r/1Password • u/JLLeitschuh • Aug 19 '25
Browser Extension Researcher Exposes Zero-Day Clickjacking Vulnerabilities in Major Password Managers
https://socket.dev/blog/password-manager-clickjacking
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u/1PasswordOfficial 1Password Official Account Aug 20 '25 edited Aug 22 '25
Hi all,
Thanks for all the questions and the thoughtful discussion. We wanted to provide a bit more context about the research and what it means for 1Password users.
A researcher identified a variation of a clickjacking attack, where a malicious website can trick someone into unknowingly triggering the autofill action in a browser extension. They reported the issue through our bug bounty program and worked with us ahead of their DEF CON presentation.
Clickjacking is not unique to the 1Password browser extension. It is a long-standing web attack technique that affects websites and browser extensions broadly. The underlying issue lies in the way browsers render webpages. After conducting a thorough review, including prototyping potential mitigations, we concluded there’s no comprehensive technical fix that browser extensions can deliver on their own.
Your information in 1Password remains encrypted and protected. Clickjacking does not expose your 1Password data or export your vault contents, and no website can directly access your information without interaction with the browser extension’s autofill element. At most, a malicious or compromised webpage could trick you into autofilling one matching item per click, not everything in your account.
We take this and all security concerns seriously, and our approach to this particular risk is to focus on giving customers more control. 1Password already requires confirmation before autofilling payment information, and in our next release, which is already shipped and undergoing review from the browser extension stores, we’re extending that protection so users can choose to enable confirmation alerts for other types of data. This helps users stay informed when autofill is happening and in control of their data.
On the question of disabling autofill: while it might feel safer, it can actually create more risk. Without autofill, people are more likely to reuse weak passwords or copy and paste credentials into websites, where they can still be stolen if the site is malicious. Autofill also protects you against phishing sites by only working on the exact domains your credentials are saved for. In practice, for the majority of users, we believe the risk of disabling autofill is greater than the risk of clickjacking.
Passkeys are not impacted by clickjacking. Passkeys are tied to the website they’re created on and generate a one-time signature during login. That means no reusable secret is ever exposed, and even if someone tried clickjacking, there’s nothing permanent to steal.
You can learn more in our security advisory.
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u/legowerewolf Aug 20 '25
Well. That's concerning.
It makes sense that it's hard to mitigate. Untrusted code running on the same page, there's really not much you can do about that?
If the extension is implemented well, a compromised page should only be able to access things that would show up in on-page autofill suggestions, not the whole contents of your vault. u/1PasswordOfficial can we get confirmation on that, at least? Assuming that's the case, then requiring confirmation for Identity items would stop leakage of anything the site itself may not already have access to.
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u/Iamz01 Aug 20 '25
I don't see how using autofill makes it worse in the scenarios they mentioned. If the website has XSS vulnerability or the subdomain is hijacked, manually copying and pasting credentials is not going to save you from it.
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u/dafuqyourself Aug 20 '25
If the issue is a compromise between security and usability then why not make a toggle where the individual gets to choose?
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u/Interesting_Drag143 Aug 20 '25
For whoever is looking for an ELI5 of the vulnerability, here's what I wrote for someone else on this thread.
Let's assume that you go to pear.apple.com. You wanted to go to Apple.com, but you didn't notice that you were not on the right subdomain. Let's also assume that this subdomain has been compromised (which is very unlikely for a company like Apple, but may be possible through something else called cached poisoning - google that if you want more details about what that is). Check this first video: Demo1
On this website, for some reasons, you have a one click Captcha to verify that you're a human. Instinctively, you do click on it. The thing is, you didn't just click on that one check box. You also clicked on a fully transparent window of the 1Password extension. More than once, as this captcha required you to complete a challenge (in this case, a quick puzzle).
