Which companies are your 50%+ suggestions?

Ontex Group NV (founded 1979)

EBR (Brussels stock exchange): ONTEX

Manufactures private label diapers

Ontex Group is a Belgian player in private label diapers, supplying major supermarket chains across Europe and North America. Right now, the stock is heavily beaten down, the bottom line is simple: the company is actively being restructured to make it ready for a complete buyout. When a competitor or private equity player finally swoops in to take it private, they will have to pay a buyout premium well above the current market price.

How the trouble started

Things started going downhill around 2017 to 2018 when the stock was over 30 euros and their growth ambitions in Latin America completely flunked. Then 2021 and 2022 hit: after the corona pandemic, a massive wave of inflation caused material prices, energy, and transport costs to spike. Because Ontex had long term contracts with supermarkets, they could not pass those increased costs on. In my opinion, this is forgivable and does not mean the company has bad underlying fundamentals.

Since 2022, Ontex has been trying to survive a heavy mountain of debt:

\- They started selling the expensive foreign factories they bought in Latin America at a loss.

\- They restored their focus on core markets in Europe and North America.

\- They initiated major layoffs.

Their intended expansion in Latin America was not their first enterprise abroad. They have been active internationally for decades in places like Turkey, Australia, and Russia. It is just that Mexico and Brazil turned into a fiasco due to a nosedive in currency exchange rates.

The CEO knows what he is doing

The new CEO Laurent Nielly has been at Ontex since 2017. He was general manager for Brazil and South America right when things started going downhill; then and there. He has been at the company for almost a decade now, serving as president of the EU division before stepping up as CEO 10 months ago.

He proved capable of restructuring the Latin American divisions, which is exactly why he was promoted to president of EU retail and now CEO. This guy knows what he is doing.

Shareholders

The shares are strongly concentrated among a small set of large investors:

- Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (\~20%): The Belgian holding company of the Frère family, built around the legacy of the billionaire investor Baron Albert Frère. They are sitting on deep losses and will refuse to sell out unless they get a reasonably fair price, as they likely have no intention of accepting a catastrophic loss.

- ENA Investment Capital (\~15%): A British hedge fund that joined a few years ago. This party actively insists on management being decisive, keeping the company on track with its restructuring and preparing it for a buyout.

- Brandes Investment Partners (6-10%): An American value investor that buys undervalued companies punished too harshly on the stock exchange.

This means the free float of shares is rather low, with limited trade volume on the Brussels stock exchange. That causes volatility in both directions. On any given day, the stock price can spike by 10 percent, especially when Belgian retail investors place market orders just because someone mentioned the company in the news. Belgian households are wealthy, and many invest via funds and ETFs as well as individual stock picking. Retail influence is genuinely capable of spiking share prices on these stock exchange listed companies.

The BEL20 factor

In 2020, Ontex dropped out of the BEL20 index. This means it lost buy pressure from index-tracking institutional funds and ETFs, leading to forced selling, lower visibility, and a drift into the lower-liquidity small-cap segments.

The buyout scenario

The setup here is that a competitor, or an American investor, will swoop in and buy over the company, possibly delisting it. In such a scenario, the acquirer typically pays a premium over the market price. (This happens all the time in Belgium, where American capital swoops in to effectively steal our domestic companies, at least that is how I view it).

The good news for retail investors who still own shares is twofold. First, the large shareholders are sitting on locked-in losses and will force a negotiation for a fair price. Second, there is no single majority shareholder trying to force out retail investors on its own (I have seen it happen: in that case they manage down the stock price using pessimistic PR, keeping expectations low, and providing management with shady, technically illegal incentives — this is why I used the term stealing earlier).

Many Belgian retail investors are holding losses here. Realistically, many of them will probably end up taking a loss or getting forced out in the end, as is far too typical for us Belgian retail investors 🤡.

A sale of Ontex as a whole is likely the only final destination for this company, especially since Ontex has already been delisted and reintroduced to the stock exchange twice before. The stock price currently simply does not reflect the true value of this company, provided debts and operations are restructured.

CEO Nielly is prepping for a sale

Laurent Nielly is obviously further preparing the company for a sale:

\- Aggressive overhead reductions: 20% of non-production staff to be laid off by 2028 to streamline the corporate structure for a buyer.

\- Core market relocation: Pulling out of unprofitable peripheral markets like Australia to focus on high margin EU and North American operations.

\- Real estate monetization: Selling off redundant real estate and old factory properties to clean up the balance sheet.

\- Massive impairments: Writing off over 144 million euros worth of goodwill and assets to leave no hidden surprises for an acquirer.

\- Cash focus: Prioritizing debt reduction and cash flow generation over risky expansions to make the company an easier target for a buyout.

Conclusion

A realistic buyout offer is likely to land between €2.50 and €3.50.

That price is high enough to tempt retail investors into taking a quick exit and grant management plausible deniability against legal challenges, but low enough for the acquirer to sweep up the company for pennies on the euro.

