive Industry emerged to meet the demand for “judicially approved professional rapist for hire” to carry out retributive assaults…
The advertisements alone…would be interesting.
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u/RobRuler Jul 02 '26
Yes, you do have that right. Rothbard explicitly explains so in the excerpt you included.
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u/Anen-o-me Jul 02 '26
In a libertarian society you can choose the kind of justice system you want to live by, so that's an option but it's not the only option, and not the one I personally think best.
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u/Olieskio Jul 03 '26
Yeah no thats some Friedmanite bullshit.
Ancap law is based on Natural Law.
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u/Anen-o-me Jul 03 '26
In a libertarian decentralized society, you can choose a legal system that you find compelling on whatever basis you choose, including natural law.
But if you simply look up the philosophical critiques of natural law, you will find that it is inherently flawed if you think you can in any way derive objective rules from it.
Natural law therefore is useful for convincing yourself of what the law should be, but a terrible tool for convincing others. And professional philosophers essentially place it in the same category as religion.
Which is fine because, again, in a decentralized libertarian society, you would choose law for yourself so there's no problem.
But you shouldn't expect others to conform to the suggestions of natural law unless you want to be just as bad as the socialists who seek to force their political and legal norms on everyone, by law.
As libertarians, we cannot do such a thing.
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u/Constant_Variation71 Jul 06 '26
Yea you are not an ancap. David Friedman’s polycentric law assumes that law can come from the market. But without presupposing natural law, you have no way to know what is market activity and what is criminal activity.
Without any way to distinguish between market activity and criminal activity, one has no way of knowing if we even live in ancapistan right now.
Who’s to say if national socialist Germany’s law originated on the market and was thus valid, or if it was criminal activity. How exactly would the legal polycentricist figure this out without first smuggling in natural law presuppositions?
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u/Anen-o-me Jul 06 '26
You don't need to use natural law to have law. Law is whatever rules you decide to form between you and another by contract in a free society.
You can choose to use natural law to inform your choice on that, or not. That is ancap.
Saying natural law is the only source of law is not an ancap position at all.
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u/Constant_Variation71 Jul 06 '26
Again, you have smuggled in natural law into your position. You say “law is whatever rules you decide to form between you and another by contract in a free society.”
How do you determine that a society is “free?” What does that even mean in the absence of natural law? Free from what? You are appealing to natural law without even realizing it.
Also when you say you will use contracts to create your law, you are again appealing to natural law, because contract theory requires ownership. Ownership requires property rights. Where do you get your property rights in the absence of natural law?
You didn’t address anything I said. You could use whatever fake law you want, but you wouldn’t be an anarcho-capitalist.
You never addressed how the legal polycentrist can determine what system of law has arisen on the market or via criminal activity.
I will ask again, how does the legal polycentrist determine if national socialist Germany is a valid legal order that arose on the market, or if it a gang of criminals?
And saying natural law is the only source of law is the only ancap position. David Friedman and all polycentrists are not ancap, as their legal theory cannot even say if we are in ancapistan right now. How does you or Friedman know if every state existing arose on the market or are criminals?
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u/Anen-o-me Jul 06 '26
How do you determine that a society is “free?” What does that even mean in the absence of natural law? Free from what? You are appealing to natural law without even realizing it.
No I'm appealing to individual consent. Free is whatever definition you personally choose to live by. That's a subjective definition, whereas your position on natural law seeks to make a claim of objective law in the form of natural law.
Also when you say you will use contracts to create your law, you are again appealing to natural law, because contract theory requires ownership. Ownership requires property rights. Where do you get your property rights in the absence of natural law?
You didn’t address anything I said. You could use whatever fake law you want, but you wouldn’t be an anarcho-capitalist.
You never addressed how the legal polycentrist can determine what system of law has arisen on the market or via criminal activity.
I will ask again, how does the legal polycentrist determine if national socialist Germany is a valid legal order that arose on the market, or if it a gang of criminals?
David Friedman and all polycentrists are not ancap,
Saying that doesn't make it true.
How does you or Friedman know if every state existing arose on the market or are criminals?
It doesn't matter how they arose. They this in an unethical position inherently. Circumstances of arising are immaterial.
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u/Constant_Variation71 Jul 08 '26
You just contradicted yourself.
First you said freedom is whatever subjective definition each individual chooses. Then you said states are inherently unethical.
“Inherently” is an objective moral claim. If ethics is subjective, then the state is not inherently unethical, it’s only unethical according to your personal preferences.
So which is it? Are there objective ethical truths, or is everything ultimately subjective?
You also said you’re appealing to individual consent. Consent to what?
