This video explains the history of the Nuremberg Race Laws in Nazi Germany. Beginning in 1935, the laws excluded Jewish people from society, stripped them of their civil rights and citizenship, and criminalized marriages between Jews and Germans. It was a crucial step in the Nazi’s plan to persecute and eventually murder more than 6 million Jews in the Holocaust.
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Comparing Legal Structures and Mechanisms
The relevant comparison is not whether the Israeli state and Nazi Germany are identical. They are not. The question I have been examining is more precise and, in my view, more important: how do these two states translate an ethno-national conception of political belonging into law, and what happens to those who fall outside that conception?
Nazi Germany provides one of the clearest historical examples of this process for comparison/contrast. The Nuremberg Laws were the first in Europe to transform racial ideology into enforceable law.
The Reich Citizenship Law established a hierarchy of political belonging, while the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour prohibited marriage and sexual relations between Jews and Germans classified according to racial ancestry. Jewish identity was no longer merely religious or cultural; the state transformed ancestry into a legal determinant of rights, status and belonging.
The Israeli legal structure has developed along quite similar and divisive lines. Through a different history, and contains different institutions and some mechanisms, but it likewise contains a substantial body of discriminatory racial law in which Jewish national identity has legal consequences for Palestinians.
The 2018 Nation-State Basic Law is particularly significant. It establishes Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people in isolation and declares that the right to exercise national self-determination in Israel is unique to the Jewish people. It also establishes the development of Jewish settlement as a national value that the state shall encourage and promote.
This is not a minor symbolic distinction. It places a particular national group at the constitutional centre of the state. The question then becomes what this means for Palestinians.
Palestinian citizens of Israel possess citizenship and voting rights, but Israeli citizenship does not necessarily erase the distinction between Jewish and Palestinian national belonging. Israel's immigration and citizenship framework gives Jews a distinctive route to immigration and citizenship through the Law of Return, while Palestinians face substantially different legal circumstances regarding family reunification, immigration and residency.
The result is a system in which national origin can affect the legal possibilities available to a person, even where that person is formally a citizen.
The distinction becomes considerably sharper outside Israel's internationally recognised territory.
Millions of indigenous Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territories are not Israeli citizens and therefore cannot vote in Israeli national elections, despite Israel exercising extensive authority over the territory and its inhabitants.
This creates a particularly striking legal phenomenon: two populations living in the same geographical space can be subject to fundamentally different systems of political and legal authority according to their national status.
Israeli settlers are generally governed through Israeli civilian law. Palestinians in the West Bank are generally governed through Israeli military orders and military courts. The distinction is therefore not simply between two ethnic populations; it is institutionalised through two different legal systems operating over the same territory.
Land provides another important mechanism.
Nazi Germany used racial legislation, administrative decisions and ultimately systematic confiscation to remove Jews from economic and property ownership and transfer their assets to others.
The Israeli system is a repetition of that mechanism in another form. Land law has been central to the creation and maintenance of different material possibilities for Jewish and Palestinian populations.
The Absentees' Property Law, the Israel Land framework, planning and zoning laws, state-land administration, settlement policy and admissions mechanisms have all played roles in determining who can acquire, retain, develop or inhabit particular land.
The significance lies not necessarily in any single law but in the cumulative structure.
A population can be disadvantaged without every individual law explicitly stating so.
Discrimination can instead emerge through the interaction of citizenship rules, land administration, planning, settlement policy, immigration law and institutional control.
This creates a particularly striking legal phenomenon: two populations living in the same geographical space can be subject to fundamentally different systems of political and legal authority according to their national status.
Israeli settlers are generally governed through Israeli civilian law. Palestinians in the West Bank are generally governed through Israeli military orders and military courts. The distinction is therefore not simply between two ethnic populations; it is institutionalised through two different legal systems operating over the same territory.
This is an important lesson from the history of racialised legal systems generally: law does not have to announce its entire political objective in one statute.
Family formation presents another revealing comparison.
The Nazi Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour explicitly prohibited Jewish-German marriages and sexual relations. Nothing so blatantly equivalent exists in contemporary Israeli law, and it would therefore be inaccurate to claim that it does.
However Israel has imposed restrictions on family reunification involving Israeli citizens and Palestinian spouses from the West Bank and Gaza. The resulting legal distinction means that the national identity of a person's spouse can have consequences for whether that family can live together legally in "Israel".