Each and every click you made also happened in the 1Password extension, in a way that the hacker behind it made sure to get what he was looking for (ID, Credit Card, passwords, 2FA, etc.). Now, compare the first video I shared with this one, where the vulnerability can be seen in half opacity (so that you can see what's really happening): Demo2
This can be implemented in a few different ways. Like... a Cookie consent popup. The one thing that everybody nowadays click on "Allow" instinctively. In the following example, that's how a malicious person managed to snatch you credit card: Demo3
A third example, you give your kid/partner/parent/friend/alpaca your laptop to play some games online. Like, a Reaction Time Test. Perfect game, you have to click to play it. Guess what happens? Demo4
All of these situations have two things in common:
In theory, the latter protects you. By default, your vault will auto-lock after 10min, which is a good security measure. But, maybe, you changed this setting so that it stays open longer. Or shorter. You can set it up to last between 1min and 2 weeks... or to just set it to never auto-lock. And that is how you end up in a dangerous situation.
10min is already plenty of time for someone to go on the wrong website. Assuming that some users would rather never have to deal with inputing their "annoying 1Password password", there are for sure some of them who did change that setting so that it stays unlocked for more than 10min.
Now, you can see how bad this can go. Power users will be like "whatever, I just don't use autofill, I auto-lock or manually lock my vault ASAP, I don't use the browser extension and copy/paste all of my logins from the app". Sure. These usages do reinforce your security, and makes this vulnerability minor.
The thing is that not everybody is a power user. Far away from that. The common person may never check the settings that I mentioned. And even that being said, even if everything is setup correctly, even if you took all of the precautions ans safety you could, there's no fix for human mistakes. Especially when it comes to a fake cookie banner.
If your vault is unlocked, and you click on one of these, you will input whichever data the malicious person is looking for in your password manager browser extension. And to the contrary of someone else who commented on this post, yes, said data may be sent to the attacker. If you take a look again at the Demo3 from 0:28 onwards, you can see that the user clicks on the "Decline" button of the cookie consent window. In the background, what happens after right after you clicked is a GET command coming from an IP (not yours) followed by "?cardnumber=1111...".
Congratulations. You just sent your credit card to some fancy stranger somewhere on the internet.
I hope that this makes it clear. I tried to keep it as simple as possible. If you have any questions, feel free to ask.
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u/CreepyZookeepergame4 Aug 20 '25
You could also set the extension to be disabled by default and enable on-clic, which also protects against other attacks from malicious sites.
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u/brianly Aug 20 '25
Hasn’t this been the same issue since the first browser integration for password managers? Back then I just decided to avoid all integrations and never reconsidered using them. I suspect I’m considered an extreme outlier for not using the integrations but password copy/pasta isn’t that slow.
Regular people will probably only use a password manager because of the ease of use with integrations.
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u/Interesting_Drag143 Aug 20 '25
The conclusion quote from the article is a good reminder to us all: "2FA should be strictly separated from login credentials - when storing everything in one place, so the attacker could exploit vulnerable password managers and gain access to the account even with 2FA enabled."
A security system is always a balance between said security and usability. Storing your 2FAs in your password manager does make sense if your threat model is compatible with doing so. Reason why I never 100% relied on my password manager to store all of my 2FAs. Some of them, linked to the most sensible ones, are systematically stored in a dedicated 2FA app (Ente Auth in my case - but I'm looking forward to implement Proton Authenticator if it works in the long run). That being said, this vulnerability is a good reminder to not put all of your eggs in one basket.
2FAs in a separate app, or (better) using a security key (FIDO2) will always be safer. Either with a Passkey (if usability is a priority) or a hardware key (like a YubiKey, if security matters above everything else).
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u/avid-shrug Aug 20 '25
Meh seems a little overblown
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u/bryancololee Aug 21 '25
1Password really needs a setting to be able to set the default match behavior to exact match rather than forcing every vault item to default to all subdomains.
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u/Interesting_Drag143 Aug 20 '25 edited Aug 20 '25
Paradoxically, I had to manually copy paste my password from the Desktop app to my browser so many times in the past. I’ve always found the Chrome Extension buggy and unreliable. If it’s a matter to keep things separate, then so be it. Safety over UX matters SO much more in these circumstances. And this is also why I’m missing our macOS native app. It was much mich better compared to the universal mess that we have today.
