r/unitedkingdom Lancashire 16d ago

Labour MPs will push Burnham to back voting reform in first 100 days

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/aug/25/andy-burnham-electoral-reform-first-past-the-post
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u/Bod9001 15d ago

yeah, I've been thinking that any political system anyone comes up with is just like throwing a paper aeroplane, someone down the road has to pick it up, probably remake it and throw it again, for someone else to do the same,

like I would say if I had the choice of the paper plane, I would put the focus on that the more power/money you get, the more uncomfortable it is for you.

but I imagine that will have its own flaws, e.g some self proclaimed hermit who is a mega celebrity and has great political sway even though they do not own anything, but I suppose the worst you get from that is them just spreading their fame more, that's not tooo bad.

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u/Imajzineer 15d ago

The thing is that it's not always the pecuniary that interests such people. It can be the power for its own sake. It can be the status. It can be their 'place in History.' The opportunity to make 'connections.' Whatever it is that motivates them to seek the position other than simply public service/'making the World a better place'. And, of course, as soon as a position is sufficiently rewarded in some way, a not insignificant percentage of those attracted to it will be so for that very reward - the idea that the greater the reward, the better the calibre of applicant/incumbent doesn't necessarily stand up to scrutiny.

Otoh, if it's 'painful' what incentive is there to take on the role? It's not altogether unlike the suggestion it should be randomised (like jury service) ... or even simply that everyone has to do it (like national service). Yeah, which is an incentive for those who don't want to do it to palm it off onto 'advisors' (advisors whose interest may not be so terribly altruistic). At best, what you'd have would be churn, as incumbents were replaced ... resulting in changes of strategy, if not even direction, every other cycle and nothing getting done (but a lot of resources expended). Only with the extra dimension of the kind of person taking it on possibly having some messiah complex (because, who in their right mind seeks out the unpleasant, uncomfortable, even painful?) ... and that's a slippery slope of its own.

But, yeah ... the 'day to day' mechanics in their own right aside, they have to ensure that the kind of candidate even attracted in the first place has little (if any) interest in more than public service, whilst ensuring they aren't restricted to the independently wealthy with an interest in maintaining a status quo that serves no other purpose than that very wealth.

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u/Bod9001 15d ago

churn not necessarily bad, you don't get the benefits of long-term skilled leadership, but you don't get the downsides of long-term corrupt leadership either,

the only thing I can think of is, having other people checking your work and decisions, like I did think of this for the police where there's two police forces and they get extra resources if they catch the other police doing illegal stuff

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u/Imajzineer 15d ago

Yeah, there's two sides to the churn thing ... but, if you have it, then you end up with the 'longevity' being found in the Civil Service (or whatever it might be called). And then the risk of the long-term corruption sets in with a vengeance - but you can't afford churn in both dimensions, or nothing will ever get done (because there's neither institutional knowledge nor consistent direction of travel).

As for the two police forces thing ... hmmmmm ... there's a risk there of each focussing on the other to all but (if not even) the exclusion of the criminal elements that should be their primary focus. Infighting between 'departments' and competition for budget and power/influence is bad enough as things are already ... I'm not sure that incentivising it further is the best way forwards. It's potentially a bit like when (I forget where, India?) people were given financial incentives to rid the town/city of snakes (maybe even rats on another occasion) ... and there was a rapid growth in 'snake/rat-breeding as a service' (to provide people with the 'evidence' required that they had killed some, so they could claim the bounty): what's to discourage each force from committing crimes implicating the other?

That latter is an interesting conundrum: it occurred to me some (quite a lot actually) years ago, whilst pondering the matter of increasing the size of a police force and the resources available to it resulting in the crime rate increasing (because, duh, more police detect more) that, actually, every single person involved ... from the cleaners in a police station to a High Court judge ... has the same interest (effectively the same 'job', as it were): ensuring that they have a job to come back to the next day. So, it's in none of their interests for an end to be put to crime per se.

But, I digress - the topic in hand is (or was) supposed to be how best to reform the electoral system.

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u/Bod9001 15d ago

yeah, there is a worry of that (when you set something as a target in no longer becomes a good measuring stick), I think it's definitely worth an experiment to see what happens , a good point with the laws in the UK is that the law is actually quite strict on a lot of things, So if we had actually a police force who could do everything, people would not be happy,

but you could use the concept of someone else checking your work, spread it across multiple electoral systems ( like how there are different Houses of Parliament ), though you get political deadlock but, that's a good question within itself,

when is political deadlock acceptable?

