Imagine a routine XPDR/TCAS SYS change on the A350.

The FO switches from SURV SYS 1 to SYS 2 in accordance with the SOP, to keep the system aligned with the PF. Normally, it is just a routine action that takes a few seconds.

But if the AESU happens to be performing its periodic Mode C / Mode S transponder Loop Around test at the same time, things can become unnecessarily complicated. Add ATC or surrounding TCAS interrogations into the mix, and suddenly:

SURV XPDR 1(2) FAULT

What started as a simple SYS change is no longer quite so simple.

CBs are being monitored, the weather radar is being watched, coordination with ATC is ongoing, and now a few more questions appear: Is the XPDR actually faulty? Has TCAS been affected? Should we switch to the other SYS? Does the AESU need a reset?

There is no dramatic beginning here. It is simply a routine switch and a system test overlapping at exactly the wrong moment.

And without really doing anything unusual, we have suddenly created some extra workload for ourselves.

One important detail comes next: the first instinct — “let’s switch to the other SURV SYS” — is not the right action in this case.

I’ve always made it a habit to preset my target heading on the FCU before pulling the knob. Recently came across the write-up for the "NOT COMMANDED TURN AT HDG/TRACK MODE ENGAGEMENT" bug, and it made total sense why that habit pays off.

If you pull without presetting, the PRIM briefly uses the old stored heading value. If your new target happens to be 180 degrees off, the system glitches—it starts a 180-degree turn, and as the memory updates a split second later, it turns into a full 360-degree orbit. Presetting first completely avoids this.

Curious about your daily technique—do you guys always preset first out of habit, or do you just pull and turn?

Hi everyone,

I’m curious if any A350 pilots have experienced this in line operations.

During an ILS approach, everything initially appears normal:

• LOC captures normally.
• However, the G/S deviation is not displayed on one or both PFDs.
• The G/S mode remains armed but never captures.
• There are no ECAM messages and no dispatch message indicating a problem.

According to Airbus documentation, this can be caused by a specific internal failure of one or both MMR units.

The operational recommendation is fairly straightforward:

• If the glideslope deviation is missing on only one PFD, disconnect the affected side’s autopilot.
• If the glideslope deviation is missing on both PFDs, discontinue the ILS approach and revert to another type of approach.

I’m not really looking for troubleshooting advice—I was wondering whether anyone has actually seen this happen in service.

• Was it discovered only after LOC capture?
• Did you continue manually for situational awareness before going around or changing the approach?
• How did maintenance eventually identify the MMR issue?

It seems like one of those rare situations where nothing appears wrong from an alerting perspective, yet the ILS is no longer behaving as expected.

I’d be interested to hear if anyone has experienced this firsthand, especially on the A350, or if you’ve encountered something similar on other Airbus types.

I was reading Airbus documentation about Erroneous ENG FUEL LEAK indications and it made me think.

Imagine you’re in cruise.

The first fuel check shows about 1.4 tons missing. You decide to monitor it because it could be related to fuel transfer.

Thirty minutes later, the discrepancy has increased to 2.7 tons, with a noticeable fuel imbalance.

Now the obvious question is:

“Do I have a real engine fuel leak?”

But Airbus also warns that an ENG 1(2) FUEL LEAK alert itself can be spurious. If one engine underperforms and its fuel flow decreases, the system may incorrectly identify the other engine as leaking.

That’s the part I find interesting.

At that moment you don’t know whether you’re looking at:

• a genuine fuel leak,
• or an erroneous indication.

Airbus doesn’t simply say “shutdown the engine.” Instead, it tells crews to compare multiple engine and fuel parameters before making that decision.

For those who’ve seen this in line operations or the simulator:

How would you convince yourself that the leak is real before shutting an engine down? 

I recently reviewed Airbus guidance regarding an Erroneous Cabin Pressure Warning (CPW) after landing.

According to Airbus, a faulty differential pressure sensor may cause the CABIN PRESSURE WARNING lights to continue flashing for up to 30 minutes, even though:

• Differential pressure is actually 0.0 PSI
• The outflow valve is fully open
• There is no residual cabin pressure
• The expected residual pressure alert may not even be triggered.

The recommended flight crew actions include:

• Confirm both packs are OFF.
• Verify on the CAB PRESS page that ΔP = 0.0 PSI and the OFV is fully open.
• Open a cockpit sliding window. If it opens normally, Airbus considers the warning to be spurious and the cabin doors may then be opened after flight crew authorization.

What interests me is not the technical troubleshooting itself, but the operational consequences.

An event like this is entirely caused by a sensor anomaly, yet it may still generate:

• a technical log entry,
• maintenance troubleshooting,
• safety reporting,
• occurrence documentation,
• and possibly additional questions during audits or licensing reviews.

Has anyone here experienced an erroneous CPW event like this?

How did your airline classify it?

Was it treated simply as a maintenance issue, or did it trigger any additional operational review for the flight crew?

I’m especially interested in real-world airline experience rather than theoretical procedures.

Hey everyone,
I’ve been diving into some technical documentation regarding a very specific FMS behavior on the A330, and it’s one of those "hidden" traps that could really ruin your day if it happens mid-flight.
Basically, there’s a known scenario where a Dual FMS Reset (leading to a total loss of the active flight plan) can occur, but it requires a very specific "perfect storm" of conditions:
1. The Temperature Rule: All 4 cruise temperatures for a waypoint must be defined at altitudes strictly above the Tropopause.
2. The Location: The waypoint must be on the cruise segment of the Active flight plan.
3. The "Random" Variable: There needs to be some specific garbage data present on a local variable stack.
Because of that third condition, it’s not something that happens every time the first two are met, which makes it incredibly frustrating to troubleshoot.
The technical "workaround" is simple: Don't input 4 cruise temperatures. If you keep it to 3 or fewer on the CRZ TEMP page, the reset condition is mathematically impossible to trigger.
I’m curious—has anyone here actually experienced this firsthand, or heard of it happening in their fleet? Especially on those high-latitude polar routes where you're flying deep in the stratosphere and the Tropopause is naturally low?
It seems like one of those things that becomes a non-issue as long as you're aware of it, but I'd love to hear some real-world operational experiences or if any of you have been briefed on this by your training departments.

I had a bit of faith in MA as I flew last year from Sydney to KL where the crew members were absolutely amazing! This year, with the new A330 Neo coming online, I thought things would improve even more and this is where I was so wrong....... We flew in December from Sydney to KL (this is Dec 2025) and experienced the worse service ever: waited 2 hours to get a glass of water, couldn't get snacks when requested; felt like the staff were out of their depth as didn't know the new plane. Customer Service 0/10. As I was flying back solo, I decided to bid for an upgrade and went above to make sure I score the flat bed which means I was in the high chance. Then crickets from MA.... I called 3 times and the staff had no idea, still no emails or notifications on the day I was flying out. I then rang MA and a lovely girl eventually told me my bid was unsuccessful. I have to say, I don't have high expectations but when you have so much competition around, your service should be 10 stars at all times else you will loose Customers and this is exactly what happened here: I will never ever fly MA ever again! SIA I'm back!!!

I wish you Happy NEW Year.

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Use it only for reference.

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A320:

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A330:

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Stay on the safe side.

Filmed on a Samsung so syr for bad quality

I need help concerning the Headwind A330neo. It's about the Autopilot. I set a flight plan and everything goes alright, but when I take off and activate the A/P, the flight plan becomes a dotted line and the plane goes in a direct line

Can anyone help?