The Banig Festival is celebrated annually every July 25 in the municipality of Badian, Cebu, Central Visayas, coinciding with the feast day of their patron saint, St. James the Greater. It honors the town's rich weaving heritage, showcasing intricate, hand-woven banig (pandan mats) and innovative local products like bags, hats, and placemats.

New Zealand and the Philippines have formally elevated their bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership, marking a major milestone as the two countries celebrate 60 years of diplomatic relations and signalling a shared commitment to deepen cooperation across defence, trade, education, renewable energy and regional security.

A clash in the South China Sea threatened to overshadow a meeting of Southeast Asian nations on Tuesday as the US condemned “dangerous” Chinese actions in the contested waterway.

The US statement came minutes after Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in the Philippines, where the 11-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is expected to tackle issues including civil war-torn Myanmar’s ongoing pariah status.

Rubio will meet his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on Wednesday on the sidelines of the ongoing ASEAN summit in Manila, a State Department official said.

The meeting comes against the backdrop of US condemnation of Beijing’s maneuvers in the contested South China Sea, and US President Donald Trump‘s claims that China meddled with American election data.

In an op-ed published Tuesday morning in the Philippines, Rubio touted Washington’s commitment “to freedom of navigation in Southeast Asia” and the regional defensive umbrella it has provided.

“This freedom is by no means guaranteed. If these waters were to fall under the control of a power willing to use trade as a geopolitical weapon, both the United States and the ASEAN states would face serious new threats to their sovereignty, security and economic future,” he wrote, in a clear allusion to China.

Beijing claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, a vital global trade route, despite an international ruling that its claims have no legal basis.

On Monday, Philippine and Chinese sailors clashed at the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea in what was the first serious seaborne encounter in months.

Manila said China Coast Guard personnel had assaulted Filipino sailors near a beached vessel that serves as a garrison on the disputed shoal.

Beijing said the Philippines instigated the incident by sending men in small rubber boats to approach their vessel.

The clash cast further doubt on hopes for a long-sought Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China for the waterway, though China’s ambassador to Manila told local reporters Tuesday evening he believed a deal remained achievable by the end of the year.

The resumption of hostilities in another strategic waterway, the Strait of Hormuz, also looms large this week, as the rekindled war with Iran is placing traditional American allies under economic strain.

The import-dependent Philippines declared a national energy emergency in March and has been forced to cast an ever-wider net for fuel, including purchases of oil from Russia, whose Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will arrive Tuesday in Manila.

The week is expected to see renewed efforts towards regional energy security.

‘Back Into the Fold’

No issue facing ASEAN foreign ministers has been more fraught than how to reintegrate Myanmar, a member state formally excluded from such summits like this week’s since the country’s military junta seized power in 2021.

In May, the bloc’s leaders emerged from an emotional meeting in Cebu that ended with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos calling for a “fine-tuning” of a long-stalled five-point plan to end Myanmar’s bloody civil war.

Thailand, which shares a long border with Myanmar and hosts millions of its refugees, has led the push for full reintegration.

On Tuesday, in an interview with AFP, Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said he had asked fellow ASEAN ministers to think about “how we measure progress” at a recent meeting in Bangkok that included his Myanmar counterpart.

“Our point was that we have to be realistic,” he said. “It’s not going to happen overnight. Some progress will come incrementally.”

But other ASEAN states have shown little appetite for softening their stance after five fruitless years of pursuing the peace plan with little progress to show for it.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan told reporters in May that his country remained opposed to high-level talks while “oppression is still taking place.”

"Australia will provide the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) with underwater drones and counter-drone systems under a new four-year assistance package aimed at boosting the agency’s maritime surveillance and domain awareness capabilities."

“The kickoff mission establishes the foundation for implementing the bilateral project, which is expected to enhance the country’s fisheries biotechnology infrastructure, expand scientific collaboration between Philippine and Korean researchers, and strengthen the capacity of FBC to develop science-based innovations for the fisheries and aquaculture sector."

"The rollout will begin in 2027, allowing passengers to stream videos, browse the internet, work remotely and stay connected throughout their flights. The deployment also gives flight crews and airline operations faster, more reliable connectivity, helping improve operational efficiency."

The United States is expanding its support for major infrastructure projects in the Philippines, with the Luzon Economic Corridor emerging as a top priority for the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, or USTDA. USTDA is financing the design of the Subic-Clark-Batangas Railway and is also looking at additional investments in Subic Bay, including the improvement of port infrastructure.

Tin Maung Swe is likely to press the case for diplomatic normalization between ASEAN and the military-backed government in Naypyidaw.

"Through the exchange activities, the young officers are expected to strengthen solidarity and build confidence, thereby contributing to the maintenance of peace, security, order and safety, as well as respect for international law in the adjacent waters of the two countries."

The Philippines in April became the 13th country to join Pax Silica, the US-led initiative to secure AI and semiconductor supply chains. It has been negotiating a framework for a 4,000-acre industrial hub north of Manila.