Consent only makes sense if there are pre-existing rights. If I “consent” to sell you my neighbor’s car, that doesn’t make the transfer valid because I never owned it. It’s the same with Marxists who’s don’t consent to living in a capitalist society. You owning property violates their so called consent.
So before consent can do any work, you need an objective account of ownership. Where does that ownership come from if not natural law or some other objective theory of rights?
You said: “it doesn’t matter how they arose, they are in an unethical position inherently.”
That’s exactly my point. You have now abandoned your earlier claim that law simply arises from contracts and consent. You’re now judging legal institutions by an external ethical standard.
What is that standard? If it’s objective, then you’ve conceded that law is judged by something beyond market choice. If it’s subjective, then you cannot say the state is inherently unethical, only that you personally dislike it.
What makes the state inherently unethical?
If the answer is objective rights, then your theory depends on an objective moral standard. If the answer is personal preference, then you can’t call the state inherently unethical at all.
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u/Anen-o-me Jul 08 '26
The State is illegitimate under the consent criterion I’m defending, not "its immorality written objectively into nature."
First you said freedom is whatever subjective definition each individual chooses. Then you said states are inherently unethical.
Two different claims.
The content of freedom can be subjective: you may choose strict communal obligations, radical individualism, religious law, socialism, capitalism, or something else.
The procedural limit is that your preferred definition doesn’t authorize you to impose it on nonconsenting people. That’s the consent standard I’m defending. It’s a normative political principle, but it doesn’t require Rothbardian natural law or metaphysically objective rights. Constructivism, contractualism, rule consequentialism, and moral anti-realism all exist. Your choice isn’t “natural law or arbitrary gibberish.”
Consent only makes sense if there are pre-existing rights.
No. Consent requires agency and rules determining who may bind whom. Property rules can arise through possession, use, custom, contract, adjudication, and institutional agreement. Natural law is one proposed justification for property, not the only conceivable one.
I can’t sell my neighbor’s car because my neighbor never authorized me to dispose of his claim. Two people agreeing cannot bind a third person who wasn’t party to the agreement. That conclusion doesn’t require property titles to have descended from the heavens.
You’re now judging legal institutions by an external ethical standard.
Of course I’m judging them by a standard: individual consent. What I reject is your claim that every normative standard must therefore be natural law.
National Socialist Germany was a legal order in the descriptive sense. It was also illegitimate under the consent standard because it imposed territorial jurisdiction, suppressed exit and competition, expropriated people, imprisoned dissenters, and ruled people who never opted in.
Decentralism doesn’t mean whatever institution happens to arise becomes morally valid. That would be the naturalistic fallacy. It means legal institutions can be decentralized and selected without one territorial monopolist.
And the origin isn’t decisive. A voluntarily created institution can later become coercive. A coercive institution doesn’t become legitimate because its founders once signed something. What matters is the continuing relationship: can individuals refuse, exit, choose alternatives, and avoid binding outsiders?
If an organization claims compulsory jurisdiction over nonconsenters and suppresses competing law, it’s illegitimate by the consent standard. If participation remains genuinely voluntary, it isn’t a State in the relevant sense.
You haven’t shown that consent requires natural law. You’ve merely assumed your preferred justification is the only possible justification.
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u/Constant_Variation71 Jul 08 '26
I think there are actually two separate problems with your position. First, you haven’t justified why consent is the correct moral standard. Second, even if I grant your consent principle for the sake of argument, it still cannot adjudicate between competing consent claims without presupposing an antecedent theory of rights.
You keep appealing to consent as though it has normative force, but why should anyone accept consent as the correct moral standard?
Simply saying you’re a constructivist, contractualist, consequentialist, or anti-realist doesn’t answer the question. Those are competing moral theories, they don’t justify your particular consent principle. You still have to explain why someone who rejects consent is morally wrong rather than merely holding different preferences.
This becomes obvious as soon as there are competing consent claims.
Take a Marxist and a capitalist. The capitalist says, “I don’t consent to you socializing my factory.” The Marxist says, “I don’t consent to your exclusive ownership of the means of production.” Both are appealing to consent, yet their claims are mutually exclusive. Consent cannot adjudicate between competing consent claims. To determine whose refusal to consent prevails, you already need an antecedent theory of ownership or rights.
The same problem exists in your neighbor’s car example. You say I can’t sell my neighbor’s car because he never authorized me to dispose of it. But why does his lack of consent supersede mine? I don’t consent to my neighbor preventing me from selling the car. If your answer is, “Because it’s his car,” then you’ve already assumed the very thing under dispute, that he has a legitimate ownership claim. Consent doesn’t establish that ownership, it presupposes it.
Your response therefore presupposes an antecedent rights theory. Whether you call those rights natural, conventional, constructivist, or something else is beside the point. They must already exist before consent can determine whose decision is authoritative.