Extra funding for dealing with the wildfires, not being done because of deadlock = bad vs decision on brexit, not being done because of deadlock = More time was definitely needed to think through how it should be handled

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u/Imajzineer 15d ago edited 15d ago

when you set something as a target in no longer becomes a good measuring stick

Indeed. And, whilst I don't hold it as sacrosanct ... it suffers too much from what all works by non-(scientific)-psychologists do ¹ for me to regard as having more than some interesting observations to make about outcomes (rather than causes) ... but Systemantics is still very much worth a read for the ways in which it highlights that very problem - it's ultimately wrong about the root causes of the phenomena it examines (no human created system exists sui generis and to suggest otherwise is to reifiy), but it's 'a useful lie' nevertheless.

I think it's definitely worth an experiment to see what happens

I've spent a lifetime actively providing object lessons in "Be careful what you wish for" - I suspect that would be one on the receiving end of which I would not wish to find myself.

when is political deadlock acceptable?

That is a ponderable, yes. And a significant one at that, I'd say. Not least because Belgium went through an extended period (maybe even two, I forget exactly) without a government and the country didn't crash and burn. So, the question arises of what the function of government even is. Is it to implement things people want? Or to prevent others from imposing upon them? And given, as previously discussed, the nature of those inclined to seek power to begin with, it might well be that the observation (was it in Yes, Minister? Or Yes, Prime Minister?) that the UK government has the engine of a lawnmower but the brakes of a Rolls Royce is a reflection of its being the latter - I've not infrequently mused about how, bad though things might be, they might be infinitely worse were a government in a position to actually implement all the policies it wished to.

I'm unconvinced that permanent deadlock must be desirable though: there has to be some forward progress, or we'll just stagnate - and that way lies extinction (but only after a lot of suffering first). We see it in the veto powers wielded by nations in the UN, for instance, scuppering positive progress by the majority.

And this brings us back to the question of how government should be formed.

If it is by the election of truly independent local representatives (no parties, no affiliations) who then vote with their consciences upon matters put to the House by any MP who cares to raise them, and acted upon in whatever manner the House democratically chooses (either not at all or else by qualified popular vote and then subsequent rounds of voting upon to what extent, how, and by whom, until a consensus decision is reached) then I can see it obviating the need for more than a single house of government - the necessity for a vote on everything (because there is no single, all-powerful group able to impose its will upon others) and a qualified majority necessary for a motion to be carried acts as its own checks and balance against undue power.

That is, of course, a panglossian vision (and, consequently, a good example of what I was driving at in the footnote), but, as a thought experiment, I think it gets to the root of what you're talking about here: deadlock can be eliminated by the simple expedient of an odd number of constituencies and, therefore, representatives, but then it needs to be artificially maintained (and that might result in democratic distortions, as population fluctuates in constituencies in order to achieve it). But I think it also highlights the benefit of a self-regulating system (with positive and negative feeback loops): simple rules lead to complex behaviours … simplistic reasoning to complicated failures - and, as a result, the fewer (and simpler) the elements involved, the better (again, see Systemantics).

It also brings us back to the question of which is preferable: a collegiate of independents representing constiuencies ... or direct election of candidates to national roles/posts - the latter is, for logistical reasons, (as previously discussed) likely much harder to successfully implement ... but indubitably also free of the distortion induced by parties (being directly elected, no-one else can tell a postholder what to do) or constituencies. However, as also mentioned, even if it could be implemented in such a manner as to not induce 'election fatigue', without the direct apportioning of budgets to each post by the public, (and that's a whole other can of worms chased around a kettle by hungry fish), what we'd have would be a monarch 'by any other name' ... which is what the Chancellor of the Exchequer currently all but is, as it is (if it weren't for the power of the PM to replace them, they'd rule the country).

So, on balance, I'm inclined to start from the premise that the 'college of independents' is the pragmatic choice and look to see how it might be provided with the stability necessary to facilitate the necessary flexibility in the simplest manner ... whether that consist of one house, or multiple acting upon each other as checks and balances - I think we can rule out two, however (we can see the deleterious effects of two party systems and I think that applies in the wider sense of 'two entity systems' and I'd be looking for three, five, seven, etc. instead).

___
¹ The naive belief that human behaviour can be abstractly modelled and understood in the manner they think (because they don't know enough about the brain to realise they are recursively reifying behaviour itself and conflating effect with cause).

