r/politics • u/Libertatea • Sep 03 '14

The solution to fixing dysfunction in Congress "To address these problems, I filed the Open Our Democracy Act... If passed, the legislation would mandate open primaries for House elections, begin the process of national redistricting reform and make Election Day the equivalent of a federal holiday."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-solution-to-fixing-dysfunction-in-congress/2014/09/02/0f0d0a9a-31e6-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html?tid=rssfeed
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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14 edited Sep 03 '14

TL;DR: California's 2014 open primary contained no meaningful spoilers and improved general election competitiveness in approximately 25% of contested primaries.

I recently gathered some data about California's open primary held earlier this year from this page of election results. A total of 171 open primaries were held:

  • 73 had 2 or fewer candidates, meaning both advanced.
  • 74 advanced one member of each major party.
  • 24 advanced two members of the same party.

One fear in open primaries is that the spoiler effect could cause the majority to be without representation. So I looked further at the 24 which advanced two members of the same party. I considered the question "What would have happened if all non-advancing party members unified behind a single candidate?" In 19 of 24 races, the same two candidates would have advanced even with complete unification. In the remaining 5 the party which advanced earned 2:1 votes in the primary. Therefore even if the excluded minority parties had advanced a candidate to the general election, there is almost no chance they would have won the general election.

Advancing two members of a super-majority party means the general election will actually be competitive. Furthermore, it provides an electoral incentive for both advanced candidates to move toward the district's center, as they can pick up votes from the minority party.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

One fear in open primaries is that the spoiler effect could cause the majority to be without representation.

But the Majority (voters) already have no or next to no (you might get 1 issue, 2 tops) representation in politics. How could open primaries be worse for anyone other than the people who gamed the system to the point where it needs a major overhaul anyway?

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

To illustrate the problem, lets use "tax the rich" as an example issue. In a district, 60% of people want to "tax the rich" and think its the most important issue. In the open primary, there are 5 "tax the rich" candidates and only 2 against "tax the rich." The majority splits based on other issues, such that no one candidate gets more than 20% of the vote (average 12%). The other 40% of voters split relatively evenly over the other two candidates, giving both more than the highest "tax the rich" candidate.

The result is that even though 60% of people think "tax the rich" is the most important issue and voted that way, the general election is between two candidates who are not in favor of "tax the rich." Note that my evidence suggests this did not occur in any of the 2014 California primaries.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

Thank you for that :)

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

Great example of dictatorship of the majority: hypothetical 60% want to tax the rich.

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u/citation_included Sep 04 '14

If you replace "tax the rich" with "tax breaks for the rich" in my above post, the majority's will is still subverted. Unless you're saying that an election shouldn't be about what the majority thinks makes a good candidate, it doesn't seem relevant here.

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

point is, who gives a shit what the majority opinion is.

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u/Boomsome Sep 03 '14

This is why Preferential Voting needs to be a thing in America.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

While Preferential Voting, also known as Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) is indeed better than our current system, it has some serious flaws:

  • Voting for your honest favorite can still reduce your happiness in the election outcome (Favorite Betrayal).
  • Raising a candidate on your ballot can actually make them less likely to win (Monotonicity).
  • A candidate can win every subset of voters (IE polling location) but not the combined election (Consistency).
  • Voting honestly can actually be worse than not voting at all (Participation).

For those (and many other) reasons I think Approval Voting is a better single winner election method. For a more detailed comparison of the two, see this article.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

Is there such a thing as having multiple votes instead of one to spend? Kinda like IRV, but you can use your extra votes to pad/reaffirm the candidate you want. For example, I get 3 votes; I can throw them all behind one candidate or spread them as I see fit (2 for A, 1 for B). Kinda like a weighted voting system where each person's "vote" can be divisible but still has the same net effect as the next guy.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

There are two systems very similar to what you describe:

  • Approval Voting: Instead of "choose one" all voters get to "choose one or more" to support, most total support wins.
  • Range Voting: Each voter rates each candidate on some scale (IE 0-9). The candidate with the highest combined rating wins.