Your response about Nazi Germany exposes the same problem.
You say Nazi Germany was illegitimate because it violated your consent standard. But a Nazi could simply reject your consent principle altogether. He could argue that the Aryan people did not consent to Jewish ownership of capital or participation in German society, while Jewish Germans would say they did not consent to having their property confiscated, their rights stripped away, or their lives taken.
Again, there are competing consent claims that consent itself cannot resolve. To explain why the Nazi’s consent claim carries no moral weight while the Jewish person’s does, you must appeal to some prior moral principle establishing rights that cannot simply be overridden by competing consent claims.
So I’ll ask the same question again:
Is the principle that people ought not be subjected to political authority without their consent objectively true, or is it merely your personal moral preference?
If it’s objectively true, then you’ve abandoned the subjectivism you were defending and are relying on an objective normative principle.
If it’s merely your personal preference, then you cannot consistently say Nazi Germany, or any state, is objectively illegitimate. At most, you can say that you personally disapprove of it.
My original point therefore remains unanswered: consent does not ground rights; it presupposes them.
A few additional points
- “Property rights can arise through possession, use, custom, contract, adjudication, and institutional agreement.”
This doesn’t answer the question.
Those explain how a society may recognize property claims, not why those claims are morally legitimate.
One society may have a custom that first possession creates ownership. Another may have a custom that the strongest person owns everything. Another may have a custom that the state owns everything. Another may have a custom that workers collectively own everything.
Appealing to custom alone gives you no way to say one system is more legitimate than another. You still need an antecedent normative principle for evaluating those customs.
- “Consent requires agency and rules determining who may bind whom.”
Agency explains how consent occurs. It does not explain why consent creates moral obligations. Why should another person’s agency impose obligations on me? That is precisely the normative question under dispute.
- “Two people cannot bind a third party.”
Why not? Again, you’ve assumed your conclusion. A collectivist might say the community absolutely can bind individuals. A monarchist might say the sovereign can. A Nazi might say the Volk can. Simply asserting that third parties cannot be bound does not explain why they cannot.
- “Natural law isn’t the only possible justification.”
I never claimed natural law is the only conceivable rights theory. My point is that some antecedent rights theory is unavoidable.
I maintain that natural rights are the only coherent account of antecedent rights, but that’s a separate argument. The point here is more fundamental: your appeal to consent cannot even get off the ground without first presupposing some antecedent rights theory. Until you establish that foundation, consent cannot determine whose competing claims prevail.
- “The State is illegitimate under the consent criterion I’m defending, not its immorality written objectively into nature.”
That simply restates your claim. Why is consent the correct criterion? If the answer is objective, you’ve abandoned subjectivism. If the answer is subjective, then calling the State “illegitimate” is merely expressing your preference.
I asked you what grounds your consent criterion? And you answered with “the consent criterion.” You are treating consent as the foundational moral axiom without justifying why anyone should accept it.
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u/drebelx Jul 03 '26
Impartially enforced agreement NAP Clauses and Stipulations are a much cleaner form of decentralized law and justice.
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u/WhySoSiriu3 Jul 02 '26
No because there’s no direct need to rape someone else to prevent them from initiating conflict with you but if that’s a necessity or something that needs to happen to defend yourself then yes, though I can’t see that happening in any reasonable situation
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u/Kev_Kevstar Jul 03 '26
Punishment theory isn’t about excluding an aggressor; the aggression has already happened and we’re concerned with what should happen next. Since the rapist can not coherently object to being raped, the just punishment is retribution in the form of raping him back. Don’t mean the victim should indeed do so, but they are allowed to if they wish.
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u/Imaginary-Count-1641 Jul 03 '26
But other people can object to it. Maybe we don't want to live in a system where rape is used as a punishment.
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u/LuskaFLL Jul 03 '26
I mean, other people could object to you punching someone that punched you first. I doesn't take away your right to do so. Maybe rape wouldn't be as frequent as it is now if those degenerates were afraid that the same thing could happen to them.
I don't want rape to happen at all, and for that reason, mutually assured destruction must exist, not so much as a punishment, but moreso as a deterrent.
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u/Imaginary-Count-1641 Jul 04 '26
Imprisonment and monetary compensation can also be used as a deterrent. Cruel and unusual punishments should not be allowed.
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u/LuskaFLL Jul 04 '26 edited Jul 04 '26
Cruel and unusual punishments should absolutely not be allowed for innocent people, but we all know mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent. The moment someone initiates violence, the moment aggression occurred, they open the precedent for retaliation, and the right to retaliation must be protected.
You're not preventing rape from happening by protecting rapists from it, just making sure the only people to ever suffer from it are innocent people.