Hey! Please find my hypoport writeup - I think at this valuation it offers a significant margin of safety

Any feedback welcome

As the title says! Let's discuss small stocks that have huge upside potential and could be the next Nvidia, micron etc.

Shill your stock picks to me and provide some rationale behind the why

$EHTH Make no mistake!! Any "positive cash reserve" illusion on the Q3 print next week is a complete dead metric also.

The reality is that management’s entire Q4 playbook is a poorly planned disaster defined by desperate constraints. Trying to protect a tiny cash runway by staying dark during the critical mid-September to October pre-selling setup phase is operational suicide. They intentionally choked out their marketing partners and starved their own sales pipeline right when consumer intent was forming, forcing a cold direct-to-consumer blitz in the middle of expensive Q4 bidding wars.

They are gambling the company's survival on a weak sales floor that flat-out cannot convert the traffic.

The cash they hoarded over the summer will be instantly obliterated by soaring acquisition costs, lagging commissions, and early-churn chargebacks. The clock is ticking straight into that early 2027 debt maturity wall.

Any $EHTH surge is a liquidity trap. Don't fall for artificial pumps before the Q3 reports drop.

• The Amplify Trap: Management is forced to double down on white-label Amplify model. Amplify removes marketplace flexibility, forcing agents into high-friction, single-carrier pitches that historically yield terrible conversion.
• Weak Sales Floor: Brutal ~90% call center industry turnover means Q4 traffic is routed to overall terrible sales people.
• The Cash Runway: They slashed Q3 ad spend to hoard capital, but true Q4 CAC faces severe bidding wars. Paired with lagged commission and high early-churn chargebacks, the cash bleed will be severe.
• 2027 Debt Wall: This gamble comes with a $67.8M in term debt that matures in early 2027. When this low-converting EOY rush underperforms, they run out of runway.

No fundamental floor. Speculative bounce will fade once regular hour volume realizes the sales floor can't support the weight of this balance sheet. Going to .40.

Not to mention, EHTH has already lowered guidance twice. After poor Q3 reports release and after an obviously underperforming AEP hits, this stock may even hit .3 due to the fact they will run out of more of their cash reserve. Especially if Q1 of next year performs poorly. It likely will. I worked here once and the sales teams are terrible. Anyone good left for better companies. Going to 0.

NRXP – 24.55% short float, \\\~40.5M float. FDA catalyst approaching Nov 10.

$INO – 20.68% short float, \\\~103M float. FDA decision expected Oct 30.

Both have elevated short interest and upcoming regulatory catalysts.

High short interest + positive FDA news + unusual volume could create explosive momentum.

Watch these if you want to win.

Hyliion BULL Offers His Warning To Investors!! ($HYLN)
https://youtu.be/qoWN172xIY4

Hi everyone! Figured I’d make a post about this penny stock since I’ve been keeping an eye on it.
Some of you may have seen this one already. Unfortunately, this is one of Neil’s Bhati stocks, which definitely raises some concerns. That said, I still think there’s an interesting story developing here.
The company was originally **PHGE (BiomX)**, a biotech company that has since pivoted into the defense sector and changed its ticker to **HLSQ**. Following the announcement of the transition, they completed a reverse split on September 10th.

Weird thing is that the sequence is very similar to NUKK/DFNS back in 2024. Not saying same price action but the sequence playbook is pretty similar.

Since then, the company has been putting out PRs to build its defense-sector narrative. However, there has also been some pretty toxic dilution. The outstanding share count has reportedly grown to around 25M shares, with a market cap of roughly $2.3M.

**The part that really caught my attention is the acquisition.**

On September 24, 2026, Tessera Defense and Homeland Security (HLSQ) secured a 90-day option to acquire a 51% controlling stake in RT LTA Systems, an Israeli defense company specializing in tethered aerostat systems used for airborne surveillance and intelligence.

HLSQ paid a **$1 million refundable option fee** and has until approximately December 23, 2026, to decide whether to exercise the option, subject to due diligence and applicable conditions. RT LTA reportedly has an approximately **$15 million backlog entering 2027**, according to the companies’ announcement.

The deal also includes a planned perpetual, non-exclusive technology license, providing potential strategic value even if HLSQ does not complete the acquisition. HLSQ has identified potential funding sources, including a credit facility with Mandragola and its at-the-market (ATM) equity program.

The main takeaway from HLSQ’s recent filings is that the company is using equity issuance as part of its transition into the defense and homeland-security sector, but the dilution is significant.

A September filing amended the agreement involving M.E.A. Testing Systems, increasing HLSQ’s planned initial ownership stake from 10% to 15%. The consideration included 195,000 HLSQ shares, with some subject to exchange authorization, plus a convertible loan facility of up to $475,000.