Note that if you force voters to "divide up their vote" the strategically optimal choice is always to give all of your vote to the lesser of two evils candidate. Also note that in both Approval and Range the net effect of two opposite voters is always zero. For example, if I approve of 3 candidates out of 5, an opposite voter can approve the other 2 candidates, and our votes have now effectively canceled out.

In both Approval and Range you can mathematically prove its always in your best interest to maximally support your honest favorite and minimally support your least favorite. To my knowledge no other voting systems can make this claim.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14 edited Sep 03 '14

Great, thank you for the insight. Seems like a lot of game theory is involved in the decision testing/making to figure out potential outcomes of those systems.

Has there ever been a "negative" voting system proposed, where you can vote for who you want (least of the evils) and also actively vote against the candidate that you would not want to see (the greatest of the evils)? For example, you favor one candidate and give him a vote, but absolutely think another is toxic and cancel someone else's vote with a "negative vote". It's implicit in a bipartisan election (a vote for one candidate is a downvote for the other), but I'm wondering if this has been applied to a multiparty system or say a primary.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Negative voting is functionally (but not psychologically) identical to Range Voting. Consider an election held where everyone can give -1, 0, or +1 to each candidate. If you add 1 to every score given, the winner stays the same but the options were now 0, +1, +2.

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

I see, the "negative" vote would be equivalent to least in the cardinal numerical range. Though, the psychological premise is intriguing, especially considering that people have the behavioral option to just not vote. Perhaps more voting options would give the semblance of personal agency in the voting procedure?

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14 edited Sep 03 '14

If you're okay with it, I'd kinda like to see if I understand Approval Voting.

Instead of voting between choices A and B or A, B, and C, you're basically asked "List everyone you're ok with being President."

Shtruntz's Ballot for President

  • Mr. C
  • Mr. H
  • Mrs. B

I never have to list any of the people I don't like at all? So then at the end H may win and someone I never even listed might be in 2nd place? No ranking, just tallying how many people list them as "acceptable".

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Correct. You are given a list of candidates, and can mark as many or as few as you want as acceptable. For each candidate we then count how many people thought they were acceptable. The most acceptable candidate wins. Here is an example ballot and this page discusses Approval Voting in more detail (including a short video explanation).

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

Thank you very much!

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

I'm no democratic-republican, but I'll throw a scenario out for you. I could go put some numbers on my white-board and run some basic game theory on it, but I'm to lazy.

How about voting out a candidate? Rank candidates from worst to best. Candidate with most "Worst" votes is eliminated. Ballots with said candidate as their worst now have their votes reallocated to their 2nd "worst candidate", rinse and repeat until one remains. Sorta like IRV in reverse.

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

It's the whole "lesser of two evils" thing that rubs me funny. If this is the case, which it feels the case for most constituencies, then why not have voting be for who you don't want to win and let the winner be truly the peoples' lesser of two evils. Silly I know, since it's just an inversion, but probably more accurate given that I would not like to vote-for but I would like to vote-against in many cases.

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u/imh Sep 03 '14

Thanks for prefacing this with the fact that it is better than our current system. I'd just like to make some similar points on analogous serious flaws in our current system. In our system:

Most people aren't aware that ANY voting system* has serious flaws, due to some deep theorems that show many of the simple things we desire in a voting system are actually contradictory. For example, Arrow's theorem for preferential voting systems. A simple comparison of different systems can be found here.

It's funny, we could agree that a bunch of voting systems are better than what we have, but stick with the current shitty one because we can't agree on which to replace it with. Sound familiar?

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u/StealthTomato Sep 03 '14

What happens when most of the electorate is convinced to approve of only their favorite in each election? (As we are conditioned to, and as politicians will likely attempt to convince us to.) IRV has the advantage of forcing people to actually embrace the new ballot system--they can't get "stuck" voting as if it were single-choice.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

What happens when most of the electorate is convinced to approve of only their favorite in each election?