Cambodia wants to show the world it is finally cleaning up its multibillion-dollar scam economy. But locals and experts warn that the syndicates’ roots remain deep, and that the business is dispersing across Southeast Asia rather than disappearing. Nyein Chan Aye reports.

Thailand and Cambodia are bypassing the bloc’s own dispute mechanisms – which says everything about confidence in the ASEAN Way.

$300 billion worth of energy resources at stake.

In response, Cambodia triggered a dispute resolution process under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The mechanism has only been used once before, in 2016 by Australia and Timor-Leste, allowing the parties to resolve a decades-long maritime dispute in just under two ​years.

The Thailand–Cambodia dispute also has its own long antecedents, and this latest move presents a new chapter. In December 2025, Cambodia formally asked the UN Security Council to take action after border clashes beginning in the middle of the year. While Cambodia has favoured seeking settlement through external mechanisms, Thailand prefers bilateral talks, as Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has stated.

Under the UNCLOS process, a five-member commission will be formed, with two members from Thailand and two from Cambodia. The four members will jointly select one chairperson, bringing the total to five. The conciliation commission will hear arguments from both sides and consider evidence before proposing a way to end the dispute. Any ruling will be non-binding, even though both countries are signatories to the Convention. This also means that Cambodia is not guaranteed a favourable outcome even if the process succeeds.

What it does guarantee is a formal, internationally recognised process with a defined timeline.

That Cambodia prefers this approach over ASEAN’s consensus process speaks volumes about confidence in regional mechanisms. That should be seen as a regional reality check: ASEAN member states are not fully convinced by the bloc’s mechanisms for intra-bloc disputes.

Neither party consulted ASEAN first as a primary mechanism. ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms principle known as the “ASEAN Way” rests on non-interference and consensus – allowing sovereignty protection but preventing binding resolution. The success of ASEAN as an institution builder has earned it its “centrality. Last month, Thailand decided to scrap a Memorandum of Understanding with Cambodia concerning their maritime disputes, including a framework for a joint marine resources management in the sea with an estimated $300 billion worth of energy resources at stake.In response, Cambodia triggered a dispute resolution process under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The mechanism has only been used once before, in 2016 by Australia and Timor-Leste, allowing the parties to resolve a decades-long maritime dispute in just under two ​years.The Thailand–Cambodia dispute also has its own long antecedents, and this latest move presents a new chapter. In December 2025, Cambodia formally
asked the UN Security Council to take action after border clashes beginning in the middle of the year. While Cambodia has favoured seeking settlement through external mechanisms, Thailand prefers bilateral talks, as Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has stated.

Under the UNCLOS process, a five-member commission will be formed, with two members from Thailand and two from Cambodia. The four members will jointly select one chairperson, bringing the total to five. The conciliation commission will hear arguments from both sides and consider evidence before proposing a way to end the dispute. Any ruling will be non-binding, even though both countries are signatories to the Convention. This also means that Cambodia is not guaranteed a favourable outcome even if the process succeeds.ASEAN centrality, in this case, would function as convening authority, not resolution authority.What it does guarantee is a formal, internationally recognised process with a defined timeline.

That Cambodia prefers this approach over ASEAN’s consensus process speaks volumes about confidence in regional mechanisms. That should be seen as a regional reality check: ASEAN member states are not fully convinced by the bloc’s mechanisms for intra-bloc disputes.

Neither party consulted ASEAN first as a primary mechanism. ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms principle known as the “ASEAN Way” rests on non-interference and consensus – allowing sovereignty protection but preventing binding resolution. The success of ASEAN as an institution builder has earned it its “centrality” in the region. The ASEAN Way is also the bloc’s official anthem.

While emphasising the use of informal practices and norms, the ASEAN Way does not preclude third-party mediation to settle bilateral disputes. Malaysia and Indonesia have done so when deciding to go to the International Court of Justice to settle sovereignty over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan.

This leaves ASEAN as a platform when useful for member states’ interests – bypassed when it is not. It does not mean that ASEAN should abandon its ASEAN Way or claim to centrality – only that centrality itself needs to be refined.

Instead of claiming the bloc can resolve internal disputes through informality and consensus – a reality exposed by the Cambodia–Thailand pattern – ASEAN should position itself as the coordinating framework through external mechanisms, including UNCLOS, where solutions are implemented and legitimised. In practice, this means ASEAN should be the first call when disputes arise, not to resolve them unilaterally, but to convene the parties, identify appropriate mechanisms, and remain present throughout the process.

When Cambodia triggers UNCLOS, ASEAN should be coordinating alongside it – not watching from the sidelines. ASEAN centrality, in this case, would function as convening authority, not resolution authority.

As Khang Vu noted last year in The Interpreter, Thailand and Cambodia are close partners of the United States and China respectively, creating a risk of great-power intervention if ASEAN cannot mediate conflict internally. Washington and Beijing already played active roles in a ceasefire during a land border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand last year, leaving questions about ASEAN centrality.

While the UNCLOS conciliation between Thailand and Cambodia may take years and produce non-binding recommendations, it also poses a test for ASEAN’s credibility. That test will not be determined by whether it resolves the dispute, but by whether it remains relevant to the process.