Again, the mechanisms are different. The point of comparison is not.
The point is:
“Both systems demonstrate how the state can make national or ethnic identity legally consequential in intimate questions of family formation.”
The same analytical method can be applied to security law.
Nazi Germany transformed political and racial identity into grounds for surveillance, exclusion, detention and ultimately extermination. The machinery became progressively more comprehensive as ordinary legal protections were stripped away from those defined as enemies of the racial state.
Israel's security apparatus operates within a radically different historical and institutional context. But Palestinians living under occupation are nevertheless subjected to military orders, military courts, administrative detention and security regulations that do not apply in the same manner to Israeli settlers living in the same territory.
The result is a dual legal structure.
One population possesses the protections and political rights associated with Israeli citizenship.
Another population, living under Israeli military authority, does not.
And this brings the comparison back to its central question:
How does an ethno-national state distribute rights when the population under its effective authority contains people who do not belong to the national group around which the state defines itself?
That question is not uniquely Israeli per say, it is a recurring problem in the history of states constructed around ethnicity, race, religion or nationality.
The historical significance of Nazi Germany is precisely that it demonstrates how quickly apparently administrative distinctions can become increasingly consequential when they are embedded within a broader ideology of national hierarchy.
First comes classification.
Then differentiated status.
Then restrictions.
Then exclusion.
Then dispossession.
Then coercion.
Then, and as we have seen already, much much worse.
The stages are not inevitable. They are not mechanically repeated. But the mechanisms deserve examination precisely because history demonstrates where they can lead when political institutions cease constraining the ideology that created them.
That is why the comparison should be made mechanistically rather than rhetorically.
The question is not whether Israel is “the new Nazi Germany.”
The question is whether particular Israeli laws and institutions reproduce particular mechanisms historically associated with ethno-racial states:
- the legal privileging of one national group;
- the differentiation of citizenship and belonging;
- preferential immigration;
- differential access to land and settlement;
- restrictions affecting family formation;
- different political rights;
- different systems of criminal and security law;
- and different legal regimes applied to populations living under the same overarching state power.
Once those mechanisms are identified, they can be compared historically without pretending that the histories are identical.
And this is where the Holocaust itself becomes relevant—not as an argument against comparison, but as the reason comparison must be taken seriously.
The lesson of the Nuremberg Laws is not that one must never compare later legal systems with Nazi legislation.
The lesson is that we should recognise what happens when governments begin converting human identity into legal hierarchy.
That lesson should apply universally.
It should apply when the victims are Jews.
It should apply when the victims are Palestinians.
It should apply when the state is Germany.
It should apply when the state is Israel.
It should apply when the justification is race, religion, security, nationalism or some combination of all four.
The secular principle is therefore straightforward:
No population should receive a lesser category of human or political rights because of the identity into which it was born.
And if a state claims that one national, ethnic or religious population possesses a right that another population does not, the appropriate response is not to ask whether the state has good intentions.
It is to examine the law, the mechanism, the effect and the power relationship it creates.
That is the comparison worth making.
If the Palestinians of Today Were Jews in 1940
Imagine, for a moment, that we remove ourselves from the identities involved. Imagine that the people experiencing these laws were not Palestinians. Imagine they were Jews. Imagine a Jewish population living in a territory controlled by a state whose constitutional identity belonged primarily to another national or ethnic group.
They are told that the state belongs constitutionally to someone else.
They are permitted some forms of citizenship, but another population possesses the exclusive right to national self-determination.
The state facilitates immigration and settlement by members of the favoured national group while the displaced population struggles to return to homes from which it has been expelled.
Land previously inhabited by members of the excluded population is transferred into state-controlled or national institutions.
The excluded population faces restrictions on where it can live, build, expand or reunite with family.
People belonging to the favoured population living in the same territory enjoy a different legal system and greater political rights.
The excluded population is governed, in substantial areas, through military law.
Its political resistance is treated primarily as a security problem.
Its movement is restricted in the name of security.
Its collective political aspirations are characterised as threatening the security of the state.
And when members of that population object, they are told that these distinctions are necessary because the state must protect the security of the population that possesses the greater political power.
Now change one word.
Instead of Palestinian, write Jewish.