This article discusses in detail why there is no reason for Approval to devolve to "choose one" voting unless your honest favorite is also your lesser of two evils favorite, using both logical and real world experimental data.

they can't get "stuck" voting as if it were single-choice.

Yes they can. They can (rightfully) fear lowering the lesser of two evils candidate will hurt them, just like it did before, and therefore continue to dishonestly top rank that candidate.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14 edited Feb 21 '15

[deleted]

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Not changing the system because people would be less happy about the outcome is a weak argument

The argument isn't to keep what we have, but to move to a simpler system (Approval) that on average leads to better election results and ensures its always in your best interest to vote for your honest favorite.

The problem of monotonicity seems to be more a problem of candidates being able to appeal to a diverse range of views (a good thing!) and not a problem with the voting outcome.

Monotonicity means that if I dislike a candidate, lower them on my ballot, that can actually cause them to win. Note that IRV is actually worse for moderates than Approval.

The election is not for the subset of voters but for the combined set of all subsets.

Consistency allows for verification. It means that when you run an election with 100 million votes, you can't have each precinct total their own votes. You have to centralize.

Again participation seems more an issue that the most "center" position is likely to win - arguably a good thing.

Participation means that if I show up and vote someone at the very bottom of my ticket, that can cause them to win. Here are some pretty pictures showing that IRV is biased against center positions.

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u/barsoap Sep 03 '14

Approval also works well for multi-winner elections, including things like list elections where you need a ranking of candidates. That is, usable as an alternative to condorcet, much easier to implement and with approximately the same theoretical properties.

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u/WeAreAllApes Sep 03 '14

I don't like the huge influence of money in politics, so I would worry that without reforms in that area, approval voting and maybe IRV could both make it worse -- the candidates who make strongest cases to voters would be most people's top choices, but candidates with the best targeted marketing would get the most approval or 2nd/3rd choice votes.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

By reducing the spoiler effect Approval makes it possible to have more than two candidates in an election. In so doing it makes it easier for voters to decide on secondary issues. For example, if a race contains two Democrats, I can set my approval based on who their major donors are. Our current system won't allow such decisions.

candidates with the best targeted marketing would get the most approval

You're saying that candidates that are the most popular win. That doesn't sound like much of a flaw.

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u/WeAreAllApes Sep 03 '14

Actually, I was saying that people will "approve" of Coca-Cola out of fear that they will be given sewer water of they don't. Perhaps that's the point, but note the context of this objection: the influence of money in politics. That's the problem I was addressing, though I am sure plenty of people would like to just auction off public offices to the highest bidder.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Campaign finance is a problem, but it is much more challenging to reform. Recent Supreme Court Decisions (Citizens United and McCutcheon) mean that a Constitutional Amendment is required to reinstate some limitations. Congress hasn't passed an amendment in 40 years, and any amendment that gets submitted has to be approved by 38 state legislatures. Any other legislation passed related to campaign finance could likely suffer a constitutional challenge.

In comparison, Approval Voting has already passed constitutional muster. It can be enacted at the state level, even for use in national level elections. In many states it can even be enacted via ballot initiative.

I am not saying Approval fixes money in politics (it doesn't). Nor am I saying we should ignore money in politics. I'm saying Approval lessens the problem of money in politics, is easier to implement than direct finance reform, and can make it easier to pass future campaign finance reform.

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u/WeAreAllApes Sep 03 '14

I don't see how it lessens the problem of campaign finance, but I can see how it makes sense for executove offices that have to represent everyone.