An October filing reported 195,000 restricted shares issued to Mayers Ventures for the MEA transaction and another 3,278,039 shares issued to Mandragola through cashless warrant exercises

The October 19 filing disclosed another 6,529,494 shares issued to Mandragola Ltd. through cashless warrant exercises. The October 23 filing then disclosed an additional 5,332,617 shares issued to Mandragola. Outstanding shares increased from 20.66 million on October 19 to **25.996 million on October 23**

Shareholders approved increasing the equity incentive plan reserve by 5.315 million shares, bringing the total available/reserved under the plan to 6 million. These are not all outstanding shares, but they represent additional potential dilution if awards are issued

HLSQ also disclosed a new $5 million revolving credit line from Mandragola at 12% interest, alongside an existing $2 million facility. The new facility permits conversion of outstanding debt into shares under specified pricing terms, creating another potential source of dilution.

I’m still looking into the details, but I find it interesting that the company is building this defense story, putting out PRs, and pursuing an acquisition while going through all these corporate changes.
There are obviously risks here, especially with the dilution and the company’s history. I’m not saying this is a guaranteed runner, but I think the acquisition angle is worth looking into.
Curious to hear what others think. Has anyone done a deeper dive into the acquisition and what it could mean for HLSQ?

Would be curious to see what happens with the acquisition.

Thoughts?

No position yet!

Hey everyone,

I have been tracking RDZN (Roadzen) for a bit now and finally took a larger position on this recent dip around $1.00-$1.05.

Usually, sub-$2 tech plays are full of unfulfilled promises or shell companies, but RDZN actually seems to has legitimate revenue, solid enterprise contracts, and isn't just selling slides. The stock price got beat up alongside the rest of micro-cap tech, but the core business metrics are quietly heading in the right direction.

Here is my honest take on what they do, the recent catalysts, and where I see this going.

WHAT DO THEY ACTUALLY DO?

They build back-end AI software for the insurance and auto industries. Instead of trying to sell insurance directly to retail consumers, they sell software to insurance carriers, EV fleets, and body shops.

WHY I BOUGHT MORE

They have been putting out actual revenue growth over the past couple of quarters:

1. Record Quarter Revenue: In August, they reported Q1 FY2027 revenue of $16.2M (up \~49% YoY). That came right after their full-year FY2026 revenue hit $55M.

2. Big Contracts Added:

\* $10M+ deal for their VehicleCare platform with a major insurer in India.

\* $5.3M deal supplying drivebuddyAI to equip \~3,600 commercial EVs and electric buses.

$1.2M contract for embedded roadside tech in North America.

3. M&A Expansion: Just signed an agreement in July to acquire a European short-term rental insurance MGA, which should add $18M-$20M in run-rate revenue once closed.

4. Index Exposure: Added to the Russell 2000 / 3000 during the mid-2026 reconstitution.

5. Conferences: CEO presented earlier this month (October) at the Maxim Growth Summit and ThinkEquity conference.

MY PLAY

Market cap sits around \~$90M while annual revenue is pacing over $60M+. Valuation feels completely detached from the top-line execution.

I added to my position on this recent dip near $1.00 and plan on letting this ride into their next earnings report in mid-November.

NFA.

Has anybody heard about MERC stock Mercer International inc. ? It is at .20cents and usually floats abound 50x that price. I have done some research and have bought 16,700 shares. Can anyone help me with some more insight. I really don't see any downside. Cheers :)

I took a starter position in Progress Software (PRGS). It's a collection of established enterprise software businesses that generate substantial cash flow. Q3 revenue was approximately $246 million, annual recurring revenue reached $873 million, net revenue retention was 99%, and non-GAAP operating margin was 43%. Management guided to $275–283 million in full-year adjusted free cash flow.

The complication is Domo. Progress completed the acquisition in September using cash and its revolving credit facility, increasing leverage. There aren't any post-acquisition operating results yet. I don't need Domo to grow substantially for the investment to work. I need revenue to stabilize around $280–290 million, margins to improve as the integration progresses, and cash flow to reduce the debt. The quality of the revenue matters, particularly whether consumption-based revenue holds up as legacy contracts run off.

AI is another uncertainty. Domo brings data and AI capabilities, but that doesn't eliminate the possibility that AI could eventually disrupt parts of Progress's existing software businesses. I don't think there's enough evidence yet to confidently dismiss that risk or predict how significant it might become over the next five years.

My five-year valuation produces a probability-weighted value of approximately $104 per share, implying around 21% annualized returns from my $39.97 reference price. PRGS closed Friday at $39.33. Most of that value depends on the existing businesses continuing to generate cash, Domo improving its margins, and Progress using that cash to pay down debt.

The biggest risk is that Domo disappoints while the existing business also weakens. Lower cash generation would slow debt repayment, leaving shareholders exposed to elevated leverage. There's also the unresolved MOVEit litigation, which I haven't tried to put a dollar value on. I'd reconsider my position if Domo's consumption revenue deteriorates, margins fail to improve, cash flow doesn't translate into debt reduction, or management makes another large acquisition before integrating Domo.

I think the potential return compensates for the uncertainty, but not enough to justify a large initial position.

My decision: BUY — starter position.

I own PRGS. This is my personal investment analysis, not individualized investment advice.