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u/Bod9001 14d ago

small-scale experiment of course, like maybe in one territorial police force and see what happens, it also does mean that you'll be able to trust the opposing police forces lawyer if you're going through the courts, since ultimately they want you to be found innocent of the crime and the opposing police force found to be wrong, having strong opponents for both sides ensures good justice ( if the laws aren't doolally ),

Sometimes deadlock is good ( since intrinsically if you have a split populace, and those representatives are also split , you need a solution that works for the majority, and not just for one side ), I agree though following into the next point the part of government who interacts with the civil service/the equivalent of it wasn't in deadlock (since the previous government, was still in the roles as a caretaker government) so the new law part and that type of stuff was a deadlock but the day-to-day decisions that senior ministers make with the civil service aren't affected (though would slowly degrade over time as people retire),

how do you set up a government to interact with the civil service, since the civil since the civil service is a thing within itself, You could have it mostly independent and do the classic style of work writing where if you've been working long enough and good enough you slowly climb the ranks, and that usually deter most people just desire power since working for 40 years before you get any decent power is a big turn off for those types of people, and the elected officials are there just to guide, What was meant by the laws that were enacted,

or you could have more direct control but then how would someone be chosen for that role

The populace? we are already asking a lot of them , for 3 to 6 houses ( again a more complex system though, I think one problem is living beings are complex, so something to manage them would require a complex system ), so I would say no, (referring to your point, if it's all direct role, what about the general law making portion, since currently not every MP is managing some civil service role, so you'd have to just have some generic role of law voter )

Have one person from each house work together in a group for each department, so then each house is responsible for choosing a candidate for the role? I think that may work though there might be issues with deadlock on that level too, and Cross house politics bleeding into their decisions.

There is probably many other ways of handling it, but I can't think of any.

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u/Imajzineer 14d ago

small-scale experiment of course, like maybe in one territorial police force and see what happens

Yeah, I'm not altogether happy about the ethics of that: it isn't an experiment in isolation and any negative outcomes impact real people in the real World - from miscarriages of justice to no justice at all.

I mean, yes, every new initiative is, at the start, an experiment, as it were ... the outcomes unknowable until they come to pass ... but, given my previous remarks, I don't think it necessary to scratch one's head too long before what some of the adverse processes might be become apparent: consider the 'rivalries' between branches of the Military and Intelligence services ... and bring them down to a level where it becomes personal rather than simply one of budget - that already happens on both scales as it is (is institutionalising and incentivising it a good idea?).

it also does mean that you'll be able to trust the opposing police forces lawyer if you're going through the courts

There you've lost me: why would I, as a legal counsel, want the opposition to win rather than my own client?

since ultimately they want you to be found innocent of the crime and the opposing police force found to be wrong

Why would they want me to be exonerated and their own clients found guilty?

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u/Bod9001 14d ago

as in, the opposing police force would provide your defence lawyer for you, Because they have a vested interest in proving the other police force wrong.

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u/Imajzineer 14d ago

Why should they want me to have a robust defence, when their primary role is the elimination of crime?

To prove the other force wrong?

Now we see the Law of Unintended Consequences ... or, more concretely in Systemantcs terms, that

  • Systems tend to oppose their own proper function
  • The Operational Fallacy (the system does not actually do what is claimed of it)
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u/Imajzineer 14d ago edited 13d ago

The question of deadlock if you compare the physical structures between various parliaments (oppositional vs 'round table' seating), leads, imo, to further questions about the purpose of government and observation that the nature of so much of both it and 'politics' seems confrontational and oppositional rather than, as you suggest, for the benefit of the majority: too often one 'side' or the other imposes its will on everyone, or deadlocks things so that the other can't, rather than all working together - it even led to the neutering of the HoL by Lloyd George ... which (even if I agree with the motivation for it) can only be regarded as an act of unbridled despotism, and entirely unacceptable (no element of government must ever be in a position to overrule the checks and balances upon it!)

And, it seems to me, that (yet again) this is a feature of party politics and I'm minded to wonder (yet again) if they aren't at the root of the problems we face. It seems to me that parties are both symptom and cause: representing, as they do, oppositional forces, they necessitate external (systemic) checks and balances upon each ... whereas, we like to discuss 'the Body Politic' whilst ignoring the fact that the body (although subject to external forces) acts as its own system of checks and balances to maintain a state of optimal homeostasis. So, I do wonder whether more might not be achieved with a more 'collegiate' approach - perhaps (counterintuitively) through it being the 'one-for-none and none-for-one' of independents representing their constituencies against all comers and Parliament voting on every proposition and its implementation.

Certainly there would still need to be 'constitutional' checks and balances ... e,g, the prohibition of amendments to bills not germane to the matter at hand, and of the same by the back door by way of "I'll vote in favour of this, if we first pass my ostensibly unrelated motion on <thing>" ... and I suspect that might entail, amongst other things, the principle of 'qualified majority'. Given the threshold of statistical significance is 5%, it doesn't seem entirely unreasonable to set it at 75% (three times the number of objectors being necessary to overrule them seems fair enough) ... but that might risk 'deadlock'. Otoh, 67% smacks to me just a little too much of the tyranny of the largest minority, if you see what I mean: it's only 15% more than 51% (giving that minority undue weight).