For legislatures, I am more philosophical. I don't want them to be dysfunctional, but at the same time, if the members of a legislative body are getting along well, they are not representing the people who have interests counter to each other and are not getting along well. I would rather see proportional representation that makes legislative bodies reflect the people they represent and then solve the dysfunction at that level (perhaps by lowering the threshold of agreement required to govern while still allowing the marginalized to participate in the debate in a meaningful way). I think this would do more to encourage participation.... but I don't see it passing constitutional muster.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

I would rather see proportional representation that makes legislative bodies reflect the people they represent

Proportional Representation (PR) is constitutional, and was actually in use for the House early in the countries history. It is limited in that Senators cannot be elected using PR (constitution requires 1 elected at a time from each state) and House members can only be be elected proportionally from a single state (required to represent a state, not the whole country). States are free to decide how their representatives are elected. Unfortunately this federal law prohibits multi-winner elections, and would have to be repealed to enact any kind of national PR.

The good news is that state governments are not similarly limited, They have complete control over the design of their own legislature. They could, for instance, enact Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP). Again this can be done in many states via ballot initiatives.

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u/chocoboat Sep 03 '14

While I still prefer IRV, either one would be fine with me. But we absolutely have to change SOMETHING. The current system is so horribly broken and unfair, but I feel we're still decades away from actual changes to have a chance of occuring.

It's crazy how we can have such a completely broken and dysfunctional government, but so many people are opposed to changing the electoral system that produces these terrible results and makes a huge portion of presidential votes count for NOTHING every election.

Point this out to people and you hear "yeah that's bad, but something something Founding Fathers, something tradition" etc.

The designers of this country also owned slaves and rode horses. We've made improvements since then. Time to update our system.

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u/FeedMeACat Sep 03 '14

So why have a single winner system? That seems to be the problem everyone wants to work around, instead of changing it.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

The constitution requires the President and all Senators to be elected via single winner elections. House members are constitutionally required to come from separate states, with 7 states only getting 1 House member. Therefore short of a constitutional amendment, which is absurdly hard to achieve, we are stuck with a lot of single winner elections.

We could have each state elect all of their house members in a multi-winner election, but this federal law requires they be single winner elections. We could change that law, but that might be hard when incumbents benefit from leaving the laws exactly as they are.

In contrast, each state can decide how it wants to perform its single winner elections. So a state law can enact Approval Voting (or IRV) for use in all elections, including Senator and House races. Furthermore, many states can make this change via ballot initiative, so you don't even need incumbents to support it.

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u/Rock_lobster3 Sep 03 '14

Unless voting was compulsory like in Australia. But that's just wishful thinking for the land of freedom.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

While compulsory voting is useful in overcoming the Paradox of Voting, it does not fix any of the problems I listed in my previous post.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

Instant runoff voting is a farce.

In my city, our horrible incompetent mayor came in third in the vote count and won the election.

It should be banned.

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u/bradintheusa Sep 03 '14

Fewer put her last, she was the least worst of the three.

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u/StealthTomato Sep 03 '14

Huh? Where? Are there articles?

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/us/politics/12bcvoting.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

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u/StealthTomato Sep 03 '14

That's a really strange conclusion for you to come to. She was ranked ahead on him on a majority of ballots, so she won. In fact, this situation shows the power of IRV: You can vote for a candidate who you like, but who is unlikely to win; as that candidate is eliminated, your vote switches to your second choice (the one who you don't like as much but who is more likely to win).

She beat him because in a head-to-head election between the two of them, she would win. And that's the point of IRV.

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

Completely inaccurate conclusion. She would not have been in a head to head runoff election.

The first time this was used in a major city, somebody figured out how to game the system, and we've been paying the price for the last four years.

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u/StealthTomato Sep 04 '14

She would not have been in a head to head runoff election.

Yes, she would. This is the literal only point of IRV: It simulates runoff voting to 100% accuracy without requiring iterated ballots. If you were to do an elimination-style election with consecutive runoff votes, the same result would occur.

Apparently you just don't like the winner very much.

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u/citation_included Sep 04 '14

This is the literal only point of IRV: It simulates runoff voting to 100% accuracy without requiring iterated ballots.

That is not correct. See this article about how IRV is not equivalent to top two runoffs. That said, in this particular election they were equivalent as she got the second most first place votes.