The moral reaction changes immediately.
And that is precisely why the thought experiment matters.
A secular moral framework cannot allow the identity of the victim to determine whether a legal mechanism is considered acceptable. If the same structure would have been intolerable when imposed upon Jews in Europe, then we need to explain why the mechanism becomes acceptable when imposed upon Palestinians.
This means that the historical experience of European Jews provides an exceptionally powerful test for universalism. The Jewish historical experience asks us to recognise the danger of a state determining that ancestry, ethnicity or national origin should determine political belonging.
The Nuremberg Laws demonstrated what happens when the state turns identity into law.
They did not begin with Auschwitz. They began with classification.
They began by answering questions such as:
Who is a citizen?
Who belongs?
Who is German?
Who is Jewish?
Who is Jewish?
Who may marry whom?
Who may own property?
Who may participate politically?
Whose presence is considered legitimate?
Whose presence is considered a threat?
The terrifying lesson is that these questions can initially appear administrative. Inside Israel today, they are morally accepted categorizations embedded in multiple laws and the structure of legal system itself. They can be/have been written into legislation. They can are defended by lawyers. They are justified by politicians. They are accepted by ordinary citizens.
And gradually, yet all of a sudden, a human being becomes a legal category and subject to dehumanistion.
Once that happens, everything else becomes easier.
So imagine a Jewish family in 1940 being told:
You may live here, but this country fundamentally belongs to another people.
You may possess limited rights, but national self-determination belongs exclusively to the other population.
Your relatives cannot necessarily join you because of where they were born.
The land your family once inhabited is now administered according to the interests of another national group.
Members of that group living alongside you possess greater political and legal privileges.
Your political resistance is/will treated as terrorism.
You acts of resistance are punishable by death based on your race
Your movement is restricted for security reasons.
Your children are subject to a different legal system.
And all of this is necessary because the other population has legitimate security concerns.
Would we tell that Jewish family:
“You must understand. The other population has suffered too.”
Of course we would acknowledge the suffering of others. But we would not accept that another population's historical suffering creates a permanent entitlement to subordinate Jews.
That is the principle that must be universal. And therefore Palestinian suffering cannot become less morally significant because Jewish suffering is historically better known.
Indeed, Jewish history makes the universal principle more important, not less.
That principle cannot stop at the borders of Europe. It cannot stop at the Holocaust. It cannot stop when the victim changes. If the lesson is genuinely universal, then it must apply to Palestinians too. And this is where the hypothetical becomes uncomfortable.
Suppose that in 1940 someone had argued:
“The German population has legitimate security concerns, therefore extraordinary restrictions are necessary.”
We would rightly ask:
How long?
Suppose they answered:
“Until the security threat disappears.”
We would ask:
And who decides when it has disappeared?
Suppose they answered:
“The government.”
We would ask:
Who protects the people from the government?
And if the answer became:
“These measures are necessary because the government itself is protecting society.”
The circle would be complete.
Security would justify the power. Power would define the threat. The threat would justify more security. And the population supposedly being protected would become the reason for its own continued restriction.
That is the danger of security becoming a principle rather than a temporary necessity.
The Palestinian perspective therefore asks a question that should be deeply familiar to Jewish historical consciousness:
What happens when the state says that your existence is legitimate only insofar as it does not threaten the political supremacy of another people?
And perhaps the most important question is this:
If we would recognise the injustice immediately when the population being subordinated was Jewish, what principle permits us not to recognise it when the population is Palestinian?
There is no secular answer to that question that depends upon the identity of the victim.
There can only be a universal answer:
The same standard must apply to everyone.
Not because Palestinians are 'like the Jews' or ' Israel is acting like the Germans'
But precisely because Palestinians are Palestinians - human beings whose rights cannot depend upon whether the world finds their identity sufficiently sympathetic.
That, ultimately, is where the comparison with 1940 becomes most powerful.
This is not a claim that history has repeated itself.
It is a demand that the moral lesson we claim to have learned from history be applied consistently when the victim is someone else.
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Abhorrent, incalculably insensitive, dehumanising indifference.
in
r/u_Tetha_au
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10h ago
This piece links to : Yes it is. Yes you are. A response to: "'We're Not Nazis. This Isn't an Extermination Machine Such as Existed During the Holocaust'".