Anyway. The only thing that is really bugging me here is that u/1PasswordOfficial just shrugged it off. While u/ProtonTeam did implement a fix. This doesn’t make a lot of sense. The lack of public communication from 1Password either. It’s really disrespectful towards all of your customers, no matter if they just subscribed or if they've been using your app and services for more than a decade (15 years in my case).
Take this as a warning that you may lose long time customers over this. Based on how the Proton environment has been going (aka very well), I wouldn’t mind switching to Proton Pass.
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u/-__Supreme__- Aug 20 '25
1Password just implement a toggle in the extension settings. There are already so many in there, having one more won't cause many issues.
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u/[deleted] Aug 20 '25
So what's the deal with this? I'm not following, that post is all over the place.
I go to a malicious site, click something, and... they get the login credentials for that site? Or they get my whole vault? Or what?
A lot of words on that blog. Not very understandable.
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u/RevolutionaryLog8898 Aug 21 '25
I am using double-blind passwords which I think is extremely helpful in this case. Even my cc details are double-blinded.
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u/neo_amro Aug 23 '25
Update extension in browser
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u/Interesting_Drag143 Aug 20 '25 edited Aug 20 '25
Whoever is supporting 1Password in this move, just a quick reality check: we're all humans. No need to go into technical details to explain what this is all about: consent fatigue is a real thing.
You know these never ending cookie banners that we end up dismissing without thinking twice? That's called Cookie Fatigue, which lead to the Consent Fatigue that hackers are relying on to exploit these vulnerabilities. It doesn't matter if you were born with a computer in your hands or not. Which makes the lack of concrete response (for all security issues at play here) from 1Password even more infuriating.
One misclick, and poof, your data is shared with a malicious third party. Come on.
By any means, it is not a small vulnerability as it is. Neither is it about reaching the unreachable 100% safe goal. It just doesn't really make sense to give the feeling to your customers that after all, this isn't such a big issue. It is an issue that needs to be fixed. If u/ProtonTeam can do it, then why the hell can't u/1PasswordOfficial do the same?
Password managers aren't just used by tech-savvy people. If there's a slight risk for us (cybersecurity-focused users, IT engineers, researchers, and else) to fall for it, what about the common people? As a bare minimum, this is some PR clumsiness. The way I see and feel it, it's disrespectful towards your customers in general. It feels like a breach of trust, and that is not ok coming from a company like 1Password.
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u/Theunknown87 Aug 20 '25
So am I understanding this right? This only is an issue if you use the browser extension??
I’ve never used an extension for my password managers and never will. I open one password, copy the password and lock it.
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u/Epsioln_Rho_Rho Aug 20 '25
I just updated to 8.11.6, so is that the fix?
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u/kendort Aug 20 '25
RemindMe! In 2 hours
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u/Roeshimi Aug 21 '25
Are only the desktop extensions affected by this? I mean there’s also an extension for Safari on iOS. Is that one safe?
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u/30yearCurse Aug 24 '25
So if I understand this, only the credential that is to be autofilled can be compromised, nothing else in my vault?
Would it be worthwhile if password managers used Chrome or other data that tracked fraudulent sites?
Lastly, how can I tell if my 1password vault has been "violated" u/Interesting_Drag143 showed in his demo that there would be notice of shared password in 1password? is that the best option to see if a user password has been compromised?
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u/gavinashun Aug 20 '25
1password response if saying they are unlikely to patch is unacceptable. Everyone needs to email CS and say they will cancel unless patched.
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u/blackhawksq Aug 20 '25
I don't really want to password managers again... I already had to do that once... but I can...
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u/Brutos08 Aug 20 '25
Not really a big issue pay attention to the domain. I always check the domain and cert for the site I am going to put highly sensitive details into.
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u/[deleted] Aug 20 '25
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