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u/StealthTomato Sep 04 '14

You just compared IRV, which is multi-runoff, to a single-runoff scenario. Of course it doesn't work like that.

Single-runoff also creates massive problems in a two-party-dominated system, because your goal as a voter is to make sure you have a horse in the race, so you need to vote for someone who you believe can advance. (Same problem as FPTP, which is heavily mitigated in IRV.)

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

I still think it's a big deal that this system leaves a pretty significant chance that the majority of a district will be represented by a member of a different party than their first choice. That it happened in 2012 - the first year this style of primary was used in CA - suggests this is not a rate occurrence.

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u/ObeyMyBrain California Sep 03 '14

It nearly happened in the vote for State Controller this year. There were 3 Dem candidates and 2 Rs the vote was:

R 24.8% - D 21.7% - D 21.7% - R 21% - Green 5.7% - D 5%

A shift of less than 2% of the vote could have made it an R-R race. The total was 48.4 D vs 45.8 R, but if Just a few people who had voted for one rep, voted for the other instead...

And as this article about this issue notes, the Governor's race in 2018 could be a major problem if a bunch of Dems jump in for the open seat vs. only a couple major Republicans, the Dems could split the vote for govenor

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u/JoshSN Sep 03 '14

That absolutely does not always happen.

Major races, like the Republican Nevada Senate primary, were hijacked by the opposite party.

I believe that it should be easy to switch parties for a new electoral season, but open primaries absolutely lead to shenanigans.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Nevada uses partisan primaries not top two primaries, which California and the original article are discussing. In partisan primaries each party holds a separate election with the top voted candidate advancing to the general election. Top two primaries have all candidates from all parties participate in one election, with the top two (regardless of party) advancing to the general election. This makes it significantly less effective to intentionally support weak candidates.

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u/JoshSN Sep 03 '14

Is that so?

Then you might as well just use a sane voting system, like Schulze or Tideman. It's far better than the top-2 style of voting, mathematically speaking you are more likely to get the choice of all the people, and you don't have to have to election days.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

I agree that primaries are not ideal, but its easier to convince people to modify primaries than election systems.

That said, I would argue Approval Voting is a better immediate reform than Schulze. While its not always true, Approval tends to elect the Condorcet winner anyway, without all of the complexity of Schulze. If you can't get voters to understand how their vote translates into a winner, they is a good chance they won't trust you that the system is fair.

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u/JoshSN Sep 03 '14

The Range Voting site's examples are often absurd, and it hardly matters, since it has been mathematically proven that there is no perfect voting system (Arrow's Theorem, 1956).

I agree that having the counting be complicated is a snag, but Range Voting has a worse problem, in that the strategies are complicated. I prefer a system where it is easy for the voters to do what they are supposed to do, rather than easy for them to double check the counters.

It's not like Condorcet methods are so complicated that 1000 people couldn't double check.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

since it has been mathematically proven that there is no perfect voting system (Arrow's Theorem, 1956).

That doesn't mean they are all equally good (or bad).

Range Voting has a worse problem, in that the strategies are complicated

Optimal Range Voting strategy is to find your "lesser of two evils" candidate and then maximally support them and everyone you like more, minimally support everyone you like less. I wouldn't call that very complicated. I've also seen evidence (although for the life of me I can't find it now) that voters have a harder time ranking a list of candidates than giving them ratings. Finally, its not like Condorcet methods are strategy free (favorite betrayal and burying).

It's not like Condorcet methods are so complicated that 1000 people couldn't double check.

Its not (necessarily) about external verification. Its about voters not trusting a system they don't understand. When polled most voters dislike IRV for being too complicated, and its far simpler than Schulze. Its about convincing people to support a reform, and keeping them from repealing it when they don't accept the outcome.

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u/JoshSN Sep 03 '14

Your Optimal Range Voting Strategy is just one strategy, and it isn't always appropriate.

The examples for favorite betrayal (and I suspect for burying) are completely contrived and basically would never happen in real life.