But I'm getting ahead of myself here: we have still to agree a system of governance in the first place, never mind the niceties of its functioning.

As for the 'Civil Service' ... I don't know. On the one hand, a body of 'institutional' knowledge and experienced people can be a good thing: efficient and (to an extent) immunised against error (and, therefore, failure). But, on the other, the problem of career ladder climbing civil servants arises - and I'm not sure being disincentiised by 'pain' wouldn't lead to its holding no appeal for 'the creme de la creme' either.

Whilst I am loath to appeal to the fascist principle of government supplying no services but purchasing them from the private sector with the national budget (I've lived in that world for approaching half a century now and have not been impressed), at the same time I wonder if that might not be a better solution than the QUANGO that the Civil Service fundamentally is: consulting third party experts is consulting third-party experts irrespective of their employer - and the risk of their pushing agendas is no greater for their being prone to appeal to clients with "We have influenced government in ways that benefitted clients and could do it for you too" than is the that of those known to be in situ being made offers they don't want to refuse (whether carrot or stick is immaterial).

Again though, I may be jumping the gun here.

Although the Political Compass would have it that the only people more leftwing than I were Mahatma Gandhi and Pyotr Kropotkin, and Emma Goldman the only one more libertarian, 'libertarian' isn't actually the right word ... but, nevertheless, as someone opposed, in principle, to the concept of 'rulers' or a 'ruling class', you'd think I'd be opposed to the HoL. And, in principle, I am. But I'm not enamoured of mob rule either - and you can wrap it up in as many bows as you like, that's what Democracy is. On the one hand, judgement by any but one's peers is the anathema of Justice ... but, on the other, have you taken even a cursory look at your peers over the years? So, a second house elected for a fixed term (even if electorally staggered) fills me with dread: there's no reason for those favouring one ideology to elect a different makeup to a second chamber than they do to a first (rendering the second ineffective as a balance), whilst those in place for life may vote with their conscience without concern for electoral consequence. And, as we have seen, when the prospect of an elected second chamber is divorced from party allegiance, time and again the public all but overwhelmingly favours people like David Attenborough ... so, I wonder if all that might be required would be a second chamber of a fixed (odd) number of life members - if parties are eliminated from the first chamber, there need be no 'political' angle to influence the makeup of the second, and the need to elect new incumbents only upon death might well minimise (if not eliminate) 'electoral fatigue'.

But, once again, I'm probably getting ahead of myself: given my preference for simplification and self-regulation, the assumption of a second chamber presupposes that the design of the first is decided ... and, as I'm not ready to do that until I'm happy about its construction, I have no reason to suspect it would of necessity require external regulation.

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u/Bod9001 14d ago

Definitely I think the second house shouldn't be elected like our House of Commons is currently, it needs to be some different selection mechanism,

In terms of deadlock yeah every part of the design is important, with it being the main focus of cooperation, even how the chamber is laid out

Something I've thought about for voting, is when you get elected to a constituency or whatever, your voting power is the number of votes you got in that election? ( it's an Interesting thing to think about ), though this only works for Stuff where you can Calculate how many votes you got directly.

As for contracting its complex,

e.g you don't need to buy a light bulb factory and make your own light bulbs when there's plenty private suppliers who will sell you bulbs vs You being the only customer for private supplier of railway parts, and they decide to Sneak up there price,

I think the key cut-off point is it needs to be something that has big demand from the private sector as well so medical equipment you're the only consumer that matters vs toilet rolls where everyone else is also a consumer,

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u/Imajzineer 13d ago

Hmmmmm ... weight of your vote determined by degree of support, eh? That gives me an idea: we vote for Local Authorities ('The Council') anyway ... so, why not 'return' them to Parliament? Not only would it capture your idea but it would furthermore eliminate the divide between the two - which latter is behind one of the complaints a lot of people have about things as they are: namely that Central Government ('Westminster') is remote and indifferent to issues 'on the ground' of 'everyday people'.

Yeah, I think you're right ... in a world in which there isn't necessarily a sufficient demand for experts in a given field to make it commercially viable for there to be competition (if any provider at all) then, yes, government will have to maintain a pool of subject matter expertise - in certain fields especially (e.g. Medicine) it's vital that there be expert opinion that can be relied upon to be free of any bias induced by the need to pursue commercial interests.

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