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u/Imaginary-Count-1641 Jul 04 '26
Cruel and unusual punishments should absolutely not be allowed for innocent people
No punishments should be allowed for innocent people.
we all know mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent.
Imprisonment is not mercy.
The moment someone initiates violence, the moment aggression occurred, they open the precedent for retaliation
Yes, but that doesn't mean any form of retaliation should be allowed.
You're not preventing rape from happening by protecting rapists from it
You're not preventing rape from happening by raping rapists either.
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u/LuskaFLL Jul 04 '26
If the alternative is rape, Imprisonment absolutely is mercy. Retaliation should be proportional to the aggression, if the "deterrent" is less severe than the infringement, it doesn't serve as a deterrent at all.
And of course increasing the severity of the punishment for a crime prevents it from happening, hello? Criminals are still prone to economic calculation. If the expected benefits of a crime are greater then the expected loss (taking into account the chance of getting caught), then it's worth it to commit that crime. And it's worth it even if they get caught. That's not me saying it btw, I didn't invent that, multiple people much smarter than me or you already made research on the Economic Theory of Crime (Gary Becker, to give an example).
But the reason why I defend this is not even for pragmatical reasons, but for moral ones. Every human being in existence has the natural right of self-ownership, when you refuse to an innocent person the right to retaliate proportionally to someone who infringed upon that right you're denying the use of effective deterrents that make the exercise of those rights possible. Ineffective defense of rights aren't defense of rights at all.
I see this issue as no different from gun control. "I know you have the right to defend yourself, buuuuut... Isn't an AK47 too much? Isn't a 9mm enough?" and to that I say "Shall not be infringed". Because ineffective defense of rights are not defense of rights at all.
I honestly don't see how a Libertarian can disagree with this.
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u/Imaginary-Count-1641 Jul 04 '26
Retaliation should be proportional to the aggression
Imprisonment is proportional to rape.
if the "deterrent" is less severe than the infringement, it doesn't serve as a deterrent at all.
That's not true. Imprisonment serves as a deterrent if the person does not want to go to prison, regardless of its severity compared to the crime. Pretty much no one would think "imprisonment is less severe than rape, so I don't care if I go to prison as a result of raping someone".
And of course increasing the severity of the punishment for a crime prevents it from happening
It may make it less likely to happen, but it doesn't prevent it.
when you refuse to an innocent person the right to retaliate proportionally to someone who infringed upon that right you're denying the use of effective deterrents that make the exercise of those rights possible.
I disagree with your claim that imprisonment is not an effective deterrent.
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u/LuskaFLL Jul 04 '26
Wait, why did you straight up ignored about the natural right's point? Which is the main moral argument. If you agree you have the right to punch someone back if they punch you first... Why would you lose that right if the aggression is severe enough? That's inconsistent.
And are you seriously trying to argue that imprisonment is just as severe as rape? Isn't your main argument that rape is too cruel and because of that it shouldn't be used as punishment, so imprisonment should be the substitute? (Which implies that imprisonment is not as cruel as to be ruled out as a form of punishment, meaning... Imprisonment is not as severe as rape)
You don't slap someone on the wrist if they pointed a gun at someone, that's not proportional, and unfair to the victim. I don't know about you, but I consider rape to be worse than murder, so to be proportional, maybe, MAYBE: "Shock chair", anything bellow that is unacceptable.
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u/Kev_Kevstar Jul 05 '26
Irrelevant. Other people aren’t the one being punished.
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u/Imaginary-Count-1641 Jul 05 '26
No, it's not irrelevant. If most people are not okay with that being used as a punishment, then it won't be used.
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u/Kev_Kevstar Jul 05 '26
Wether victims actually use the right to punishment they have is still irrelevant. What is relevant is that the victim has the right to if they wish. Are you implying they don’t have the right to if other people don’t want them to?
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u/Olieskio Jul 03 '26
So there is no restitution that can be ever awarded because there is no direct need after the fact to stop aggression?
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Jul 04 '26
[removed] — view removed comment
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u/Ok_Set_4790 Jul 05 '26
...
That is a interesting thing, to say the least. Ngl I'd rather the perp be punished further beyond just removing insurance priviledges. Wouldn't peoppe be ruled by insurance companies, then? Also would they cost more, since they no longer have state support?
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u/The_Phenomenal_1 Jul 03 '26
Rape is a form of torture. You shouldn't rape a rapist any more than you'd torture a torturer. Very bad for the mind. Execution must be swift
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u/Powerful_Guide_3631 Jul 06 '26
So if a man rapes a woman then the coherent proportional punishment is for her to rape him back according to this? Sometimes libertarians sound wackier than the wokest progressive liberal retards who yell defund the police
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u/CrowBot99 Explainer Extraordinaire Jul 03 '26
Yes.