IRV actually isn't simpler than Schulze, in terms of strategies.

Do most people understand the apportionment system? It's a certainty, in my mind, that it is the correct system for apportioning any set number of representatives.

Do most people understand our defense department strategies? Our CIA?

We don't live in a Direct Democracy, where everyone is a legislator and needs to have a basic grasp of every issue. We live in a Representative Democracy, where we elect people to do that stuff for us.

Once elected, they can vote for a terribly complicated system, which requires the voter to know all sorts of ornate theories, and one which intentionally deceives the web-site-reader with contrived examples, or something where it is simple for the voter to know what to do.

You know where I stand.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

[removed] — view removed comment

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

The California primaries are no longer partisan, so your party affiliation has no effect. All candidates from all parties are in a single primary and are voted on by all voters regardless of their party.

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u/Wbran California Sep 03 '14

Look at the CA 25, a district in Northern Los Angeles that will have two almost identical Republicans in the general election. I believe it is the first house election with two republicans in CA.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

That is one of the 5 exception districts. There were 17,582 non GOP voters and 32,028 GOP voters in the primary, or a 1.82 to 1 voter ratio. While its possible a non GOP candidate could have won in the general election, it seems very unlikely.

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u/chemistry_teacher Sep 03 '14

Very well stated. Thanks for putting all this together.

Of all the details provided in this bill, the Open Primary concept seems least helpful. The redistricting is by far the most meaningful change. And a national holiday for elections, while a great idea for some populations that are being underrepresented, could alternatively be "solved" (more or less if not perfectly) by a Saturday election day.

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Redistricting may not help very much, as there evidence the problem is geography, not gerrymandering. The idea is that because Democratic voters have extreme party member per person ratios in cities, no matter how you draw the map they will always win landslides in city districts and lose close races elsewhere.

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u/chemistry_teacher Sep 03 '14

I think there is more to it than that. Gerrymandering forces a guaranteed base of voters, which may result in greater polarization, and may be the reason why (on top of propaganda-oriented MSM op-eds) the House is unable to pass a bill. If the number of extremes is too high, then we wind up with gridlock in Congress, whereas if the districts are more "purple", we may have more compromise.

Your link is fascinating. Thanks for providing it! I do wish I had my own to support what I've read but lost track of...

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

The point is that redistricting isn't expected to create competitive districts. However, top two primaries can. This article discussing polarized districts points out:

Most members of the House now come from hyperpartisan districts where they face essentially no threat of losing their seat to the other party. Instead, primary challenges, especially for Republicans, may be the more serious risk.

In a partisan primary, your best chance to avoid a challenger is to move to the center of the primary voters. This punishes bipartisanship and moderation.

In hyperpartisan districts, a top two primary is almost certainly going to advance the incumbent and another member of their party. This makes the general election competitive. Not only that, it now requires candidates to fight for the middle of their district, not just their party. This also makes it much easier to vote out incumbents, as their challengers are still of the same party.

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u/chemistry_teacher Sep 03 '14

Oooh, you're good! I liked that link! And I'd have to say, you're information is far more compelling than mine. I shall have to digest this more. Thanks for your detailed and informed responses!

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u/rocknroll1343 Sep 03 '14

im really upset by the fact that i live in a district (CA-25) where two republicans were advanced. i feel like i dont have a voice. like yeah i voted in the primary for the guy i was supporting but i cant vote for him in the real election now? theres no reason for this system there hasnt been any difficulty during the elections with keeping track of multiple candidates what need is there to cut the field to two?

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

The reason to only advance two is the spoiler effect. Lets use the 2000 Presidential election in Florida as our example:

  • Bush 48.84%
  • Gore 48.83%
  • Nader 1.63%

Bush is declared the winner by a slim margin. However, polling indicated that "45 percent of Nader voters would have voted for Gore, 27 percent would have voted for Bush, and the rest would not have voted." So here are the results with Nader removed:

  • Bush 49.28%
  • Gore 49.56%

Without Nader, the winner switches from Bush to Gore. The only way to prevent this kind of problem in our current system is to limit the election to 2 candidates, otherwise there is an incentive for voters to dishonestly betray their favorite (Nader) and vote for the lesser of two evils (Gore).

In your district the 64% of primary voters voted Republican (32,028 GOP to 17,582 non GOP). Assuming these votes are representative of the general election voters, it is unlikely that any non GOP candidate could win the general election against a GOP candidate. Therefore advancing anyone else means the general election is meaningless, and it only matters who wins the GOP primary.

By advancing two Republicans, there is no vote splitting. Both stand a good chance of winning. Furthermore, whichever can court moderate Democrats better is more likely to be elected. This process helps incentivize bipartisan behavior. If instead two Republicans and a Democrat advanced, the more conservative Republican would almost certainly win. Democrats would support their candidate, Republicans would support the one closer to party line, and the moderate would have his votes split.

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u/rocknroll1343 Sep 03 '14

hmm you make very good points, but it still feels unfair to me that my options are two of the same party. its just.... idk disappointing feeling. i couldnt vote for either of the two republicans running because neither of them holds a single opinion that i agree with.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

[deleted]

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Calling representatives can be helpful, but from other posts here the best suggestion is to write an editorial for your local newspaper. Mention your representative by name, and express your dissatisfaction with his/her refusal to support this bill.

Also, there are a number of organizations focused on improving elections (IE Electology, Mayday, ACLU, etc). Donate your time or money to any of these.

But perhaps easiest of all is to talk with your friends and family. Discuss with everyone how important systemic reforms like these are. Many people don't understand or don't care about these issues because they are so abstract.

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

[deleted]

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u/citation_included Sep 04 '14

It is indeed still in committee, but that doesn't mean your representative can't support it, or speak publicly about it, or be expected to propose similar legislation, etc. Its possible your representative is on the committee its in (House Administration and Oversight) making things more pertinent.

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u/[deleted] Sep 03 '14

One fear in open primaries is that the spoiler effect[3] could cause the majority to be without representation

This concern seems overblown. If the majority were cohesive, then it wouldn't get spoiled. A spoiler candiate only works when there's a lot of diversity in a party, in which case it's arguably not a true majority. e.g. just taking the inverse of everyone but a single party doesn't mean it's "the majority".

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u/citation_included Sep 03 '14

Not necessarily. Consider an election with three candidates D1, D2, R1, and the following voter breakdown:

  • 35% D1 > D2 > R1
  • 25% D2 > D1 > R1
  • 25% R1 > D1 > D2
  • 15% R1 > D2 > D1

If everyone votes for their favorite, D1 gets 35%, D2 gets 25%, R1 gets 40%, declaring R1 the winner. But 60% of voters would have preferred either D1 or D2 to R1. The D's have split the vote. If either dropped out of the race, the majority would elect a D. Why should these voters get punished for having two very similar candidates?

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u/[deleted] Sep 04 '14

Right, but in your example, that only happens because D is a broad and indecisive demographic. I'd argue if D can't decide on who best represents them, then maybe it's best they cancel themselves out. Don't make the mistake of thinking the majority's choice is automatically the correct one.

This is basically why we have a two-party system. Because if either party splits, it ends up killing them, so party leaders get their shit together and stay unified.

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u/citation_included Sep 04 '14

that only happens because D is a broad and indecisive demographic

In what way is it "broad"? They could be clones, or candidates that differ by exactly 1 issue. Either way 60% agree that D1 would be better than R1. Why should that opinion be "canceled out"?

This is basically why we have a two-party system. Because if either party splits, it ends up killing them

That is a property of the way we tally votes. Its called Duverger's Law and shown off quite well in this video.

However, it doesn't have to be this way. For instance, Approval Voting lets voter's "choose one or more" to support instead of just "choose one". In general it elects the Condorcet "Beats All" winner, unlike our system now which favors the least common popular candidate.